UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS

DIPLOMA PAPER

MOTIVES FOR BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF AFRICA

Ljubljana, August 2009
KATJA ŠTEBLAJ

STATEMENT

I, Katja Šteblaj, student of Faculty of Economics, state that I am the author of this diploma paper, whose mentor was prof. dr. Mojmir Mrak. I do permit this paper to be published on the faculty's web pages.

In Ljubljana, date _____   Signature: _____

Table of Contents

Contents of Tables

Contents of Figures

1

List of Abbreviations

AFDB	African Development Bank
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
IDA	International Development Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Least developed countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLIC	Other Low Income Countries
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNFAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees
UNOHRLLS	United Nations Office for the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States
WB	World Bank
WRI	World Resources Institute
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Introduction

Development aid is often a crucial determinant of the development of the poorest countries. If donors behave altruistically, development aid might take thousands of people out of poverty. Yet, if they pursue their self-interests, foreign aid might even deteriorate the situation. The criteria by which bilateral development aid is allocated are often not obvious. The United Nations Development Report states that 'development aid is often not determined by the needs of developing countries, but by the fluctuating goodwill of the people and their parliaments in the rich countries; as a result, it is largely ad hoc and unpredictable' (UNDP, 1992, p. 45).

Africa is frequently seen as a forgotten region that is lagging behind all the others in many aspects. While standards of living are rapidly increasing on the global level, Africa's situation is deteriorating. Today, almost 400 million Africans, which is half the total European population, live on less than USD 1.25 a day (WB, 2009c). Deaths from diseases such as malaria, AIDS and malnutrition occur daily. Education and thereby the hope for a better future is a privilege of the minority that can afford it. Large amounts of development aid have been provided to Africa but, so far, we have not seen significant progress. Whether development aid is really given for the purpose of human development is clearly a relevant question. However, not many studies have provided a rich analysis of what determines aid flows to Africa.

This thesis enquires into the motives that determine the pattern of aid giving. Therefore, the purpose of the thesis is to examine theoretical motives of aid giving and test them for the case of Africa, the region that performs the worst regarding the crucial indicators of development. However, my hypothesis is that aid flows to Africa are not only determined by humanitarian motives but also by colonial bonds, economic interests and political alliances.

This thesis is divided into five main sections. The first section defines bilateral development aid, searches for theoretical arguments for the need for foreign funds, presents aid donors and aid recipients and finally deals with measurement problems of aid flows. The second section provides a systematic description of possible motives for aid allocation. They are divided into four major categories; colonial past, political, economic and humanitarian motives. The third section reviews literature concerning analyses of the factors of aid giving. The first subchapter deals with aggregate aid flows from Development Assistance Committee ('DAC') member countries to recipient countries. The second subchapter examines donors individually and studies their motives for providing development assistance. The last two sections focuses on Africa. At the beginning, an outline of African history, its political, economic and social situation as well as Official Development Assistance ('ODA') allocations is given. Later on, I discuss motives and variables that could determine aid flows to African countries. At the end I perform two

regressions; the first one on aggregate bilateral aid flows in order to examine the general pattern of aid disbursements in Africa and the second one on the ODA flows of individual donors to reflect donors' specific interests for aid disbursements in African countries.

The methods employed are a review of the literature on aid allocation and a statistical analysis of data for African countries. The data studied are largely accessible online and provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ('OECD'), the International Monetary Fund ('IMF'), the World Trade Organisation ('WTO'), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation ('UNFAO'), Freedom House and the Central Intelligence Agency ('CIA'). Regressions were performed with the econometric programme Soritec.

Since the motives for allocating aid to Africa are not frequently studied, I hope that this thesis can contribute to raising awareness about Africa's situation and revealing the kinds of help we in fact offer to the world's poorest.

2   The basic principles of bilateral development aid

Bilateral development aid is influenced by many factors; by the growing number of donors, their policies and motives for aid allocation, by the recipients, their policies and their developmental progress, by varieties of aid flows and by economists' views on development aid.

This chapter starts with a definition of bilateral development aid. Then it explores arguments for the need for foreign aid, briefly examines donors, recipients, and finally describes measurement problems of aid.

2.1   Definition of bilateral official development assistance

The OECD defines official development assistance ('ODA') 'as grants or loans to developing countries that are undertaken by 'the official financial sector with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective' (IMF, 2001, p. 5). Financial and capital flows must meet two criteria to be considered as development aid: '(1) their objective should be non-commercial from the point of view of the donor and (2) they should be characterised by concessional terms, which means that the interest rate and repayment period for borrowed capital should be less stringent than commercial terms and should include a grant element of at least 25 percent' (Todaro, 2006, p. 718). Bilateral ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies directly to developing countries and exclude aid to multilateral institutions (IMF, 2003, p. 262). Military aid as well as lending by export credit agencies with the purpose of export promotion is normally excluded from statistics on foreign aid, although technical co-operation is included (IDA, 2007, p. 32).

ODA has five elements: (1) the type of flows – including grants, loans and technical assistance; (2) the source - the official sector of donor countries; (3) the recipients – countries that are on the DAC list of ODA recipients; (4) the development/welfare purpose of the related transactions; and (5) transactions characterised by concessional terms (IDA, 2007, p. 32).

Bilateral development assistance is collected and distributed through official agencies which include federal, state and local departments and agencies. The source of funds for development aid can either be taxation or borrowing from the private sector (OECD, 2008, p. 3).

2.2 Foreign aid and development

Development aid is provided to poorer countries to help them develop; to improve their residents' standard of living. In this chapter I will define development and explain relevant theories of economic and human development.

There are two views of development; a traditional one that refers to economic development and a modern one that uses the term human development (Sen, 1996, p. 10). The first one is deeply influenced by growth economics and the values that underpin it. This view regards development as 'essentially a rapid and sustained expansion of gross national product per head, perhaps qualified by some requirement that the fruits of this expansion reach all sections of the community' (Sen, 1996, p. 10). The other, modern view focuses on people and defines human development as 'the process of enlarging people's choices. Their three essential choices are to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living' (UN, 1997, p. 12).

According to this modern definition of development, development aid must have at least three objectives: (1) to increase availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health and protection; (2) to improve levels of living by raising incomes, providing more jobs, better education and paying greater attention to cultural and human values, which serve to not only improve the economic situation but also to generate greater individual self-esteem; and (3) to expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and to nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence (Todaro, 2006, p. 22).

Foreign aid aiming at objectives described above is regarded as a promoter of growth and development. This view derives from theories of economic development that identify capital as the most important factor of growth. Developing countries have been able to remove the three major deficiencies – capital, foreign exchange and technical knowledge – through foreign aid (Pankaj, 2005, p. 104). Although modern theories do not see development as being purely economic, foreign funds are needed to build appropriate infrastructure and create conditions that lead to human development. Further, although

economic growth alone does not guarantee human development there is a generally a strong correlation between GDP per capita and indicators of development such as life expectancy, infant mortality, political and civil rights, adult literacy and some indicators of environmental quality (WRI, 2009).

Harrod-Domar's model is frequently used to explain the need for foreign aid in a country's development. It suggests that savings provide funds for investment purposes. Therefore, the rate of growth of a national economy depends on the level of savings, the savings ratio and the productivity of investment. The model was followed by Rostow's 'Stages of growth' theory that outlines a five-stage development history: (1) traditional society; (2) preconditions for take-off; (3) take-off; (4) the drive to maturity; and (5) the stage of high mass consumption (Pankaj, 2005, pp. 105-109). The main precondition for the take-off is the mobilisation of domestic and foreign savings in order to generate sufficient investment to accelerate economic growth (Todaro, 2006, p. 105). Since the 1960s, some socio-cultural models of development have been propounded. However, the capital-centric growth model remains prominent in development economics.

According to Pankaj, there are 'three basic approaches to validate the proposition that foreign aid makes a positive impact on the growth and development of the recipient country' (Pankaj, 2005, p. 109). These include: (1) the savings-investment gap approach; (2) the foreign exchange earning-expenditure gap approach; and (3) the capital absorptive capacity approach.

The savings-investment gap is often a major constraint on the development of LDCs. Economic growth is hindered by poor savings and a low investment rate as well as their inability to rise. Higher growth can be achieved if extra savings in terms of foreign aid are provided to these economies. The foreign exchange earning-expenditure gap is another obstacle to the development of LDCs. If foreign aid is used to finance the purchase of foreign goods and services that are strategically important to the developing country, aid can have an even greater favourable impact on development. In any case, one of these two gaps is often binding and dominant for LDCs at any given point of time. Countries facing either of these gaps will be unable to generate economic growth. Foreign aid can help countries overcome these gaps, increase investment and lead to economic growth. Once a high level of incomes is reached, growth is self-sustaining (Todaro, 2006, p. 726).

The capital absorptive capacity approach pleads for a non-economic model of foreign aid. Capital absorptive capacity represents the absolute limit on the amount of capital that can be productively employed in a national economy. Foreign aid can help put in place specific programmes that help develop human capital, establish technical institutions and provide training for managerial and technical personnel, allowing LDCs to improve their growth rates and develop (Pankaj, 2005, p. 111).

2.3 Donors and recipients

There is a long list of ODA donors and an even longer one of ODA recipients. In general, the donor countries are the Western ones, while the recipient countries are located in three regions; Africa, Asia and Latin America. Nevertheless, a small number of ODA recipients is located in Europe, more precisely in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

2.3.1 Donors

The majority, approximately 70% of ODA flows is provided through bilateral organisations, while the remaining 30% is distributed through multilateral organisations (IDA, 2007, p. 4).

Among multilateral organisations, the most important are the European Commission, providing 35% of ODA and United Nations agencies providing 25% of ODA in the 2001-2005 period. The role of the International Development Association ('IDA'), the World Bank's agency, in the same period declined, with its contributions accounting for 20% of multilateral assistance. The other important donor organisations mainly include regional development banks (IDA, 2007, p. 4).

The major donors of bilateral ODA are the most developed countries of the OECD which form the Development Assistance Committee ('DAC') (Thirlwall, 1994, p. 331). DAC members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission (IDA, 2007, p. 42).

DAC member countries have distributed more than 95% of ODA disbursements worldwide. In 2006 they together provided USD 103 billion, which is equivalent to 0.31% of their GNI (OECD, 2009). In volume terms, the largest aid donor has been the United States. It is followed by Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom (OECD, 2003). However, their contribution in relative terms is much smaller; it accounts for just 0.18% of the GNI of the USA. In relative terms, in 2007 the largest donors were Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg. Their ODA disbursement accounted for approximately 1% of their GNI (OECD, 2009). These countries are also the only ones that meet the UN target of 0.7% of GNI (Todaro, 2006, p. 719). In 2005, the European Union adopted a time plan that calls on the older member states to increase their development aid to 0.56% of their GNI by 2010 and to 0.7% by 2015. Newer member states have to achieve a target of 0.33% of GNI by 2015 (Mrak, Bučar & Kamnar, 2007, p. 51).

In addition, in recent years countries of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries ('OPEC') have provided substantial sums of aid to developing countries and their role in development assistance is becoming increasingly important (Thirlwall, 1994, p. 331).

However, OPEC aid flows have highly concentrated on Arab and Muslim countries (Raffer & Singer, 1996 p. 13).

Other high-income countries also provide aid, but they are not part of the DAC. They include developed countries such as Iceland, Israel and Taiwan. Although the bulk of ODA flows from the North to the South, the DAC definition does not exclude any developing countries from qualifying as a donor. Countries on the DAC list of aid recipients may and do themselves give ODA to other recipients of OECD aid flows. Apart from OPEC members, donor countries are also India, China, Brazil and Egypt. However, their contribution is relatively small (Raffer & Singer, 1996 pp. 119-123).

Since its beginnings in the 1960s, ODA flows have grown 25 times and accounted for USD 105 billion in 2007. Development assistance rapidly expanded during the Cold War period, but declined in the 1990s. After the Millennium Development Goals ('MDGs') were adopted in 2000, aid flows again rose but began to fall after 2005 (OECD, 2009). Economists have started to speak about aid fatigue (Economists warn of 'aid fatigue' in meeting UN development goals, 2008); donors have started to doubt the effectiveness of aid in many developing countries since enormous amounts of ODA have not brought any visible results and they have therefore cut the amounts of their ODA (Bird, 1999). However, in 2008 donors again boosted their spending on foreign assistance and ODA was higher than ever; it accounted for USD 109 billion (OECD, 2009).

2.3.2 Recipients

DAC members approve the List of Recipients of ODA every three years, whereby the main criterion is GNI per capita (Raffer & Singer, 1996, p. 12). The DAC List divides countries into four groups: (1) Least Developed Countries (LDC); (2) Other Low Income Countries; (3) Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories; and (4) Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories (OECD, 2007).

The first group form LDCs that are approved by the United Nations. The list of LDCs currently consists of 50 countries that meet three criteria: a low income, human resource weakness and economic vulnerability. Countries performing worst regarding these three criteria are mainly African and some Asian countries (UNOHRLLS, 2009). Other low-income countries are countries whose GNI per capita in 2007 was less than USD 935, but do not qualify as an LDC. The group of lower-middle-income countries comprises countries with a GNI between USD 936 and USD 3,705 per capita in 2007. The GNI of upper-middle-income countries ranged between USD 3,706 and USD 11,455 in 2007 (OECD, 2007).

In the 2001 to 2005 period around 67% of ODA went to low-income countries; least developed countries (LDCs) and other low-income countries (OLICs) (IDA, 2007). The biggest aid recipient in 2007 was Iraq with USD 9,000 million in aid although it is not the worst performer among countries; it is listed in the group of middle-income countries. Iraq

was followed by Afghanistan, Tanzania, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Sudan which all received above USD 2,000 million in aid (OECD, 2009). When assessing foreign aid in relative terms, the absolute leaders with the largest aid per capita disbursements were mainly small island countries with small populations: Solomon Islands, Cape Verde, Tonga and Grenada. They all received above USD 300 in per capita aid in 2005. The only two other territories that received more than USD 300 in per capita aid were Congo and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (UNDP, 2009).

2.4 Measurement problems of aid

Aid flows can take different forms. Some can easily be compared, i.e. by comparing the grant element of loans or by deflating aid flows. However, it is often difficult to measure the real aid effects of tied aid. Additional measurement problems can arise from having a variety of donors who do not all use the same procedures and definitions when measuring aid flows.

2.4.1 Loans and grants

Aid flows might be provided in the form of: (1) loans, which have to be repaid; or (2) grants, which do not have to be repaid. Due to the different nature of capital flows, a common procedure is required for measuring their equivalence. Loans and grants are made comparable through an estimation of the grant equivalent or aid component. A capital inflow which is a pure grant is worth its face value, while a capital inflow that has to be repaid is worth less. In the latter case, the aid component represents the difference between the nominal flow and the future repayments due, discounted by the market interest rate. Hence, not only is the nominal value of the interest rate important, but the grace period and maturity of the loan also have to be taken into consideration (Thirlwall, 1994, p. 340).

2.4.2 Tied aid

Tied aid is 'foreign aid in a form of bilateral loans or grants that require the recipient country to use the funds to purchase goods or services from the donor country' (Todaro, 2006, p. 829). Aid can be tied either by source, where funds have to be spent on the purchase of donor-country goods and services, or by project, where grants or loans have to be spent on a specific project. In those cases the real value of aid is reduced as the specified source is likely to be an expensive supplier or the project is not of the highest priority (Todaro, 2006, p. 719). Studies have proven that tied aid raises the cost of goods, services and works by 15% to 30% on average. For food aid, this figure is even higher; it accounts for around 40% (Clay, Geddes, Natali & te Velde, 2008, p. 1). Further, aid may be tied to the importation of capital equipment, which may impose additional real resource costs on the recipient nation. Costs may include higher unemployment in developing countries or the purchase of new machinery and equipment of monopolistic suppliers (Todaro, 2006, p. 719).

In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed in 2005 the DAC countries committed themselves to increasing the proportion of untied aid (IDA, 2007, p. 24). In 1991, the proportion of untied bilateral commitments provided by DAC accounted for one-third of all commitments provided to developing countries. In the 1998 to 2007 period this proportion was halved and accounted for around 15% (OECD, 2009).

2.4.3 Inflation

Especially during periods of rapid inflation, the distinction between the nominal and real value of development aid is very important. Aid flows are normally calculated at nominal levels and therefore tend to present a steady rise over time. However, when aid disbursements are deflated by rising prices the actual real volume of aid significantly differs from accounted values (Todaro, 2006, p. 719).

2.4.4 Non-DAC donors' aid flow statistics

DAC figures on non-DAC donors have often been criticised as they justify doubts about their reliability. First, OPEC's ODA has often been presented as more tying and stringent that it was in reality. Some authors argue that the possibilities of tying OPEC aid are extremely limited. As OPEC members' exports are limited to oil, they cannot use ODA for export promotion, as is done by many DAC donors. Further, a substantial amount of the money provided by OPEC to developing countries has been used to finance imports from Northern countries (Raffer & Singer, 1996, p. 11). Second, there are many other non-OPEC and non-DAC donors such as Greece, Israel, Iceland as well as Southern donors like India, China, Brazil, Egypt, Korea and Taiwan. Their aid activities are often overlooked as their share of bilateral ODA is relatively small. However, they should not be left out of the picture as they are 'nevertheless significant by their nature and by the effort it represents in relation to available resources' (OECD, 1977, p. 92).

On the other hand, these donors have never tried to provide statistical figures comparable to those of the DAC. DAC members argue that the diversity in types and sizes of donors makes it difficult to present a complete picture of all non-DAC donors' aid activities, while the monitoring and analysis of non-DAC aid flows is further complicated by the absence of comparable statistical information. In addition, non-DAC donors have a practice of withholding information and thereby make data collection on aid flows more difficult (Raffer & Singer, 1996, p.120).

3 Motives for aid allocation

There are many reasons for studying the determinants of aid levels. Many recent studies have found a positive impact of aid on growth and thereby aid can be seen as an important means by which donor countries try to eradicate poverty in developing ones (Dalgaard, 2007, p. 1896). Therefore, two factors are important: (1) if the aid is being directed to

countries with the greatest need; and (2) if aid tends to go more towards countries where it might be most effective and has an ability to foster economic growth (Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006, p. 1). Donors often seek win-win situations, where the primary criteria used for selecting a country reflect both the recipient country's needs and the donor's interests. However, in September 2000 United Nations member countries adopted the eight Millennium Development Goals ('MDGs') and promised to halve poverty by 2015 by eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS and malaria, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for development by providing a sufficient amount of ODA (UN, 2008a, pp. 6-48). It is believed that these goals have led to a more strategic approach to recipient country selection (OECD, 2006, p.1).

The major donors often assert that aid is motivated by a humanitarian concern to promote development. They claim the criteria for aid allocation mainly include: (1) poverty criteria; (2) the capital-absorptive capacity is taken into account; (3) the performance record of partner countries; (4) the expected future impact; and (5) allocation by results vs. for results (OECD, 2006, p. 1). However, the vast empirical literature that deals with the motives for and factors of aid allocation clearly concludes that 'donors pursue political, economic and strategic interests in inter-country aid allocation, especially with regard to bilateral aid allocation of larger donors, and that developmental concerns such as reduction of poverty, receive relatively low or even zero weight in this process' (Isopi & Mavrotas, 2006, p. 1) Similarly, Todaro argues that the allocation of aid is rarely determined by the relative needs of developing countries. Most bilateral aid seems unrelated to recipient countries' needs as the income level is clearly not a priority when distributing aid. Moreover, bilateral aid is often largely based on political and military considerations (Todaro, 2006, p. 721). However, some authors claim that the link between aid and the needs of recipient countries is stronger than it was during the Cold War (Wall, 2008, p. 21).

There are two broad models of aid criteria: (1) the recipient-needs model; and (2) the donor-interests model. In recipient-needs model, 'aid is given to compensate for the shortfalls in domestic resources.' In donor-interests the aid serves donor's 'political/security, investment, and trade interests' (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984, p. 881). However, some authors have added a so-called 'hybrid' model which combines the variables of the both two models (Berthelemy, 2006, p. 179).

Throughout history, there have been many different motives for development assistance. Four of them are the most important: (1) compensation for injustices committed during a colonial period; (2) geostrategic aims and the rationale of power policies; (3) economic motives, particularly securing markets for products; and (4) humanitarian motives and

ethical imperatives (Leisinger, 2000, p. 10). These motives will be further considered in the following chapters.

3.1 Colonial past

At the end of the colonial era, none of the newly independent countries had sufficient indigenous expertise to confront the problems they faced, nor were there infrastructures adapted to their new needs. The former colonial powers provided their former colonies with large sums of development assistance on the basis of a bad conscience and the need to provide compensation (Leisinger, 2000, p. 11). However, the influence of the colonial past varies enormously from donor to donor, reflecting their different histories as colonial powers. It generally holds that the longer the time the recipient country was the donor's colony, the higher the aid (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, p.7). Alesina and Dollar found that a colonial past determined 99.6 percent of aid flows in the case of Portugal and accounted for over 50 percent in cases of Australia, Belgium, France and the UK in the 1970 to 1994 period (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, p. 28).

On the other hand, Leisinger argues that the 'feeling of guilt cannot permanently motivate people to offer assistance based on solidarity and to convince them that compensation is justified' (Leisinger, 2000, p. 11). He mentions two reasons why the motivation to provide compensation erodes. First, three-quarters of people who today in countries that once possessed colonies did not live in the colonial era and therefore cannot be held responsible for the injustices caused during the colonial period. Second, developing countries suffer more from policy failures at the national level, autocratic forms and the mismanagement of their national economies than from their colonial past (Leisinger, 2000, p. 11).

3.2 Political motives

Political motivation is the oldest motive of allocating development assistance. The Marshall Plan, which represents early forms of development assistance, chiefly provided funds to Western European countries, although many African, South American or Asian countries showed a stronger need for development aid (Todaro, 2006, p. 721). Later on, a large part of American aid was provided to countries in order to limit the spread of communism (Thirlwall, 1994, p. 327). When the balance of Cold War interests shifted from Europe to the developing world in the mid-1950s, US aid flows were redirected to their strategic allies among those countries. Most aid programmes where therefore more oriented to purchasing US security rather than promoting long-term economic and social development. This also explains the shifts in emphasis from South Asia and the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s and toward Africa and the Persian Gulf in the 1970s, to Central America in the 1980s and then to the Russian Federation, Bosnia, Ukraine and China in the 1990s. Since 2001, aid has shifted towards countries with an Islamist insurgency or facing potential public support from terrorists (Todaro, 2006, p. 722).

Donor countries often try to soften the impact of politically motivated aid and create a humanitarian image through volunteer programmes such as the US Peace Corps. Other OECD countries' governments also have volunteer programmes. Although volunteer work is not explicitly tied to political objectives, it is indirectly linked through overall aid programmes for specific countries (Tisch & Wallace, 1994, p. 58).

Political motives are characterised by (1) security concerns, (2) showing prestige and power, (3) enlightened self-interest, (4) preventing migration flows and (5) rewards for good policies of developing countries.

3.2.1 Security

Security as an argument for providing development assistance includes security, military and geopolitical interests.

Some legislators claim that 'aid is necessary to support geopolitical and strategic interests' (Van der Veen, 2000, p.121). Other authors argue that aid is given because the progress of LDCs is critically important to the West. Without progress being financed by Western countries, anti-Western countries would emerge in these countries and they would fall to political systems with a different ideology, similarly to how many countries fell to Communism in the 20th century. Western security would thereby be threatened (Bauer, 1993, p. 9).

By providing aid, countries can also support allies or friendly states. Further, aid purses the same goals as a state's defence policy, but at a much lower cost. Therefore, many authors suggest that funds should be moved from the defence budget to the aid budget where they can be used more efficiently and with greater effect (Van der Veen, 2000, p. 121).

Social inequalities, political polarisation and peaceful co-existence are highly correlated on both national and international levels. International development assistance is thus also one of the instruments by which international peace is secured (Leisinger, 2000, p. 13). Balla finds considerable evidence for this; she discovers that practically all DAC donors are more likely to give money to countries either bordering or containing conflicts than to countries with no conflicts (Balla, 2008, pp. 2567-2584).

3.2.2 Power and prestige

Two motivations qualify as power objectives; influence and obtaining a voice in international institutions.

Many governments use aid policy in order to pursue a greater international influence. Le Hodley argued back in 1955 that if 'Europe wants to continue to play a role in the world, it is necessary that the European countries occupy themselves not only with their own problems, but also with the problems of other countries' (cited in van der Veen, 2000, p. 121).

Providing aid also helps countries attain an influence within international institutions. Alesina and Dollar found that those countries whose votes in the United Nations tended to follow those of major donors generally received more aid (Wall, 2008, p. 21). This was especially true for Japan, the USA, Germany, France and the UK. This obviously demonstrates how aid can be used to buy political support in the United Nations (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, p. 16).

Motivations linked to prestige are less tangible for development aid. They comprise status and an expression of national identity. At some points they might also overlap with power interests.

Countries support development aid programmes because this allows them to take on a leadership role on the global level. Being recognised as a leader the donor becomes an example for other states to follow. Another argument is that aid might also be related to expressing national identity and promoting the donor itself (Van der Veen, 2000, p. 119).

3.2.3 Enlightened self-interest

Enlightened self-interest originates from the fact that the South and North are mutually dependent on one another. The destiny of nations living in LDCs and those living in developed countries has suddenly become highly correlated. Helping LDCs therefore also benefits the donors. The main motive that falls into this category is environmental awareness.

Developed nations are helpless when observing environmental degradation in developing countries. The only way they can limit natural resource exploitation is by providing aid for halting and slowing down the destruction of tropical forests and limiting greenhouse gas emissions (Leisinger, 2000, p. 13). Maier argues that for poor countries wishing to develop it is bad economics to ignore environmental quality and therefore development needs environmental management. Accordingly, financing sustainable development is the objective of donor countries, especially since investments in green technologies and sustainable projects are costly and might therefore not be on the priority list of developing countries (Meier, 1995, p. 231).

3.2.4 Preventing migration flows

In the 1990s the question of refugees became another determinant of development aid (Forsyth, 2007, p. 37). The motive is rooted in a desire to resist the unwanted flow of immigrants from developing countries to the United States and to the European Union (Leisinger, 2000, p. 12). Therefore, in the early 1990s this trend was reflected in the shift of aid to Eastern and Central European countries. Haiti, for example, has also become more prominent in US aid (Forsyth, 2007, p. 37).

Most non-forced migration is demand-driven; once they know about opportunities elsewhere, people tend to move towards them. As countries develop, migration normally increases (Skeldon, 2008, p. 4). Therefore, this motive can only be important case where aid is given to countries that are in geographical proximity to developed ones or when aid is directed at the most developed of the developing countries.

3.2.5 Rewarding good policies

Aid can also be given to support regimes whose policy the donor wants to strengthen. Brown argues that during the Cold War foreign aid often propped up dictators and autocratic regimes, thus discouraging or even preventing democratic rule. With the end of the Cold War and disappearance of Communism and Soviet expansionism as credible threats to the USA and its allies there was a shift in donors' interest from security to the promotion of democracy. As there was no longer any need for strategic alliances in the developing world, donors became more closely involved in the domestic matters of weaker states and took political liberalisation into account when allocating aid. Therefore, since the 1990s aid has often promoted and rewarded democratisation. Although tying aid to political reform is not very successful, it can be very effective in facilitating a move from a one-party state to a multiparty system (Brown, 2005, pp. 180-182).

There is also some strong evidence that more open and more democratic countries receive more aid relative to more closed, autocratic ones. Alesina and Dollar found in their study of aid determinants that a typical democratising country receives a 50% increase in aid. However, they also found that factor becomes important in aid allocation only after strategic interests and alliances have been met. Similarly to political openness, it can also be observed that economically relatively open countries receive more aid than relatively closed ones (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, p. 12).

When motivations for aid also include a desire to support democratisation, this can also be considered as a humanitarian motive. A democratic regime, both economically and politically, is often considered a first step in development as it helps countries retain what they have already achieved and further develop (Van der Veen, 2000, p. 125).

3.3 Economic motives

Developed countries invest in developing countries not only to raise the growth rate of the recipient countries, but also because they see the foreign aid business as an instrument with which their own welfare can also be increased (Thirlwall, 1994, p. 327). Many authors argue that aid always flows to countries where recipient-need criteria can somehow satisfy a donor's interest. Nevertheless, donor self-interest may also have positive externalities for some aid recipient countries. These economic motives are mainly (1) investment and (2) trade (Nath & Sobhee, 2005, p. 2).

3.3.1 Investment

Most donors have specific programmes to promote investments in developing from their national firms in developing countries. They are often organised via special financing corporations via mechanisms such as investment guarantees (Forsyth, 2007, p. 36).

Further, finance provided to developing countries is often not a grant but a loan. Loans to developing countries that are considered as development aid include a grant element of at least 25%, yet the lender still earns interest. Developing countries accept these loans because most of them are short of foreign exchange and estimate that the benefits of the programmes these loans finance are greater than the costs and any other unfavourable side-effects. Thirlwall states that 'if there are also under-utilised resources in developed countries, which could otherwise not be activated because of balance-of-payments constraints, international assistance will be mutually profitable through and addition to resources in developing countries' (Thirlwall, 1994, p. 327). If returns in developing countries are higher, the welfare of both the donor and recipient is improved through such aid flows; while developed countries acquire interests, developing ones can stimulate their economic growth (Krueger, 1986, p. 63).

3.3.2 Trade and export promotion

Development assistance is often used to open markets to a donor's products, to subsidise the donor's own firms or fight unemployment in the donor country, even if goods and services are delivered on concessional terms. In such cases, the donor is able to shift some of the costs of its own domestic economic policies onto developing countries (Raffer & Singer, 1996, p. 8). Further, aid can be applied to help reduce the impacts of downturns in cyclical economies when used to combat recession by providing goods and services from severely hit industrial sectors (Forsyth, 2007, p. 36). There are many reasons why aid and trade might be correlated and the patterns of their correlation can significantly differ. In general, there are three primary reasons why aid flows may induce donor exports: (1) aid might stimulate donor exports because of the general economic effects on the recipient; (2) aid might be directly linked to trade – tied aid; or (3) aid reinforces bilateral economic and political links (Lloyd, McGillivray, Morrissey & Osei, 1998, p. 3).

3.3.2.1 Expanding markets

Traditional development theories of aid imply that aid supplements domestic savings and thereby leads to greater investment which stimulates economic growth and reaches a higher level of growth than would be the case with no foreign finance. This growth then induces the greater capacity of developing countries to absorb and purchase foreign goods and services, including those originating from donor countries. In addition, aid is often linked to the implementation of structural economic reforms such as liberalising trade regimes. Liberalisation can have a positive indirect effect on donor exports as reductions in trade barriers can allow donors easier access to developing countries (Lloyd, McGillivray,

Morrissey & Osei, 1998, p. 4). However, some authors argue that aid may have a negligible effect on economic growth and that the impact varies from country to country (Dalgaard, 2007, p. 1986).

3.3.2.2 Tied aid

Tying aid creates a direct link between aid and trade. In the case of formal tying, the recipient country is obliged to purchase goods and services from the donor country or is already provided with goods and services from that donor country. In this case, the aid itself is trade. In addition, some donor goods can demand purchases of complementary goods. A common variant of tied aid is a mixed credit whereby donors give an export subsidy to their companies that are seeking contracts in developing countries (Morrissey, 1991, p. 107).

Informal tying is a less direct form of tied aid. Here donors direct aid towards countries, projects or goods in which their own industries have a significant comparative advantage (Lloyd, McGillivray, Morrissey & Osei, 1998, p. 4).

Nevertheless, the tied aid can have a negative effect on economic growth if it is counterproductive in promoting donor exports. Not only can goods purchases under conditions of tied aid be overpriced by up to 40 percent (Jempa, 1991, pp. 41-52), but the goods offered could be a low priority for the recipient. Moreover, tied aid often supports industries that are inefficient (Morrissey, 1991, p. 106).

3.3.2.3 Creating aid-induced trade dependency

Even if the aid provided to the recipient country is formally untied, aid can still induce the recipient's dependence on donor goods and services. This can happen when aid finances a project that requires the importing of specific capital goods produced by donors. Another case is food aid. Food aid can distort domestic consumption patterns as well as the allocation of resources in recipient countries away from the production of food. The result is then 'prolonged dependence on the donor country not only for food aid but also for food purchased on commercial terms' (Lloyd, McGillivray, Morrissey & Osei, 1998, p. 5).

It is also interesting to investigate the reverse relationship between trade and aid. Aid can also be given as an award for prompting donor country imports and removing trade restrictions. This implies that countries can influence recipients to obtain preferential treatment on goods imported from donor countries without even signing a formal trade agreement (Younas, 2008, p. 662).

3.3.3 Securing valuable imports

Some governments advocate aid because it helps secure ongoing supplies of important raw materials (Van der Veen, 2000, p. 119). For example, Japanese policy-makers were especially concerned about ensuring access to raw materials. Top recipients of Japanese

foreign aid in Africa in the 1980s were therefore countries that were either important sources of raw materials vital to Japanese industry, or potential future sources of such raw materials (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998, p. 312).

3.4 Humanitarian motives

The last important group of motives that determines aid flows to be considered are humanitarian motives. They include arguments for aid aimed at the well-being of others and inspired by a political sense of moral obligation; more precisely, (1) moral motives, (2) the promotion of human rights and (3) showing support to democratic regimes (Van der Veen, 2000, p. 125). The latter motive involves both political and humanitarian motives and was therefore already discussed before in the section on rewarding good policies.

Even though humanitarian aid is less ideological than politically motivated aid, its success often depends on friendly relations between non-governmental implementers and host-country government agencies (Tisch & Wallace, 1994, p. 64).

3.4.1 Moral motives and humanitarianism

There are two opposing views concerning moral obligations for giving aid. Some authors argue that 'the transfer of resources to developing countries is not a matter of moral obligation at all, but a matter of charity or benevolence' (Opeskin, 1996, p. 23). Therefore we do good to give, but we are not morally obliged to do so. Other authors claim that the global transfer of resources is a moral obligation and finds the basis of that idea in humanity and justice. Singer argues that 'obligations of humanity extend universally, to all individuals beyond state borders.' If it is in our power to prevent suffering and death from a lack of food, shelter or medical care, we are morally obliged to do so, especially because richer nations are able to reduce the number of starving people without having to give up their own basic necessities of life (Opeskin, 1996, p.24). No matter which theory we accept, the reasons why donors provide aid are definitely rooted in morality.

Moral motives can be measured by the proportion of aid distributed to countries whose population has a strong economic or physical need. Economic need is measured in per capita income, while to measure physical need infant mortality is normally taken into account. Wall and Bandyopadhyay found in their study of the determinants of aid in the post-Cold War era that aid tends to correspond to the recipient's physical and economic needs (Bandyopadhyay &Wall, 2006, p. 10). Younas also found that 'donors care about the economic and physical well-being of the residents in the recipient nations' (Younas, 2008, p. 667)

3.4.2 Promoting human rights

Over the years, donors' interest in a recipient's domestic policies has increased and the protection of human rights has become an important criterion for development aid. One

reason for this is that in the case of undemocratic and inhumane governments the development programmes are unsustainable in the long run. However, developing countries are sometimes somewhat suspicious of the inclusion of human rights as part of good governance and hence one of the conditions of aid. Human rights conditionality is felt to be an even greater infringement of national sovereignty than economic conditionality (Raffer & Singer, 1996 p. 165).

Empirical studies also support this view; greater respect for human rights by recipients results in them receiving more aid. The estimation of respect for human rights is usually based on indexes of political and civil rights (Younas, 2008, p. 668). In addition, Alesina and Dollar found that aid flows respond to democratisation episodes and may help consolidate them. Therefore, shocks to democracy are good predictors of shocks to aid. Nevertheless, it is not typically the case that large increases in aid precede political reforms (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, p. 21).

4 Literature overview: Studies of motives for aid allocation

Extensive literature exists to explain donor behaviour underlying the allocation of foreign aid. Researchers have tested various motivations in terms of donor self-interest and recipient need in two different ways; by either studying aggregate bilateral aid flows or by examining each donor individually. In this section I will briefly describe the most visible studies. They will serve as a reference for my analysis on ODA flows to Africa.

4.1 Studies of aggregate bilateral aid flows

Many authors have studied correlations between aggregate bilateral aid flows and the different characteristics of recipient countries. Trumbull and Wall (1994), Alesina and Dollar (1998) and Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006) captured a wider range of motives for aid allocation in their models and therefore provided wider analyses. They all found that donors pursue both humanitarian and political motives.

Trumbull and Wall found that ODA allocations in the 1984-1989 period to recipients in the DAC list were indeed determined by the needs of the recipients (Figure 1) They first tested a one-way panel with an observable period effect and found that aid allocation per capita highly corresponded to GNP per capita as well as civil and political rights. Infant mortality did not correlate with differences in ODA. However, when testing a two-way panel where results were conditioned on both the period and recipient effect the estimated importance of per capita income diminished considerably. Instead, the importance of infant mortality rose as did the significance of civil/political rights. The authors concluded that due to the statistical importance of heterogeneity the latter panel is more appropriate for determining the motivation for aid allocation (Trumbull & Wall, 1994, pp. 876-882).

Figure 1: Trumbull and Wall: The model and the empirical results

Model

$LODACAP_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta_1 LGNPCAP_{it} + \beta_2 LINFMORT_{it} + \beta_3 LRIGHTS_{it} + \beta_4 LPOP_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$

*The constant α_t in the one-way panel also captures the period effect, which is the same for all recipient countries within a given year. In the two-way panel they added the recipient effect which varies between countries but is the same over the years. The recipient effect assigns recipient countries different weights in order to capture effects not captured by the explanatory variables.

Results

Variable	No fixed effects	With fixed effects
LGNPCAP	-0.6883*	-0.1719
LINFMORT	-0.0450	1.4650*
LRIGHTS	0.2771*	0.8766*
LPOP	-0.6670*	-0.8745*
R squared	0.56	0.93

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.

Sample

Countries listed as net recipients of ODA in the World Bank's World Development Report 1991 between 1984 and 1989.

Source: Trumbull & Wall, Estimating aid allocation criteria with panel data, 1994.

Alesina and Dollar examined patterns of aid giving in advanced industrial countries in the period from 1970 to 1995 (Figure 2). They found considerable evidence that 'the pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations' When examining a regression on aggregate bilateral aid flows, they found that more economically open and more democratic countries received more aid. Countries with a colonial past were favoured. They also found that aid was sensitive to per capita income. There was a strong relationship between population and aid; smaller countries generally received more aid per capita. They also tried to capture political ties with the USA and Japan UN friend variables by testing whether countries whose votes in the UN tended to follow the USA/Japan received more aid. This variable proved to be significant for Japan, but was not significant for the USA (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, pp. 1-26).

Figure 2: Alesina and Dollar: The model and the empirical results of aggregate ODA flows

Model

Ln(Bilateral aid) = α_0 + β_1LN(initial income) + β_2[LN(initial income)]^2 + β_3LN(population) + β_4[LN(population)]^2 + $\beta_5$openness + $\beta_6$democracy + β_7US UN friend +β_8Japan UN friend + β_9LN(years as colony) + β_{10}Egypt + β_{11}Israel + ε_{it}

Results

Variable	Coefficient
LN(initial income)	7.415*
[LN(initial income)]2	-0.545*
LN(population)	2.223*
[LN(population)]2	-0.055*
Openness	0.334*
Democracy	-0.131*
US UN Friend	-0.007
Japan UN Friend	0.157*
LN (years as colony)	0.236*
Egypt dummy	1.558*
Israel dummy	6.150*
R squared	0.61

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.

Sample

Countries on the DAC list of ODA recipients in 1970-1995. Five-year averages were used for the panel regressions.

Source: Alesina & Dollar, Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why, 1998.

Bandyopadhyay and Wall estimated the responsiveness of aid to recipient countries' economic and physical needs, civil/political rights, and government effectiveness in the post-Cold War era (Figure 3). They first examined simple correlations between aid and: (1) GDP per capita; (2) infant mortality; (3) civil/political rights; (4) government effectiveness; and (5) population. There was a general tendency that poorer countries and countries with higher infant mortality received more aid. There was also a general positive correlation between per capita aid and rights. Generally smaller countries received more aid per capita, while the opposite was true for larger countries (Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006, pp. 1-18).

Figure 3: Bandyopadhyay and Wall: The model and the empirical results

Model

$Aid_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 GDPpercapita_{it} + \beta_2 GDPpercapita_{it}^2 + \delta_1 InfantMortality_{it} + \delta_2 InfantMortality_{it}^2 + \lambda Civil/PoliticalRights_{it} + \omega GovernmentEffectiveness_{it} + \theta_1 Population_{it} + \theta_2 Population_{it}^2 + \varepsilon_{it}$

*i denotes the recipient country and t denotes time. α_i includes the recipient country fixed effect, while γ_t, captures the period effect.

Results

Variable	No fixed effects	With fixed effects
Common intercept	564.693*	400.684*
2000 dummy	-56.913*	-82.195*
2003 dummy	-18.343	-11.714
Real GDP p.c.	-78.178*	-116.490*
Real GDP p.c. squared	2.646*	3.927*
Infant mortality	-3.052*	3.632*
Infant mortality squared	0.022*	-0.015*
Civil/political rights	0.212	8,940*
Government effectiveness	114.432*	82,453*
Population (million)	7.497*	13.419*
Population squared	-0.005*	-0.012*

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.

Sample

Countries listed on the DAC list (with more than two observations for selected variables; 135 countries) in the years 1995, 2000, 2003.

Source: Bandyopadhyay & Wall, The Determinants of Aid in the Post Cold-War Era, 2006.

In the model with no fixed effects all the explanatory variables except for the political/civil rights were statistically different from zero, which means that aid was responsive to GDP p.c., infant mortality, government effectiveness and population, but was not responsive to rights. However, when recipient fixed effects were added, civil and political rights also became significant (Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006, pp. 1-18).

In the following table (Table 1) I summarised the findings of the studies described above. Generally, analyses show that ODA flows are indeed determined by the economic and physical needs of recipients. The level of civil liberties and size of the population also prove to be important.

Table 1: Comparison of studies of aggregate ODA flows

Test	Trumbull and Wall		Alesina and Dollar	Bandyopadhyay and Wall	
Period	1989-1989		1970-1995	1995, 2000, 2003	
Sample	All ODA recipients		All ODA recipients	All ODA recipients	
Dependent variable	ODA per capita		Total ODA	Total ODA	
	No fixed eff.	Fixed eff.	No fixed eff.	No fixed eff.	Fixed eff.
Real GDP p.c.	Negative**	Negative	Negative*	Negative*	Negative*
Infant mortality	Positive	Positive**	-	Positive*	Positive*
Rights[1]	Positive**	Positive**	Positive*	No relation	Positive*
Population	Negative**	Negative	Negative*	Negative*	Negative*
Government effect	-	-	-	Positive*	Positive*
Colonies	-	-	Positive*	-	-
Openness	-	-	Positive*	-	-

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
[1]As the authors used a reverse index of civil/political rights, positive correlations mean that more aid is allocated to countries with a higher level of rights.

Sources: Trumbull & Wall, Estimating aid allocation criteria with panel data, 1994; Alesina & Dollar, Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why, 1998; Bandyopadhyay & Wall, The Determinants of Aid in the Post Cold-War Era, 2006.

4.2 Donor-by-donor studies

While literature examining aggregate bilateral aid flows is not too extensive, a much more significant number of studies examines each donor individually. Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) provide a wide analysis of the responsiveness of different donors to recipients' socio-economic and political indicators while some authors, such as Berthelemy (2006), also focused on differences among donors in aid allocation. I will again turn to Alesina and Dollar's (1998) analysis as their study also included donor-by-donor empirical results. At the end I will present the results of Shraeder, Hook and Taylor's comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish aid flows to African countries. A more detailed description of the analyses is found in the appendix.

Schraeder, Hook and Taylor focused on bilateral aid flows to African countries (Figure 4). They introduced six sets of variables: (1) humanitarian need; (2) strategic importance; (3) economic potential; (4) cultural similarity; (5) ideological stance; and (6) region. The dependent variable in the model was ODA as a percentage of a recipient's GNP. It is striking that they included GNP per capita as a measure of economic and not humanitarian motives. They argued that donors might want to provide more aid to economically powerful countries in order to promote their own economic security. However, this hypothesis did not hold as there is a significant negative relationship between GNP per capita and aid.

Figure 4: Schraeder, Hook & Taylor: The empirical results

Model

Dependent variable: Total ODA to a recipient country as a percentage of the recipient's GDP[2]

Results

Group	Variable	USA	France	Japan	Sweden
	Constant	1.453**	1.864**	0.645	1.063**
	Lagged dependent variable	0.408**	0.1819**	0.262**	0.022
(1)	**Caloric intake**	-0.005	0.006	-0.002	-0.007
	Life expectancy	-0.001	-0.002	0.018**	0.002
(2)	**Military spending (% of GDP)**	-0.001	0.006	0.005	0.001
	Military force (% of population)	0.018	0.022*	0.008	0.006
	Security alliance	0.162*	0.043	-	-
(3)	**GNP per capita (logged)**	-0.467**	-0.457**	-0.547**	-0.271**
	Trade (% of total, lagged)	0.277*	-0.276*	0.230*	0.166*
(4)	**Marxist**	-0.120	0.028	-0.138	-0.052
	Socialist	0.024	0.114	0.023	0.122*
	Capitalist	0.096**	0.085	0.115*	-0.070
(5)	**Similar to British**	-0.039	-0.268**	0.032	-0.089
	Similar to French	0.077	0.745**	0.083	-0.109
	Similar to Portuguese	-0.147	0.007	-0.087	0.384**
	Similar to Belgian	0.067	0.091	0.067	-0.260*
	Previously non-associated countries	0.043	-0.574**	-0.096	0.074
(6)	**Northern**	-0.057	-0.190	-0.158	-0.109
	Western	0.014	0.023	0.0496	-0.214**
	Central	-0.110	0.194*	-0.091	-0.062
	Southern	0.010	-0.041	0.011	0.348**
	Eastern	0.144	0.015	0.190	0.036
	R squared	0.432	0.534	0.298	0.389

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. An '**' indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.

Sample

36 African countries in the 1980-1989 period.

[2]The exact model was not presented.

Source: Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows 1998.

The statistical analysis confirmed that US foreign aid was driven by strategic and ideological interests associated with the Cold War; the existence of a security alliance and capitalist regimes ensured the generous provision of foreign aid. Aid flows were also influenced by economic concerns, yet humanitarian needs remained unacknowledged. The

analysis of French aid proves that France foremost promotes its culture by providing aid; there was a significant positive relationship between aid on one side and former French colonies. France notably also had strategic interests as there was a significant positive relationship between military force and aid. However, neither economic nor humanitarian motives played a role in French foreign aid policies concerning Africa. In the case of Japan, economic self interest proved to be the key determinant of Japanese foreign aid. Capitalist countries received more aid, but more due to their propensity to maintain free markets than their ideological stance. Aid was definitely not influenced by humanitarian concerns since countries with a higher life expectancy received more aid than those with a lower one. Sweden restricted its foreign aid programmes due to its limited budget on one region; Southern Africa. There was clear evidence that Sweden supported progressive, socialist-oriented regimes. The negative relationship between aid and GNP per capita was explained by the fact that Sweden tended to provide more aid to former Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa that had found themselves beset by ongoing civil wars which devastated their economies. Although Sweden is usually regarded as an altruistic donor, the results did not confirm its altruistic behaviour (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998, pp. 294-323).

Alesina and Dollar (1998) also tested their model on individual donors (Figure 5). They examined aid allocation motives for 16 DAC countries. However, I will only now present those that will be important in the next section; the USA, the UK, France, Japan, Germany and the Netherlands. Income levels captured the economic component of a recipient's needs. *Ceteris paribus*, most donors gave more to poorer countries. The most responsive donors regarding income level were the USA and the Netherlands, while the least were Japan and France. The variable openness had a positive coefficient in the cases of the USA, the UK, France and Japan. These donors made an effort to reward good policy. Democracy was an area in which there were clear differences among donors; the strongest positive response to democratic institutions was found for the USA and the Netherlands, while Germany and Japan put a small weight on this factor. France seems to pay no attention to the presence of democracy in the recipient country. Two variables examined a colonial past; own colony and another's colony. The first was significant for all five donors, while the latter was not significant for even one. Donors favoured their own colonies, however they did not discriminate against other donors' former colonies. Political alliances were captured by the UN friend variable. It was found to be significant for all five major powers in international relations, but not for the Netherlands. Another form of capturing strategic importance were dummies for Egypt and Israel. The strategic importance of Egypt was proved for all donors in question except for the UK, while the strategic importance of Israel was found significant for the USA, Germany and the Netherlands (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, pp. 1-26).

Figure 5: Alesina and Dollar: The model and the empirical results of donor-by-donor ODA flows

Model

$$\text{Log(Aid)}_i = \alpha_i + \beta_1\text{Income}_i + \beta_2\text{Openness}_i + \beta_3\text{IDemocracy}_i + \beta_4\text{UNFriend}_i + \beta_5\text{OwnColony}_i + \beta_6\text{OtherColony}_i + \beta_7\text{Egypt}_i + \beta_8\text{Israel}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Results

Variable	USA	UK	France	Japan	Germany	Netherlands
Income	-1.29*	-0.73*	-0.28*	-0.17*	-0.49*	-1.12*
Openness	0.91*	0.87*	0.59*	1.09*	0.17	0.09
Democracy	0.43*	0.16*	0.05	0.13*	0.10*	0.31*
UN Friend	0.05*	0.06*	0.06*	0.11*	0.10*	0.02
Own colony	0.40*	0.69*	1.00*	1.65*	0.18*	0.68*
Other colony	0.04	-0.04	0.13	0.10	0.13	0.04
Egypt dummy	4.21*	0.14	2.58*	1.07*	1.51*	1.08*
Israel dummy	4.11*	-2.32	0.29	-0.15	3.40*	1.98*
R squared	0.48	0.64	0.65	0.64	0.55	0.51

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.

Sample

Countries listed on the DAC list of ODA recipients between 1970 and 1994. Five-year averages were used for the panel regressions.

Source: Alesina & Dollar, Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why, 1998.

The studies of Schraeder, Hook and Taylor and Alesina and Dollar are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2: Comparison of donor-by-donor studies

Test	Schraeder, Hook and Taylor				Alesina and Dollar					
Period	1980-1989				1970-1995					
Sample	African countries				All ODA recipients					
Dependent variable	Total ODA/GDP				Total ODA					
	US	JP	FR	SW	US	UK	FR	JP	GE	NE
Real GDP p.c.	neg*	neg*	neg*	neg*	neg*	neg*	neg*	neg*	neg*	neg*
Life Expectancy	neg	pos*	neg	neg	-	-	-	-	-	-
Similar regimes/Democracy	pos*	pos*	pos	neg	pos*	pos*	pos	pos*	pos*	pos*
Culture/Colonies	-	-	pos*	-	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos*
Trade/Openness	pos*	pos*	neg*	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos	pos	pos
UN Friend	-	-	-	-	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos*	pos

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.

Sources: Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows 1998; Alesina & Dollar, Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why, 1998.

The studies differ in the variables chosen. I united the findings of both studies for similar regimes (capitalism) and democracy and for cultural similarity and a colonial past and for trade and openness as I believe they measured similar motives.

5   The case of Africa: Current situation

The region of Africa performs worst in many aspects; it has a huge number of undernourished people, low GDP, many ongoing wars and armed conflicts, dictatorships and it is the least integrated into the world's economic system with a negligible percentage of world exports. In the next chapters I will present its current situation through the same aspects that motivate the aid allocation process; colonisation, political situation, economic relations and socio-economic factors.

5.1 Impacts of colonisation

In the pre-mercantilist period, from the time of the first explorers of Africa in the early 16th until the 17th centuries, when taken as whole Africa did not appear weaker than the rest of the old world, also taken as a whole. The mercantilist period of the 18th century was characterised by slave trade. It badly affected the African economy as the effects of slavery spread out throughout the continent and resulted in a decline in productive forces. The real and far-reaching colonisation of Africa began at the end of the 19th century (Amin, 1972, pp. 106-118). Africa was colonised largely by six nations; the British and the French, who seized the largest parts and by the Dutch, the Germans, the Italians, the Portuguese (CIA, 2009). The aims of all the colonisers were the same; to obtain cheap exports. They exploited cheap labour and natural resources (Amin, 1972, p. 114). Bretocchi and Canova found in their study of the causes of Africa's underdevelopment evidence that 'colonization exerted a direct effect on the growth pattern of African countries and that it also affected physical and human capital accumulation and the socio-political factors thought to explain growth' (Bertocchi & Canova, 2001, p. 1868). They conclude that the factors of colonisation are able to explain differences in the growth of African countries compared to the rest of the world that did not see such a form of colonisation. Another reason for underdevelopment might lie in the many conflicts among African countries. The tense atmosphere in the area is at least partly due to the fact that colonisers divided the land by simply drawing straight frontiers and without considering political units and ethnic groups (The Scramble for Africa, 1999).

The independence of the majority of African countries from imperial powers occurred in the late 1950s and 1960s. With independence the economic situation of many countries improved; there was a significant structural break in the growth pattern at independence (Bertocchi & Canova, 2001, p. 1865). However, the freedom from imperial powers was not a smooth transition and still results in many conflicts and civil wars (Shah, 2009).

According to the above facts it is clear why donors might pursue colonial motives when allocating aid to African countries. Providing aid to economies devastated by their exploitation demonstrates the taking of responsibility for their former actions. Map of Colonies in 1914 can be found in the Appendix (Appendix Figure 2).

5.2 Political situation

A series of conflicts and civil wars have been going on in Africa in recent years. Since 1980, 28 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have been involved in war (Shah, 2009). The greatest number of interventions in a conflict were recorded by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Kenya, Libya and Uganda (Yoon, 2004, p. 11). In the 2000 to 2007 period, there were over 9 million refugees and internally displaced people across the continent (UNHCR, 2009). Root causes for problems involve political corruption, violations of human rights, lack of respect for the rule of law and colonisation (Shah, 2009). Another important cause may be the post-Cold War atmosphere as the end of Cold War accelerated the regionalisation of internal conflicts and that, as superpowers withdrew themselves from local conflicts, regional powers filled the vacuum (Yoon, 2004, p. 1). As found by Balla, aid flows on the basis of security interest are an important determinant of ODA, especially due to the persistent conflicts in Africa (Balla, 2008, pp. 2566-2585). Map of recent conflicts in Africa can be found in the Appendix (Appendix Figure 4).

As regards democracy and the level of rights, there is no unique picture for Africa. According to Freedom House data, out of 53 African countries only 11 are 'free' with a broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life and independent media. The freest countries include Mauritius, Cape Verde, South Africa, Mali and Botswana. The largest group includes 'partly free' countries, where there is limited respect for political and civil rights, a weak rule of law, endemic corruption and ethnic or religious strife and often a single political party. The group of 'not free' countries accounts for 20 states such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Libya and Equatorial Guinea in which basic political rights are absent and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied. In the 2006-2008 period, Africa saw a modest decline of civil and political liberties in 16 countries, where the major reason was a deterioration in the rule of law (Freedom House, 2009a, pp. 1-5). With the fall of Communism, security motives for aid in Africa lost much of their former relevance. Instead, donors started to intervene in the domestic policies of African states and pursued democratic motives. Development agencies earmarked sizeable funds specifically to promote democracy. In 1999, 6 percent of the US aid budget for Africa, which equalled USD 123 million represented democracy assistance (Brown, 2005, pp. 181-182). Map of political and civil rights in Africa can be found in the Appendix (Figure Appendix 3).

5.3 Economic relations

Africa's share of world exports continuously declined from 7.3 percent in 1948 to 2.4 percent in 2003. In recent years, it has slightly increased and accounted for 3.1 percent (WTO, 2008). Reasons for such a low export share of world trade lie in a lack of appropriate trade infrastructure such as transport corridors, modern customs facilities to move products rapidly and efficiently across borders, information systems to connect exporters to world markets, testing labs to ensure that exports meet international standards and institutions needed to manage a complex global trading system (AfDB, WTO & UN, 2007). Most African countries export mainly primary products, making them vulnerable to volatile commodity prices. In relative terms, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the highest dependence on exports of primary goods. Only a small number of countries such as Lesotho, Mauritius and Tunisia draw a significant part of their export revenue from manufactured products (UN, 2008b, pp. 29-76). However, more than half of all Sub-Saharan African exports came from South Africa and Nigeria (Diemond, 2009, p.4).

Africa's biggest trading partners are the EU, the USA and China. Exports from Sub-Saharan Africa to the EU accounted for 29 percent where the most visible exporters were Germany, France and the UK. China's exports have grown rapidly in recent years and accounted for almost 9 percent of total Sub-Saharan Africa's trade. The US' export share fell slightly in 2007 to 5 percent (Diemond, 2009, p. 6). Exports to African countries included oil, various high technology goods, medicaments, motor vehicles and intermediate goods. Major importers of African commodities were the EU with 32 percent, the USA with 30 percent and China with 12 percent. Leading imports for all major partners are similar; they include oil, platinum, diamonds, iron, steel and cocoa beans (European Commission, 2009).

Africa is not a major market for Europe. However, Europe's share in Africa's imports is wholly disproportionate. Collier and Gunning claim that Africa's poor economic performance over the last 20 years has consequently been costly to European exporters. If Africa had approached the East Asian growth rates over the past two decades, it would now be a sizeable market (Collier & Gunning, 1995, p. 407). Also for the USA, Africa represents only a minor share of its exports, precisely 1 percent (Diemond, 2009, p.6). Therefore, expanding markets through aid might not be the prime motive for providing aid as the same amount of aid would bring better results elsewhere. However, according to the studies securing raw materials, especially oil that presents by far the biggest part of Africa's exports, can also not be as an important motive as elsewhere. Svayatets studied patterns of US aid in Africa in the 1996 to 2004 period and found an inverse and statistically significant relationship between the amount of foreign aid and value of oil imports from the recipients (Svayatets, 2008). It can therefore be concluded that trade cannot play a significant role in the aid allocation process, but only appears as one of the determinants of aid allocation.

FDI inflows to Africa grew rapidly in the period from 2005 to 2007. The rate of return of FDI in Africa has been increasing since 2004 and, at 12 percent, was the highest among developing regions in 2007 (AFDB, OECD & UN, 2009). However, Africa's share of global FDI remained modest as it accounted for 3 percent. FDI investments were heavily focused on the oil, gas and mining sectors. The most favoured destinations were thereby oil exporting countries such as Egypt, Nigeria and Sudan (Ford, 2008). According to a study by Asiedu, Yin and Nandwa, aid can help mitigate risks and thereby increase FDI (Asiedu, Yin & Nandwa, 2009, pp. 268-275). Therefore, aid from bilateral donors can also be given in order to accommodate the FDI of the donor's domestic companies.

5.4 Socio-economic factors

Africa is the world's second largest region regarding both its area and its population; the Population Division of the United Nations estimates that Africa's population will exceed one billion in 2010 (UN Population Division, 2009). However, the region has found itself in a development crisis.

In 2007, per capita GDP accounted for USD 950 compared to USD 30,000 in OECD countries. However, there is no unique picture for the region. While GDP per capita of Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Botswana, Mauritius, Libya and South Africa was more than USD 10,000, it was below USD 400 in the poorest countries such as Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Burundi (IMF, 2009). In the 2005 to 2007 period, growth rates in Africa exceeded 5 percent, but countries grew unequally. Oil-exporting countries have grown more than three times faster than non-oil exporting countries. In general, countries of North Africa performed much better than the rest of the continent. Meanwhile, slow growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has meant increases in both the poverty line and the number of poor in recent years. Further, the Economic Commission for Africa points out that at current growth rates only a few African countries are positioned to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (UNECA, 2007, p. 2).

Extreme poverty in Africa is persistent; in 2005 roughly 40 percent of the African population lived on less than USD 1.25 per day (AFDB, 2006, p. 43). The worst performers were West and East Africa, while in North Africa less than 4 percent of the population lived on such low incomes. The distribution of malnourished people was similar (WB, 2009b). Overall, around 24 percent of the African population was undernourished (UNFAO, 2009). Map of prevalence of undernourished population can be found in Appendix (Appendix Figure 5).

Africa's public health systems are ineffective and inaccessible to the majority, while malaria is resurging due to rising drug resistance and an AIDS pandemic is spreading across the continent (Sachs, 2004, p.116). Currently, about 6 percent of Africans are infected with HIV. With the exception of South Africa and Namibia, in all countries of Sub-Saharan Africa more than 10 percent of infants died before their first birthday (WB,

2009c). Africa has a long road ahead to achieve universal education; in 2006, less than 60 percent of African children had completed primary school and more than a third were unable to read or write (WB, 2009b).

The social conditions of the whole continent reveal great economic and physical needs. Aid flows to Africa, more than any other region of the world, should be driven by humanitarian motives.

5.5 ODA flows to African countries

Aid has gone to Africa for many purposes and only one of them is development. Aid flows reflect political pressures and motives of groups in donor countries and bureaucratic imperatives in urging recipients to spend all available aid funds within set budget cycles. Even though the Cold War ended some time ago and hence Africa is no longer an ideological and strategic battleground where 'trusted allies' receive foreign assistance regardless of their record on governance and development, Africa still suffers the consequences of misdirected aid flows; partly in the form of the legacy of ineffective aid and partly in the form of loans that have accumulated into large debts. Even today, Africa is the world's most aid dependent and indebted region. Many countries receive net ODA equal to 10 percent of their GNP (WB, 2000). The situation of high inflows of foreign funds relative to domestic GDP is often denoted as aid dependency. The characteristics of aid dependency are that developing countries receive more aid than they can usefully utilise, a post-colonial aid regime in which donors retain the final decision over aid allocation and a high proportion of tied aid. Due to these factors, the effectiveness of aid can be reduced (Ali, Suliman & Malwanda, 1999, pp. 505-506).

In the 2005 to 2007 period, African countries received more than a third of total global aid. DAC countries contributed almost 70% of aid disbursements, which totalled USD 29 million (Figure 6) (OECD, 2009).

Figure 6: Donor shares of ODA to Africa in 2009

Source: OECD, 2009.

In 2007, ODA flows to Africa rose by 12 percent in real terms, excluding debt relief grants. The largest recipient of net bilateral ODA in 2007 in Africa was Tanzania which received USD 1.8 billion, followed by Cameroon and Sudan which received USD 1.6 billion each (OECD, 2009). Donors continued to focus on countries which have historically benefited from large aid flows: Egypt and Morocco in North Africa; and Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mozambique, Uganda, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Sub-Saharan Africa. These nine countries received more than half of all ODA disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 (AFDB, OECD & UN, 2009). Countries receiving the highest levels of per capita aid were small island states such as Cape Verde and Sao Tome & Principle that received roughly USD 200 in per capita aid. They were followed by Cameroon, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Liberia that received between USD 60 and USD 90 in per capita aid (OECD, 2009 & IMF, 2009). This pattern suggests that the determinants of aid disbursements are not unique; Sierra Leone's and Liberia's performances in terms of infant mortality, undernourishment of the population and GDP were among the worst in Africa, while Namibia enjoyed one of the highest GDPs of Sub-Saharan Africa and relatively low infant mortality (OECD, 2009, IMF, 2009 & UNFAO, 2009). Map of per capita ODA disbursements to African countries can be found in the Appendix (Appendix Figure 1).

The major donors in Africa were the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands (Figure 7). Their share accounted for approximately three-quarters of DAC ODA flows and half of the total aid provided to Africa in the 2005-2007 period (OECD, 2009).

Figure 7: Major donors to Africa: Net disbursements of bilateral ODA (2005-2007 period average, constant USD millions)

Source: OECD, 2009.

Many authors argue that the Millennium Development goals have triggered a more strategic and focused approach to aid allocation (OECD, 2006). However, its effectiveness might be weakened because aid for Africa is delivered by a large number of donors with fragmented projects and requirements (WB, 2000).

In the next sections I will examine ODA allocation in Africa and test whether humanitarian and developmental motives really prove to be an important part of aid policies.

6 The case of Africa: The empirical analysis of ODA flows

I will examine bilateral ODA flows to African countries; first I will analyse aggregate flows and then continue with donor by donor model to reveal behavioural patterns of aid allocation of individual donors.

6.1 Aggregate bilateral aid flows model

In this model I will test all four aspects of motivation for allocating ODA; humanitarian motives, political motives, economic motives and a colonial past. First, I will present the variables used in the model and substantiate the choice of variables. I will turn to the model and at the end analyse the results.

6.1.1 Explanatory variables

I introduce five independent variables to the model which I believe are the best measure of a specific motive. They are summarised in Table 3 and expanded on in later chapters.

Table 3: Explanatory variables in the aggregate ODA model

Variable	Measure	Year	Source
ODA per capita	ODA per capita in USD (2007 constant)	2005-2007 average	OECD, IMF
Undernourished Population	Undernourished population as a percentage of the total population	2003-2005 average	UNFAO
Civil and political rights	Sum of two indexes (values from 1 to 7)	2005	Freedom House
Migration flows	Immigrants to DAC countries (thousands)	2005-2006 average	OECD
Trade	Sum of recipient's imports from DAC countries and exports to DAC countries relative to recipient's GDP	2005-2007 average	WTO
Former colonies	Dummy for countries that were French, British or German colonies	20th century	CIA, OECD
Country size	Population (millions)	2005-2007 average	IMF

6.1.1.1 *Dependent variable: ODA per capita*

To estimate the motives for official bilateral aid allocation, I took a three-year average of ODA per capita in the 2005 to 2007 period. A three-year average was used to minimise singe year exceptional aid disbursements. To capture the effects of actual allocated aid I

applied net disbursements rather than net commitments. Net disbursements include grants, capital subscriptions and the grant element of net loans and present actually allocated funds, while net commitments comprise a donor's promises for aid disbursements. With some donors the differences between net disbursements and net commitments can be significant.

In order to avoid apparent increases in aid due to inflation, aid allocation for all three years was measured in 2007 constant US dollars. As the OECD does not provide ODA per capita, ODA disbursements were divided by the recipient population based on IMF data. Due to measurement problems and the unavailability of non-DAC donors' aid flows, I only took ODA flows from DAC countries. The exact data on net commitments of DAC countries can be found in Table 1 in the Appendix.

6.1.1.1   *Variables capturing a colonial past*

There were six major colonisers in Africa in the 20th century; France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Portugal. However, only three of them are visible donors in absolute terms; France, Great Britain and Germany. Each of them contributed more than 10 percent of the total ODA distributed to Africa. The contributions of Belgium, Italy and Portugal were in total relatively small (less than 3.2 percent of all ODA) (OECD, 2009). I will therefore only capture the effects of the French, British and German colonial past on aid flows by introducing a common dummy variable for the former colonies of those countries.

The vast majority of studies capture these effects only when analysing donor-by-donor behaviour. However, Alesina and Dollar tested whether countries with a colonial past are generally favoured compared to countries with no colonial past and found a significant positive correlation between aid flows and a colonial past also on the aggregate data level (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, p. 9). However, when applying the model to Africa it is senseless to add a dummy variable for all countries that were former colonies since all but two countries were colonised in the 20th century. Therefore, I test whether the former colonies of major donors tend to receive more aid compared to former colonies of less visible donors.

6.1.1.2   *Variables capturing political motives*

Two variables were introduced to catch political motives of donor countries; (1) civil and political rights to capture aid disbursements provided as a reward for good policies; and (2) migration inflows. In my opinion, both can be used together without fear of the risk of multicollinearity as, although both present measures for political motives, there is no obvious link between the two.

The first measure, civil and political rights, does not solely measure political interests but to a certain extent also humanitarian interests as it is believed that 'good regimes', such as a democracy, can stimulate economic growth and foster development. On the other hand,

providing more aid to democratic countries may capture political interests as giving aid to support ideologically similar regimes. Civil and political rights were estimated by Freedom House for 2005. They can take values from 1 to 7, where 1 is given to countries whose residents have the most political/civil rights. Each of the two groups of rights, civil and political, are measured separately. Nevertheless, the values for the two indexes for a given country never differ by more than two. For the purpose of including them in the regression, I took the sum of both indexes, similarly as Dollar and Alesina did in their model, to capture the effects of both civil and political rights.

The second measure, migration inflows, is used to test whether donors provide aid to prevent migration flows to their own countries. The data used include migration inflows to all OECD countries in the 2005 to 2006 period (the latest available data) and they are measured in thousands.

Because of Africa's numerous armed conflicts, I also wanted to include military expenditure, measured as a percentage of GDP, in order to capture the reaction of donors to aggressive politics of the recipient country. One could argue that donors interested in promoting their security would favour recipients that maintain relatively large military establishments in terms of overall financial resources and are therefore able to act as surrogates for the donor within their specific regions (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998, p. 304). However, according to studies by Berthelemy this variable was never significant since donors might also fear that excessive military expenditure could imply a high risk of utilisation of the assistance for non-developmental purposes and therefore trigger a reduction of foreign assistance (Berthelemy, 2006, p. 184). Another reason for excluding military expenditure was that I found a high positive correlation between military expenditure and civil and political rights; less free countries generally spend a bigger percentage of GDP on military purposes.

6.1.1.3   *Variables capturing economic motives*

There are various methods for capturing economic motives. It is often captured as a percentage of a donor's exports relative to either the donor's GDP, recipient's GDP or recipient's total imports (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998, p. 304). However, I decided to measure economic interests with an index of openness; the level of trade with a DAC country measured as the sum of recipient imports from the DAC country and recipient exports to the DAC countries relative to the recipient's GDP. As I am investigating aggregate bilateral aid flows, I am not able to capture specific trade ties between a recipient and donor. However, I expect this variable to show whether countries that are more economically open to DAC donors receive more aid than more closed ones.

6.1.1.4   *Variables capturing humanitarian motives*

To capture humanitarian motives for providing aid I introduced a variable that captures the percentage of the undernourished population in the recipient country. I took the average

percentage of the undernourished population in the 2003 to 2005 period, which was the latest available data, provided by the Statistics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of United Nations ('UNFAO'). Although previous studies worked mainly with infant mortality to capture the humanitarian motives of ODA, I believe that the percentage of the undernourished population is a better measure of physical need because it captures the needs of the whole population. It also reflects the unequal situation among African countries.

Many authors such as Alesina, Dollar and Wall also included GDP per capita to measure economic need. They argue it is necessary to include both as, although they are correlated in the long run, they do not necessarily move in the same direction over shorter periods of time and aid should therefore correspond to both aspects of needs (Bandyopadhyay and Wall, 2006, p. 4). However, I did not include GDP per capita in the model for two reasons. First, I did not want to run the risk of multicollinearity as I found a strong negative correlation between GDP per capita and the percentage of the undernourished population. Second, GDP per capita can be an inappropriate measure of standard of living of the entire population, especially when the Gini coefficient is high. This is definitely the situation in Africa as the world's top seven countries with the greatest inequalities are African (UN, 2005, p. 5). Due to data unavailability about the distribution of incomes in most African countries, it was impossible to verify the situation.

6.1.1.5 Variable capturing country size

Since ODA is not given to individuals but countries, the population of the recipient country can be important. There might be diseconomies of scale to per capita ODA and, if so, the impact of per capita ODA might be decreasing in the recipient's population (Trumbull and Wall, 1994, p. 878). Therefore, population is captured by its own variable. All studies of motives for aid allocation showed that country size is an important factor of aid allocation. I therefore also expect to see a negative correlation between the size of the population of the recipient country and aid per capita. It seems interesting that none of the authors of the mentioned analyses has studied the impacts of this phenomenon more precisely. However, I believe there might be two reasons for this negative correlation: (1) strengthening political alliances; and (2) the absorptive capacity of the recipient country. Political motives can be explained by the fact that if a donor wants to strengthen political ties with a recipient even a relatively small amount of aid might work to achieve such an effect with aid-fatigued country. Absorptive capacity might limit aid disbursements since aid is usually given for specific projects. Many governments of larger countries are unable to implement and realise many projects at the same time and efficiently use aid. Accordingly, I see this variable as a consequence of a mixture of political motives and rational political/humanitarian motives as donors believe that aid could be better used elsewhere.

6.1.2 The model

As a basis I used a log-log functional form of model similar to that used by Trumball and Wall. All variables except for dummies are in logarithms. In such a model heteroscedasticity should be reduced. As I am studying one period only, I will be unable to include fixed effects in the sample. I had 51 observations; data for all independent African countries, except for Equatorial Guinea and Somalia due to unavailability. All countries in the sample are also on the DAC list of ODA recipients.

The model is specified as follows:

$\log(\text{Aid per capita})_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2\log(\text{Undernourished population})_i + \beta_3\log(\text{Civil/Political Rights})_i + \beta_4\log(\text{Migration})_i + \beta_5\log(\text{Trade})_i + \beta_6(\text{Dummy for former colonies})_i + \beta_7\log(\text{Country size})_i + \varepsilon_i.$

6.1.3 Empirical results

Table 4 summarises the results obtained in the regression.

In the estimated model, the effects of all of the explanatory variables except for the trade variable and former colonies dummy are statistically different from zero. Thus, according to this model, donors have humanitarian and political motives for providing aid to African countries.

Table 4: Regression analysis: Aggregate ODA flows to African countries

Variable	Coefficient
Constant	3.639**
log(Undernourished Population)	0.347**
log(Civil/Political Rights)	-0.519**
log(Migration)	0.125*
log(Trade)	-0.001
(Former colonies dummy)	0.160
log(Country size)	-0.253**
R^2	0.364

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. An '**' indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.

R squared accounts for 0.36, which means that 36 percent of the variability of the logarithm of aid per capita is explained by the linear influence of the logarithms of explanatory variables and the dummy. However, although R squared is not high, this value is not alarming as a lower value of R squared is common when studying intersection data.

6.1.3.1 Colonial past

The dummy for former colonies suggests that countries that were colonised by France, Germany and the United Kingdom receive more aid per capita than other donors' colonies but it is not significant at the aggregate level of aid flows.

6.1.3.2 Political motives

Both variables capturing political motives were significant, which proves the importance of political relations in aid flows to Africa.

Donors clearly reward democratic regimes since if a developing country's government violates rights, which results in a higher index of civil and political rights, aid per capita will decrease. Similar results were obtained in all previous studies on aggregate bilateral ODA for aid disbursements in all aid-receiving countries.

The variable capturing the effects or even fears of migration is also significant. Countries whose residents migrate in larger numbers to OECD countries receive more aid per capita as donors clearly want to prevent unwanted migration flows.

6.1.3.3 Economic motives

The hypothesis that economic openness is desired by donor countries cannot be proved. Not only is the variable that measures the effects of trade insignificant and extremely low in value, but it also has the opposite value to what was expected. There are three possible explanations of this.

First, it might be the case that trade flows vary significantly between donors and that recipients are not equally open to all donors. Hence, trade ties between individual donors and recipients could offset each other when the aggregate effect is considered.

Second, the reason might lie in the unequal import and export shares among African countries. The majority of trade flows to oil-producing countries. Due to their natural resources, these countries are richer than others in terms of GDP and experience higher growth. Therefore, they might seem to have a smaller need for foreign aid. Further, development theories also mention the foreign exchange gap that binds LDCs and hinders their development as they are unable to import intermediate goods and other resources they need for their industries.

Third, Africa's share in world trade is negligible. Due to its low growth rates and economic stagnation, African markets are not expanding as much as in other developing countries. Trade is thus unlikely to be a strong motive for giving aid.

6.1.3.4 Humanitarian motives

The variable capturing humanitarian motives, undernourished population, was positive and significant and thereby proves that countries with as greater physical need receive more aid

compared to those with lower levels of need. More specifically, if the percentage of the undernourished population increases by 1 percent aid per capita increases by 0.3 percent on average. It can thereby be concluded that donors do pursue humanitarian aims in Africa. This result raises hope for Africa since it is in a great need of high quality aid to ensure better human development.

6.1.3.5   *Country size*

The population variable is, as in all models of aid allocation, highly significant. If a recipient's population increases by 1 percent, aid will on average fall by 0.25 percent. As I previously related this variable to political motives, it can be concluded that either donors' pursuit of political alliances or their concerns about the effectiveness of aid can again be proven via this variable. However, since these are two completely different motives no valuable conclusion can be made about the importance of the population variable.

6.2 Donor-by-donor model

The donor-by-donor model is similar to the model of aggregate aid flows. However, I believe studying each donor individually will enable me to provide a richer analysis of aid patterns and reveal motives that remained unnoticed on the aggregate level. I will focus only on the aid flow of the major six donors; United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands.

6.2.1 Explanatory variables

I will try to explain individual donors' motives for aid allocation with similar variables as aggregate bilateral aid flows. Accordingly, I will only alter those variables that might show a better picture if changed.

Table 5: Explanatory variables in the donor-by-donor model of ODA flows

Variable	Measure	Year	Source
ODA p.c. from donor	ODA per capita in USD (2007 constant)	2005-2007 average	OECD, IMF
Undernourished population	Undernourished population as a percentage of the total population	2003-2005 average	UNFAO
Civil and political rights	Sum of two indexes (values from 1 to 7)	2005	Freedom House
Trade	Donor exports (million USD 2007 constant)	2005-2007 average	WTO
Former colonies	Dummy for a donor's former colony (only France, UK and Germany)	20th century	CIA, OECD
Country size	Population (millions)	2005-2007 average	IMF

Since the variables for capturing humanitarian motives, country size and civil and political rights will stay the same, I will not explain them again here. Due to data unavailability for

migration inflows for specific countries, I will also omit this variable. The list of variables used is presented in Table 5.

6.2.1.1 Explanatory variable: ODA per capita

Since I am studying the motives for aid disbursements of individual donors, I will use a three-year average for the 2005 to 2007 period of ODA per capita of the donor in question.

However, ODA disbursements can also be negative because of repayments. As my function is logarithmic, I will have to omit observations with negative numbers.

6.2.1.2 Variable capturing a colonial past

Here I will introduce a dummy variable for each donor's former colony. However, since only three out of six donors (France, United Kingdom and Germany) colonised Africa in the 20th century I will only use a dummy variable when studying their aid flows and omit it in the regression function of the other three.

6.2.1.3 Variable capturing economic motives

In my previous regression I used an index of openness to check whether more economically open countries receive more aid. Here, because I am studying donors individually I will instead look at bilateral trade flows between a donor and recipient in order to capture the specific economic motives of each donor. I will follow the approach of Isopi and Mavrotas who use the absolute value of the bilateral exports of a donor country to a recipient to capture the degree of interest a donor has in the economy of a recipient country. In this case, ODA disbursements based on self-interests will be biased towards countries which naturally tend to have more trade with the donor (Isopi & Mavrotas, 2006, p. 6). One could expect that trade is a determinant of aid; donors grant more aid to those recipients that import more from them. However, some authors suggest that a negative relationship between aid and donor exports can also be observed. Rather than focusing on established export markets, donors might be using aid to promote export ties in countries whose markets have not yet been conquered (Lloyd et al., 1998, p. 6). With this variable I expect to catch the effects of a donor's promotion of its own exports and tied aid.

As explained in chapter about Africa's economic relations, Africa's share in world's exports is negligible. Therefore trade might not be an important determinant of ODA flows. However, trade variable was included into the model with the argument, that if donors pursue economic self-interest in other non African countries, they might do the same in the case of Africa, while not paying attention to its trade volume.

Due to high rates of return on FDI in recent years, providing aid for mitigating risks in African economies might prove to be an important motive. Nevertheless, since rates of return first boosted in the 2005-2007 period, this might not immediately reflect on ODA flows. Yet, studying the effects of FDI on future aid allocations could provide interesting results.

6.2.2 The model

The model had the same functional form as that used for studying bilateral aid flows:

log(Aid per capita)= β_1 + $\beta_2$log(Population Undernourished) + $\beta_3$log(Civil/Political Rights) + $\beta_5$log(Donor exports) + β_6(Dummy for Donor's Colonies) + $\beta_7$log(Country size) + ε_i.

Countries with negative values of aid flows had to be omitted from the model due to its logarithmic form. The analysis of French aid flows included 49 observations – all independent African countries except for Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Lesotho, the analysis of German aid flows had 48 observations – all independent African countries except for Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and Swaziland, while the analysis of Japanese aid flows included 48 observations – all independent African countries except for Algeria, Botswana, Egypt and Equatorial Guinea. For the Netherlands, 49 observations were included – all independent African countries except for Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Tunisia, while for the UK there were 47 observations – all independent African countries except for Cote d'Ivore, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland. In the case of the USA 49 observations were added to the model – all independent African countries except for Equatorial Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia.

6.2.3 Empirical results

Interesting differences among donors are revealed when the aid allocation model is estimated donor by donor. Table 4 displays the results for the six biggest donors.

Table 6: Regression analysis: Donor-by-donor ODA to African countries

Variable	France	UK	USA	Netherlands	Germany	Japan
Constant	0.241	-8.416**	-1.024	-4.646**	1.775*	1.031
log(Undernourished	0.478*	2.153**	0.959**	0.784*	0.062	0.533**
$\beta_2$log(Civil/Political Rights)	-0.374	-1.05	-0.446	-1.224	-0.820**	-0.861**
$\beta_3$log(Donor Exports)	0.687**	0.533**	0.351**	-0.198	0.042	0.229*
β_4(Dummy for Donor's	0.815*	1.596*	-	-	1.042*	-
$\beta_5$log(Population)	-0.820**	0.890**	-0.172	1.252**	0.117**	-0.335**
R^2	0.687	0.586	0.405	0.373	0.166	0.217

An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level. An '**' indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.

6.2.3.1 France

France is often considered an egoistic donor as its motives for aid allocation to countries with the greatest physical need are usually not significant. However, my regression results for France suggest that it does indeed pursue humanitarian aims, but puts a relatively smaller weight on them in comparison to the UK, the USA and the Netherlands. The variable capturing political motives is, as expected and proved by other researchers, insignificant. Aid flows seem to be highly affected by bilateral trade; in comparison to

other donors, France pursues economic motives at the highest level among the donors tested – if French exports to a recipient country increased by 10 percent, aid per capita rose by almost 7 percent on average. The portrayal of France in the literature as foremost promoting the spread of French culture is strongly supported by the statistical results; the dummy for former colonies is found significant and, according to its value, it seems that a colonial past is the most important component of the determination of French aid. The size variable is negative and highly significant; French foreign aid policy is clearly more oriented to smaller countries. In summing up, France pursues many motives for aid allocation in Africa; the most important being a colonial past and economic benefits. However, in recent years French aid flows have also been driven by humanitarian factors.

6.2.3.2   United Kingdom

According to the regression results, the UK is the most altruistic donor as its aid is determined foremost by the humanitarian need of the recipient. If the percentage of an undernourished population increased, the percentage increase in aid was on average more than double. The variable capturing the effects of the level of rights has the right sign as countries with lower levels of rights generally receive less aid, but it is not significant. Bilateral aid flows also effect UK aid disbursements in Africa since there is a significant and positive correlation between the two. The UK is, similarly to France, also promoting is culture and colonial past by making significant differences between its former colonies and other countries. It is interesting to note that the paradox whereby smaller countries received more aid, which holds on the aggregate level, did not hold in the case of the UK; it was positive and highly significant. Generally, smaller countries received less per capita aid than the bigger ones. As I am controlling a colonial past with a dummy variable, it could not be argued that this is due to the fact that many former UK colonies are now large countries. There are two possible explanations. First, as bigger countries are often believed to be more powerful it could be explained that the UK provides aid to make alliances with (future) powerful countries. On the other hand, the British might notice that countries which are bigger in population terms receive less aid per capita and want to mitigate the negative correlation between country size and aid flows of the other donors. However, I did not capture the responsiveness of one donor to the behaviour of the others in the model and therefore could not prove this hypothesis.

6.2.3.3   United States

During the Cold War, the widely held presumption of US aid was that it reflected strategic and ideological interests. However, aid flows to Africa in recent years have shown that humanitarian need is also an important determinant of US aid as the magnitude of the coefficient for undernourished population was sufficiently high and highly significant. Further, the variable capturing political motives has the right sign but was not found significant, as expected based on other analyses. However, Isopi and Mavrotas (1998) argue that the USA sometimes does support less democratic regimes and provides aid to countries where the level of civil liberties is low. If it is concluded that the USA responds

differently to same levels of rights in different countries then this result might not be so rare. The levels of trade and aid were significant and positively correlated. This might be due to the fact that in 2007 roughly one-third of US aid was tied (OECD, 2009).

6.2.3.4   *The Netherlands*

The Dutch are believed to be some of the most altruistic donors. Also the results of the regression above suggest that it is motivated more by recipient needs than by its own interests. There was a high and significant correlation between an undernourished population and aid flows, while trade and aid were negatively correlated, although the trade variable was not significant. The level of rights of the recipient did not determine aid flows to such an extent as to be found significant, although the magnitude was high. Similarly to the case of the UK, the population variable was found significant, but with a different sign than expected. Hence the interpretation is also similar; the Dutch either sought alliances with bigger and more powerful countries or simply wanted to offset the aggregate effect of population size on aid per capita.

6.2.3.5   *Germany*

The regression results for Germany were not as expected. It is believed that Germany emerges as a donor country strongly motivated by recipient needs. However, in my regression this variable is extremely low in magnitude and insignificant. On the other hand, with an insignificant variable capturing the effects of bilateral trade it cannot be argued that Germany had economic interests. However, the variable capturing civil and political rights was found significant and, due to its high value, quite an important factor for aid allocation; the Germans rewarded good policies by providing them with more aid per capita. Further, the colonial past variable was found significant and important as former colonies were favoured and received more aid per person. The variable capturing population size was found to be significant, but with a negative sign and low in magnitude which proves that although Germany provides more aid to bigger countries it does not discriminate too much between different population sizes. In summing up, Germany pursues political and colonial goals in the case of African aid. However, as R squared is low it may be concluded that this model did not catch the real determinants of German ODA.

6.2.3.6   *Japan*

Japan is usually viewed as a donor that foremost follows its economic interests when allocating aid. However, in my regression the variable capturing the relationship between ODA and trade flows was significant and positive, but not too high in magnitude. Japan also noticed the humanitarian needs of the recipients, although it did not put as much weight on them as the UK, USA and Netherlands. The most important factor seemed to be the level of rights. Japan foreign aid policy was more oriented to smaller countries. My findings are similar to those of Isopi and Mavrotas; the Japanese foreign aid process seems to be driven by a combination of altruistic factors and donor self-interests. However,

although higher than in the case of Germany R squared is also low in the case of Japan, meaning that there should be some other important determinants of aid which I did not capture in my model.

In summary, the aid of all donors, with the exception of Germany, was responsive to needs of the recipients. However, most donors also pursued their own interests; trade was positively correlated with French, British, American and Japanese aid flows. Former colonies were favoured. Civil and political rights were not as important as expected as they determined aid flows only in the cases of Japan and Germany. The population variable was generally significant, yet not always of the same sign; some countries such as the UK, Germany and the Netherlands clearly favoured bigger countries, while others (France and Japan) provided more aid to smaller nations.

Conclusion

Official development assistance is regarded as one of the most powerful weapons available for fighting poverty. It is believed that underlying ODA are strong moral values of compassion, equality and solidarity. However, this is not always the case; aid is in fact driven by many motives other than humanitarian ones. This thesis provides a study of the factors that determine aid patterns.

The determinants of aid allocation fall into one of the following categories; a colonial past along with political, economic and humanitarian motives. According to the theory as well as the empiricism, former colonies tend to receive more aid from donors that were their former colonialists as they want to provide compensation for the injustices caused during the colonial period. The oldest motives for providing aid are political. They capture a wide range of interests such as security concerns, showing power, preventing migration flows, rewarding good policies in recipient countries and enlightened self-interest in the form of environmental concerns. Economic self-interest captures investment opportunities and trade. Donors often provide aid just to seek opportunities to expand their markets and to secure valuable imports that are crucial for their own economies. The last category, humanitarian motives, involves a mixture of concerns for the well-being of others and a sense of moral obligation. They include humanitarianism and the promotion of human rights. All of these motives are relevant for aggregate bilateral aid flows as well as for aid flows from individual donors. My hypothesis that in the period since the MDGs were adopted donors still do not only pursue humanitarian motives has been supported. Indeed, I realised that altruism presents just one piece of the complex foreign aid puzzle.

The thesis presents an analysis of bilateral aid flows to African countries in the 2005-2007 period on both the aggregate level and the level of each donor individually. Variables introduced to the model captured all four groups of motives. To measure the importance of colonial ties, a dummy for former colonies of major donors was introduced to the model.

Political motives were summarised into two variables; the level of political and civil rights and migration. Economic interests were measured by the level of trade. How much donors pursue humanitarian motives was captured through the undernourished population variable.

On the aggregate level of bilateral ODA flows, only two motives proved to be important determinants of aid; humanitarian and political. Countries with a greater percentage of an undernourished population generally received more aid per capita. Donors often provided aid to support democratic regimes and to prevent unwanted migration flows.

A more precise study of each of the major donors (France, UK, USA, Germany, Netherlands and Japan), showed that differences among donors and their motives are significant. It may generally be concluded that donors do pursue humanitarian motives; they were the main determinant of UK aid flows but also important in the cases of the USA, the Netherlands, Japan and France. In the post-Cold War era, aid flows seem to be less conditioned on political motives; civil and political rights only proved to be important with Japan and Germany. However, the donor-by-donor analysis showed that economic self-interest is still an important factor; the trade link between donor and recipient proved to be important for France, the USA, the UK and Japan. A colonial past resulted in more aid per capita in the cases of all three donors that colonised Africa in the 20th century.

Africa had high expectations for a better future in new millennium. Developed countries have, by adopting the MDGs, promised to help Africa achieve them. Donors have indeed started to attribute greater weight to the physical needs of recipients and moved away from purely political aims. However, other motives are still being pursued. Africa is, with almost half of its population living below the poverty line, in desperate need of quality aid. Therefore, it is particularly important to study aid flows to Africa; appropriate measures can be taken if it is discovered that aid is not meeting the stated goals.

Povzetek v slovenščini

Uvod

Razvojna pomoč je pomemben dejavnik razvoja najrevnejših držav. Kadar se države donatorke obnašajo altruistično, lahko z razvojno pomočjo rešijo revščine tisoče ljudi. Kadar pa težijo k lastnim interesom, lahko tuja razvojna pomoč še dodatno poslabša gospodarske razmere manj razvitih držav. Afrika zaostaja za ostalimi regijami v mnogih pogledih. Medtem ko življenjski standard v svetu rapidno narašča, se razmere v Afriki slabšajo. Danes skoraj 400 milijonov Afričanov živi pod pragom absolutne revščine. V mnogih afriških državah več kot petina otrok ne dočaka petega leta starosti. Zdravstvena oskrba je dostopna redkim, prav tako tudi izobrazba. Afrika je že prejela veliko razvojne pomoči, ki pa še ni prinesla vidnega napredka. Ravno zato je vprašanje, ali je razvojna pomoč res dana z namenom razvoja, pomembno. Študije, ki bi se ukvarjale s tem vprašanjem in ga preučevale na primeru Afrike, pa so redke.

Naloga analizira vzorce razdeljevanja uradne razvojne pomoči v Afriki. Pri tem sem se oprla na hipotezo, da razvojna pomoč afriškim državam ni pogojena le s humanitarnimi motivi, temveč tudi s kolonialnimi vezmi, političnimi zavezništvi in ekonomskimi interesi.

Naloga je razdeljena v pet poglavij. Prvo definira razvojno pomoč in predstavi pomembne pojme, drugo obravnava splošne motive za dajanje razvojne pomoči, tretje razišče obstoječe študije motivov za bilateralno pomoč in vzorce razdeljevanja, četrto predstavi aktualne razmere v Afriki, zadnje pa ponudi empirično analizo tokov bilateralne razvojne pomoči. Uporabila sem metodo študija literature in statistično analizo podatkov z ekonometričnim programom Soritec.

Cilj naloge je razkriti, kateri dejavniki vplivajo na razdeljevanje pomoči v afriških državah. Glede na to, da so študije, ki se na primeru Afrike ukvarjajo s tovrstno tematiko, redke, upam, da bo ta naloga lahko prispevala k ozaveščanju o razmerah v Afriki in pomoči, kakršno ponujamo najrevnejšim prebivalcem sveta.

Osnovna načela bilateralne razvojne pomoči

Organizacija za ekonomsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) opredeljuje uradno razvojno pomoč (ODA – Official Development Assistance) kot "koncesijske kredite in nepovratna sredstva iz javnih virov, ki so dodeljena manj razvitim državam z namenom spodbujanja ekonomskega razvoja in povečanja blagostanja" (IMF, 2001, str. 5). Finančni in kapitalni tokovi morajo izpolnjevati dva kriterija, da štejejo za razvojno pomoč; (1) njihov namen mora biti nekomercialen; (2) dani morajo biti po koncesijskih pogojih, kar pomeni, da morata biti obrestna mera in čas odplačevanja manj stroga kot pri komercialnih kreditih, hkrati pa morajo vsebovati darilno komponento v višini vsaj 25 odstotkov (Todaro, 2006, str. 718).

Bilateralni tokovi ODA zavzemajo prispevke vladnih agencij držav darovalk, ki so dani neposredno državam v razvoju. Pri tem v bilateralno razvojno pomoč ne sodi pomoč, ki se prerazdeli v manj razviti svet prek multilateralnih insitucij.

Približno 70 odstotkov uradne razvojne pomoči predstavljajo bilateralni tokovi, ostala sredstva pa se prerazdelijo prek multilateralnih organizacij, kot so Evropska komisija, Združeni Narodi (ZN) in Svetovna banka (IDA, 2007, str. 4). Večina donatorjev bilateralne razvojne pomoči so najbolj razvite države organizacije OECD, ki skupaj sestavljajo Odbor za razvojno pomoč (DAC – Development Assistance Committee) (Thirlwall, 1994, str. 331). Članice DAC vključujejo Avstralijo, Avstrijo, Belgijo, Kanado, Dansko, Finsko, Francijo, Nemčijo, Grčijo, Irsko, Italijo, Japonsko, Luksemburg, Nizozemsko, Novo Zelandijo, Norveško, Portugalsko, Španijo, Švedsko, Veliko Britanijo in Združene države Amerike. Omenjene države prispevajo več kot 95 odstotkov sredstev celotne razvojne pomoči. V letu 2006 so ponudile 103 milijarde USD, kar je 0,31 odstotka njihovega bruto narodnega dohodka (BND). V absolutnih številkah je največji donator ZDA, sledijo pa ji Japonska, Nemčija, Francija in VB (OECD, 2003). Vendar pa nobena izmed naštetih držav ne izpolnjuje cilja ZN, ki določa, da bi morale razvite države donirati vsaj 0,7 odstotka svojega BND. Edine države, ki dosegajo ta cilj, so Norveška, Švedska, Nizozemska, Danska in Luksemburg, ki darujejo približno en odstotek svojega BND (OECD, 2009). V zadnjih letih je veliko sredstev za razvojno bilateralno pomoč prispevala tudi Organizacija držav izvoznic nafte (OPEC – Organisation of petrolium exporting countries), vendar pa je njena razvojna pomoč usmerjena predvsem v arabske in muslimanske države (Raffer & Singer, 1996, str. 13). Pred kratkim se je seznam držav donatork ODA, ki niso članice DAC oziroma OPEC, povečal; poleg razvitih držav, kot so Islandija, Izrael in Taiwan, je na njem moč najti tudi države v razvoju, ki so same tudi prejemnice ODA. Primeri takšnih držav so Indija, Kitajska, Brazilija in Egipt; te države sicer prispevajo manjše zneske, ki simbolično predstavljajo medsebojno solidarnost (Raffer & Singer, 1996, str. 119–123).

Do sredstev ODA so upravičene le države, ki jih članice DAC potrdijo in uvrstijo na seznam prejemnikov uradne razvojne pomoči. Pri tem je glavni kriterij višina BND na prebivalca. V obdobju od 2001 do 2005 je bilo okoli 67 odstotkov sredstev ODA doniranih v države z najnižjimi dohodki. Največ pomoči je leta 2007 prejel Irak, čeprav njegov BND ni bil med najnižjimi; sledili so mu Afganistan, Tanzanija, Vietnam, Etiopija, Pakistan in Sudan. Praviloma prejmejo države z majhno populacijo več pomoči na prebivalca kot velike; v samem vrhu prejemnic so namreč majhne otoške države, kot so Salomonovi otoki, Kapverdski otoki, Tonga, Granada, in države, v katerih se odvijajo oboroženi spopadi, to so Kongo in okupirana palestinska ozemlja. Vse naštete države so prejele več kot 300 USD pomoči na prebivalca (UNDP, 2009).

Motivi za bilateralno razvojno pomoč

Države donatorke pogosto trdijo, da so njihovi motivi za nudenje razvojne pomoči izključno humanitarni. Vendar pa obširne študije o motivih za dajanje razvojne pomoči dokazujejo, da donatorji sledijo političnim, ekonomskim in strateškim ciljem, ki močno vplivajo na izbiro držav prejemnic pomoči. Razvojni cilji so pri tem pogosto pozabljeni

(Isopi & Mavrotas, 2006, str. 1). Vendar pa naj bi milenijski razvojni cilji (MDGs – Millennium Develoment Goals) vodili k bolj strateškemu načinu izbire držav prejemnic v smislu usmerjenosti k humanitarnim ciljem (OECD, 2006).

Skozi zgodovino se je teža motivov in interesov donatorjev spreminjala; za najpomembnejše pa so se izkazale štiri skupine motivov: (1) kompenzacija za krivice, storjene v času kolonializma, (2) geostrateški in politični cilji, (3) ekonomski motivi in širjenje trgov ter (4) humanitarni motivi in etične obveze (Leisinger, 2000, str. 10).

Ob koncu obdobja kolonializacije nobena od novonastalih držav ni imela potrebnega znanja, ne zadovoljive infrastrukture, ki bi ji omogočila rešitev gospodarskih, političnih in razvojnih težav, s katerimi se je soočala. Nekdanji kolonizatorji so svojim nekdanjim kolonijam namenili velike vsote razvojne pomoči, s katero so želeli kolonijam omogočiti nov začetek, hkrati pa sebi olajšati slabo vest zaradi dolgoletnega izkoriščanja (Leisinger, 2000, str. 11). Vendar se teža motiva kolonialne preteklosti močno razlikuje med državami donatorkami, kar odraža tudi različne načine kolonializacije ter jakost vezi med kolonijami in imperialnimi velesilami. Študije so pokazale, da je skoraj vsa pomoč Portugalske usmerjena v nekdanje kolonije, medtem ko je bila v primerih Avstralije, Belgije, Francije in Velike Britanije več kot polovica pomoči v zadnjih treh desetletjih 20. stoletja ponujena nekdanjim kolonijam (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, str. 28).

Politična motivacija za nudenje pomoči je najstarejša izmed vseh; začela se je po drugi svetovni vojni z Marshallovim planom, prek katerega je sredstva prejela opustošena Evropa, čeprav je veliko afriških, azijskih in latinskoameriških držav kazalo večjo potrebo po razvojni pomoči. Razvojna pomoč je pomembno vlogo odigrala med hladno vojno, še danes pa služi mnogim političnim interesom. Politični motivi zavzemajo (1) varnostne interese, (2) izkazovanje moči, (3) razsvetljene lastne interese, (4) preprečevanje migracij in (5) nagrajevanje zaželenih politik. V času hladne vojne je ODA odigrala pomembno politično vlogo, saj je prek financiranja razvoja držav tretjega sveta postala sredstvo za boj proti komunizmu in s tem ohranjanje stabilnosti in varnosti zahodnega sveta (Todaro, 2006, str. 722; Bauer, 1993, str. 9). Nudenje pomoči lahko pomeni tudi podpiranje zaveznikov in prijateljskih odnosov med državami; razvojna pomoč tako torej sledi istim ciljem kot državna obrambna politika, ampak z nižjimi stroški in večjo učinkovitostjo (van der Veen, 2000, str. 121). Pomoč deloma zagotavlja tudi globalni mir, saj so socialne neenakosti tudi na mednarodni ravni lahko povod za nemire (Leisinger, 2000, str. 13); nekatere študije dokazujejo, da države, ki mejijo na konfliktna območja, dobijo več pomoči kot države, kjer ni nemirov (Balla, 2008, str. 2567–2584). ODA lahko tudi korsti državam donatorkam, da pridobijo večjo moč v mednarodnem merilu in pridobijo večji vpliv v mednarodnih institucijah. Alesina in Dollar dokazujeta, da manj razvite države, katerih glasovi v ZN sledijo glasovom glavnih donatorjev, dobijo več pomoči kot ostale (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, str. 16). Razsvetljeni lastni interesi izhajajo iz dejstva, da sta razviti in manj razviti svet vzajemno odvisna drug od drugega. Razvite države manj razvitim pogosto nudijo pomoč za različne ekološke projekte, s čimer želijo preprečiti čezmerno izsekavanje tropskih gozov in omejiti izpuščanje toplogrednih plinov (Leisinger, 2000, str. 13). V 90-ih letih je vprašanje beguncev in migrantov postalo pomemben dejavnik

dodeljevanja pomoči. Z nudenjem pomoči se ZDA in EU pogosto trudita izboljšati pogoje in ustvariti nova delovna mesta v državah, iz katerih prihaja največ migrantov, da bi s tem zajezila tokove migrantov v lastne države (Leisinger, 2000, str. 12). Zato so bile v zadnjem času velike vsote pomoči usmerjene v vzhodnoevropske in karibske države (Forsyth, 2007, str. 37). Donatorke pogosto nudijo več pomoči državam, ki sledijo s strani držav donatork zaželenim političnim ciljem; študije dokazujejo, da država, ki se začne demokratizirati, dobi v povprečju 50 odstotkov več pomoči (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, str. 12).

Države donatorke uporabljajo pomoč tudi kot inštrument za povečanje svoje lastne blaginje. Ekonomski motivi vključujejo (1) investiranje, (2) spodbujanje izvoza in (3) zagotavljanje nemotene preskrbe s pomembnimi uvoženimi surovinami. Večina donatork z razvojno pomočjo podpira programe, ki v manj razvitih državah odpirajo vrata domačim podjetjem in investitorjem. Poleg tega krediti, ki so sicer dani po koncesijskih pogojih, še vedno prinašajo obresti posojilodajalcu (Thirlwall, 1994, str. 327). Sredstva razvojne pomoči so pogosto donirana z namenom širjenja trgov in povečanja izvoza. Z nudenjem dobrin in storitev iz sektorjev, ki jih prizadene ciklično gibanje gospodarstva, države donatorke pogosto rešujejo problem nezaposlenosti v lastnih državah in manjšajo učinke recesij. S tem je nekaj stroškov donatorjevih domačih politik prenesenih na države v razvoju (Raffer & Singer, 1996, str. 8). Najbolj očitna vez med izvozom in pomočjo je vezana pomoč. Pogosta oblika vezane pomoči so mešani krediti, kjer donatorji nudijo izvozne subvencije domačim podjetjem, ki poslujejo z državami v razvoju. Čeprav je tudi vezana pomoč dana z razvojnimi cilji, ima pogosto negativen učinek na razvoj manj razvitih držav, saj so dobrine v takšnih pogojih pogosto dražje ali državi nepotrebne (Morrissey, 1991, str. 106–107). Nekatere države nudijo pomoč državam zato, da bi si zagotovile nemoten dostop do pomembnih surovin, ki so ključne za njihova gospodarstva (van der Veen, str 119). Pomoč je tako pogosto dana državam, ki že predstavljajo pomembne trgovske partnerice, ali tudi tistim, ki bi z razvojem in nadaljnjim sodelovanjem to lahko postale (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998, str. 312).

Humanitarni motivi vključujejo (1) moralne motive in humanitarizem, (2) podporo spoštovanju človekovih pravic in (3) izkazovanje podpore demokratičnim režimom. Zadnji motiv je deloma tudi političen. Moralni motivi izhajajo iz prepričanja, da je človekova moralna dolžnost, da prepreči trpljenje drugih, posebno kadar se mu zato ni treba odpovedati zadovoljevanju lastnih življenjsko nujnih potreb (Opeskin, 1996, str. 23–24). Mnoge študije tokov razvojne pomoči so dokazale prisotnost tega motiva pri izbiri držav prejemnic razvojne pomoči; motiv je postal izrazitejši v času po koncu hladne vojne (Banyopadhyay & Wall, 2006, str. 10). V zadnjih desetletjih so se donatorke začele zanimati za domače politike držav prejemnic pomoči in stopnja upoštevanja človekovih pravic je postala pomemben kriterij pri izbiranju držav. Razvojni programi so praviloma pod okriljem demokratičnih in humanih vlad bolj trajnostni v daljšem obdobju. Vendar pa so manj razvite države pogosto nezaupljive do takšnih kriterijev, saj jih občutijo kot vmešavanje v svojo neodvisnost (Raffer & Singer, 1996, str. 165). Empirične študije dokazujejo, da nenadno zmanjšanje političnih in civilnih pravic vodi v sunkovito zmanjšanje razvojne pomoči (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, str. 21).

Pregled literature: študije motivov za razvojno pomoč

V literaturi se pojavlja kar nekaj študij, ki skušajo razložiti odločitve držav donatork o alokaciji razvojne pomoči. Nekatere med njimi preučujejo agregatne tokove razvojne pomoči, druge obravnavajo individualno motive vsake države donatorke. Trumbull in Wall (1994), Alesina in Dollar (1998) ter Bandyopadhyay in Wall (2006) so preučevali bilateralne tokove ODA in v svojih študijah testirali širši nabor motivov, kot so BDP na prebivalca, umrljivost novorojenčkov, politične in civilne pravice, velikost populacije, kolonialna preteklost, učinkovitost vlade in ekonomska odprtost. Skupne ugotovitve vseh študij so bile, da države donatorke sledijo predvsem političnim ciljem, vendar pa vlogo igrajo tudi humanitarni motivi. Alesina in Dollar sta hkrati tudi dokazala, da sta tako kolonialna preteklost kot tudi ekonomska odprtost izrednega pomena pri določanju vzorcev razdeljevanja pomoči.

Poglobljeno analizo obnašanja individualnih donatorjev so predstavili Alesina in Dollar (1998), ki sta v analizo vključila vse prejemnice uradne razvojne pomoči, ter Schraeder, Hook in Taylor (1998), ki so se osredotočili na Afriko. Čeprav se njihovi rezultati deloma razlikujejo, je iz obeh študij razvidno, da vsi preučevani donatorji upoštevajo humanitarne motive, medtem ko so v primeru ZDA in Japonske prisotni tudi močni ekonomski in politični interesi, v primeru Francije pa kolonialna preteklost.

Primer Afrike: trenutno stanje

Afrika dosega najslabše rezultate med celinami sveta v mnogo pogledih; pesti jo veliko število podhranjenega prebivalstva, dosega nizko raven BDP, izčrpavajo jo trajajoče vojne in ponavljajoče se diktature, hkrati pa je z zelo nizkim odstotkom izvoza in uvoza skoraj izolirana od ostalega globaliziranega sveta.

Dobi trgovine sužnjev in kolonializma sta Afriko povsem izčrpali. Trgovina s sužnji se je že v 18. stoletju razširila čez celotni kontinent in zmanjšala obseg produktivne delovne sile in s tem ohromila gospodarski razvoj (Amin, 1972, 106–118). Prava kolonizacija pa se je začela konec 19. stoletja, ko je celino zavzelo šest narodov; največje dele so si priborili Britanci in Francozi, nekoliko manjše pa Nemci, Nizozemci, Italjani in Portugalci (CIA, 2009). Čeprav so se načini kolonizacije med seboj razlikovali, so bili cilji kolonizatorjev enaki; prilaščanje surovin in izkoriščanje poceni delovne sile. Bretocchi in Canova (2001, str. 1868) sta v študiji o vzrokih za slabo razvitost Afrike ugotovila, da imajo posledice kolonizacije močne učinke na današnjo gospodarsko rast. Drugi razlog za slabo razvitost leži v sporih in vojnah med afriškimi državami; za napete odnose so vsaj delno krivi kolonialisti, ki so si ozemlja razdelili tako, da so zarisali ravne črte po zemljevidu, pri čemer niso upoštevali etničnih skupin in političnih enot (The Scrambe for Africa, 1999). Večina afriških držav se je osamosvojila v 50-ih in 60-ih letih 20. stoletja. Z razglasitvijo neodvisnoti se je gospodarska situacija v mnogih afriških državah izboljšala, vendar pa po drugi strani osamosvojitev ni potekala gladko; pripeljala je do številnih konfliktov in razkrila probleme manjkajočih kadrov in znanja za vodenje držav (Shah, 2009). Glede na uničujoče posledice kolonizacije je očitno, zakaj donatorji pogosto sledijo kolonialnim

motivom pri alokaciji razvojne pomoči; gre za simbolični prevzem odgovornosti za pretekla dejanja.

Oboroženi spopadi so v Afriki stalnica; v zadnjih 30 letih je bilo v vojni udeleženih več kot polovica afriških držav. Vzroki konfliktov ležijo v politični korupciji, kršenju človekovih pravic, nespoštovanju zakonov in kolonialni preteklosti (Shah, 2009). Balla (2008, str. 2566–2585) je v študiji tokov ODA dokazala, da politični motivi za zagotavljanje mednarodnega miru in strahu pred širjenjem konfliktov pomembno usmerjajo denarne tokove razvojne pomoči, saj države, udeležene v konfliktih, v povprečju prejmejo več pomoči kot druge. Afrika je v pogledu političnih in civilnih pravic precej raznolika; medtem ko prebivalci petine držav uživajo osebno in politično svobodo, so v več kot tretjini držav nesvobodni z močno omejenim naborom človekovih pravic (Freedom House, 2009a, str. 1–5). V zadnjih desetletjih so razvojne agencije namenile veliko denarja za spodbujanje demokracije v afriških državah; ZDA same so za to namenile šest odstotkov celotne pomoči, ki so je nudile Afriki (Brown, 2005, str. 181–182).

Afriko pesti nizka vključenost v globalni trgovinski sistem; njen delež izvoza v svetu je v 20. stoletju postopno padal in dosegel 3,1 odstotka v letu 2007 (WTO, 2008). Razlogi za nizko vključenost ležijo v pomanjkanju za trgovanje primerne infrastrukture, kot so prevozni koridoriji, potrebne institucije in informacijski sistemi, ki bi jo povezali z globalnim trgom (AfDB, WTO & UN, 2007). Večina afriških držav izvaža pretežno primarne produkte, zato so zelo občutljive na nihanje cen surovin na svetovnem trgu (UN, 2008b, str. 29–76), uvaža pa visokotehnološke dobrine, nafto, motorna vozila in intermediarne dobrine (European Comission, 2009). Glavne trgovinske partnerje Afriki predstavljajo EU, ZDA in Kitajska (Diemond, 2009, str. 6). Čeprav EU Afriki predstavlja pomemben trg za njene izdelke, je delež Afirke v trgovini EU zanemarljiv. Gospodarska stagnacija afriških držav v zadnjih desetletjih 90-ih let je negativno vplivala na evropske izvoznike, ki so pogosto pričakovali hitrejše višanje kupne moči in s tem rasti trgov (Collier & Gunning, 1995, str. 407). Zato nudeje pomoči z namenom rasti afriških trgov in povečanja lastnega izvoza ne more biti pomemben motiv za alokacijo uradne razvojne pomoči, saj bi enaka količina sredstev prinesla vidnejše rezultate v večini drugih držav v razvoju. Situacija na področju neposrednih tujih investicij pa je drugačna. Od leta 2005 naprej so kapitalski donosi začeli naraščati in so v letu 2007 znašali 12 odstotkov, kar je bil najvišji rezultat med razvijajočimi se regijami (AfDB, WTO & UN, 2007). Najbolj priljubljene destinacije so bile države izvoznice nafte (Ford, 2008). Ker razvojna pomoč ne le utre pot domačim investitorjem držav donatork, temveč tudi zmanjša tveganja, bi investiranje tako lahko postalo mnogo pomembnejši dejavnik razvojne pomoči v prihodnosti (Asiedu, Yin & Nandwa, 2009, str. 268–275).

Afrika še v 21. stoletju doživlja razvojno krizo; povprečni BDP na prebivalca je več kot 30-krat manjši od BDP-ja držav OECD, kar se odraža v tem, da skoraj 40 odstotkov prebivalstva živi z manj kot 1,25 USD na dan (IMF, 2009; AfDB, 2006, p. 43). Čeprav je gospodarska rast presegla pet odstotkov letno v obdobju 2005–2007, je dejansko rast beležilo le nekaj držav izvoznic nafte, medtem ko je gospodarstvo ostalih stagniralo

(UNECA, 2007, str. 2). Regijo, kjer ima le peščica prebivalcev dostop do zdravstvenih storitev, pestijo številne bolezni; kar šest odstotkov prebivalstva je okuženih s HIV, smrtnost novorojenčkov pa je v večini držav podsaharske Afrike več kot 10-odstotna (WB, 2009c). Petina prebivalstva je podhranjenega (UNFAO, 2009). Afrika ima še dolgo pot za dosego univerzalne izobrazbe; trenutno je kar tretjina Afričanov nepismenih (WB, 2009b). Socialne razmere celotne regije kažejo na močno potrebo po zunanji pomoči; ravno zato je pomembno, da se donatorji pri razdeljevanju razvojne pomoči ozirajo tudi na ta dejstva.

V obdobju od 2005 do 2007 je Afrika prejela več kot tretjino celotne globalne pomoči; skoraj 70 odstotkov le-te so prispevale članice države DAC, kar je enako 123 milijonom USD. Največje zneske razvojne pomoči so namenile ZDA, Francija, Velika Britanija, Nemčija, Japonska in Nizozemska (OECD, 2009).

Primer Afrike: Empirična analiza tokov bilateralne razvojne pomoči

Tokove bilateralne pomoči ODA sem analizirala na dva načina; začela sem s študijo agregatnih tokov in nadaljevala s preučevanjem vsake države donatorke posebej. Zaradi pomanjkljivosti in nezanesljivosti podatkov držav donatork, ki niso članice DAC, sem v analizo vključila le pomoč zadnjih; s tem sem zajela 70 odstotkov sredstev ODA.

Za analizo agregatnih tokov sem za odvisno spremenljivko izbrala povprečno bilateralno ODA na prebivalca v obdobju 2005–2007, s čimer sem skušala omiliti učinke enkratnih izjemnih nadpovprečnih izplačil pomoči. Da bi zajela vplive dejansko razdeljene pomoči, sem raje kot obveze donatorjev za nudenje sredstev izbrala dejanska izplačila.

V model sem vključila šest neodvisnih spremenljivk, ki glede na preučeno situacijo in teoretično ozadje najbolj vplivajo na alokacijo pomoči; (1) kolonialno preteklost, (2) civilne in politične pravice, (3) migracijske tokove, (4) trgovino, (5) podhranjenost populacije in (6) velikost države.

Študije agregatnih tokov ODA navadno merijo vpliv kolonialne preteklosti s primerjavo prejemkov držav, ki so nekoč bile kolonizirane, s prejemki držav, ki nikoli niso bile kolonije. Vendar pa je glede na preteklost Afrike to nesmiselno, saj le dve državi nista bili nikoli kolonizirani. Med šestimi glavnimi kolonizatorji Afrike v 20. stoletju so le trije vidni donatorji, ki so posamično prispevali vsak vsaj 10 odstotkov celotne ODA, namenjene Afriki. To so Francija, Velika Britanija in Nemčija (OECD, 2009). Da bi ugotovila, ali nekdanje kolonije teh treh držav prejmejo več uradne razvojne pomoči kot ostale, sem za ta motiv uvedla slamnato spremenljivko.

Za merjenje učinkov političnih motivov sem vpeljala dve spremenljivki; indeks političnih in civilnih pravic ter migracijske tokove. Indeks političnih in civilnih pravic, ki meri deloma tudi humanitarne motive, sem povzela po organizaciji Freedom House, ki države ocenjuje na lestvici 1–7, pri čemer so prebivalci držav, ki imajo indeks 1, najbolj svobodni. S tem sem želela raziskati, če države donatorke namenjajo več pomoči demokratičnim

državam in se tako posredno vmešavajo v notranje politike držav prejemnic. Z analizo migracijskih tokov iz afriških držav v države članice DAC sem želela ugotoviti, če donatorke ponudijo več pomoči državam, iz katerih prihaja večje število migrantov, da bi s tem preprečile nezaželene tokove migrantov v lastne države. Zaradi številnih konfliktov, ki divjajo po Afriki, sem sprva želela vpeljati tudi indeks militarizacije. Vendar pa sem našla močno negativno povezavo med stopnjo političnih in civilnih pravic ter stopnjo militarizacije; manj svobodne države navadno namenijo več sredstev za militarne namene in bi z vključitvijo indeksa militarizacije prišlo do problema avtokorelacije in s tem nepravih rezultatov.

Ekonomske motive sem zajela z indeksom odprtosti držav prejemnic napram državam članicam DAC, ki je merjen kot vsota vrednosti uvoza in izvoza posamezne afriške države glede na njen BDP. S tem sem želela ugotoviti, če donatorke nagrajujejo ekonomsko odprtost.

Humanitarne motive mnogo avtorjev meri z BDP na prebivalca ali (in) z umrljivostjo novorojenčkov. Sama sem izbrala raje odstotek podhranjene populacije, saj se mi zdi v primerjavi s prejšnjima dvema primernejši; BDP na prebivalca lahko namreč daje lažne podatke, saj so lahko neenakosti med prebivalci znotraj držav velike, medtem ko umrljivost dojenčkov v primerjavi s podhranjenostjo ne zajeme potreb celotne populacije. S to spremenljivko, ki zajema humanitarne motive, sem skušala ugotoviti, kakšno moč imajo fizične potrebe prebivalstva na države donatorke.

V model sem vključila tudi spremenljivko, ki zajema velikost populacije države prejemnice, saj je le-ta lahko pomembna, ker je ODA dodeljena državam, in ne posameznikom. Če donatorji državam z večjo populacijo resnično namenjajo manj pomoči na prebivalca, lahko razlog za to leži v tem, da velike države niso sposobne učinkovito uporabiti proporcionalno večje količine pomoči za razvoje projekte ali pa je le-ta pogosto ponujena z namenom utrjevanja političnih zavezništev, pri čemer je pomembnejši absolutni kot relativni znesek.

Da bi zmanjšala učinke heteroskedastičnosti, sem vse spremenljivke v modelu z izjemo slamnate zapisala v logoritmih. Vse ocenjene spremenljivke z izjemo ekonomske odprtosti in kolonialne preteklosti so bile statistično značilne. Kolonialna preteklost se ni izkazala kot pomemben motiv na ravni agregatnih tokov razvojne pomoči. Spremenljivka, ki je zajela vpliv pravic na tokove ODA, je pokazala, da donatorji resnično nudijo več pomoči bolj demokratičnim državam. Preprečevanje migracijskih tokov se je prav tako izkazalo kot motiv pri alokaciji razvojne pomoči. Zanimivo je, da spremenljivka, ki je ugotavljala učinke ekonomske odprtosti, ni bila le neznačilna, temveč je imela tudi drugačen predznak od pričakovanega. Države donatorke na primeru Afrike torej ne iščejo lastnih ekonomskih interesov v takšni meri, da bi bili razvidni na ravni agregatnih tokov razvojne pomoči. Razlog za to lahko leži v slabi vključenosti Afrike v svetovno trgovino ali pa so posamezne države različno odprte napram različnim donatorjem. Humanitarni motivi so očitno

odigrali pomembno vlogo, saj so države z večjim odstotkom podhranjenega prebivalstva prejele več pomoči. Spremenljivka, ki je merila velikost države, se je prav tako izkazala za pozitivno, kar potrjuje to, da donatorji verjamejo v disekonomije obsega pri razdeljevanju sredstev ODA.

Model, v katerem sem obravnavala države donatorke posamezno, je precej podben modelu agregatnih tokov ODA, vendar pa preučevanje donatorjev posamično prikaže pomembne razlike med donatorji in omogoča podrobnejšo analizo. Osredotočila sem se na šest največjih darovalcev ODA v afriške države; Francijo, Veliko Britanijo, ZDA, Japonsko, Nemčijo in Nizozemsko. Spremenljivke, ki so merile vpliv humanitarnih motivov, civilnih in političnih pravic ter velikost države, so ostale enake, spremenljivko, ki je merila vpliv migracijskih tokov, pa sem morala zaradi slabe dostopnosti podatkov za posamezno državo donatorko izpustiti.

Za odvisno spremenljivko sem v tem modelu izbrala povprečno ODA posameznega donatorja v obdobju 2005–2007. Tokovi ODA imajo lahko tudi negativen predznak zaradi odplačevanja, vendar ker delam z logoritmičnim modelom, sem morala takšne vrednosti izpustiti.

Pri preučevanju vpliva kolonialne preteklosti sem v model vključila slamnate spremenljivke za države, ki so bile nekoč kolonije donatorja; vendar le v primeru Francije, Nemčije in Velike Britanije, saj ostale tri države donatorke v 20. stoletju niso kolonizirale Afrike.

Ekonomskih motivov sem se v tem modelu lotila drugače; za spremenljivko sem izbrala absolutno vrednost izvoza države donatorke v posamezno afriško državo. S tem sem zajela dejanski interes posamezne države in ugotovila, ali donatorji preferirajo prejemnike, s katerimi več trgujejo.

Model sem ocenila za vsako izmed držav donatork posebej. Francija je pri nudenju pomoči ODA zasledovala humanitarne motive, čeprav so imeli ti pri njej precej manjšo težo kot pri drugih donatorjih. V njenem primeru sta se kot najpomembnejši izkazali trgovina in kolonialna preteklost, saj je država prejemnicam, s katerimi je več trgovala oziroma imela skupno kolonialno preteklost, namenila precej več pomoči kot ostalim. Francija pa, kot ugotavljajo že mnogi avtorji, svoje pozornosti ne posveča internim politikam držav prejemnic. Velika Britanija se je izkazala kot najbolj altruistični donator pomoči ODA, saj je imel odstotek podhranjene populacije pri njej največjo moč. Vendar pa sta bila kot motiva prisotna tudi kolonialna preteklost in ekonomski interesi. Tudi ZDA je več pomoči namenila državam z večjim deležem podhranjene populacije. Hkrati pa je zasledovala tudi ekonomske interese. Čeprav se ZDA pogosto smatra za donatorja, ki se največkrat vmešava v politiko držav v razvoju, v tem primeru ni bilo tako, saj je bil koeficient pravic statistično neznačilen. Nizozemsko pogosto smatramo za altruistično državo donatorko. Na primeru Afrike je potrdila ta motiv, hkrati pa nobeden izmed ostalih motivov razen

velikosti države ni bil statistično značilen, kar pomeni, da drugi motivi ne vplivajo na njene alokacije razvojne pomoči. Zanimivo pa je, da je v primeru Nizozemske velikost države statistično značilna, vendar ima drugačen predznak od pričakovanega; večje države z več prebivalci dobijo več pomoči na prebivalca. To bi lahko pojasnila dva motiva; država opazuje alokacijo razvojne pomoči drugih držav in skuša kompenzirati nasprotne učinke drugih držav donatork ali pa išče zavezništva z večjimi državami. Rezultati za Nemčijo so bili popolnoma drugačni od pričakovanih; Nemčija pri alokaciji ni upoštevala potreb prebivalstva. Zanimale je niso niti ekonomske zmožnosti, temveč kolonialna preteklost in interne politike držav prejemnic, saj so bolj demokratične države dobile več pomoči. Vendar pa je bil R-kvadrat veliko nižji kot v primeru ostalih držav donatork, kar pomeni, da so bili motivi Nemčije za razdeljevanje pomoči drugačni od predpostavljenih. Japonska slovi kot donator, ki je močno usmerjen v lastne ekonomske interese. Vendar pa je analiza japonskih tokov ODE pokazala, da država poleg ekonomskih sledi tudi humanitarnim in političnim motivom.

Zaključek

Uradna razvojna pomoč lahko prepolovi število podhranjenih, bolnih in neizobraženih prebivalcev tretjega sveta. Vrednote, na katerih sloni koncept pomoči manj razvitim državam, naj bi bile sočutje, enakost in solidarnost. Vendar pa je realna slika pogosto drugačna; tokove sredstev razvojne pomoči pogosto vodijo drugi dejavniki, ki ne sovpadajo s ciljem zmanjšanja revščine.

Dejavniki, ki določajo alokacijo razvojne pomoči, vključujejo kolonialno preteklost ter politične, ekonomske in humanitarne motive. Teorija pravi, da države, ki so nekoč bile kolonizirane, dobijo več pomoči od svojih nekdanjih kolonizatorjev, saj ti želijo s pomočjo ponuditi kompenzacijo za izkoriščanje lokalnega prebivalstva in naravnih virov koloniziranih območij. Najstarejši motivi za nudenje pomoči so politični; ti zajemajo širok nabor interesov, kot so skrb za varnost, izkazovanje moči, preprečevanje migracijskih tokov, nagrajevanje dobrih politik in pa spodbujanje razvijajočih se držav v varovanje okolja. Ekonomski interesi vključujejo investicijske možnosti in trgovino. Donatorji si pogosto želijo povečati izvozni delež ali pa zavarovati pomembne uvozne surovine, ki jih dobivajo iz držav prejemnic pomoči. Humanitarni motivi vključujejo mešanico altruistične skrbi za druge in občutka moralne dolžnosti; vključujejo motiva humanitarizem in promocija človekovih pravic. Moja hipoteza, da v letih po sprejetju milenijskih razvojnih ciljev, ki zastavljajo resne časovne okvirje za prepolovitev revščine, doseg univerzalne izobrazbe in zmanjšanje umrljivosti dojenčkov, države donatorke še vedno ne sledijo le humanitarnim motivom, temveč v ospredje pogosto prihajajo tudi zgodovinske povezave ter politčni in ekonomski interesi, se je izkazala za pravilno.

Naloga predstavlja analizo agregatnih in indiviualnih bilateralnih tokov uradne razvojne pomoči v obdobju med letoma 2005 in 2007. Spremenljivke, ki sem jih vpeljala v model, so zajele vse štiri skupine motivov. Politični motivi so bili strnjeni v dve spremenljivki;

stopnjo civilnih in človekovih pravic v državi prejemnici pomoči in migracijske tokove iz držav prejemnic v države donatorke. Ekonomski interesi so bili merjeni z obsegom trgovine. Koliko donatorji upoštevajo humanitarne motive, sem merila z odstotkom podhranjene populacije.

Na ravni agregatne pomoči sta se kot pomembni izkazali le dve kategoriji motivov; humanitarni in politični. Države z večjim odstotkom podhranjenega prebivalstva so praviloma prejele več pomoči na prebivalca. Države donatorke so pogosto ponudile pomoč kot nagrado za demokratične režime v državi prejemnici ali kot sredstvo v boju pred migracijami prebivalstva revnejših držav v države donatorke.

Posamezna obravnava vsake izmed na področju Afrike vidnejših držav donatork (Francija, Velika Britanija, ZDA, Nemčija, Nizozemska in Japonska) je pokazala, da različni donatorji pri alokaciji pomoči sledijo različnim motivom. V splošnem lahko zaključimo, da države donatorke sledijo humanitarnim motivom, saj so bili le-ti glavna determinanta pomoči Velike Britanije, vendar tudi pomembno značilni v primerih ZDA, Nizozemske, Japonske in Francije. Danes so politični motivi manj pomembni kot v času hladne vojne, saj sta demokratične države preferirali le Japonska in Nemčija. Analiza je razkrila, da so trgovske vezi pomembne v primeru Francije, ZDA, Velike Britanije in Japonske. Vse tri države, ki so kolonizirale Afriko v 20. stoletju, so svojim nekdanjim kolonijam nudile več pomoči kot ostalim državam.

Afrika je gojila visoke upe za boljšo prihodnost v novem tisočletju. Razvite države so s sprejetjem resolucije milenijskih ciljev obljubile Afriki, da ji jih bodo pomagale doseči. Resda so humanitarni motivi v zadnjih letih postali pomembnejši determinanti alokacij razvojne pomoči kot kdaj koli prej, pa vendar še zdaleč niso edini dejavnik. Afrika s skoraj polovico prebivalstva, ki živi pod mejo ekstremne revščine, nujno potrebuje kakovostno razvojno pomoč, usmerjeno v prvi vrsti v humanitarne cilje. Ravno zato je preučevanje motivov za razvojno pomoč izrednega pomena.

Sources

1. AFDB (2006). *Annual Report 2006*. Tunis: AFDB.

2. AFDB, OECD & UN (2009, June). *African Economic Outlook.* Retrieved July 27, 2009, from http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/

3. AFDB, WTO & UN (2007, November). *Mobilizing Aid for Trade: Focus Africa. Report and Recommendations.* Retrieved August 1, 2009, from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/africa_e.pdf

4. African Studies Centre (2009). *Exploring Africa.* Retrieved July 27, 2009 from http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/images/colonialism1914.jpg

5. Alesina, A. & Dollar, D. (2000, March 1). Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5(1), 33-63.

6. Ali, A., Malwanda, C. & Suliman, Y.(1999). Official Development Assistance to Africa: An Overview. *Journal of African Economies*, *8*(4).

7. Amin, S. (1972). Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin. *Journal of Peace Research*, *9*(2), 105-119.

8. Asiedu, E., Jin, Y., & Nandwa, B. (2009, July). Does Foreign Aid Mitigate the Adverse Effect of Expropriation Risk on Foreign Direct Investment?. *Journal of International Economics*, *78*(2), 268-275.

9. Balla, E. (2008). Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does Conflict Count? *World Development,* 36(12).

10. Bandyopadhyay, S. and Wall, H. (2006, October). *The Determinants of Aid in the Post-Cold War Era. (*FRB of St. Louis Working Paper).

11. Bauer, P. (1993). *Development aid: end it or mend it.* San Francisco: ICS Press.

12. Berthélemy, J. (2006). Bilateral Donors' Interest vs. Recipients' Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same? *Review of Development Economics*, 10 (2), 179-194.

13. Bertocchi, G., & Canova, F. (n.d.). Did Colonization Matter for Growth?: An Empirical Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa's Underdevelopment. *European Economic Review*, *46*(10), 1851.

14. Bird, G. (1999). The Political Economy of Foreign Aid: Fatigue or Regeneration? *Zagreb International Review of Economics & Business,* 2(2), 1-24.

15. Brown, S. (2005, June). Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa. *The European Journal of Development Research,* 17(2), 179-198.

16. CIA (2009). *The World Factbook.* Retrived June, 25, 2009 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

17. Clay, E., Geddes, M., Natali, L. & Willem te Velde, D. (2008). *Thematic study: The developmental effectiveness of untied aid: Evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration and of 2001 DAC recommendation on untying ODA to the LDCs – Phase 1* (Overseas development institute Working Paper).

18. Collier, P., & Gunning, J. (n.d.). Trade policy and regional integration: Implications for the relations between Europe and Africa. *World Economy*, 18(3), 387.

19. Dalgaard, C. (2007). Donor policy rules and aid effectiveness. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,* 32, 1896-1918.

20. Diemond, D. (2009). U.S.-African Trade Profile. U.S. Department of Commerce: International Trade Administration. Retrieved August 1, 2009, from http://www.agoa.gov/resources/US_African_Trade_Profile_2009.pdf

21. EU Commission (2009). Trade Issues: Bilateral trade relations. Retrived August 1, 2009, from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/stats.htm.

22. Economists warn of 'aid fatigue' in meeting UN development goals (2008, 19 September). *EU Business*. Retrieved July 30, 2009 from http://eubusiness.upfronthosting.co.za/news-eu/1221833869.88

23. Ford, N. (2008, January). Record FDI for Africa. *African Business*, Retrieved August 2, 2009, from Business Source Premier database.

24. Forsyth, T. (2007). *Encyclopedia of International development*. London: Routhledge.

25. Freedom House (2009a). *Freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009: A Survey of Political rights and Civil Liberties*. Retrieved August 1, 2009, from http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/77.pdf

26. Freedom House (2009b). *Map of Freedom in the World: 2005 Eddition*. Retrieved June 1, 2009, from http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2005

27. Humanitarian Information Unit (2009). *Sub-national and Transnational Conflict Affected Areas.* Retrieved July 27, 2009, from http://hiu.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=JF4R.

28. IDA (2007). *Aid Architecture: An overview of the main trends in official development assistance flows.* Washington: International Development Association.

29. IMF (2001). *Official Financing for Developing countries.* Washington DC: IMF.

30. IMF (2003). *External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users.* Washington DC: IMF.

31. IMF (2009). *World Economic Outlook Database.* Retrieved June 27, from http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28

32. Isopi, A. & Mavrotas, G. (2006). *Aid Allocation and Aid Effectiveness: An Empirical Analysis.* (Research Paper No. 2006/2007). United Nations University.

33. Jepma, C. (1989), *The Tying of Aid. International Foundation for Development Economics*: (Research Paper of University of Groningen).

34. Krueger, A. (1986, January). Aid in the Development Process. *World Bank Research Observer,* Vol 1 (1), 63-67.

35. Leisinger, K. (2000). *Development assistance at the threshold of the 21st century. Annual report 1999/2000*. Basel: Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development.

36. Lloyd, T., McGillivary, M., Morrissey, O. & Osei, R. (1998). *Investigating the Relationship between Aid and Trade flows.* (Creidt Research Paper). Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

37. Maizels, A. & Nissanke, M. (1984). Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries, *World Development,* 12 (9), 879-900.

38. Meier, G. (1995). *Leading issues in economic development.* New York: Oxford University press.

39. Morrissey, O. (1991). An Evaluation of the Economic Effects of the Aid and Trade Provision, *Journal of Development Studies*, 28, 104-129.

40. Mrak, M., Bučar, M. & Kamnar, H. (2007). Mednarodno razvojno sodelovanje Republike Slovenije. *Urad Republike Slovenije za makroekonomske analize in razvoj*, 41 (3-4), 50-67.

41. Nath, S. & Sobhee, S. (2005). *Aid motivation and donor behaviour*. (Discussion Paper Series). Retrived June 15, 2009 from http://www.uom.ac.mu/Faculties/FSSH/EcoStat/discpapers/DP2005_01.pdf

42. OECD (1977). *Development Co-operation, Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee: Review 1977.* Paris: OECD.

43. OECD (2003). DAC Countries begin a recovery in development aid. *Newsroom*. Retrieved May 10, 2009, from http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en_2649_34487_2507754_1_1_1_1,00.html

44. OECD (2006, October 12). *Partner country selection: A Different Perspective of Emerging Donors?* (Issues Paper).

45. OECD (2007): *DAC List of ODA recepients.* Retrieved June, 20 2009 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/48/41655745.pdf

46. OECD (2008, November). *Factsheet: Is it ODA?* Retrieved May, 18 2009 from www.oecd.org/dac/stats

47. OECD (2009). *Stat Extract: Country Statistical Profiles 2009 .* OECD [Data file]. Retrieved May, 15 2009 from http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CSP2009

48. Opeskin, B. (1996). The moral foundations of foreign aid. *World Development*, 24(1).

49. Pankaj, A. (2005). Revisiting Foreign Aid Theories. *International Studies*, 42 (2), 103-121.

50. Raffer K. & Singer, W.H. (1996). *The Foreign Aid Business: Economic Assistance and Development Co-operation.* Cheltenham, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.

51. Sachs, J. (2004). *Ending Africa's Poverty Trap.* Retrieved August 3, 2009 from http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/BPEAEndingAfricasPovertyTrapFINAL.pdf.

52. Schraeder, P., Hook, S. & Taylor, B. (1998). Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows. *World Politics*, (50) 2, 294-323.

53. Sen, A. (1996, September). A matter of choice. *UNESCO Courier*, 49(9), 10.

54. Shah, A. (2009). Conflicts in Africa. *Global Issues*. Retrieved August 1, 2009, from http://www.globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-africa-introduction.

55. Skeldon, R. (2008, September). *Migration and Development*. Bangkok: UN Expert Group Meeting on International migration and Development in Asia and the Pacific.

56. Svyatets, E. (2008). *Foreign Aid and Imports of Oil: the United States as a Strategic Donor.* (Conference Papers of International Studies Association).

57. The scramble for Africa. (1999, December 31). *Economist*, 8151(353). Retrieved August 1, 2009, from Academic Search Premier database.

58. Thirlwall, A. (1994). *Growth and Development.* (5th ed.) Hampshire: The Macmillian Press.

59. Tisch, S. & Wallace, M. (1994). *Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The What, Why, and Who of Foreign Aid.* Oxford: Westview Press.

60. Todaro, M. & Smith, S. (2006). *Economic development.* (9th ed.) Harlow [etc.]: Pearson/Addison-Wesley.

61. Trumbull, W. & Wall, H. (1994). Estimating Aid Allocation criteria with Panel Data. *The Economic Journal,* 104(425), 876-882.

62. UN (1997). *Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in Methods. Series F, No. 67.* New York: United Nations.

63. UN (2005). *Gini Coefficient: Factsheet*. Retrived August 2, 2009 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/328232/United-Nations-Gini-Coefficient

64. UN (2008a). *The Millennium Development Goals - Report 2008.* New York: United Nations.

65. UN (2008b). *Economic Develement in Africa 2008: Export Performance Following Trade Liberalization*. New York: United Nations.

66. UN Population Division (2009). *World Population Prospects: Population Database*. Retrieved June, 29, 2009, from http://esa.un.org/unpp/

67. UNDP (1992). *Human Development Report 1992.* New York: United Nations.

68. UNDP (2009). 2007/2008 *Human Development Report: Flows of aid, private capital and debt.* Retrieved May, 15, 2009 from http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/171.html

69. UNECA (2007). *Economic Report on Africa 2007.* Addis Ababa: UNECA.

70. UNFAO (2009). *Food Security Statistics*. Retrived June, 30, 2009 from http://www.fao.org/faostat/foodsecurity/index_en.htm

71. UNHCR (2009). *UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.* Retrived July, 30, 2009 from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a013eb06.html

72. UNOHRLLS (2009). *List of Least Developed Countries.* Retrieved May, 15, 2009 from http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm

73. van der Veen, A. (2000). *Ideas and interests in foreign policy: The politics of official development assistance.* (Ph.D. dissertation). Massachusetts: Harvard University.

74. Wall, H. (2008, July). Need and the Need for Favors: Motivate Foreign Aid Decisions. *Regional Economist*, 20-22.

75. WB (2000). *Can Africa Claim 21st Century?* Washington: World Bank.

76. WB (2009a). *Quick Query: Database on selected development indicators*. Retrieved August, 4, 2009 from http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers

77. WB (2009b). *Africa: Human development*. Retrieved August, 4, 2009 from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20266824~menuPK:538117~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:258644,00.html

78. WB (2009c). *Online Atlas of the Millennium Development Goals.* Retrieved August, 4, 2009 from http://devdata.worldbank.org/atlas-mdg/

79. WRI (2009). *Economic Growth and Human Development.* Retrieved August, 1, 2009 from http://www.wri.org/publication/content/8372

80. WTO (2008). *International trade statistics 2008*. Geneva: Switzerland.

81. WTO (2009). *International Trade and Tariff Data: Statistic Database.* Retrived June 27, from http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/Statis_e.htm

82. Yoon, M. Y. (2007). *Explaining African Military Interventions*. Conference Paper. Montreal: Annual meeting of the International Studies Association.

83. Younas, J. (2008). Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 24, 661-674.

Appendix

Figure Appendix 1: ODA per capita in USD; 2005-2007 period.

Source: OECD, 2009.

Figure Appendix 2: Colonialism in Africa in 1914.

Source: African Studies Centre, 2009.

Figure Appendix 3: Political and civil rights in Africa; 2005.

Source: Freedom House, 2009b.

Figure Appendix 4: Conflicts in Africa from January 2007 to October 2008.

Source: Humanitarian Information Unit, 2009.

Figure Appendix 5: Percentage of undernourished population, 2003-2005 period.

Source: UNFAO, 2009.

Table Appendix 1: Total ODA from DAC countries.

Total ODA from DAC countries, US $, millions

Country/Year	2005	2006	2007
Algeria	306,98	230,62	289,21
Angola	274,39	-67,21	85,64
Benin	231,43	250,56	238,25
Botswana	33,26	38,18	63,62
Burkina Faso	381,51	423,94	411,84
Burundi	202,58	241,43	199,73
Cameroon	372,5	1669,03	1696,83
Cape Verde	119,07	109,33	114,16
Centr. Af. Rep.	68,26	70,93	117,77
Chad	179,43	164,93	223,39
Comoros	17,44	22,25	19,59
Congo, Dem.Rep.	1040,68	1595,83	788,38
Congo, Rep.	1553,83	187,94	47,56
Cote d'Ivoire	146,51	217,34	111,5
Djiobuti	59,77	98,37	75,46
Egypt	733,64	581,49	787,04
Eritrea	246,26	68,44	45,45
Ethiopia	1303,77	1104,46	1242,02
Gabon	32,52	35,54	33,62
Gambia	15,84	26,06	33,11
Ghana	677,17	648,37	708,46
Guinea	138,37	109,12	122,22
Guinea-Biss.	30,96	43,53	43,61
Kenya	559,73	808,12	824,09
Lesotho	44,23	41,77	62,33
Liberia	158,19	198,48	226,48
Libya	19,06	35,05	15,15
Madagascar	560,66	280,25	386,53
Malawi	368,74	435,05	400,53
Mali	416,93	433,41	558,08
Mauritania	116,38	101,85	133,21
Mauritius	20,95	8,91	43,57
Morocco	344,74	624,83	627,93
Mozambique	868,49	1019,89	1073,21
Namibia	98,64	113,26	143,52
Niger	285,14	257,22	232,74
Nigeria	6799,81	11781,51	1385,22
Rwanda	318,59	349,35	373,93
Sao Tome & P.	21,03	20,4	31,05
Senegal	503,8	559,65	450,91
Seychelles	8,85	7,69	1,41
Sierra Leone	147,13	192,45	380,74
South Africa	522,39	609,83	597,18
Sudan	1610,6	1619,48	1666,14
Swaziland	18,03	11,97	12,13
Tanzania	974,11	1087,22	1830,67
Togo	67,19	60,78	64,74
Tunisia	299,61	319,05	193,89
Uganda	771,92	1020,44	1002,46
Zambia	909,05	1210,23	712,92
Zimbabwe	211,59	218,83	371,44

Source: OECD, 2009.

7

Table Appendix 2: Total population.

| Population, millions | | | |
Country/Year	2005	2006	2007
Algeria	32,906	33,8	34,4
Angola	15,412	15,864	16,329
Benin	7,395	7,612	7,856
Botswana	1,731	1,745	1,761
Burkina Faso	13,113	13,418	13,727
Burundi	7,491	7,641	7,794
Cameroon	17,842	18,341	18,855
Cape Verde	0,476	0,485	0,491
Centr. Af. Rep.	4,104	4,186	4,27
Chad	9,035	9,261	9,493
Comoros	0,613	0,626	0,639
Congo, Dem.Rep.	57,549	59,275	61,053
Congo, Rep.	3,35	3,447	3,547
Cote d'Ivoire	19	19,57	20,157
Djibouti	0,728	0,747	0,765
Egypt	70,717	72,131	73,574
Eritrea	4,401	4,692	4,851
Ethiopia	73,026	75,071	77,173
Gabon	1,364	1,398	1,433
Gambia	1,509	1,548	1,589
Ghana	20,889	21,423	21,97
Guinea	9,341	9,645	9,958
Guinea-Biss.	1,597	1,646	1,695
Kenya	33,445	34,046	34,653
Lesotho	2,322	2,364	2,407
Liberia	3,442	3,579	3,75
Libya	5,854	5,97	6,089
Madagascar	18,643	19,159	19,683
Malawi	12,862	13,122	13,386
Mali	12,479	12,766	13,059
Mauritania	2,824	2,892	2,961
Mauritius	1,244	1,253	1,261
Morocco	30,268	30,648	31
Mozambique	19,551	19,942	20,34
Namibia	1,957	1,992	2,028
Niger	12,56	12,949	13,351
Nigeria	136,253	140,004	143,854
Rwanda	9,038	9,2	9,394
Sao Tome & P.	0,153	0,155	0,158
Senegal	11,658	11,938	12,225
Seychelles	0,081	0,083	0,083
Sierra Leone	5,45	5,592	5,737
South Africa	46,888	47,391	47,851
Sudan	35,3	36,218	37,159
Swaziland	1,011	1,015	1,018
Tanzania	37,5	38,2	38,964
Togo	6,145	6,301	6,461
Tunisia	10,029	10,128	10,225
Uganda	28,816	29,854	30,928
Zambia	11,595	11,873	12,158
Zimbabwe	11,732	11,732	11,732

Source: IMF, 2009.

Table Appendix 3: Percentage of undernourished population.

Undernourished population among total popualtion, percentage

Country/Year	2003-2005
Algeria	5
Angola	38
Benin	14
Botswana	30
Burkina Faso	17
Burundi	67
Cameroon	25
Cape Verde	15
Centr. Af. Rep.	45
Chad	33
Comoros	62
Congo, Dem.Rep.	72
Congo, Rep.	34
Cote d'Ivoire	72
Djiobuti	26
Egypt	3
Eritrea	73
Ethiopia	46
Gabon	5
Gambia	27
Ghana	12
Guinea	24
Guinea-Biss.	37
Kenya	31
Lesotho	12
Liberia	49
Libya	2,5
Madagascar	38
Malawi	34
Mali	28
Mauritania	10
Mauritius	6
Morocco	6
Mozambique	45
Namibia	23
Niger	32
Nigeria	9
Rwanda	36
Sao Tome & P.	12
Senegal	23
Seychelles	9
Sierra Leone	50
South Africa	3
Sudan	27
Swaziland	19
Tanzania	44
Togo	25
Tunisia	2.5
Uganda	19
Zambia	47
Zimbabwe	45

Source. UNFAO, 2009.

Table Appendix 4: Index of political and civil rights.

Political and civil rights index		
Country/Year	**2005**	**2005**
Algeria	6	5
Angola	6	5
Benin	2	2
Botswana	2	2
Burkina Faso	5	4
Burundi	5	5
Cameroon	6	6
Cape Verde	1	1
Centr. Af. Rep.	6	5
Chad	6	5
Comoros	4	4
Congo, Dem.Rep.	6	6
Congo, Rep.	5	4
Cote d'Ivoire	6	6
Djiobuti	5	5
Egypt	6	5
Eritrea	7	6
Ethiopia	5	5
Gabon	5	4
Gambia	4	4
Ghana	2	5
Guinea	6	4
Guinea-Biss.	4	4
Kenya	3	3
Lesotho	2	3
Liberia	5	4
Libya	7	7
Madagascar	3	3
Malawi	4	4
Mali	2	2
Mauritania	6	5
Mauritius	1	1
Morocco	5	4
Mozambique	3	4
Namibia	2	3
Niger	3	3
Nigeria	4	4
Rwanda	6	5
Sao Tome & P.	2	2
Senegal	2	3
Seychelles	3	3
Sierra Leone	4	3
South Africa	1	2
Sudan	7	7
Swaziland	7	5
Tanzania	4	3
Togo	6	5
Tunisia	6	5
Uganda	5	4
Zambia	4	4
Zimbabwe	7	6

Source: Freedom house, 2009b.

Table Appendix 5: Migration to DAC countries, thousands of people.

Migration to DAC countries, thousands		
Country/Year	2005	2006
Algeria	25,539	51,046
Angola	0,981	1,957
Benin	0,545	1,088
Botswana	0,044	0,046
Burkina Faso	0,337	0,674
Burundi	0,319	0,376
Cameroon	4,947	9,888
Cape Verde	0,543	1,085
Centr. Af. Rep.	0,638	1,275
Chad	0,249	0,497
Comoros	1,127	2,254
Congo, Dem.Rep.	3,494	6,963
Congo, Rep.	4,439	8,593
Cote d'Ivoire	3,894	7,677
Djibouti	0,098	0,187
Egypt	1,744	2,531
Eritrea	0,181	0,229
Ethiopia	0,775	0,936
Gabon	0,472	0,942
Gambia	0,071	0,139
Ghana	0,444	0,723
Guinea	1,244	2,334
Guinea-Biss.	0,162	0,324
Kenya	1,076	1,105
Lesotho	0,011	0,013
Liberia	0,891	0,931
Libya	0,028	0,032
Madagascar	1,857	3,713
Malawi	0,051	0,053
Mali	2,516	5,031
Mauritania	0,874	1,747
Mauritius	1,08	1,726
Morocco	27,219	54,385
Mozambique	0,027	0,03
Namibia	0,063	0,064
Niger	0,123	0,239
Nigeria	0,766	1,347
Rwanda	0,419	0,79
Sao Tome & P.	0	0
Senegal	2,534	5,061
Seychelles	0,032	0,033
Sierra Leone	0,708	0,774
South Africa	6,474	6,635
Sudan	5,905	6,149
Swaziland	0,004	0,004
Tanzania	0,212	0,227
Togo	0,819	1,629
Tunisia	8,422	16,839
Uganda	0,25	0,294
Zambia	0,165	0,179
Zimbabwe	1,721	1,74

Source: OECD, 2009.

Table Appendix 6: Exports of DAC to African countries, US dollars, million.

DAC countries exports, US $ millions

Country/Year	2005	2006	2007
Algeria	1176,9229	1157,7677	3490,2539
Angola	288,94601	449,89895	1022,4866
Benin	46,950761	61,738324	155,35595
Botswana	20,561949	13,586901	54,148032
Burkina Faso	32,990198	35,703058	100,66254
Burundi	9,068646	10,2225	28,13781
Cameroon	97,382829	105,55429	298,49359
Cape Verde	25,763515	31,759322	83,286352
Centr. Af. Rep.	5,353787	8,319926	19,0275
Chad	22,428935	22,866875	67,615216
Comoros	3,146696	4,122852	10,416244
Congo, Dem.Rep.	53,711464	65,256989	171,47666
Congo, Rep.	65,361521	81,157829	211,05772
Cote d'Ivoire	210,5671	172,02412	592,09585
Djibouti	19,189498	20,468559	58,709826
Egypt	1098,5411	1252,7228	3405,7274
Eritrea	53,925912	17,698087	125,54991
Ethiopia	61,568593	63,513248	184,57487
Gabon	81,086557	95,422182	256,83196
Gambia	13,347327	13,195499	39,460801
Ghana	154,39508	200,24397	496,27717
Guinea	44,867412	44,881821	133,52796
Guinea-Biss.	8,359251	7,906593	24,619315
Kenya	148,78933	167,06361	459,13225
Lesotho	274,13821	135,05035	683,31047
Liberia	42,756749	57,72401	142,94199
Libya	372,80604	444,14016	1182,9822
Madagascar	42,916865	42,066097	127,57257
Malawi	9,216496	219,63427	237,84794
Mali	42,241465	49,566027	132,86118
Mauritania	53,19758	63,522819	168,90914
Mauritius	94,003163	107,59399	289,06765
Morocco	1656,5883	1442,9572	4738,0887
Mozambique	55,6925	63,313159	146,28387
Namibia	24,867041	28,806262	78,18733
Niger	73,516626	54,413364	200,91082
Nigeria	760,11826	936,71865	2447,4512
Rwanda	8,081352	42,615555	58,778259
Sao Tome & P.	13,629452	9,888436	37,138406
Senegal	142,29808	162,59066	444,71708
Seychelles	30,280631	29,390801	89,708889
Sierra Leone	21,925337	14,438137	57,774064
South Africa	2366,2866	2677,6627	7260,3332
Sudan	215,05535	222,87426	631,43132
Swaziland	4,297269	5,142775	13,442297
Tanzania	66,509952	98,69883	226,89926
Togo	62,108808	78,251857	201,63635
Tunisia	850,9172	926,51542	1086,129
Uganda	51,868692	45,511833	148,37161
Zambia	19,745268	32,198014	70,064216
Zimbabwe	18,939701	23,076153	60,300354

Source: WTO, 2009.

Table Appendix 7: Imports from African to DAC countries, US dollars, million.

DAC countries imports, US $, millions			
Country/Year	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**
Algeria	3290,1963	4157,4902	4306,9891
Angola	993,46205	1246,1628	1538,7393
Benin	2,17793	6,592009	15,418884
Botswana	224,85617	250,06254	327,3163
Burkina Faso	2,717116	3,059227	2,898824
Burundi	4,278829	2,943346	4,620705
Cameroon	209,25509	280,2667	286,68648
Cape Verde	1,843237	2,878507	2,383357
Centr. Af. Rep.	7,556734	6,875506	6,278136
Chad	132,03585	165,4951	183,00594
Comoros	0,663547	1,204311	1,229674
Congo, Dem.Rep.	96,718177	69,934114	107,38762
Congo, Rep.	168,14342	327,56249	340,03931
Cote d'Ivoire	274,29258	299,96924	340,44836
Djibouti	6,93613	4,166762	1,664902
Egypt	660,18385	988,37797	978,53532
Eritrea	6,078783	7,344505	7,962239
Ethiopia	27,956698	34,162232	34,855579
Gabon	302,87024	182,13076	273,25124
Gambia	1,996252	6,106028	9,389017
Ghana	95,749751	118,1691	123,85946
Guinea	50,704519	49,416818	63,213052
Guinea-Biss.	0,174799	0,847932	1,271124
Kenya	104,42608	112,83407	122,37397
Lesotho	499,48654	251,38306	54,868462
Liberia	14,20182	68,409674	118,30169
Libya	2162,3439	2894,2794	3471,4574
Madagascar	77,016325	83,168593	96,003838
Malawi	21,012148	360,6208	663,63444
Mali	5,105464	13,601857	4,862613
Mauritania	47,907417	196,37666	291,13223
Mauritius	133,92776	136,29532	142,60407
Morocco	1611,8825	1301,6863	993,08943
Mozambique	107,31492	131,83935	158,54197
Namibia	114,08917	138,52088	143,93537
Niger	101,9756	46,131976	22,769722
Nigeria	2929,5495	3636,3573	3933,3793
Rwanda	3,426477	50,72637	60,859153
Sao Tome & P.	1,805732	42,787191	0,558054
Senegal	40,413388	36,887221	41,321479
Seychelles	33,644327	27,478714	21,09839
Sierra Leone	16,825627	18,234786	23,491152
South Africa	2572,5759	2886,0736	3286,9301
Sudan	27,397223	34,54458	20,373631
Swaziland	37,257859	32,451116	41,076045
Tanzania	39,827975	39,162884	42,234036
Togo	15,804764	14,606404	15,596913
Tunisia	729,15423	851,64136	1066,5744
Uganda	30,193269	28,833175	35,381826
Zambia	20,937981	37,676418	46,723886
Zimbabwe	40,380955	43,688981	41,083956

Source: WTO, 2009.

13

Table Appendix 8: Gross Domestic Product, US dollars, billions, current prices.

Gross Domestic Product, US $, billions

Country/Year	2005	2006	2007
Algeria	102,721	116,825	135,343
Angola	30,632	45,168	59,263
Benin	4,396	4,739	5,554
Botswana	10,363	11,298	12,339
Burkina Faso	5,437	5,777	6,769
Burundi	0,801	0,919	0,975
Cameroon	16,593	17,957	20,691
Cape Verde	1,006	1,203	1,459
Centr. Af. Rep.	1,352	1,475	1,7
Chad	5,884	6,306	7,018
Comoros	0,388	0,404	0,466
Congo, Dem.Rep.	7,223	8,785	9,969
Congo, Rep.	6,098	7,738	7,657
Cote d'Ivoire	16,392	17,383	19,824
Djibouti	0,709	0,769	0,848
Egypt	89,794	107,375	130,346
Eritrea	1,098	1,211	1,316
Ethiopia	12,307	15,168	19,431
Gabon	8,666	9,546	11,571
Gambia	0,462	0,508	0,651
Ghana	10,726	12,729	15,031
Guinea	2,937	2,903	4,157
Guinea-Biss.	0,302	0,317	0,382
Kenya	18,769	22,518	27,026
Lesotho	1,376	1,517	1,672
Liberia	0,528	0,612	0,735
Libya	45,451	55,077	69,869
Madagascar	5,044	5,519	7,354
Malawi	2,742	3,145	3,586
Mali	5,496	6,128	7,156
Mauritania	1,857	2,699	2,819
Mauritius	6,278	6,317	6,927
Morocco	59,524	65,64	75,116
Mozambique	6,579	7,214	8,069
Namibia	7,258	7,982	8,711
Niger	3,375	3,649	4,252
Nigeria	112,248	146,89	167,435
Rwanda	2,398	2,833	3,412
Sao Tome & P.	0,115	0,125	0,145
Senegal	8,723	9,367	11,3
Seychelles	0,884	0,968	0,912
Sierra Leone	1,215	1,424	1,665
South Africa	242,676	257,894	283,381
Sudan	27,386	36,401	46,531
Swaziland	2,523	2,671	2,89
Tanzania	14,165	14,351	16,691
Togo	2,111	2,22	2,503
Tunisia	29,029	31,11	35,109
Uganda	9,223	9,957	11,906
Zambia	7,271	10,893	11,411
Zimbabwe	4,627	5,596	11,977

Source: IMF, 2009.

14

Table Appendix 9: Former colonies in the 20th century.

Former colonies of France, UK or Germany	
Country/Period	**20th century**
Algeria	France
Angola	no
Benin	France
Botswana	UK
Burkina Faso	France
Burundi	no
Cameroon	France, Germany
Cape Verde	no
Centr. Af. Rep.	France
Chad	France
Comoros	France
Congo, Dem.Rep.	no
Congo, Rep.	France
Cote d'Ivoire	France
Dijiobuti	France
Egypt	UK
Eritrea	no
Ethiopia	no
Gabon	France
Gambia	UK
Ghana	UK
Guinea	France
Guinea-Biss.	no
Kenya	UK
Lesotho	UK
Liberia	no
Libya	no
Madagascar	France
Malawi	UK
Mali	France
Mauritania	France
Mauritius	France
Morocco	France
Mozambique	no
Namibia	Germany
Niger	France
Nigeria	UK
Rwanda	no
Sao Tome & P.	no
Senegal	France
Seychelles	UK
Sierra Leone	UK
South Africa	UK
Sudan	UK
Swaziland	UK
Tanzania	Germany
Togo	Germany
Tunisia	France
Uganda	UK
Zambia	UK
Zimbabwe	UK

Source: CIA, 2009.

15

Table Appendix 10: Total ODA flows from donor countries in millions of US dollars.

Total ODA from donor countries, US $, millions									
Donor	**France**			**Germany**			**Japan**		
Country/Year	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**
Algeria	268,2	193,79	185,18	2,89	-28,31	9,38	1,71	-11,45	7,26
Angola	11,49	-108,5	3,24	13,8	12,61	12,26	24,15	12,17	23,1
Benin	49,42	82,41	56,4	31,12	29,41	29,58	16,4	9,86	6,81
Botswana	1,56	1,62	9,24	3,89	3	2,45	-0,79	0,25	-2,22
Burkina Faso	91,8	146,87	114,76	33,49	32,74	39,9	17,34	18,11	20,43
Burundi	16,1	15,53	18,28	12,81	16,15	23,02	0,45	15,12	8,52
Cameroon	19,41	272,23	596,23	206,41	253,41	754,52	17,7	18,4	18,55
Cape Verde	4,78	4,95	5,97	3,51	2,54	1,09	2,6	2,48	1,89
Central Af. Rep.	38,17	29,98	54,19	3,34	5,42	5,31	0,14	0,1	2,55
Chad	47,51	47,09	47,85	27,01	29,66	29,46	1,88	8,57	9,9
Comoros	16,3	21,72	18,27	0,06	0,02	0,04	0,03	0,06	0,01
Congo, Dem. Rep.	47,98	63,96	27,6	57,61	39,66	62,96	345,56	22,71	22,93
Congo, Rep.	1155,4	137,87	18,52	71,87	4,18	5,78	0,16	0,39	4,99
Cote d'Ivoire	63,51	119,37	50,69	14,89	13,85	19,81	1,26	12,7	6,54
Djibouti	40,63	80,02	56,7	0,44	0,16	0,28	5,86	4,5	3,67
Egypt	92,55	70,08	77,13	123,12	156,21	153,91	-33,15	-5,1	-27,04
Eritrea	1,32	0,95	0,9	5,55	5,37	3,9	6,65	9,72	8,37
Ethiopia	17,57	19,39	20,05	56,21	63,06	96,48	31,38	56,72	36,03
Gabon	19,11	33,6	32,15	2,13	-0,24	-1,44	5,63	-0,27	0,26
Gambia	0,31	0,7	0,74	1,57	1,48	0,9	4,02	10,78	6,39
Ghana	43,85	25,87	41,6	74,92	66,47	52,7	40,61	42,81	46,48
Guinea	34,46	23,04	55,09	21,76	15,53	15,75	10,97	16,74	12,02
Guinea-Bissau	3,42	11,09	3,38	0,73	0,36	0,36	0,03	0,04	1,08
Kenya	9,19	22,44	47,82	55,88	50,45	62,47	55,91	103,04	57,11
Lesotho	-1,52	-1,29	-1,02	5,64	7,28	6,76	6,13	4,67	4,88
Liberia	0,64	2,29	1,13	1,49	9,95	10,03	0,01	17,06	12,46
Libya	2,7	2,7	1,09	4,12	4,29	3,9	0,3	0,04	0,43
Madagascar	102,06	116,02	141,97	12,35	12,4	14,01	36,38	38,47	111,19
Malawi	2,81	0,67	0,92	28,56	26,47	24,36	18,09	22,92	40,29
Mali	96,73	91,21	214,02	32,75	44,6	40,64	21,31	26,22	9,65
Mauritania	34,37	35,31	37,92	14,07	15,31	12,88	13,52	11,84	23,45
Mauritius	3,93	3,06	39,79	-1,06	-0,13	-0,12	15,2	3,93	2,77
Morocco	227,88	336,82	218,77	69,63	116,08	142,82	-49,77	59,93	64,65
Mozambique	15,83	10,03	25,74	48,08	72,04	61,78	13,56	104,74	27,77
Namibia	3,98	2,19	2,75	24,18	15,49	21,18	0,36	0,99	5,74
Niger	81,24	99,22	56,72	27,93	23,62	21,4	21,75	11,85	28,28
Nigeria	1646,1	2265,28	11,8	1331,64	1900,13	25,45	63,52	1599,69	26,84
Rwanda	10,86	11,82	5,43	20,86	21,54	23,08	2,62	12,49	19,53
Sao Tome & Pr.	4,18	3,5	4,37	0,01	2,47	6,43	1,41	0,03	3,11
Senegal	181,62	321,24	176,66	38,69	38,7	27,14	25,67	33,82	31,95
Seychelles	5,8	2,82	0,67	0,1	0,08	0,08	1,16	1,87	0,76
Sierra Leone	2,41	2,16	41,7	7,16	11,95	36,53	1,92	42,3	30,11
South Africa	32,66	177,42	105	41,71	45,03	101,49	14,79	15,61	4,67
Sudan	21,02	16,44	13,8	50,62	56,35	36,93	1,94	41,88	51,58
Swaziland	0,21	0,25	0,3	-1,34	-3,38	-5,92	23,8	11,39	7,26
Tanzania	2,87	2,27	2,96	56,25	54,81	65	33,16	38,62	721,66
Togo	34,39	37,26	33,67	9,42	8,91	12,08	0,7	0,43	0,46
Tunisia	210,37	197,01	127,94	32,74	44	27,47	46,93	18,19	20,56
Uganda	8,83	6,02	8,98	57,94	60,61	47,58	13,26	21,35	27,51
Zambia	18,29	71,19	1,11	133,23	319,43	40,68	121,17	30,91	94,61
Zimbabwe	4,21	3,99	15,45	15,22	11,03	19,45	3,76	6,41	11,71

Total ODA from DAC countries, US $, millions									
Donor	Netherlands			UK			US		
Country/Year	2005	2006	2007	2005	2006	2007	2005	2006	2007
Algeria	0,11	0,13	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,57	1,11	0,78	1,69
Egypt	8,88	14,53	14,6	7,18	21	0,13	425,87	200,87	462,41
Libya	0,23	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,29	0,14	25,79	4,03
Morocco	1,77	0,43	-0,3	0,01	0,01	0,34	-15,8	-6,71	5,49
Tunisia	-2,17	-2,31	-1,96	24,67	18,45	0,12	-16,05	-13,09	-10,87
Angola	14,56	2,34	-49,29	16,33	14,12	10,04	71,27	33,73	39,63
Benin	25,82	27,11	34,72	0,01	2,55	0,01	25,87	20,82	25,33
Botswana	1,17	0,68	0,1	0,29	0,07	0,41	19,04	25,42	44,84
Burkina Faso	61,14	61,05	65,7	3	3,11	0,01	21,32	22,49	21,81
Burundi	26,01	18,8	23,14	17,18	30,09	13,24	58,08	47,83	25,88
Cameroon	19,95	20,99	2,58	5,37	189,74	51,74	14,58	13,91	30,65
Cape Verde	12,67	13,1	12,1	0,01	0,59	0,54	12,88	7,28	7,1
Central Af. Rep.	0,4	0,01	6,34	0,01	1,03	5,05	18,52	21,51	18,38
Chad	1,81	6,74	6,84	-0,85	2,7	5,13	64,5	38,16	59,59
Comoros	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,03	0,01	0,03
Congo, Dem. Rep.	52,58	33,08	50,74	90,16	156,54	121,23	152,26	861,04	132,44
Congo, Rep.	6,92	0,15	0,01	0,67	0,72	0,2	15,97	9,22	9,6
Cote d'Ivoire	2,75	1,11	1,51	3,57	2,08	-37,11	25,2	31,75	37,03
Djibouti	0,86	0,01	1,43	0,01	0,01	0,01	8,02	10,47	10,21
Eritrea	6,63	3,62	4,43	3,57	6,2	5,2	149,99	6,74	1,61
Ethiopia	66,72	55,09	50,76	87,73	184,15	291,5	645,13	324,28	371,73
Gabon	0,03	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	1,9	1,16	1,05
Gambia	0,33	0,09	10,07	1,76	4,59	5,03	2,11	4,78	1,66
Ghana	80,18	107,35	142,23	139,17	187,02	152,27	70,91	70,26	70,66
Guinea	1,08	0,06	0,01	1,71	1,07	1,08	46,22	35,79	24,74
Guinea-Bissau	2,98	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,02	0,05	1,46	5,69	6,3
Kenya	32,17	29,1	11,04	100,28	120,6	111,3	162,46	289,98	325,22
Lesotho	0,11	0,1	0,01	8,87	8,48	8,07	2,88	3,32	19,45
Liberia	8,19	7,23	2,85	8,76	17,08	9,96	91,53	90,77	102,73
Madagascar	1,11	0,18	11,88	15,63	5,73	1,7	85,44	62,78	66,9
Malawi	22,08	11,56	6,8	118,5	191,24	133,72	59,72	65,74	78,98
Mali	74,88	73,2	64,87	1,52	4,61	0,01	60,26	66,75	54
Mauritania	0,68	0,44	0,08	0,01	1,1	0,07	21,22	12,51	10,22
Mauritius	0,01	0,01	0,01	-0,93	-0,12	0,11	0,72	0,38	0,27
Mozambique	73,32	66,05	80,66	93,96	111,16	115,68	90,48	111,78	153,38
Namibia	3,69	1,04	1,01	1,5	1,67	0,88	30,6	51,92	58,83
Niger	8,59	0,01	0,12	9,25	6,84	2,44	30,95	31,38	41,28
Nigeria	229,72	253,25	344,03	2558	3564	285,95	104,9	808,43	240,59
Rwanda	32,32	27,29	27,84	95,25	106,73	95,01	60,56	79,68	90,76
Sao Tome & Pr.	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,15	0,47	0,23
Senegal	23,26	21,59	22,38	8,03	11,3	11,72	47,41	38,74	39,24
Seychelles	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,02	0,02	-0,86	0,01	0,11	0,14
Sierra Leone	8,19	6,45	47,14	70,42	73,36	88,11	23,16	21,6	20,91
South Africa	63,12	58,93	44,87	81,66	1,67	-20,37	123,79	144,28	227,08
Sudan	176,04	106,37	202,51	228,34	241,14	206,17	804,59	758,67	710,45
Swaziland	0,09	0,02	0,04	-10,84	0,27	2,23	1,78	1,9	3,48
Tanzania	102,63	126,83	128,15	256,1	244,85	231,79	99,31	124,85	166,89
Togo	6,05	0,01	0,01	0,99	0,78	0,28	3,16	2,09	7,44
Uganda	91,13	91,2	70,43	64,66	239,87	167,15	242,55	252,85	301,57
Zambia	63,63	61,67	71,54	192,62	97,07	74,23	117,44	318,25	165,29
Zimbabwe	15,47	8,2	7,07	52,86	78,17	94,1	44,15	37,37	139,09

Source: OECD, 2009.

Table Appendix 11: Donor exports to African countries, millions of US dollars.

Donor exports to African countries, US dollars, millions

Donor	France			Germany			Japan		
Country/Year	2005	2006	2007	2005	2006	2007	2005	2006	2007
Algeria	487,16	421,88	475,39	112,08	112,61	137,04	44,56	36,19	71,08
Angola	30,70	52,67	62,55	11,95	21,20	42,71	9,86	15,57	17,40
Benin	17,78	19,71	30,26	3,55	4,68	5,79	1,58	1,37	1,67
Botswana	0,49	0,59	0,81	2,08	2,05	2,36	0,54	0,80	1,25
Burkina Faso	19,71	21,77	24,61	1,43	1,91	1,89	0,37	0,61	0,52
Burundi	1,07	1,05	1,79	0,70	0,87	1,58	0,66	0,15	0,18
Cameroon	46,25	52,22	64,73	8,15	8,06	10,67	1,50	1,53	1,97
Cape Verde	0,93	1,10	4,21	0,61	0,86	1,47	0,48	0,77	0,70
Centr. Af. Rep.	2,80	3,49	4,28	0,32	0,50	0,43	0,10	0,07	0,12
Chad	7,84	7,55	11,08	1,16	2,95	4,10	0,04	0,09	0,43
Comoros	1,91	2,68	2,15	0,08	0,12	0,08	0,03	0,15	0,06
Congo	27,45	35,88	50,84	2,58	3,03	5,20	0,54	0,85	0,72
Congo, Dem. Rep.	10,80	14,64	15,68	5,52	5,30	7,76	1,39	1,96	1,69
Côte d''Ivoire	58,18	62,70	79,54	8,54	10,93	11,52	1,90	1,95	3,43
Djibouti	4,29	4,68	5,84	0,65	1,41	2,37	3,85	3,74	6,15
Egypt	145,39	138,30	137,70	175,94	198,89	244,19	65,68	94,96	107,51
Eritrea	1,10	0,29	0,39	1,05	1,08	1,46	0,31	0,17	0,28
Ethiopia	7,07	7,22	7,03	11,38	13,15	13,58	6,30	9,47	10,33
Gabon	45,53	52,60	57,01	3,27	5,60	5,26	3,38	3,63	4,06
Gambia	1,44	1,40	1,13	0,99	1,07	0,90	0,31	0,40	0,37
Ghana	15,54	21,12	25,95	14,73	16,67	22,59	8,22	7,56	9,47
Guinea	10,21	13,66	15,56	1,74	2,29	3,28	1,14	3,98	0,86
Guinea-Bissau	0,49	0,46	1,09	0,10	0,14	0,14	0,03	0,02	0,04
Kenya	10,80	11,19	19,13	16,00	20,54	23,92	20,94	29,46	46,07
Lesotho	0,00	0,08	0,05	1,13	1,35	1,04	0,09	0,16	0,12
Liberia	2,72	1,10	1,69	5,53	8,99	29,00	92,02	72,81	99,47
Libya	32,10	48,53	59,60	68,14	61,88	76,61	11,50	15,86	21,16
Madagascar	24,00	22,56	29,33	2,78	2,73	3,60	1,49	1,73	4,32
Malawi	1,02	1,08	1,40	0,92	2,73	2,16	0,46	0,79	0,67
Mali	20,33	22,98	27,68	4,84	5,22	6,68	0,44	0,44	0,39
Mauritania	16,11	13,28	23,20	3,94	3,90	5,19	2,40	1,34	1,58
Mauritius	25,98	45,50	43,87	12,94	11,55	9,14	5,59	5,42	7,02
Mayotte	11,13	16,63	24,37	0,20	0,19	0,56	0,00	0,00	0,00
Mozambique	2,70	2,34	3,32	2,12	4,55	2,69	3,32	3,77	5,40
Namibia	0,60	0,82	0,72	4,16	6,42	5,99	0,70	0,82	0,91
Niger	9,16	9,33	13,34	2,85	2,30	2,37	0,32	0,35	0,64
Nigeria	107,72	126,61	128,28	78,27	102,38	122,93	43,28	46,99	61,12
Rwanda	0,84	0,93	1,03	2,23	3,72	3,61	1,09	0,55	1,15
Sao Tome and Pr.	0,13	1,20	0,12	0,04	0,00	0,07	0,06	0,01	0,00
Senegal	61,95	70,12	83,76	5,34	6,15	7,27	2,19	2,96	2,47
Seychelles	4,04	4,90	6,50	1,95	2,27	8,23	0,48	0,94	1,34
Sierra Leone	1,07	1,79	1,30	8,67	1,12	1,53	0,59	0,13	0,24
South Africa	197,35	178,30	187,18	692,39	771,35	812,92	272,32	338,13	384,01
Sudan	14,71	26,32	15,47	23,68	34,05	27,01	14,81	17,37	10,79
Suriname	0,95	0,90	0,88	1,82	1,23	1,83	3,59	3,71	4,82
Swaziland	0,19	0,18	0,13	0,58	0,61	0,70	0,43	0,47	0,50
Tanzania	6,00	4,14	11,74	9,30	13,00	13,79	7,91	9,59	13,87
Togo	17,92	18,11	22,14	3,98	4,29	4,11	1,14	1,11	1,87
Tunisia	268,90	314,90	365,63	104,52	122,98	142,40	7,29	7,12	6,40
Uganda	3,27	4,28	4,80	4,40	5,60	7,41	5,08	6,82	10,41
Zambia	1,37	1,38	2,22	2,14	2,88	5,96	1,42	1,99	2,15
Zimbabwe	0,93	0,95	1,33	3,05	5,61	4,32	1,46	1,07	1,84

Donor exports to African countries, US dollars, millions

Donor	Netherlands			UK			US		
	2005	**2006**	**2007**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**
Algeria	22,97	27,48	41,70	22,00	25,75	27,92	96,74	91,82	137,71
Angola	0,00	0,00	0,00	23,80	31,66	44,47	77,32	129,19	106,68
Benin	0,00	0,00	0,00	5,01	5,80	7,07	5,90	9,63	24,12
Botswana	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,39	2,14	3,49	5,61	2,24	4,49
Burkina Faso	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,64	0,42	0,63	2,08	1,51	2,76
Burundi	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,28	0,17	0,17	0,62	0,54	0,58
Cameroon	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,96	3,51	4,01	9,75	10,01	11,08
Cape Verde	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,66	0,63	0,47	0,82	1,13	0,46
Centr. Af. Rep.	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,08	0,10	0,10	1,23	2,09	1,64
Chad	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,74	0,47	1,00	4,48	5,02	5,93
Comoros	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Congo	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,10	4,13	7,86	8,65	11,50	11,67
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,74	2,58	1,94	5,37	5,89	9,41
Côte d''Ivoire	0,00	0,00	0,00	8,16	6,10	6,68	10,32	12,29	13,47
Djibouti	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,85	0,79	0,92	3,99	3,97	4,91
Egypt	0,00	0,00	0,00	82,79	89,34	111,48	264,08	341,98	445,59
Eritrea	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,85	0,30	0,42	42,91	11,44	13,97
Ethiopia	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,77	5,89	8,98	2,59	0,74	0,51
Gabon	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,44	4,37	5,42	8,20	11,27	39,80
Gambia	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,49	2,16	2,27	2,54	1,77	1,67
Ghana	0,00	0,00	0,00	23,45	29,28	35,74	28,13	24,14	34,66
Guinea	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,37	5,01	4,09	10,42	5,40	6,13
Guinea-Bissau	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,11	0,00	0,18	0,48	0,56
Kenya	0,00	0,00	0,00	29,12	33,02	35,43	52,69	43,83	48,69
Lesotho	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,08	0,20	0,08	0,33	0,34	0,62
Liberia	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,71	1,82	2,40	6,25	5,65	6,31
Libya	0,00	0,00	0,00	32,00	31,33	37,66	6,99	36,24	42,54
Madagascar	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	0,65	1,35	2,35	3,73	2,66
Malawi	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,78	1,61	2,19	2,31	3,81	4,29
Mali	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,84	0,66	0,75	2,70	3,59	2,66
Mauritania	0,00	0,00	0,00	7,27	3,52	2,28	7,15	7,51	8,55
Mauritius	0,00	0,00	0,00	7,16	6,92	8,79	2,57	2,97	4,15
Mayotte	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,30	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Mozambique	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,71	1,74	1,49	5,18	5,40	9,58
Namibia	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,64	2,05	1,87	9,47	10,57	10,66
Niger	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,96	0,72	0,63	6,77	10,76	5,77
Nigeria	111,60	131,74	234,18	123,74	128,65	168,40	134,58	185,90	232,22
Rwanda	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,69	0,56	1,05	0,88	0,97	1,33
Sao Tome and Pr.	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,11	0,00	0,00	0,85	0,31	0,70
Senegal	0,00	0,00	0,00	15,48	29,11	20,27	13,16	8,07	12,75
Seychelles	0,00	0,00	0,00	2,02	2,54	2,62	1,76	0,79	0,79
Sierra Leone	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,91	2,85	3,06	3,15	3,27	4,62
South Africa	121,06	148,72	186,84	315,72	335,30	354,01	323,48	371,81	459,83
Sudan	0,00	0,00	0,00	21,06	23,80	19,87	8,60	6,41	5,58
Suriname	0,00	0,00	0,00	1,38	1,49	1,39	20,30	21,51	25,49
Swaziland	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,98	0,91	0,82	0,99	1,01	2,41
Tanzania	0,00	0,00	0,00	10,80	13,21	14,11	8,03	13,39	14,50
Togo	0,00	0,00	0,00	14,83	21,43	6,52	2,31	9,05	23,97
Tunisia	0,00	0,00	0,00	20,22	19,76	16,99	21,73	30,23	33,58
Uganda	0,00	0,00	0,00	5,62	6,00	7,76	5,21	4,43	6,69
Zambia	0,00	0,00	0,00	4,54	5,43	5,88	2,42	4,30	5,78
Zimbabwe	0,00	0,00	0,00	3,36	3,02	3,82	3,73	3,97	8,77

Source: WTO, 2009.