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SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

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**ANALYSIS OF PROVIDERS AND DELIVERY MECHANISMS OF
LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES: THE CASE OF SLOVENIA**

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SUMMARY

ANALYSIS OF PROVIDERS AND DELIVERY MECHANISMS OF LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES: THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

The topic of my doctoral dissertation covers governance issues related to local public services and possible local public services delivery mechanisms. In-house provision, privatization of local public services, and inter-municipal cooperation as delivery mechanisms are studied and discussed in detail. The role of multiple stakeholders is taken into consideration; but regarding the delivery mechanisms of local public services, the focus is on the supply side, on the providers, and more precisely on municipalities and local public utilities.

In the doctoral dissertation, we analyse corporate governance in the public sector, delivery mechanisms for local public services, and re-municipalisation in public service delivery. This gives us answers regarding the factors influencing decisions to arrive at the most appropriate delivery mechanism. Special attention is given to Slovenian experiences in the field of local public services delivery mechanisms after the reorganization of public enterprises, which occurred over the period 2007–2009 as the result of the adoption of the Public-Private Partnership Act (PPPA, Official Gazette of RS, no. 127/06). Referring to this, the empirical results show how the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia was conducted, whether it was done in accordance with the new legislation, what the final outcomes of the reorganization process are, and what influence it has had on the delivery mechanism of local public utilities. The results also present experiences with the reorganization process, both from the perspective of municipalities (principals) as owners of public enterprises, and from the perspective of public enterprises (agents) as the public services providers.

The aim of the dissertation is to investigate the area of local public services delivery mechanisms, and on that basis to update and upgrade the existing literature in the field. Further on, the aim is to identify the experiences of the reorganization process in the provision of local public services, specifically in water and wastewater management in Slovenia. Finally, the aim is to identify the final outcomes of the reorganization process and the motives behind it.

Methodologically, the dissertation is divided into two parts. In the theoretical part, we use descriptive methods, critical literature review, and comparative analysis of different practices based on a review of literature from the field. In the second empirical part, we do research on the reorganization of Slovenian public enterprises in the field of water and wastewater management on the basis of primary data collected through two self-prepared, detailed, and structured online questionnaires. One questionnaire is intended for municipalities, and the other for public utility providers. Data collection took place over the period 2018–2020.

Our empirical results confirm the characteristics and expectations of the principal-agent theory. The research conducted presents a classical principal-agent relationship, where municipalities, as owners of public enterprises, represent principals; and public utility providers, e.g. public enterprises, represent agents. The research results show that the implementation of PPPA contributed to increased full public ownership in local public utility services provision by roughly 10%, as the majority of public enterprises were already fully municipally owned, even before the reorganization process. The most important motives for increasing full public ownership are management problems in a mixed-ownership enterprise, closely followed by simpler regulation on the part of the service provider, greater control over the service provider, more opportunities to influence business activities, and greater rationality and efficiency of business activities. The retention of and transformation of public enterprises into full municipal ownership confirms the presence of re-municipalisation in Slovenian local government and a shift back from private to public provision. Classical theoretical reasons for re-municipalisation appear in our research results and are to be found in the context of motivating factors behind the pursuit toward full municipal ownership. Also, inter-municipal cooperation as a local public services delivery mechanism is recognized in the field studied.

The results present the basis for the formulation of recommendations for different types of local public services delivery mechanisms specific to the particular characteristics of municipalities. The results also provide useful information for municipalities, local public utility providers, and public policy makers in designing policies that aim at organising the delivery of local public services in the most efficient way.

Keywords: principal-agent theory, delivery mechanisms of local public services, municipality, public enterprise, water management, Slovenia

POVZETEK

ANALIZA IZVAJALCEV IN MEHANIZMOV ZAGOTAVLJANJA LOKALNIH JAVNIH STORITEV NA PRIMERU SLOVENIJE

Tematika doktorske disertacije pokriva problematiko upravljanja in zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev. Podrobneje so proučevani lastno izvajanje lokalnih javnih storitev, privatizacija lokalnih javnih storitev in medobčinsko sodelovanje pri zagotavljanju lokalnih javnih storitev. Upoštevana je vloga deležnikov, ki se, glede na obravnavo mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, osredotoča na ponudbeno stran, in sicer na občine in javna podjetja.

V doktorski disertaciji proučimo pomen korporativnega upravljanja v javnem sektorju, mehanizme zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev in remunicipalizacijo pri zagotavljanju storitev. Pri tem ugotovimo, kateri dejavniki vplivajo na izbor določenega mehanizma. Posebna pozornost je namenjena slovenskim izkušnjam na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, in sicer po procesu preoblikovanja javnih podjetij, ki ga je narekovala uvedba Zakona o javno-zasebnem partnerstvu (ZJZP, Ur.l. RS, št. 127/06). V okviru tega z empirično raziskavo pokažemo, ali je bilo preoblikovanje izvedeno skladno z omenjenim zakonom in kako je zakon vplival na način zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev. Predstavimo tudi izkušnje s preoblikovanjem javnih podjetij, tako z vidika občin (principali) kot lastnic javnih podjetij, kot tudi z vidika javnih podjetij kot izvajalcev storitev (agenti).

Cilj doktorske disertacije je raziskati področje mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev in na podlagi tega posodobiti in nadgraditi obstoječo literaturo proučevanega področja. Dalje je cilj ugotoviti, kakšne izkušnje je na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev prinesel proces preoblikovanja javnih podjetij, predvsem na področju upravljanja voda. Nazadnje je cilj prepoznati končne izide procesa preoblikovanja javnih podjetij in motive zanj.

Metodološko je doktorska disertacija razdeljena na dva dela. V prvem, teoretičnem delu so na osnovi pregleda literature uporabljene deskriptivna metoda, kritični pregled literature in primerjalna analiza različnih praks. V drugem, empiričnem delu je na osnovi zbiranja primarnih podatkov narejena raziskava o preoblikovanju slovenskih javnih podjetij v obdobju 2007–2009 na področju upravljanja voda. Podatki so zbrani z dvema lastno pripravljenima, strukturiranima spletnima anketnima vprašalnikoma, namenjena slovenskim občinam in komunalnim podjetjem. Zbiranje odgovorov je potekalo v obdobju 2018–2020.

Rezultati empirične raziskave najprej potrjujejo značilnosti in teoretična pričakovanja teorije principal-agenta. Izvedena raziskava ponazarja klasičen odnos med principalom in agentom, kjer občine nastopajo kot principal in javna podjetja kot agenti. Rezultati raziskave kažejo, da je uvedba ZJZP prispevala k povečanju popolnega javnega lastništva javnih podjetij, sicer približno le za desetino, saj je bila večina javnih podjetij že pred procesom preoblikovanja v

popolni javni lasti. Najpomembnejši motivi za preoblikovanje javnih podjetij oz tudi za ohranitev popolnega lastništva nad javnim podjetjem so problemi pri upravljanju podjetja z mešanim lastništvom, enostavnejši in boljši nadzor nad izvajalcem javnih storitev, več možnosti vplivanja na poslovanje podjetja ter večja racionalnost in učinkovitost poslovanja. Ohranitev popolnega javnega lastništva javnih podjetij oz preoblikovanje le teh v popolno javno lastništvo potrjuje prisotnost trenda remunicipalizacije ter prenos izvajanja lokalnih javnih storitev od zasebnikov k lastnemu javnemu izvajanju. V raziskavi so zaznani klasični razlogi za remunicipalizacijo, predvsem v kontekstu motivacijskih dejavnikov procesa preoblikovanja. Tudi medobčinsko sodelovanje kot način skupnega zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev je prepoznan na proučevanem področju.

Rezultati predstavljajo osnovo za oblikovanje priporočil za uporabo različnih oblik mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev glede na značilnosti občin. Poleg tega rezultati prinašajo koristne informacije občinam, izvajalcem lokalnih javnih storitev in nosilcem javnih politik pri oblikovanju politik za organizacijo zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev na najbolj učinkovit način.

Ključne besede: principal-agent teorija, mehanizmi zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, občina, javno podjetje, upravljanje voda, Slovenija

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU – (sl. Evropska unija); European Union

IMC – (sl. Medobčinsko sodelovanje); inter-municipal cooperation

LLC – (sl. družba z omejeno odgovornostjo); Limited Liability Company

MEDO Regulation – (sl. Uredba o metodologiji za oblikovanje cen storitev obveznih občinskih gospodarskih javnih služb varstva okolja); Decree on the methodology for determining prices of obligatory municipal public services for environmental protection

OECD – (sl. Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PLC – (sl. delniška družba); Public Limited Company

PPPA – (sl. Zakon o javno-zasebnem partnerstvu); Public-Private Partnership Act

SAS – (sl. Slovenski računovodski standard); Slovenian Accounting Standard

US – (sl. Združene države); United States

USA – (sl. Združene države Amerike); United States of America

WoS – (sl. Web of Science); Web of Science

ZGJS – (sl. Zakon o gospodarskih javnih službah); Services of General Economic Interest Act

INTRODUCTION

Background and the study issues

The topic of our doctoral dissertation covers governance issues related to local public services and possible local public services delivery mechanisms. In-house provision, privatization of local public services, and inter-municipal cooperation (hereinafter IMC) as delivery mechanisms are studied and discussed in detail. The role of multiple stakeholders is taken into consideration. Regarding the delivery mechanisms of local public services, the focus is on the supply side, on the providers, and precisely on municipalities and local public utilities.

Municipalities are often confronted with the issue of whether to provide local public services on their own or to contract out their delivery. The contracting-out strategy became popular in the public sector largely because of the perception that the public sector is less efficient than the private sector (Amagoh, 2009, p. 2). The efficiency of private ownership usually depends on the ownership, the competition, and regulation. However, private ownership is usually more efficient than the public in a fully competitive market (Pérard, 2009, p. 6). Private companies provide better outcomes when the utilization of contracts or competition can limit the reduction in quality connected with cost cutting, when quality innovations are important, and when the government has trouble dealing with patronage and powerful unions. Public ownership is usually preferred when cost reductions may lower quality to a large extent, when little emphasis is needed or placed on quality innovations, and when government procurement suffers from severe corruption (Lyon, Montgomery & Zhao, 2016, p. 5). However, ownership alone does not explain the performance of local public services. It is the competitive pressure that leads to better performance (Ménard & Peeroo, 2011, p. 19).

Municipalities usually choose between in-house production, privatization of local public services, and inter-municipal cooperation as delivery mechanisms (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013, p. 437; Rodrigues, Tavares & Araújo, 2012, p. 618). If in-house production of certain local public services doesn't allow for the exploitation of scale economies and makes production costs too high, a municipality can decide on an alternative method of production, usually in the form of privatization of local public services or contracting out to private providers, but more and more often, also in the form of inter-municipal cooperation or joint provision of services (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013, p. 436).

In the dissertation, we analyse trends in the world's delivery mechanisms for local public services and examine in which cases municipalities prefer certain local public services delivery mechanisms. Special attention is given to Slovenian experiences in the field of local public services delivery mechanisms after the reorganization of the public enterprises, which occurred over the period 2007–2009 as the result of adoption of the Public-Private Partnership Act (Official Gazette of RS, no. 127/06, hereinafter PPPA). The Law demanded

reorganization of existing public enterprises (to transform into a company or remain a public enterprise), awarding concessions to public enterprises that had transformed into companies, the exclusion of infrastructure from public enterprises, and the transfer of this infrastructure to municipalities.

We focus on the influence of these changes in the institutional framework on the local public services delivery mechanisms in the field of water and wastewater management – if and how the delivery of local public services has changed due to the reorganization of public enterprises. At this point, we also examine the purchase of municipal shares in public enterprises back from private individuals, and the awarding of concessions in case when private individuals still hold shares in public enterprises. As Slovenia is a country with a large number of relatively small, financially non-autonomous municipalities, we also analyse the possibilities of inter-municipal cooperation as a local public services delivery mechanism.

Goals and research questions

On the one hand, we aim to investigate the area under study – local public services delivery mechanisms – and to update and upgrade the existing literature in the field. On the other hand, we first aim to identify the experiences in Slovenia in the area under study, especially in the field of water and wastewater management, before and after the reorganization of existing public enterprises; and second, we aim to identify the final outcomes of the reorganization process and the motives behind it.

In the dissertation, we address 10 research questions, where the first four questions relate to the theoretical part (i.e. review of the literature), and the rest to the empirical part (i.e. Slovenia as the case under investigation).

The research questions are:

RQ1: Which governance issues related to local public services delivery mechanisms are identified in theory and researched in practice?

RQ2: Are different local public services delivery mechanisms (in-house production, privatization, inter-municipal cooperation) well-identified in theory and researched in practice?

RQ3: What are the global trends in delivery mechanisms for local public services?

RQ4: In which cases do municipalities prefer a certain local public services delivery mechanism, and which factors influence such decisions?

RQ5: Which experiences have the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia in the period 2007–2009 brought to the field of local public services delivery mechanisms? Which changes have been implemented, and which advantages and disadvantages has it brought?

RQ6: What is the current state of local public services delivery mechanisms in Slovenia?

RQ7: What are the experiences with the provision of local public services in municipalities that bought shares in public enterprises back from private individuals, and what are the experiences with awarding concessions in cases when private individuals still hold shares in public enterprises in Slovenia?

RQ8: To what extent does the current state of local public services delivery in Slovenia enable the adoption of inter-municipal cooperation as a delivery mechanism?

RQ9: Does inter-municipal cooperation present the most appropriate delivery mechanism for Slovenian local public services? Under which conditions is this delivery mechanism the most appropriate?

RQ10: Which good practices regarding local public services delivery can be identified in Slovenia?

Assessment of the scientific contribution

The research topic has not yet been the subject of extensive research in Slovenia. Therefore, the literature review of the local public services delivery mechanisms and their related governance issues in the theoretical part of the doctoral dissertation identifies the global trends in selecting a certain local public services delivery mechanism. To be more precise, we analyse in which cases a certain delivery mechanism presents a better alternative. We also analyse the trend of inter-municipal cooperation and the reasons for such cooperation. The findings, based on existing theoretical and empirical national and international studies, serve as a good supplement to the academic and professional literature in Slovenia, as well as in other countries. In addition to theoretical added value, the results from the research part bring two contributions. First, the results show how the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia was conducted, whether it was done in accordance with the legal provisions, and how it has affected the selection of local public services delivery mechanisms. Second, the results present experiences with reorganization on the side of Slovenian municipalities and on the side of water and wastewater utility providers. The overall results serve as the basis for the formulation of recommendations for different types of local public services delivery mechanisms according to the characteristics of the municipalities. The results also provide useful information to help municipalities, local public services providers, and public policy makers design policies aimed at organising the delivery of local public services in the most efficient way.

Methodology

Methodologically, the doctoral thesis is divided into two parts. In the theoretical part, we use descriptive methods, critical literature review, and comparative analysis of different practices based on a literature review of the field studied (e.g. theoretical and empirical studies in academic and professional journals, monographs, publications etc.). The

systematic literature review is conducted in a holistic way, using both manifest and latent content analysis approaches. The theoretical part, with the literature review, provides the answers to research questions no. 1–4.

In the second, empirical part, we research the reorganization of Slovenian public enterprises in the field of water and wastewater management based on primary data collection through two detailed and structured online questionnaires, which provide the answers to research questions no. 5–10. We use a combination of multiple-choice questions, open-ended questions, and a Likert scale of 1–5. The link to the online questionnaires was sent by email to all Slovenian water and wastewater utility providers and all Slovenian municipalities. The questionnaire sent to water and wastewater utility providers analyses their experiences regarding the reorganization of public enterprises and the influence of reorganization on the local public services delivery mechanisms. The second questionnaire, sent to municipalities analyses their choice of delivery mechanisms for water and wastewater utilities and their experiences with the delivery regarding the reorganization process. In order to gain a representative sample of utilities and municipalities, we tried to efficiently overcome problems of unresponsiveness, e.g. by sending reminders, additional requests with additional explanations of the value-added to this research, a personal visit request for the selected public enterprises and municipalities.

Structure of the doctoral dissertation

The doctoral dissertation is structured as five content chapters. We begin with the Introduction, where we briefly present the background of the study issues, goals, research questions, and an assessment of the scientific contribution and methodology. After that, in the first chapter, we present a literature review on corporate governance in the public sector, local public services delivery mechanisms, and re-municipalisation trends in the provision of local public services. In the second chapter we first provide some insight into the delivery mechanisms of local public services in the water industry in Slovenia, and secondly into the theoretical background of the reorganization process of public enterprises in Slovenia in connection with the implementation of the Public-Private Partnership Act in 2007. In the third chapter, we present the empirical part of the doctoral dissertation, i.e. the analysis of the reorganization process of the Slovenian public enterprises. This includes research issues and methodology. In the fourth chapter, we present research results – from the perspective of public utility providers, the perspective of municipalities, and from a comparative point of view. We also provide a discussion of the research results. In Conclusion, we provide concluding remarks and answers to the research questions posed.

1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 A literature review of corporate governance in the public sector

Corporate governance is a popular topic worldwide, one discussed and researched on national and international levels (Manolescu, Roman & Roman, 2010, p. 1127). The term corporate governance originates from the private sector, and focuses on the corporation-shareholder relationship (Blidisel, 2013, p. 224). In other words, it presents a relationship between shareholders and managers (Branston, Cowling & Sugden, 2006, p. 192). Therefore, corporate governance presents a mechanism for the owner(s) of the corporation, by which they govern and regulate the management's activities (Hirigoyen & Laouer, 2013, p. 2). Due to a combination of different scientific fields, i.e. economics, law, management, information systems etc., definitions of the term differ, particularly with regard to ownership status and the country's specific business models (Papachristou & Papachristou, 2014, p. 491).

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015, p. 9), provides a broad definition: »Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders«. Similarly, Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča (2019, p. 167) define corporate governance as a relationship between the board of directors, managers, employees, owners, and other stakeholders of the organization. In such relationship, decisions about the organization's operations are made, and the goals of the organization are defined. Rezart (2013, pp. 806, 815) sees corporate governance as a set of »rules of the game« for the internal management of the corporation and the supervision and monitoring of the management's and directors' actions, intending to protect the interests of stakeholders. Regarding the above definitions, corporate governance is very important for attracting investments (Rezart, 2013, p. 815) and boosting investor confidence (Romano, Salvati & Guerrini, 2018, p. 111), and is essential for the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization, as well as for the economy as a whole (OECD, 2015, p. 9; Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča, 2019, p. 167); and it increases competitiveness in the long term (Rezart, 2013, p. 815).

Nowadays, the term corporate governance is similarly used in the public sector, too. Therefore, it is a feature of private and state-owned organizations (Hirigoyen & Laouer, 2013, p. 2; Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča, 2019, p. 167). State-owned enterprises¹ present a very important part of the country's socio-economic activity, contributing to its overall economic efficiency and competitiveness, especially when present in fields such as utilities, energy, and infrastructure. However, corporate governance in the public sector is rather based on public goals, as state-owned enterprises are established and run with a view

¹ The definition of state-owned enterprise varies across countries and sectors. In general, state-owned enterprise is an enterprise where government or state have full, majority or minority ownership and control (European Commission, 2016, p. 1; IMF, 2020, p. 47; OECD, 2015, p. 14).

to fulfilling social objectives (Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014, p. 364), even though state-owned enterprises are in general established in order to pursue social, political, and economic objectives² (World Bank Group, 2020, p. 1). Mixed objectives, on the one hand, contribute to higher employment, lower poverty, fiscal stability, sectoral development, environmental protection, and sectoral regulation; but on the other hand, they obscure accountability, weaken the principal-agent relationship, and reduce performance incentives (World Bank Group, 2020, pp. 4–5).

Therefore, definitions of corporate governance in the public sector are at some point also publicly oriented. According to Papenfuß et al. (2018, p. 88), we can say that corporate governance in the public sector presents a framework for controlling, monitoring, and managing publicly owned entities. In other words, it outlines management procedures, public fund administration and control, in an attempt to satisfy stakeholders and improve a public organization's function (Papachristou & Papachristou, 2014, p. 491), as well as pursue the public interest (Ferry & Ahrens, 2017, p. 549). Still, the aim of corporate governance in the public sector should address the organization as a whole, meaning that goals should be balanced and benefit all stakeholders involved as much as possible. Public interests, as well as shareholder interests, should be taken into consideration when setting goals (Choudhury & Petrin, 2018, p. 405–406). As Choudhury & Petrin (2018, pp. 410, 414) point out, governments should use corporate governance to promote public policy issues, but in such a way as to benefit all of the corporate stakeholders and not favour one stakeholder at the expense of the others. Without mutual benefits, there is a considerable risk that the organization will be inefficient.

Different definitions of corporate governance in the public sector are a consequence of different governance models among different countries as well as inside each country, between different organizations. As organizations in the public sector differ in structure, management, administration, control etc., it is not possible to apply the same governance framework in each organization. Nevertheless, they can follow some basic principles of corporate governance in the public sector (Papachristou & Papachristou, 2014, p. 491). According to Papachristou & Papachristou (2014, pp. 491–492), these principles are openness, integrity, and accountability. Openness represents an element by which stakeholders can create trust. The community should be informed about every action via different media channels or public announcements. Integrity requires a high level of knowledge and education, specific standards of behaviour, and professionalism. Integrity within the organization prevents fraud, bad administration, and helps identify conflicts of interest. Accountability, as the last principle of corporate governance, means that each member of the organization has a clearly defined role and responsibility.

² Social goals pursue maximization of social welfare. In general they include redistribution and provision of »merit goods«. Political goals include diplomatic and foreign policy goals. Economic goals, also referred to as financial or commercial goals, pursue profit maximization (Rygh & Benito, 2021, pp. 6, 8).

Corporate governance in the public sector can enhance the efficiency of public sector organizations and also improve the quality of life in society. The aim of corporate governance principles in public organizations is to provide higher quality public services and satisfy the stakeholders. To be more precise, the principle benefits lie in improved management and administration, the more efficient functioning of the organization, the creation and retention of public trust, the prevention of fraud and mismanagement, a better public sector in general, and a better national profile in the international sphere (Papachristou & Papachristou, 2014, pp. 491–492).

In order to verify what positive or negative effects corporate governance brings to the public sector, we searched for and reviewed different examples of empirical studies referring to corporate governance in the public sector. Starting with Papachristou & Papachristou (2014, pp. 8, 16), who interpret the principles of corporate governance in the public sector. Their study measures the impact of principles, rules, directions of corporate governance code on administration, control systems, and communication with stakeholders in the public area researched. Their results show that implementation of principles, rules, and directions has a positive effect on the researched elements. Similarly, Papenfuß, van Genugten, de Kruijf & van Thiel (2018, pp. 87, 94) research whether specific EU initiatives are implemented in public corporate governance codes. They conclude that many EU initiatives apply to the private sector only, and not to the public sector, specifically not to state- or municipality-owned enterprises. They point out that sometimes rules are not as specific as those prescribed by the EU. Ferry & Ahrens (2017, pp. 549, 563) analyse how to pursue the public interest using corporate governance practices on the local level, and point to the fact that decentralization can enable and give rise to corporate governance practices.

Further on, Lin, Ma & Su (2009, pp.195, 205) investigate if and to what extent corporate governance practices affect productivity and efficiency in state-owned enterprises, and find that efficiency is positively related to public and employee ownership, but negatively related exclusively to state ownership. Similarly, Romano, Salvati & Guerrini (2018, pp. 109, 122) analyse the relationship between corporate governance and efficiency on the local level. Their results provide evidence that state-owned enterprises are less efficient than public enterprises, also those with private shareholders. Locke & Duppati (2014, pp. 8, 16) investigate agency costs in state-owned enterprises and find that costs tend to be lower in public enterprises with mixed ownership than in fully state-owned enterprises. However, Argento, Grossi & Thomasson (2011, pp. 188, 194) compare corporate governance models on the local level and find out externalization of public services brings more stakeholders, and that without coordinating the interests of all stakeholders there is a risk of conflict between the stakeholders involved.

Rezart (2013, pp. 809, 811–812) analyses executive compensation as a mechanism for assuring executive behaviour in the best interest of the firm. The results show that only fixed compensation has a low incentive potential in motivating desirable actions. Kerry (2018, pp. 131, 140) looks for a relationship between the government owners (state or local

shareholders) and the size of its ownership. He finds that government owners are usually the largest shareholders. This has a significant implication for the firm's value and performance. Corporate governance mechanisms therefore also have an influence on the financial outcomes (revenues) of the public institution. Munteanu, Grigorescu, Condrea & Pelinescu (2020, pp. 3, 14) examine this influence in state-owned enterprises, and the results show that efficient corporate governance has a great impact on institutional revenue.

Blidisel (2013, pp. 224, 226) investigates which elements of corporate governance on the local level add value to institutional financial performance, and concludes that the size of the local council board, clarity of roles, responsibility, and audit reports have a great influence on the financial performance of public entities. Similarly, Daiser & Wirtz (2021, pp. 135, 148) examine various factors related to corporate governance, like shared vision, strategic coordination, and clarity of goals in connection with the success of the municipality-owned enterprises. The results show a positive significant impact of the analysed factors on the success of municipality-owned enterprises. Another advantage of corporate governance in the public sector is the reduction of moral hazard. Jia, Huang & Zhang (2019, pp. 221, 241) examine the ways public corporate governance tools reduce moral hazard, which influences the quantity and quality of public innovation. The results indicate that corporate governance in the public sector has a strong influence on shaping the quality of innovations in state-owned enterprises.

In order to supplement the above empirical findings, we can take a look at a few non-empirical studies. Horan & Mulreany (2020, pp. 121, 139–140) analyse the adoption and evolution of corporate governance codes, standards, and guidance in the public sector. The findings confirm the fact that corporate governance in the public sector is based on private sector initiatives. However, the private sector can also learn from public governance, which fact has been analysed by Benz & Frey (2007, pp. 93, 101) in four areas: »manager compensation, the division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas of the corporation.« The results of the analysis show that corporate governance can learn from public governance and therefore be improved in practice. On the other side, Hirigoyen & Laouer (2013, pp. 1, 7) look at the differences between private and public corporate governance and conclude that public corporate governance can function as an application of private corporate governance.

However, corporate governance in the public sector should serve the public interest, and not only on the level of laws and regulation, but has to go deeper, especially in the sense of communication, which fosters relationships (Branston, Cowling & Sugden, 2006, pp. 205–206). Choudhury & Petrin (2018, p. 383) show that corporate governance in the public sector should include public goals and promote public aims, so long as they do not favour one stakeholder's interests over another's. However, we have to take into consideration, that (public) corporate governance frameworks differ in different economic, social, and political settings, and therefore we have to accept the challenges of these

differences when implementing corporate governance in different state-owned enterprises (Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014, p. 375–376).

Due to differences in goals among stakeholders, especially in state-owned enterprises, such enterprises can face certain organizational costs. These costs are usually connected to internal conflicts of interest, such as »political costs associated with government (owner) incentives to intervene in the firm, and agency costs associated with a manager's incentive to expropriate wealth from the firm« (Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014, p. 365). The whole theory of corporate governance and the already mentioned organizational costs or so-called agency costs are based on the principal-agent relationship. According to Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča (2019, p. 167), the principal-agent relationship represents a contract by which one or more persons (principals) engage another person (agent) to perform certain acts on his or their behalf. This means delegating certain decision-making authority to the agent. The principal is a person who invests in the business, which is entrusted to the agent and requires from the agent a certain outcome or refund of funds. The agent, on the other side, is a person who accepts the business from the principal, for which he is paid according to a contract. The relationship can arise between external and internal stakeholders of the organization. Internal stakeholders directly influence the operations of contractors and shape managerial decisions, while external stakeholders influence the formation, existence, and liquidation of the contractor and the selection of managers of contractors.

In a privately-owned organization, the owner has the role of the principal and the manager has the role of the agent. In state-owned enterprises, according to Scrimgeour & Duppati (2014, p. 366), the principal-agent relationship exists in multiple layers in such enterprises and stakeholder involvement ranges from government, ministries, boards, senior management, and other major stakeholders. Also, Horan & Mulreany (2020, p. 127) expose the plurality of stakeholders as a feature typical for the public sector. This plurality of stakeholders presents difficulties in leadership, coordination, and control. Here we can also point out the feature of multiple principals, which creates potentially conflicting goals and conflicting interests between stakeholders. Similarly, Gumanti, Nastiti & Lestari (2016, p. 559) define the principal-agent relationship as a »relationship between shareholders, the managers of firms, creditors, government, employees, and other stakeholders related to rights and obligations to achieve the firm's goals«. And this multi-layered relationship can create under-performance, corporate collapse, corporate corruption etc. For this reason, state ownership is often connected to corporate inefficiency, and therefore good corporate governance is vital for state-owned enterprises (Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014, p. 366).

In a principal-agent relationship, principals often face a problem with regard to motivating mechanisms in order that agents pursue the goals of the organization. The principals should create motivating mechanisms that would minimize the opportunistic behaviour of the agents (Jia, Huang & Zhang, 2018, p. 223; Pevcin, 2018, p. 22). Domadenik (2016, p. 113) and Horan & Mulreany (2020, p. 126) explain opportunistic behaviour on the part of the agent as taking actions by which his benefits increased at the expense of the principal.

Besides the opportunistic behaviour of the agents, information asymmetry can also be present, as agents usually have more and better information than do principals, and therefore it is harder for the principal to find out whether the agent has fulfilled the promised action. Information asymmetry arises regardless of corporate governance in the private or public sector, and in state-owned enterprises (with state principals) managerial agency risk connected to information asymmetry is present.

Jia, Huang & Zhang (2018, p. 223) state that managerial agency risk can be determined as » (1) the use of governance tools to align the private incentives of agents more closely with the firm value and (2) the use of monitoring by owners«. Therefore, agents and state principals do not work independently of each other when it comes to outcomes. And a problem arises when state principals are less informed about the agent's actions and are consequently less capable of recognizing the real contribution the agents bring to the outcomes of the organization. In such a situation, the principal can fail to sufficiently reward the agents or worse, punish the agents (Jia, Huang & Zhang, 2018, p. 225).

Similarly, also Domadenik (2016, p. 113) describes the agent's actions, which lead to the maximization of the principal's profit, as connected with greater effort. Therefore, principals should motivate agents with appropriate rewards. However, almost every contractual relationship wherein the agent promises the principal with action, presents a subject to an agent's problem, when the interests between the principal and agent differ and lead to conflict. Information asymmetry often leads to inappropriate attempts to solve goal conflicts and harmonize stakeholder interests. Therefore, the right approach has to be chosen in order to deal with information asymmetry. One way can be through carefully designed contracts for managers, while another option can be market-based incentives, which offer managers shares in the firm (Horan & Mulreany, 2020, p. 126).

As previously mentioned, the agent does not always comply with the principal's interests, which in the end leads to the agent's costs. To lower the costs of the agent, the principal tries to motivate the agent to realize its interest, usually with controls and incentives or rewards (Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča, 2019, p. 167). According to Booth & Cleary (2007, pp. 29–30), the agent's costs can be divided into direct and indirect costs. Direct agent costs arise when the agent does not work in the interest of the principal, for example when the agent avoids high-risk projects in fear that he could lose his job in the case of a negative outcome, or when the agent spends money on the organization to fulfil its own interests. Indirect costs usually arise when trying to avoid direct costs, for example requiring the agent to make reports. Also, Pevcin (2018, p. 28) exposes mechanisms designed to limit the agent's problems, like regular periodic reporting, the possibility of punishment in the case of unconscientious work performance, payments and rewards related to the agent's work performance etc.

Corporate governance, therefore, tries to minimize agency conflicts that arise in the organization. When a corporate governance mechanism works efficiently and effectively,

the organization will also be able to perform well (Gumanti, Nastiti & Lestari, 2016, p. 559). From this perspective, not only is maximization of the monetary value of the organization the main goal (as has been traditionally accepted), but it also goes further to include public goals as well. There should be balanced aims, which however do not negate the role of shareholders (Choudhury & Petrin, 2018, p. 384). Gumanti, Nastiti & Lestari (2016, p. 560) highlight the importance of institutional and managerial ownership in corporate governance from the perspective of conflicts between principals and agents. Institutional ownership should increase managerial accountability, as managers would be more cautious in decision-making in view of the direct impact on their welfare (when managers are shareholders, too). Therefore, we also speak about managerial ownership (share ownership by managers), which is in itself expected to reduce conflicts between the owners and managers, because it encourages the pooling of interests between them, which in the end improves the performance of the whole organization.

To conclude, the concept of corporate governance originates in the private sector, but it is incorporated in the public sector, too. The public sector differs from the private sector, especially in its different goals, which are publicly oriented (Blidisel, 2013, p. 225). As a result, the community interested in service delivery is one of the key stakeholders. And efficient service delivery is an indicator of good public sector corporate governance (Dzomira, 2020, pp. 88, 96). This is especially important on the local level, as local governments face many challenges choosing the most appropriate local public services delivery mechanism, one that will be most suitable for the needs of the local population. The most commonly used form is a public enterprise. And here we find different principal-agent relationships, because of the different stakeholders involved, from municipalities and local service users (local population), to management of public enterprises, private investors, and other private-public service providers. Although the greater autonomy of public enterprise management brings costs down, there is a risk of missing the goal of public benefit and the common good. This can happen because of following the market logic of public utilities, corporatization in the public utilities, or information asymmetry, where principals (local governments) do not have sufficient information about what is happening in their public enterprises (Pevcin, 2018, pp. 29–31).

Pevcin (2018, pp. 77–78) highlights two trends in principal-agent theory and corporatization. The first is re-municipalisation, meaning that the local authority regains the supervisory and executive function over public utilities. This is based on the desire for greater control over providing quality public utilities and the desire to ease the issue by ensuring the legitimacy of corporatized and privatized public utility providers. The second trend is further corporatization and privatization of public utility providers. Both trends are observed in Slovenia, too. However, re-municipalisation is particularly visible from the perspective of a large number of local public utility providers (agents), which should be reduced; and one possibility is their reintegration into municipal administration. Regarding the corporatization and privatization trend, it is important to note that Slovenia has relatively few opportunities

to privatize public utilities due to the extensive territorial fragmentation of municipalities, which creates high transaction costs. Therefore, an alternative path to privatization has appeared, in the form of common or shared provision of local public utilities, also known as intermunicipal cooperation.

In connection with the above-mentioned trends in principal-agent theory, the empirical part of our doctoral dissertation illustrates the classical principal-agent relationship in the context of corporate governance in the public sector. The stakeholders involved are municipalities (principals) and public utility providers, e.g., public enterprises (agents) in the field of water and wastewater management. After the implementation of PPPA, the relationship between municipalities and public utility providers has become clear. Municipalities are the only owners of public enterprises and therefore the only principal in the relationship. However, ownership of an individual public enterprise can be divided among more than a single municipality. In such a case, the public enterprise has more than one principal. Or, when a municipality has more than one public utility provider for the same utility, it has multiple agents. Along with the plurality of stakeholders, publicly oriented goals are also important for corporate governance in the public sector, which also figures in our research. The goals involved in water and wastewater management are publicly oriented, as they aim to fulfil the needs of the local population and at the same time strive to operate efficiently.

Our research tries to provide a unique contribution to both the theory and practice, as no identical situation (to case Slovenia) has been identified in the literature review. Therefore, the focus of the research is on Slovenia exclusively. The research includes both views of the field studied – the view from the perspective of municipalities as principals, and the view of local public enterprises as agents. Therefore, our analysis of the reorganization process of the existing local public enterprises in Slovenia provides insight into the re-municipalisation process, as well as insight into intermunicipal cooperation or shared services in Slovenian municipalities in the field of water and wastewater management.

1.2 Introduction to local public services delivery mechanisms

1.2.1 Selection of the most appropriate local public services delivery mechanism

Municipalities face trade-offs in deciding whether to provide a certain local public service in-house or to contract it out to a private provider. As fiscal constraints and financial pressures increase, municipalities have to be even more careful in choosing the most appropriate service delivery mechanism, which is usually the one provides a lower price for the delivery of services. Their decision is based on the features or characteristics of the service, a set of external constraints, and the production alternatives available (Rodrigues, Tavares & Araújo, 2012, p. 618). Girth, Hefetz, Johnston & Warner (2012, p. 892) also state that decisions about service delivery mechanisms are affected by several factors. One represents complex services, where it is difficult to specify contracts or monitor

performance. Such services will be considered less desirable candidates for contracting work. Then, services with specific assets that require capital-intensive network infrastructure will tend toward a natural monopoly and will also not prove desirable candidates for private contracting. Also, services that require internal knowledge and control are less suitable for contracting. Other factors affecting decisions about service delivery mechanisms are a level of uncertainty, the frequency of transactions, institutional and legal frameworks, the political environment, and the necessity for long-term investments. Hefetz & Warner (2011, p. 308) confirm that service characteristics are important from both an economic and an organizational perspective when deciding on the mode of service production.

When a municipality decides to deliver a local public service itself (in-house provision), it can establish a municipal department or create a structure with some degree of financial and administrative autonomy. In addition, it can also deliver the services through an autonomous entity, most commonly through a public (municipal) enterprise (Da Cruz, Berg & Marques, 2013, p. 105). Therefore, in-house provision can be defined as 1) the provision of local public services where the local government provides their services with their own departments, 2) a provision of services via a joint in-house department or shared services, 3) insourcing, which refers to taking in-house the elements of a private finance initiative (Sandford, 2019, pp. 4–5, 13) and as 4) the provision of services when the local authority itself creates a local enterprise to deliver the service (Wollmann & Marcou, 2010, p. 230). In-house provision of local public services and utilities is meaningful to the point where costs of further expansion become greater than the costs of giving the provision to external contractors (Nemec, Soukopová & Mikušová Meričková, 2015, p. 648).

If the in-house production of a certain local public service does not allow for the exploitation of scale economies and makes costs of production too high, a municipality can decide on an alternative production and delivery channel. This is usually in the form of the privatization of local public services or contracting out to private providers, and increasingly often also inter-municipal cooperation or joint provision of services (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013, p. 436). The problem regarding insufficient economies of scale usually arises as a result of the suboptimal size of local governments. Privatization and inter-municipal cooperation, therefore, serve as an avenue for the more efficient provision of local public services. Along with the exploitation of economies of scale, there are also other reasons (also connected to economy of scale), such as fiscal constraints and budget pressures, capital needs and investments, innovation, specific strategies for cost savings etc. (Hattery, 2015, pp. 60–61).

To move from in-house provision to arrangements for contracting out or sharing local public service we need to consider a series of steps, from assessing current service delivery and evaluating service delivery alternatives to negotiating and implementing alternatives and monitoring service delivery. The costs of the services are an essential element in the decision-making process for alternative service delivery. But we also need to consider the additional costs of changing the delivery mechanism, which usually involves legal fees, infrastructure, equipment purchases, administrative costs etc. (Hattery, 2015, pp. 62–65).

Bel & Fageda (2008, p. 60) test variables related to fiscal stress, cost reduction, and political and ideological factors to identify factors explaining choices by local governments for the delivery of services. They find that municipalities may use inter-municipal cooperation as an alternative to privatization to reduce costs by exploiting scale or density economies. They find that transaction costs matter when deciding on inter-municipal cooperation or externalizing the service. The municipality has to have the ability to realize and quantify or estimate the size of the transaction costs associated with the contract. To achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery, the transaction costs of both sides involved have to be minimized (Jurčík, 2014, p. 618).

Similarly, Bel, Fageda & Mur (2012, p. 86) state that transaction costs are relevant and can in some cases exceed the cost savings associated with the exploitation of scale economies, which is especially relevant for small municipalities. They observe that in small municipalities administrative and monitoring costs of the contracting process are themselves subject to scale economies. In such cases, transaction costs related to the privatization of local services can be greater than the potential benefits. Therefore, private production is less attractive for smaller municipalities. The aforementioned study by Bel & Fageda (2008, p. 61) provides evidence that politics and ideology are relevant factors for municipalities in choosing the appropriate service delivery mechanism. The effect of political interest is more important than the effect of ideological attitudes. The finding also points out that private production is less frequent under inter-municipal cooperation, and inter-municipal cooperation negatively influences privatization.

1.2.2 Privatization of local public services

Privatization is one way of delivering local public services, where the municipality uses a competitive bidding procedure to contract out the production of services to private providers (Mohr, Halstead & Deller, 2010, p. 894). In the past few decades, developed countries have faced a wave of privatization of public services, which has primarily been justified by the need to achieve greater levels of efficiency and productivity. However, González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & Guardiola (2011, p. 486) show that there is no conclusive empirical evidence to support that a privately run service is more efficient. A study by Bel & Fageda (2009, p. 116) concludes that US municipalities tend to privatize more often than European municipalities in order to achieve scale economies. Carrozza (2010, pp. 600–601) offers that a positive correlation between economic factors and the choice to privatize resulted in studies focusing on one field of local public services, while studies focusing on a wider range of fields resulted emphasised the role of interest groups.

Theory holds that privatization offers greater efficiency and reduces the costs of public delivery. Dijkgraaf & Gradus (2013, p. 702) state that early literature provides evidence that equates the efficient provision of local public services with privatization, adaptation to the needs of the local population, and the reduction of costs. The possibility of exploiting

economies of scale and the need for cost reduction represent the largest motivating factors in the privatization of local public services. High transaction costs in municipalities' own local production of services leads municipalities to leave the production to private contractors. Privatization of local public services can enable the sharing of fixed costs between different geographical units. Many local public goods and services have high fixed costs, and a private contractor can spread these costs out more efficiently by combining production for several municipalities at the same time.

Besides the need for cost reduction and exploitation of scale economies, Bel, Hebdon & Warner (2007, p. 513) and González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & Guardiola (2011, p. 475) highlight also fiscal constraints, interest groups, political interests and ideological motives as frequent reasons for privatization of local public services. A municipality may face financial difficulties at a given moment, which increases the likelihood of privatization of municipal services. The sale of public enterprises provides the state with revenues and greater future tax revenues. Kodrzycki (1998, p. 7) finds that local governments with rising deficits or decreasing surpluses are more likely to turn to outside contractors. Private contractors are seen as a means of reducing costs of government operations, which is particularly useful in times of fiscal stress.

According to Bel, Hebdon & Warner (2007, p. 514), transparency and public engagement are also important goals, as local governments are pragmatic actors that recognize the importance of managing markets, political interests, and public participation in service delivery. Transparency is crucial for creating and maintaining trust and for strengthening social cohesion. Transparency is also important for sustainable financing and support from other actors for efficient and effective service delivery. Besides transparency, public engagement in service delivery even further strengthens the perceived accountability of service delivery. It can also help to improve the quality and accessibility of services with additional information and new ideas by acting in and defending the public interest.

From a political perspective, partial privatization can be understood as a so-called 'pro-market' regulatory reform, meaning that public policies aim to enhance the general welfare by exposing operators to competitive pressures. But privatization of public services does not in itself necessarily imply any increase in competitive pressures (Asquer, 2014, p. 14). In general, conservative governments normally favour privatization, while progressive governments defend more public control when it comes to providing general interest services. This assumption arises from the fact that privatization first appeared in times of conservative governments, when they tried to reduce the power of the public sector in the economy. Also, the neighbouring effect is seen as a motivating factor for privatization, as municipalities may be more interested in privatization when other proximate municipalities have already decided to do so (González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & Guardiola, 2011, p. 476). Involvement of the private sector can act as a stimulus to carry out research and develop new technologies and techniques. The private sector usually involves better paid

and motivated staff, and higher management standards, which enable the transfer of important skills (Pessoa, 2009, pp. 16–17).

The benefits of privatizing local public services, like cost savings and exploiting economies of scale, are not always achievable, especially in smaller municipalities. Privatization has enjoyed most success in large and medium-sized municipalities. Private provision of local public services requires sufficient qualified contractors and managerial capacity to allow competitive bidding and to supervise contractor performance. These factors are usually not sufficient in smaller municipalities (Mohr, Halstead & Deller, 2010, p. 894). Therefore, smaller municipalities are less likely to report cost savings associated with private contractors. Owing to the limited availability of private contractors there are fewer opportunities for privatization and an increased risk of failure to achieve competition. In such cases, privatization may prove an inefficient choice.

Inter-municipal cooperation can be an alternative to the privatization of local public services. The results of a study from Bel, Fageda & Mur (2012, p. 102) support the supposition that inter-municipal cooperation appears to be a more effective alternative in reducing costs than private delivery. Inter-municipal cooperation incurs lower transaction costs and is less likely to be affected by competition failures. This study provides evidence that inter-municipal cooperation is an effective delivery mechanism for cost savings in the case of small municipalities. Bel & Costas (2006, p. 21) present the results from cost comparisons between a case of inter-municipal cooperation and a case without. The results reveal that inter-municipal cooperation can be effective in exploiting scale economies and in reducing costs, particularly in municipalities with populations of less than 20,000 inhabitants.

Transactions cost analysis (Hefetz & Warner, 2011, p. 308) highlights the importance of the nature of the service, too, particularly the specificity of the asset and the nature of the contract. These two characteristics play a key role in determining the level of contracting. Also, the nature of the local markets, meaning supplier competition and public interest, should be taken into consideration. The decision to grant provision of local public services to private contractors varies significantly according to competition, citizen/societal interest, and city status. Private markets perform better when there is plenty of competition and little citizen interest. Public markets perform better when there is less competition and greater difficulties in contract management.

Regardless of the size of a municipality, privatization of local public services can bring out certain problems and therefore inhibit the decision to privatize. One such problem suggests that it is impossible to foresee all possible events that may arise in the future. The possibility of information asymmetry is exposed in this case and refers in particular to the incompleteness of contracts. This means that the private contractors subsequently trigger requirements to change the terms of the contract, which are usually justified by the appearance of external cost shocks. In some cases, privatization also reduces costs at the expense of service quality (Bel & Fageda, 2008, p. 47).

1.2.3 Inter-municipal cooperation and joint provision of local public services

In the past decades, local governments have tended to cooperate more frequently with each other in order to save money by sharing services, reach a common goal towards economic development, and solve similar local problems (Hefetz, Warner & Vigoda-Gadot, 2012, p. 675; Rubado, 2014, p. 1). When seeking optimum scale of production for a local public service, and at the same time achieve scale economies with lower transaction costs, inter-municipal cooperation can prove an alternative to in-house production or privatization (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013, p. 437). According to Steiner (2003, p. 553) inter-municipal cooperation is defined as the »fulfilment of a public municipal task by an individual municipality, by two or more municipalities jointly, or by a third legal entity, whereby the task fulfilment simultaneously serves at least two municipalities and the participating municipalities participate directly ('performing') or indirectly ('organizing')«. Spicer (2015, p. 558) introduces five groups of core variables influencing inter-municipal cooperation – social capital, group composition, geographic density, power asymmetry, and political leadership. He argues that cooperation increases when potential benefits are large and transaction costs are low. Transaction costs are defined as costs of coordinating, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing arrangements.

National legislation and incentive structures play an important role in the scope of inter-municipal cooperation. If national legislation favours one administrative form, this will have an impact on the character of the cooperation. On the other hand, if it leaves the decision to the municipalities themselves, they will usually opt for those arrangements that best meet their actual local needs. Nevertheless, institutional context or environmental factors can alter the preference structure (Hulst, van Montfort, Haveri, Airaksinen & Kelly, 2009, p. 280). Nowadays, we find institutional shifts in inter-municipal cooperation, moving towards more flexible and hybrid solutions. Previous structures of inter-municipal cooperation have been replaced with light associations, networks, and contracts. Even private actors are becoming partners in cooperation with municipalities (Citroni, Lippi & Profeti, 2013, pp. 210–211). Proper management is also necessary for successful inter-municipal cooperation. Management of such cooperation is primarily based on financial and human resources. Financial autonomy is generally a prerequisite. As regards human resources, inter-municipal bodies can employ public or private staff, depending on whether cooperation is public or private (Wolfe & Nelles, 2009, pp. 13–17).

Mohr, Halstead & Deller (2010, p. 894) highlight the fact that inter-municipal cooperation offers, among other benefits, greater local decision-making capacity, scale economies, cost-effectiveness, and increased access to external resources. Externalities and economies of scale gradually motivate governing units to cooperate. As municipalities experience more and more externalities, there are greater incentives to cooperate and find solutions to problems jointly (Rubado, 2014, p. 3; Spicer, 2015, pp. 551–552). Such cooperation does not ensure the benefits associated with economy of scale, but it allows local governments to retain public control and local identity in service delivery (Hefetz & Warner, 2011, p. 292).

Blaeschke (2014, pp. 9–10) explains two types of efficiency gains from inter-municipal cooperation. One type refers to cost reduction, which is derived through the exploitation of economies of scale and scope in municipal service delivery, as inter-municipal cooperation extends the number of service users. This is particularly relevant for small municipalities, as some services require a minimum number of users. Similarly, Citroni, Lippi & Profeti (2013, p. 210) state that inter-municipal cooperation allows smaller municipalities to achieve economies of scale in the provision of public services and reduces the transaction costs associated with contracting out. Inter-municipal cooperation is also considered a suitable instrument to overcome shortages connected with the fragmented structure of local government, and can lead to both a higher quality of local services and more efficient delivery (Klimovský, Mejere, Mikolaityte, Pinterič & Saparniene, 2014, pp. 647–648). Steiner (2003, p. 555) also argues that in many cases municipalities are unable to fulfil their tasks professionally due to their sub-optimal size. When working in cooperation, small municipalities can achieve advantages arising from administrative size and greater professionalism. In turn, greater professionalism leads to better services at lower prices (De Mello & Lago-Peñas, 2012, pp. 2, 4; Pérez-Lópe, Zafra-Gómez & Prior-Jiménez, 2013, p. 7).

The other type of efficiency gains identified by Blaeschke (2014, pp. 9–10) refers to the internalization of losses of efficiency due to free-riding on spatial externalities – i.e. spillover effects. This is important, especially for metropolitan areas and city-periphery settings. In such cases, cooperation yields gains in efficiency when it helps to improve fiscal equivalence. Further on, Bolgherini (2011, p. 7) divides key motivating factors for inter-municipal cooperation into three groups. The first group includes more efficient provision of local services, better quality of services, lower costs, and greater administrative efficiency of municipal structures. The second group supports the fact that inter-municipal cooperation can be used both in urban and rural municipalities. And the third group of motivating factors represents opportunities to participate in a wide variety of tasks and activities.

Municipalities usually decide on inter-municipal cooperation with expectations of cost reductions and improvement of local services. Reducing costs and improving services are therefore generally seen as the main motivating factors for entering into a cooperative relationship with another municipality (Spicer, 2015, p. 565). In order to obtain cost savings from inter-municipal cooperation several factors need to be taken into consideration: the type of service, the size of the output/population, and the transaction costs imposed by the institutional design of the cooperative governance arrangement. Bel & Warner (2014, pp. 60, 62) document these factors with examples from existing studies, e.g. solid waste is more prone to scale economies; small municipalities can benefit more from exploiting scale economies than larger ones; and single separate governments are more likely to have lower transaction costs than multi-government bodies. Both the contractor municipality and the contracting municipality can benefit from the joint provision of services (Blaeschke & Haug, 2014, pp. 9-10). Inter-municipal cooperation may be more likely when supervision of the

service remains relatively simple, and when the coordination with other partner municipalities does not become too complex (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2012, p. 99).

In addition to all of the motivating factors for inter-municipal cooperation mentioned so far, Ferreira & Teles (2015, p. 4) state that inter-municipal cooperation can also yield a higher rate of recovery of investments due to the existence of externalities, enables joint management of infrastructure and functions for several municipalities, greater visibility and marketing, and easier access to external funds. Blaeschke & Haug (2014, pp. 10–11) also highlight the possibility of reducing bureaucratic inefficiencies and avoiding large staffs or capital investments due to inter-municipal cooperation. Spicer (2015, p. 564) identifies some other motivating factors, which include reducing duplication, increasing international visibility, filling service gaps, and allowing for greater access to federal and provincial grants. Also, perception of the local and national economy is highlighted, meaning that a weak local economy can motivate municipalities to enter into inter-municipal cooperation. Di Porto, Merlin & Paty (2013, p. 26) find evidence that municipal fiscal revenues are also relevant to cooperation decisions. The probability of joining inter-municipal cooperation increases if there is a positive difference between the expected fiscal revenues of a cooperating municipality and the actual revenues realized by an isolated municipality.

Even though there are many benefits or motivating factors for inter-municipal cooperation, it is also subject to potential weaknesses. Kettunen & Teles (2015, p. 6) state that inter-municipal cooperation does not in itself necessarily bring efficiency gains. To manage the transaction costs of cooperation, professional management is needed. Policymakers should provide support for professional management and study the potential economic benefits of cooperation, as well as weaknesses. The most frequently identified weaknesses are possible difficulties in reaching consensus in a jointly run organization, regional issues, complexity of governance, lack of transparency, accountability problems, and costs related to policy-making (Bel & Warner, 2014, pp. 10–11).

Leca (2014, p. 219) explains that sometimes a lack of trust between the potential partnering municipalities can hinder cooperation efforts. Disputes between local officials in neighbouring municipalities can hamper cooperation efforts as well, as they can make it difficult to bring the relevant parties to the negotiating table. Inexperience and a lack of legal knowledge can also burden cooperation. Klimovský, Mejere, Mikolaityte, Pinterič & Saparniene (2014, p. 654) provide evidence of such problems, in the case of inter-municipal cooperation in Lithuania and Slovakia. Inter-municipal cooperation in both countries is affected by inter-personal relationships and sometimes also by politics. Due to a lack of knowledge, some local representatives are not ready to cooperate in line with the legal conditions in place. Therefore, cooperation sometimes fails or remains insufficient. Ferreira & Teles (2015, p. 5) point to the fact that in the case of inter-municipal cooperation, mechanisms of democratic control in municipalities tend to be less transparent and there is less public interest, and internal control and audit mechanisms are more difficult to implement.

To conclude, inter-municipal cooperation can be a better alternative than privatization with a view to achieving scale economies with lower transaction costs (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013, p. 436). Empirical evidence from Spain by Pérez-López, Zafra-Gómez & Prior (2015, pp. 11, 22) shows that the adoption of inter-municipal cooperation by smaller local governments delivers cost savings, which makes smaller municipalities more efficient. Inter-municipal cooperation usually improves on poor performance in most of the services analysed. Also, smaller municipalities are less likely to opt for privatization, as they do not access to the wide range of private providers larger municipalities do (Citroni, Lippi & Profeti, 2013, p. 86). Similarly, Warner (2011, p. 432) shows that inter-municipal cooperation is often preferable to privatization of local public service delivery when competitive private suppliers are limited. Technical sectors such as water supply and sewage disposal in particular, where market competition is limited owing to the high proportion of sunk costs, tend to question the superior nature of private solutions.

1.3 Systematic literature review of local public services delivery mechanisms

In this section we provide a literature review in order to review the development of the area under study – the three main service delivery mechanisms (i.e. in-house provision, privatization, and inter-municipal cooperation), in order to determine which delivery mechanisms dominate in a given period of time, and to verify which economic research focus prevails in the area under study. We examine the potential impact on economies of scale, cost reduction, efficiency, and other economic, political, and institutional factors in the provision of local public services. This allows for existing reviews in the area under study to be updated and upgraded. Some authors (see e.g., Bel & Fageda, 2009; Bel & Warner, 2014) have already produced an overview of empirical studies on the privatization of local public services as well as an overview focusing on inter-municipal cooperation. Their focus is on both empirical and non-empirical research (scientific papers), refers to all three delivery mechanisms, and does include the country and/or cross-country focus of the literature. In this context, the research aims to both update the overview of investigations in the field and at the same time tries to employ a holistic approach by using both manifest and latent content analytical approaches. This literature review provides answers to three research questions central to the doctoral dissertation:

RQ2: Are different local public services delivery mechanisms (in-house production, privatization, inter-municipal cooperation) well identified in theory and researched in practice?

RQ3: What are the global trends in delivery mechanisms for local public services?

RQ4: In which cases do municipalities prefer a certain local public services delivery mechanism, and which factors influence such decisions?

1.3.1 Methodology and data

1.3.1.1 Methodology

We analyse empirical and non-empirical English-language academic journal articles on the mechanisms of local public service delivery, selected on the basis of five keywords that will be discussed later in this section. We review only scientific journal papers, as these types of paper are the most rigorous form of communication between researchers, and peer-review is assured. The literature review covers the period 2001–2020. However, the scientific papers included in the content analysis component of this literature review are limited to the period 2007–2020. First, a highly detailed literature review is outlined for the period 2007–2018, during which period the number of papers on the subject under review increased significantly. Second, a briefer review is prepared for the years 2019–2020, during which a noticeable difference in the number of papers per keyword illustrating an individual delivery mechanism occurs.

The period 2001–2006 is not particularly rich in scientific papers on the mechanisms of providing local public services. The databases researched contain only 1–3 papers per year for the keywords used. Since 2007, the number has increased to 6–8 scientific journal papers per keyword used per year. During the period 2017–2020, the number has on average jumped to 10–20 papers per keyword per year. Such an increase is probably due to increased interest in local public services delivery alternatives. In particular, inter-municipal cooperation has become very popular. However, for the years 2019–2020 the number of papers with the keyword(s) *in-house local public services delivery* fell to only 2–5 papers per year, while the number of papers with the keyword(s) *private local public services delivery* rose to 20–40 papers per year; and papers with the keyword(s) *inter-municipal cooperation* rose to 15–30 per year. The literature review is limited to European and US studies, as they represent the majority of studies related to local public services delivery mechanisms.

We conduct a literature search using four of the most important scientific literature databases: Scopus, Web of Science (WoS), Business Source Premier, and Political Science Complete. The Scopus and WoS databases are used for their multidisciplinary bibliographic collections with citation index, and which feature papers from the most influential scientific journals in the world. In addition, Business Source Premier and Political Science Complete are used specifically in connection with our research topic – local public services delivery mechanisms – as our literature review is limited to social science papers. The Business Source Premier database is intended for searching professional and academic literature in the field of economics, while the Political Science Complete database is intended for searching literature in the field of political science.

Many of the papers found are available in more than one database. Searching in more than one database is conditioned by the fact that this literature review attempts to provide a holistic view of the research topic. The search in the selected databases is limited to the

social sciences, more precisely to the economic and political sciences. Therefore, Scopus includes three available research areas: 1) social sciences; 2) business, management, and accounting; and 3) economics, econometrics, and finance. WoS includes the following areas: 1) public administration; 2) business economics; and 3) other social science topics. Business Source Premier and Political Science Complete cover areas such as economic aspects, municipal services, liberalization, political science, and policy sciences. Papers are searched for five keywords: *local public services delivery mechanisms*, *alternative local public service provision*, *in-house local public services delivery*, *private local public services delivery* and *inter-municipal cooperation*. The phrase *local public service* is the central part of the keyword(s). *Local public* is used because the focus of the literature review is on local government, and *service* because the review attempts to provide a broader insight into the delivery mechanisms of public services in general and extends beyond public utilities.

Therefore, the word *utility* is not used as a part of the keywords. All keywords used apply to the central topic of this literature review – the three local public services delivery mechanisms, namely in-house delivery, private service delivery, and inter-municipal cooperation as an alternative. The phrase *delivery mechanism* is also successfully used with the alternative phrase *provision* as one of the keywords. When we identify the relevant papers with keywords and other selection criteria (time period, territory, research area), we check the titles of the total number of papers found in order to exclude duplicate papers. The next step is to check the content. We read the paper abstracts to determine the degree of direct relevance of the content to our main topic. After that, we access the full text of the remaining relevant papers. In the following, second content check we read the full text of the remaining papers. Some additional papers have to be excluded as their content is deemed largely irrelevant. In the end, a total of 50 relevant papers are included in our literature review and content analysis of the literature sample.

We analyse the selected literature sample by means of content analysis. Berelson (1952) defines the term content analysis as a research technique to describe the manifest content of communication objectively, systematically, and quantitatively. This review provides the essential information and the underlying methodology, and the content related to the existing literature in the area and period under study. We use latent content analysis as a tool to conduct a literature review or as a tool for the systematic and transparent analysis of a literature sample (Seuring & Gold, 2012). In the process of content analysis, we focus on the main research topic of each paper and its results. During this process we aim to find answers to several sub-questions relevant to answering the three research questions.

Therefore, based on the research questions, we have posed the following sub-questions that help us to achieve our objective: 1) When was the first study published? 2) How has the number of studies changed over time? 3) What types of studies have been carried out? 4) What methodology is used in the studies? 5) What research questions are asked in the studies? 6) Are there major differences in the research questions between the studies? 7) What research topic is most strongly represented in the studies? 8) What are the decision-

making factors influencing the local public services delivery? and 9) Are there major differences in the decision-making factors between studies/authors? The answers to these sub-questions are found by analysing the selected literature sample. As described in the previous paragraph, the next step is to select the communication content and sample for our literature review in order to answer the research questions. Then, by defining content categories, we determine the type of material to be included and complete the units of analysis. Finally, we analyse the collected data.

1.3.1.2 Data set

Study of this field originated in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 21st century, with authors Warner and Hebdon (2001) at the forefront with their paper *Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and Its Alternatives*. Empirical studies dominate over non-empirical studies. Despite the extensive literature in this field, it is a fact that a literature review serves as background for almost every academic paper, as it helps to narrow the research topic. It seems that a comprehensive literature review on local service delivery mechanisms is still needed. This would contribute to a thorough synthesis of previous research on the selected research topic, which according to Seuring & Gold (2012) is one of the main steps of the research process.

Table 1: Literature review data by time period, 2001–2018

Time period	No of papers per single key word, per single year	Total No of papers per all key words, per time period
2001–2006	1–3	70
2007–2016	6–8	279
2017–2018	10–20	86
Total	17–31	435

Source: own work

As explained in section 1.3.1.1, the literature sample is compiled using five keywords for search and content review. Table 1 shows that a total of 435 scientific papers were found in the area under investigation, 131 of which were duplicates. The majority of the papers were published after 2006 (Table 1). In the period 2001–2006, a total of 70 papers with five keywords were found. Only 1–3 papers per keyword were published per year. The publication boom in this area started in 2007, when 6–8 papers per keyword were published annually until 2016. A total of 279 papers found were published between 2007 and 2016. In the years 2017–2018, the number of published papers per keyword doubles annually. Altogether, 86 papers were published in these two years, with 10–20 papers per keyword.

Table 2: Literature review data by keyword, 2001–2018

Keyword	No of papers per key word
Local public services delivery mechanisms	114
Alternative local public service provision	112
Private local public services delivery	103
Inter-municipal cooperation	73
In-house local public services delivery	33
Total	435

Source: own work

Table 2 shows that the largest number of papers found belong to the keyword search *local public services delivery mechanisms* (114 scientific journal papers found) and *alternative local public service provision* (112 papers) (Table 2). Under the keyword *private local public services delivery*, 103 papers were identified, followed by keyword *inter-municipal cooperation* with 73 papers. The lowest number of papers appeared under the keyword *in-house local public services delivery* (33 papers). As already mentioned, many of these papers are duplicates found under more than one of the keywords. The total number of papers found without duplicates is therefore less than the sum of all papers per keywords. After the exclusion of 131 duplicates, 304 papers remained for content analysis.

Table 3: Literature review data by sampling, 2001–2018

Total	435
Without duplicate papers	304
After first content scrutinization	105
Only full paper open access	62
After second content scrutinization	50
Literature sample	50

Source: own work

As seen from Table 3, we read abstracts in the first content check to identify direct content relevance to our main topic; a total of 105 papers were relevant in terms of content. We then reviewed the full open access of these 105 papers, which reduced our sample to 62 papers. This was followed by the second substantive examination of content, in which the entire text of these papers was read. Another 12 papers were excluded as irrelevant. To be more precise, reading the entire texts revealed that the main research focus of these papers was largely

related to environmental or social issues. We found 50 content-relevant papers with full paper open access that could be included in our literature sample.

Table 4: Review of literature databases used in the literature sample, 2001–2018

Scientific literature database	No of literature sample papers in database
Scopus	45
WoS	40
Political Science Complete	12
Business Source Premier	10
Scopus & WoS	38
Scopus & WoS & Political Science Complete	9
Scopus & WoS & Business Source Premier	7

Source: own work

Table 4 shows that of the total of 50 papers, 45 papers are available in Scopus, 40 in WoS, 12 in Political Science Complete, and 10 papers in Business Source Premier. As expected, the majority of the papers (38) are available in Scopus and WoS, which are known as two first-class databases for abstracts and citations from peer-reviewed literature. The other two databases, Business Source Premier and Political Science Complete, contain only 12 and 10 papers respectively, which was to be expected due to their specific field of research. However, nine papers from Political Science Complete are also available in Scopus and WoS, and seven papers from Business Source Premier in Scopus and WoS.

1.3.2 General characteristics of literature review sample, 2007–2018

First, we carried out the substantive content examination on the basis of the three types of local public services delivery mechanisms and their mix. As Table 5 shows, only one study focuses on in-house provision, 21 studies focus on private provision, 14 studies on inter-municipal cooperation, three studies on the mix of in-house and private provision, and 12 studies on the mix of private provision and inter-municipal cooperation. No study investigates the mix of all three mechanisms.

Table 5: Literature sample review by type of delivery and by country, 2007–2018

Country studies		Delivery mechanism studies	In-house provision	Private provision	Inter-municipal cooperation	Mixed delivery mechanisms
Country studies	Europe		Tavares, A.F. & Camões, P.J. (2007)	Bel, G. & Fageda, X. (2008) Carrozza, C. (2010) González-Gómez, F. et al., (2011) Rodrigues, M. et al., (2012) Sundell, A. & Lapuente, V. (2012) Zafra- Gómez et al., (2013) Wassenaar, M. et al. (2013) Petersen et al. (2015) Garrone, P. & Marzano, R. (2015) Bergman, P.A. et al., (2016)	Bel, G. et al., (2012) Citroni, G. et al., (2013) Bel, G. et al., (2013) Rayle, L. & Zegras, C. (2013) Allers, M.A. & van Ommeren, B. (2016) Allers, M.A. & de Greef J.A. (2018) Blaesche, F. & Haug, P. (2018) Soukopová, J. & Vaceková, G. (2018) Grešová, L. & Fuka, J. (2018)	Bel, G. & Mur, M. (2009) Dijkgraaf, E. & Gradus, R. (2013) Monteduro, F. (2014) Czaplak, J. (2016)
	USA			Lamothe et al. (2008) Bel, G. & Fageda, X. (2009) Levin, J. & Tadelis, S. (2010) Krueger, S. et al., (2011) Warner, M.E. & Hefetz, A. (2012) Girth, A.M. et al. (2012) Hultquist, A. et al., (2017)		Marvel, M.K. & Marvel, H.P. (2007) Mohr, R. et al., (2010) Warner, M.E. (2011) Hefetz, A. & Warner, M.E. (2011) Hefetz, A. et al., (2012) Kim, Y. & Warner, M.E. (2016) Kim, Y. (2018) Schoute, M. et al. (2018)

(table continues)

(continued)

Country studies		Delivery mechanism studies	In-house provision	Private provision	Inter-municipal cooperation	Mixed delivery mechanisms
Cross-country studies	Europe			Nemec, J. et al., (2015)	Hulst, R. et al. (2009) Wollmann, H. (2011) Klimovský, D. et al. (2014).	Bel, G. et al., (2010)
	Europe and USA			Bel, G. et al., (2007) Warner, M.E. (2008)	Bel, G. & Warner, M.E. (2015) Bel, G. & Warner, M.E. (2016)	Warner, M.E. & Bel, G. (2008) Bel, G. & Gradus, R. (2018)

Source: own work

The papers in Table 5 are also divided according to country and cross-country studies for Europe and the USA. Of 50 papers, 39 are country studies, 24 of which are European and 15 are US studies. Of 11 cross-country studies, five are European and six are mixed European and US studies. In our literature sample, there were no relevant cross-country (cross-state) US studies. In total, the literature sample includes 13 US studies, five Spanish studies, four studies covering the USA and Europe, four studies from the Netherlands, three Italian and Portuguese studies, two Swedish studies, and two studies covering several European countries. In addition, there is one country study for each of the following countries: Germany, Poland, Denmark, Czech Republic, and the Netherlands; and one cross-country study for each of the following countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Netherlands and Spain, the United Kingdom and the USA, and the USA and Spain. These countries are study units and are not related to the country affiliations of the authors.

As Table 5 shows, the majority of the sample studies (36) were published in the period 2011–2018 and refer to private provision or inter-municipal cooperation. Only 14 sample studies were published in the period 2007–2010, most of which relate to private service provision. Looking at the years of publication, we can see that inter-municipal cooperation is a rather new or recent topic. This type of delivery mechanism has gained in popularity in recent years and represents an alternative to the private provision of services. In terms of content, therefore, the literature sample mainly includes the private provision of local public services (20 studies) and inter-municipal cooperation as an alternative to private provision (14 studies). The sample also includes 15 studies covering a mix of private provision and inter-municipal cooperation. Only one study in the sample focuses on in-house provision, and only three studies cover a mix of in-house and private provision of local public services.

Most of the studies in the sample (39) cover country aspects, of which 24 studies are European country studies and 15 studies cover US states. The European country studies tend to focus largely on either private service provision or on inter-municipal cooperation, while the US state studies focus more on the mix of local public services delivery mechanisms, as well as exclusively on private provision of services. However, there are no US state studies in our sample that focus exclusively on inter-municipal cooperation. Cross-country studies include only five studies in our sample that compare European countries, and only six studies compare European and US states. There are no papers in the sample with a cross-border dimension that only compare US states. On the basis of the literature sample, we can conclude that there is a lack of studies that deal exclusively with the in-house provision of local public services, and also of studies that combine a mix of in-house provision with the other two delivery mechanisms.

Table 6: Review of methodology in literature sample, 2007–2018

Study	Empirical/ non- empirical study	Country/ cross- country study	Qualitative/ quantitative study	Research method/model, data, time frame
Allers, M.A. & de Greef J.A. (2018)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression, panel data, secondary data, 2005–2013
Allers, M.A. & van Ommeren, B. (2016)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression, micro-level dataset, 1997–2013
Bel, G. & Fageda, X. (2008)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: logit technique, primary/secondary data, 2002, 2003
Bel, G. & Fageda, X. (2009)	empirical	country	qualitative	meta-regression: probit model, secondary data, 1979–2004
Bel, G. & Gradus, R. (2018)	non-empirical	cross-country	qualitative	literature review
Bel, G. & Mur, M. (2009)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression, primary/secondary data, 2003
Bel, G. & Warner, M.E. (2015)	non-empirical	cross-country	qualitative	literature review
Bel, G. & Warner, M.E. (2016)	empirical	cross-country	qualitative	meta-regression: probit model, secondary data
Bel, G. et al., (2010)	empirical	cross-country	quantitative	explanatory/comparative analysis, secondary data, 2003, 2006
Bel, G. et al., (2012)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression, primary/secondary data, 2008

(table continues)

(continued)

Study	Empirical/ non- empirical study	Country/ cross- country study	Qualitative/ quantitative study	Research method/model, data, time frame
Bel, G. et al., (2013)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: binary probit model, primary data, 2003, 2008
Bel, G. et al., (2007)	non- empirical	cross- country	qualitative	descriptive/comparative analysis
Bergman, P.A. et al., (2016)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression, panel data, primary data, 1990–2009
Blaesche, F. & Haug, P. (2018)	empirical	country	quantitative	unconditional FDH- metafrontier, secondary data, 2006
Carrozza, C. (2010)	non- empirical	country	qualitative	case study comparison, primary/secondary data
Citroni, G. et al., (2013)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	case study, secondary data, 2008
Czaplak, J. (2016)	empirical	country	quantitative	multy-faceted analysis, primary/secondary data, 2007–2013
Dijkgraaf, E. & Gradus, R. (2013)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: cost function estimation, panel data, secondary data, 1998–2010
Garrone, P. & Marzano, R. (2015)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	mixed duration models, primary data, 2001–2012
Girth, A.M. et al. (2012)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression, multi-method approach, primary data, 2007, 2008–2010,
González- Gómez, F. et al., (2011)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: binominal discrete choice model, secondary data, 1985–2006
Grešová, L. & Fuka, J. (2018)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	data envelopment analysis, primary data, 2010–2014
Hefetz, A. 6 Warner, M.E. (2011)	empirical	country	qualitative	regression: multinomial logit models, primary/secondary data, 2007
Hefetz, A. et al., (2012)	empirical	country	qualitative, quantitative	regression: probit models, secondary data, 1992–2007
Hulst, R. et al. (2009)	non- empirical	cross- country	qualitative	comparative analysis, secondary data
Hultquist, A. et al., (2017)	empirical	country	qualitative, quantitative	regression: multinomial logit model, primary data, 2014
Kim, Y. (2018)	empirical	country	qualitative	regression: probit model, primary data, 2012
Kim, Y. & Warner, M.E. (2016)	empirical	country	qualitative	regression: probit model, primary data, 2012

(table continues)

(continued)

Study	Empirical/ non- empirical study	Country/ cross- country study	Qualitative/ quantitative study	Research method/model, data, time frame
Klimovský, D. et al. (2014)	empirical	cross- country	qualitative	descriptive/comparative analysis, primary data, 2013
Krueger, S. et al., (2011)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression: multinomial logistic model, secondary data, 1997
Lamothe et al. (2008)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression: multinomial logit model, secondary data, 1997, 2002
Levin, J. & Tadelis, S. (2010)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	multivariate regression: multinomial logit model, primary data, 1997, 2002
Marvel, M.K. & Marvel, H.P. (2007)	empirical	country	qualitative	regression, primary data, 2002
Mohr, R. et al., (2010)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression: logit, probit model, primary data, 1995, 1997, 2004
Monteduro, F. (2014)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: OLS and Student's t test, secondary data, 2004–2006
Nemec, J. et al., (2015)	empirical	cross- country	quantitative	1)cost-minimization method, primary data, 2000–2011 2)basic statistical analysis, secondary data, 2008–2012 3) basic statistical analysis, secondary data, 2008–2012
Petersen et al. (2015)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: OLS regressions with cluster-corrected standard errors, panel data, secondary data, 2007–2012
Rayle, L. & Zegras, C. (2013)	empirical	country	qualitative	case study, primary and secondary data, 1990–2009
Rodrigues, M. et al., (2012)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression: multinomial logit model, primary/secondary data, 2008
Schoute, M. et al. (2018)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression: multinomial logit model, primary/secondary data, 2010
Soukopová, J. & Vaceková, G. (2018)	empirical	country	quantitative	multiple regression: OLS model, primary/secondary data, 2012–2014
Sundell, A. & Lapiente, V. (2012)	empirical	country	qualitative	regression: OLS and FEVD model, primary data, 2008

(table continues)

(continued)

Study	Empirical/ non- empirical study	Country/ cross- country study	Qualitative/ quantitative study	Research method/model, data, time frame
Tavares, A.F. & Camões, P.J. (2007)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: multivariate probit model, secondary data, 1999–2002
Warner, M.E. (2008)	non-empirical	cross-country	qualitative	descriptive analysis, secondary data
Warner, M.E. (2011)	empirical	country	qualitative	correlation analysis, primary/secondary data, 2007
Warner, M.E. & Bel, G. (2008)	empirical	cross-country	quantitative	comparative/explanatory analysis, secondary data
Warner, M.E. & Hefetz, A. (2012)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression: probit models, primary/secondary data, 2002–2007
Wassenaar, M. et al. (2013)	empirical	country	quantitative, qualitative	regression: binary logit model, primary data, 2009
Wollmann, H. (2011)	non-empirical	cross-country	qualitative	comparative analysis, secondary data
Zafra- Gómez et al., (2013)	empirical	country	quantitative	regression: dual cost function, panel data, secondary data, 2002–2008

Source: own work

Table 6 provides an overview of the methodology used in the papers. Most of the studies are empirical (43); 19 studies are quantitative, 17 qualitative, and 14 include both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Most of the sample studies use regression analysis (32), with probit and logit models most frequently used. In addition, explanatory, descriptive, comparative analyses are used in seven studies, case study analyses in three studies, and literature review analyses in two studies. Some also use other statistical methods. Roughly half of the papers are based on secondary data, one-quarter on primary data, and on a combination of both. The time frame of the data set varies from sample study to sample study, but about half of the empirical studies use longitudinal data, while the other half use cross-sectional data.

The number of studies per author differs. It also differs among specific delivery mechanism of local public services. In the following Table 7 we see the number of our sample papers per author and per single delivery mechanism. Again, we see that studies on private provision and IMC prevail, as well as studies dealing with both, private provision, and IMC. Authors with one paper dominate and cover all three local public services delivery mechanisms (in-house provision, private provision, inter-municipal cooperation).

Table 7: Review of authors in literature sample, 2007–2018

No of sample papers	Delivery mechanism studies	Authors
1 paper	In-house provision	Camões (2007); Tavares (2007)
	Private provision	Araújo (2012); Bergman (2016); Bernick (2011); Carrozza (2010); Christensen (2015); Feiock (2008); Flynn (2017); Garrone (2015); Girth (2012); González-Gómez (2011); Gradus (2013); Groot (2013); Guardiola (2011); Harsell (2017); Hebdon (2007); Houlberg (2015); Hultquist (2017); Johansson (2016); Johnston (2012); Krueger (2011); Lamothe, M. (2008); Lapuente (2012); Levin (2010); López-Hernández (2013); Lundberg (2016); Mikušová Meričková (2015); Marzano (2015); Nemec (2015); Petersen (2015); Picazo-Tadeo (2011); Plata Díaz (2013); Prior (2013); Rodrigues (2012); Soukopová (2015); Spagnolo (2016); Sundell (2012); Tadelis (2010); Tavares (2012); Walker (2011); Wassenaar (2013); Wood (2017)
	IMC	Airaksinen (2009); Blaeschke (2018); Citroni (2013); de Greef (2018); Fuka (2018); Grešová (2018); Haug (2018); Haveri (2009); Hulst (2009); Kelly (2009); Klimovský (2014); Lippi (2013); Mejere (2014); Mikolaityte (2014); van Montfort (2009); van Ommeren (2016); Pinterič (2014); Profeti (2013); Rayle (2013); Saparniene (2014); Soukopová (2018); Vaceková (2018); Wollmann (2011); Zegras (2013)
	Mix of in-house and private provision	Budding (2018); Gradus (2018); Marvel, M.K. (2007); Marvel, H.P. (2007); Monteduro (2014); Schoute (2018)
	Mix of private provision and IMC	Czaplak (2016); Deller (2010); Fageda (2010); Halstead (2010); Mohr (2010); Mur (2009); Vigoda-Gadot (2012)
2 papers	Private provision	Fageda (2008, 2009); Hefetz (2012, 2012)
	IMC	Allers (2016, 2018); Fageda (2012, 2013); Mur (2012, 2013); Warner (2015, 2016)
	Mix of private provision and IMC	Dijkgraaf (2010, 2013); Kim (2016, 2018)
3 papers	Private provision	Bel (2007, 2008, 2009); Warner (2007, 2008, 2012)
	Mix of private provision and IMC	Gradus (2010, 2013, 2018); Hefetz (2011, 2012, 2012)
4 papers	IMC	Bel (2012, 2013, 2015, 2016)
	Mix of private provision and IMC	Bel (2008, 2009, 2010, 2018)
5 papers	Mix of private provision and IMC	Warner (2008, 2011, 2011, 2012, 2016)

Source: own work

As seen from Table 7, Bel and Warner stand out among the authors with the highest number of papers in our sample, followed by Fageda, Hefetz, Gradus and Mur. Bel is the author of 11 papers (published between 2007 and 2018) dealing with private provision (three papers), inter-municipal cooperation (four papers), and a mix of private provision and IMC (four papers). Warner is the author of 10 papers (published between 2007 and 2016) dealing with private provision (three papers), inter-municipal cooperation (two papers) and a mix of private provision and IMC (five papers). Fageda also represents private provision (two papers), IMC (two papers) and a mix of private provision and IMC (one paper), with a total of five papers (published between 2008 and 2013). Gradus and Hefetz each appear in five sample papers, both representing private provision and a mix of private provision and IMC. Gradus, however, also represents a mix of in-house and private provision. In-house provision and private provision are also represented by Tavares. The Mur's papers in our sample mainly focus on IMC and a mix of private provision and IMC. Soukopová focuses on private provision and IMC, Allers on IMC, Dijkgraaf and Kim on a mix of private provision and IMC. The other authors appear in only one of the papers in our literature sample for the period 2007–2018, indicating that authorship in the field studied is (very) limited to a small group of authors.

1.3.3 Content analysis breakdown: research focus and findings of literature sample studies, 2007–2018

Based on the review of the sample studies in the period 2007–2018, we can form six groups of factors influencing decisions for local public services delivery mechanisms. These are cost, economies of scale, efficiency, economic-political factors, economic-institutional-social factors, and other economic factors (e.g., fiscal conditions, poverty issues, quality, corporatization, competitive/non-competitive service markets, local stress, etc.). Each group covers studies from three perspectives, focusing on privatization, inter-municipal cooperation, and both privatization and inter-municipal cooperation. Each group of decision-making factors indicates the main research topic and the main findings of the studies in relation to each of the three delivery mechanisms. A breakdown of the content analysis is presented in Tables 8–13.

The first group – costs as a decision-making factor, which is shown in Table 8 – focuses primarily on cost reduction in the context of an individual delivery mechanism. In terms of the number of studies, it is also the most representative group of decision-making factors. Studies that analyse the relationship between costs and the privatization of local public services (Bel & Fageda, 2008; Hultquist, Harsell, Wood & Flynn, 2017; Nemec, Soukopová, & Mikušová Meričková, 2015; Zafra-Gómez, Prior, Plata Díaz & López-Hernández, 2013) focus on the impact of transaction costs on the choice of delivery modes in terms of their contribution to cost reduction. The authors found that privatization is less common in local public services with higher transaction costs and in small local governments.

Table 8: Costs as a decision-making factor for delivery mechanism

Delivery mechanism	No of studies	Author(s)	Main research topic	Main findings
Privatization	4	Bel & Fageda, 2008 Hultquist et al., 2017 Nemec et al., 2015 Zafra-Gómez et al., 2013	cost reduction	less common for services with higher transaction costs and for small local governments
IMC	3	Bel & Warner, 2014 Bel et al., 2012 Soukopová & Vaceková, 2018	cost reduction, size of local governments	a pragmatic choice for local governments of suboptimal size
Privatization vs IMC	6	Bel & Mur, 2009 Bel et al., 2010 Bel et al., 2013 Hefetz & Warner, 2011 Mohr et al., 2010 Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2013	cost reduction, size of local governments	small local governments prefer IMC; large local governments prefer privatization; IMC is an important alternative

Source: own work

Similarly, Table 8 shows, that studies analysing inter-municipal cooperation and cost behaviour (Bel & Warner, 2014; Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2012; Soukopová & Vaceková, 2018) focus on cost reduction and the size of local governments. The main findings of the authors show that cost savings are more common in smaller local governments and are influenced by institutional arrangements in the framework of inter-municipal cooperation. The studies covering both delivery mechanisms – privatization and inter-municipal cooperation (Bel & Mur, 2009; Bel, Dijkgraaf, Fageda & Gradus, 2010; Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013; Hefetz & Warner, 2011; Mohr, Halstead & Deller, 2010; Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2013) – have a similar focus. The authors attempt to determine whether and under what conditions privatization or inter-municipal cooperation brings greater cost advantages to local public services delivery. The studies indicate that, from a cost reduction perspective, inter-municipal cooperation is preferable for smaller local governments and privatization for larger local governments. This may be explained by the lack of competition in small local governments, such that private provision would lead to higher transaction costs.

We see that cost is one of the most important factors in choosing the most appropriate delivery mechanism. However, economies of scale, presented in the following Table 9, are very closely linked to transaction costs.

Table 9: Economies of scale as a decision-making factor for delivery mechanism

Delivery mechanism	No of studies	Author(s)	Main research topic	Main findings
Privatization	1	Levin & Tadelis, 2010	economies of scale, size of local government	large local governments most often privatize
IMC	1	Warner, 2011	economies of scale, size of local government	IMC is an important alternative when market competition is limited

Source: own work

Many sample studies, presented in Table 9 focus directly on costs, but also analyse the relation between achieving economies of scale as a result of cost reduction and the chosen delivery mechanism. Levin & Tadelis (2010) studied the advantages connected with the size of local government to achieving economies of scale in the case of privatization, while Warner (2011) examined the same in the case of inter-municipal cooperation. Levin & Tadelis (2010) found that small local governments would not opt for privatization because it does not bring with it potential advantages for economy of scale. Warner (2011) points out that inter-municipal cooperation is positively linked to the achievement of economies of scale, especially in small local governments where competition is limited.

Table 10: Efficiency as decision-making factor for delivery mechanism

Delivery mechanism	No of studies	Author(s)	Main research topic	Main findings
Privatization	2	Garrone & Marzano, 2015 Warner, 2008	efficiency gains	more likely in cases where scale and managerial efficiency have already been enhanced
IMC	4	Allers & de Greef, 2018 Allers & van Ommeren, 2016 Blaesche & Haug, 2018 Grešová & Fuka, 2018	efficiency gains	no evidence that IMC improves efficiency
Privatization vs IMC	3	Hefetz et al., 2012 Czaplak, 2016 Monteduro, 2014	efficiency gains	public-private provision shows better economic performance

Source: own work

The efficiency of local public service provision, as shown in Table 10, is another important economic factor that influences local governments' decisions on public services delivery. Garrone & Marzano (2015) and Warner (2008) focus mainly on privatization and the associated efficiency gains connected with private service provision. They found that privatization is the more likely choice in cases where scale and managerial efficiency have

already seen improvement. Conversely, authors such as Allers & de Greef (2018); Allers & van Ommeren (2016); Blaesche & Haug (2018) and Grešová & Fuka (2018) look for evidence of efficiency gains in service delivery in inter-municipal cooperation. The authors point out that local governments that cooperate tend to achieve lower technical efficiency than self-providing governments. There are potential cost savings and positive scale effects in smaller local governments, but there is no clear evidence of efficiency gains in service delivery with IMC. Studies comparing the impact of private service provision and inter-municipal cooperation on efficiency (Hefetz, Warner & Vigoda-Gadot, 2012; Monteduro, 2014; Czaplak, 2016) try to define the relationship between these two delivery mechanisms and efficiency gains. The authors conclude that public-private service provision produces better economic performance than pure public provision. However, the key to improving efficiency is the supervision of service delivery, not the delivery mode itself.

Table 11: Economic-political decision-making factors for delivery mechanism

Delivery mechanism	No of studies	Author(s)	Main research topic	Main findings
Privatization	5	Bel & Fageda, 2009 Carrozza, 2010 Rodrigues et al., 2012 Sundell & Lapuente, 2012 Warner & Hefetz, 2012	influence of economic-political environment on private provision	service characteristics, local political environment plays a key role
In-house	1	Tavares & Camões, 2007	influence on private or in-house provision	political and socio-economic context play an important role

Source: own work

Table 11 shows that studies related to economic-political factors focus mainly on the privatization of local public services (Warner & Hefetz, 2012; Sundell & Lapuente, 2012; Bel & Fageda, 2009; Carrozza, 2010; Rodrigues, Tavares & Araújo, 2012), especially on the way the political environment influences a local government's decision to turn to private service provision. The authors' main findings show that the political environment and political dynamics have a large impact on local government decisions on the delivery mechanism, especially for small local governments. However, authors Tavares & Camões (2007) also deal with the content of in-house service delivery. They look for elements that influence the decision for private provision or rather the in-house provision of certain local public services. They come to similar conclusions, namely that political and socio-economic context plays an important role in deciding on delivery mode. No studies in the reviewed literature sample deal only with political decision-making factors for IMC.

Table 12: Economic-institutional-social decision-making factors for delivery type

Delivery mechanism	No of studies	Author(s)	Main research topic	Main findings
Privatization	4	Bel et al., 2007 González-Gómez et al., 2011 Petersen et al., 2015 Wassenar et al., 2013	specifics of institutional- and social-economic factors	size of local government, financial burden, neighbouring effect, complex operating environments are more relevant, ideology is less relevant
IMC	4	Bel and Warner, 2016 Hulst et al., 2009 Klimovsky et al., 2014 Rayle & Zegras, 2013	impact of institutional- and social-economic factors	fiscal constraints, spatial and organizational factors, flexibility in institutional system, existing interorganizational networks are significant drivers of IMC

Source: own work

Economic-institutional-social factors, as presented in Table 12, refer in the analysed studies to the stability of service provision as an institutional factor, and ideology and neighbourhood effects as social factors, all of which are related to the economic performance and efficiency of local public service delivery. In the case of privatization, Wassenaar, Groot & Gradus (2013), González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & Guardiola (2011), Petersen, Houlberg & Christensen (2015) and Bel, Hebdon & Warner (2007) work to determine which institutional and socio-economic factors lead to private service provision. The authors found that more complex operating environments, financial difficulties, and larger local government tend to lead to privatization or outsourcing of local public services. In contrast, ideology has less impact on the decision to privatize. Studies focusing on inter-municipal cooperation (Hulst, van Montfort, Haveri, Airaksinen & Kelly, 2009; Klimovsky, Mejere, Mikolaityte, Pinterič & Saparniene, 2014; Rayle & Zegras, 2013; Bel & Warner, 2016) analyse the impact of these factors on various inter-municipal cooperation arrangements. The authors point out that the combination of all factors – institutional context, local government preferences, interpersonal relationships, and organizational characteristics – influences the specific character of the cooperation.

In addition, there are other economic decision-making factors (e.g. fiscal conditions, poverty issues, quality, corporatization, competitive/non-competitive service markets, local stress, etc.). They are also analysed in the sample studies and are presented in the following Table 13.

Table 13: Other economic decision-making factors for delivery mechanism

Delivery mechanism	No of studies	Author(s)	Main research topic	Main findings
Privatization	5	Bergman et al., 2016 Krueger et al., 2011 Lamothe et al., 2008 Marvel & Marvel, 2007 Schoute et al., 2018	influence of other economic factors	asset specificity, inertial effects, competitiveness of the contract environment, monitoring service provision, emphasis on outcome performance influences privatization
IMC	2	Citroni et al., 2013 Wollmann, 2011	influence of corporatization and other economic factors	corporatization increases IMC
Privatization vs. IMC	5	Bel & Gradus, 2018 Girth et al., 2012 Kim & Warner, 2016 Kim, 2018 Warner & Bel, 2008	factors driving delivery choices and effects of each delivery choice on service provision	fiscal stress and community needs lead to the choice of alternative delivery methods

Source: own work

As seen from Table 13, Krueger, Walker & Bernick (2011); Lamothe, Lamothe & Feiock, (2008); Schoute, Budding & Gradus, 2018; Marvel & Marvel (2007); and Bergman, Johansson, Lundberg & Spagnolo, (2016) examine other economic factors that could influence the privatization of local public services. The authors' main findings suggest that, among other things, limited available resources, asset specificity, inertia effects, the competitiveness of the contract environment, monitoring of service delivery, and emphasis on outcome performance also influence the decision to use private service delivery.

Citroni, Lippi & Profeti (2013) and Wollmann (2011) try to determine whether inter-municipal cooperation is enhanced through corporatization, and whether IMC is also influenced by other economic factors. They found that IMC is enhanced by corporatisation, which helps local governments choose their manner of cooperation. Studies dealing with privatization and IMC as an alternative (Warner & Bel, 2008; Girth, Hefetz, Johnston & Warner, 2012; Kim & Warner, 2016; Bel & Gradus, 2018; Kim, 2018) attempt to identify the factors that drive local governments to choose IMC as an alternative to privatization in local public services delivery, and at the same time identify the effects of privatization or IMC as an alternative to certain types of local public service provision. The authors come to the general conclusions that both privatization and IMC are influenced by fiscal stress and

community needs, that both mechanisms are subject to certain obstacles, and that monopoly services are more likely to be provided through intergovernmental contracting, and more competitive markets tend to use more for-profit contracting.

In the context of other economic decision-making factors, such as fiscal conditions, poverty issues, and local stress, the last global financial and economic crisis has undoubtedly influenced the choice of public service delivery mechanisms in the search for optimization. The focus of post-2009 analysed studies has shifted to inter-municipal cooperation as a mechanism delivery option, which in some cases brings greater cost savings and greater efficiency than pre-crisis privatization. In 2007–2009, studies analysed privatization (of a total of 9 sample studies, 5 studies cover privatization, 3 studies deal with privatization versus IMC, and only 1 study deals only with IMC). The issues addressed in these studies are of a more general nature, such as the reduction of transaction costs for the provision of service delivery, the satisfaction of citizens' interests, the influence of the political environment, the competitiveness of the contracting environment, and the influence of the size of the local community.

After 2009, the trend shifted from privatization to IMC. In this context, 13 sample studies explicitly focus on IMC and 12 studies analyse IMC versus privatization. Although 15 sample studies still focus mainly on privatization, it is obvious that IMC is becoming increasingly attractive as an efficient delivery option. Furthermore, the general nature of the analyses carried out before 2009 has changed to a more specific type of analysis, emphasizing fiscal conditions, socio-economic factors, ideological factors, and different market approaches, often related to the size of the local community, in order to find the most efficient delivery option.

To conclude the content analysis breakdown for the period 2007–2018, the main findings of the studies analysed show that the size of the local authority is relevant for decisions on the delivery mechanism for local public services. Most of these studies confirm the fact that privatization is the more common and realistic option for large local governments when it comes to cost reduction, economies of scale, and efficiency, while it is the less preferable option for small local governments, for which the IMC is a better solution.

Due to the greater fiscal constraints faced by small local governments, more emphasis has been placed in the past decade on analysing IMC as the better and more efficient alternative to privatization. Also, references from 2019 and 2020, suggest IMC is becoming an increasingly prevalent topic in the literature. Therefore, in the following section 1.3.4, a brief outline of the trends for the years 2019 and 2020 is presented.

1.3.4 Review of trends in 2019 and 2020

Using the same criteria for the literature review in 2019 and 2020 as applied in the study period 2001–2018, we identified 30 relevant papers. As previously mentioned, the analysis is limited to European and US studies, as the majority of studies originate from the USA and Europe.

Table 14: Review of studies in 2019 and 2020

Author(s)	Research area	Research type	Research territory
1. Zeemering, E.S. (2019) 2. Aldag, A.M. et al. (2020)	IMC	Empirical	Country, US
3. Assens, C. et al. (2019) 4. Prebilič, V. & Bačlija Brajnik, I. (2019) 5. Hlynisdottir, E.M: (2019) 6. Eyporsson, G.P. (2019) 7. Bischoff, I. & Wolfschuetz, E. (2020) 8. Campos-Alba, C.M. et al. (2020) 9. Bakos, E. et al. (2020)	IMC	Empirical	Country, EU
10. Fowler, L. (2019) 11. Warner, M.E. et al. (2020)	IMC	Empirical	Cross-country, US
12. Casula, M. (2019) 13. Swianiewicz, P. & Teles, F. (2019)	IMC	Empirical	Cross-country, EU
14. Noh, S. & Park, J.H. (2019)	Private provision, IMC	Empirical,	Country, US
15. Guo, H. & Ho, A.T. (2019)	Private provision, PPP	Empirical	Country, US
16. Scott, T.A. & Greer, R.A. (2019)	Private provision	Empirical	Country, US
17. James, O. & Jilke, S. (2020) 18. Li, J. & Chung, K. (2020)	Private provision	Empirical	Cross-country, US
19. Alonso, J.M. & Andrews, R. (2020)	Private provision, in- house provision	Empirical	Country, US
20. de la Higuera-Molina, E.J. et al. (2019)	Private provision, in- house provision	Empirical	Country, EU
21. Homsy, G.C. (2020)	Private provision, in- house provision	Empirical	Cross-country, US
22. Hodgkinson, I.R. & Hughes, P. (2019)	Public, private, non- profit provision	Empirical	Country, EU
23. Lee, J. & Dodge, J. (2019)	Cooperation, networking	Empirical	Country, US
24. Deslatte, A. et al. (2019)	Collaboration with government non-profit organizations	Empirical	Country, US

(table continues)

(continued)

Author(s)	Research area	Research type	Research territory
25. Nemec, J. et al. (2019)	Collaboration with third sector organizations	Empirical	Cross-country, EU
26. Voorn, B. et al. (2020)	Re-municipalisation	Non-empirical	Cross-country, EU
27. Albalade, D. & Bel, G. (2020)	Re-municipalisation	Empirical	Country, EU
28. Warner, M.E. & Aldag, A.M. (2019)	Re-municipalisation	Empirical	Cross-country, US
29. Camões, P.J. & Rodrigues, M. (2020)	Reverse contracting	Empirical	Country, EU
30. Shakirova, R. (2019)	Reverse contracting	Empirical	Country, US

Source: own work

As seen from the Table 14, half of the 30 relevant studies originated in the USA and the other half are European studies. One-third of all relevant studies are cross-country and the other two-thirds are country studies. All relevant studies are empirical, except one, which presents a literature review. IMC remains a very popular research topic, with 14 of 30 studies referring to IMC. Most of these are European studies (around 64%), of which almost 78% are country studies. In contrast, most studies that refer to private provision refer to the USA. The trend in research also shifts towards re-municipalisation and reverse contracting, as well as towards collaboration with governmental and non-governmental non-profit organizations. Coverage of these topics is relatively evenly distributed between the European and US studies.

Prominent authors such as Bel, Warner, Camões, Rodrigues and Nemec continue to publish together with many new authors, who contribute with their research results, mostly in connection with privatization and IMC as an alternative. Here, we briefly present the most important findings of the authors mentioned above. Warner, Aldag & Kim (2020) and Aldag, Warner & Bel (2020) address IMC as one of the most common forms of local public service delivery, and as the most relevant alternative to local public service delivery, as it better responds to fiscal burdens and the needs of local citizens and leads to cost reductions; however, the authors also stress the limited role of cost reductions and economies of scale in such decision.

Furthermore, Albalade & Bel (2020) and Warner & Aldag (2019) address re-municipalisation as one of the new trends in local government in the USA and Europe. Their findings show that re-municipalisation occurs more frequently in local governments with private contractors and is not primarily driven by political interests, but by the bureaucrats' preferences. Reverse contracting has also been a popular research topic in recent years. Camões & Rodrigues (2020) found that economic and financial rather than political aspects are the key drivers behind reverse contracting. Nemec, Svidroňová &

Kovács (2019) have also investigated cooperation with the third sector to achieve more efficient service delivery. His results highlight the fact that limited financial resources on both sides are the biggest barrier to efficient cooperation. In summary, economic conditions and the needs of the local population push local governments to look for the most efficient, cost-effective way of local public services delivery, with a focus on service quality. Therefore, in the past two years, other concepts such as re-municipalisation, reverse contracting, public-private partnership, and third sector participation have come to the fore alongside IMC as a highly popular alternative.

1.4 Re-municipalisation trends in local public services provision

1.4.1 Privatization vs. re-municipalisation of local public services

Private provision is a long-standing practice in the US and Europe, as many municipal services began with private delivery (Gradus, Schoute & Budding, 2019, p. 1). This trend has strengthened both the market position and the share of private-sector providers (Wollmann, 2018, p. 421). Supporters of privatization see private provision as the best way to achieve more efficient management of resources and better quality of service, as private providers may be better able to obtain resources that can be invested in service improvement (González-Gómez, García-Rubio & González-Martínez, 2014, pp. 3–4). The involvement of the private sector is expected to facilitate investment and enhance the efficiency of operations (Nissan, Hall, Lobina & de la Motte, 2004, p. 306). It is also believed that privatization reduces the cost of public service delivery, as competition can have a positive effect on cost savings. However, ownership is not the key factor. Tendering as a factor is more important for privatization, as it is cheaper than in-house production (Soukopová, Klimovský & Ochrana, 2017, pp. 151–152). Besides efficiency and quality, in many cases there are also pragmatic reasons to privatize municipal services. One of them is certainly the relief of the financial burden on the municipal budget (González-Gómez, García-Rubio & González-Martínez, 2014, p. 5).

In line with EU legislation, a certain degree of competitiveness should exist in public utilities. Many authorities have tried to introduce policies that enhance competitiveness in public utilities, but the question has always been raised whether providing public utilities through public or private providers leads to greater efficiency. The trend to privatize public enterprises also leaves the question of efficiency the private sector open. Although EU directives do not explicitly dictate the privatization of public enterprises, they nevertheless seek to liberalize public services, which of course signifies a greater role for the private sector and a change in the ownership of public enterprises (Aulich, 2011, p. 250; Boggetti & Obermann, 2012; Greiling & Grüb, 2014, p. 209; Lane, 2002, p. 60). This trend has influenced the transformation of existing traditional public enterprises across Western Europe at various times, and produced various forms of institutional frameworks of the transformed public enterprises. Most existing public enterprises were transformed into joint-

stock companies, which today represents the basic form of a public enterprise, with the share of public ownership ranging from minority to total ownership (Lane, 2002, pp. 60–61).

Today, three decades after the first wave of privatization, intense debate over the positive and negative effects of private participation in local public services continues. Opponents of privatization defend public management as the best way of assuring universal access to public services and preventing abuse by private companies of their dominant position in a natural monopoly (González-Gómez, García-Rubio & González-Martínez, 2014, pp. 1–3). Also, providing, commissioning, and organizing public services should remain as close as possible to the needs of the users (Wollmann, 2018, p. 421–422). Therefore, alternatives such as inter-municipal cooperation, re-municipalisation, and municipality-owned firms began to expand at the beginning of the century (Gradus, Schoute & Budding, 2019, p. 1).

The EU and national governments have emphasized and strengthened local-level service provision, especially through environmental protection and renewable energy policies and measures. Dissatisfaction with the outcomes of privatization has led to a reappraisal of the state and of the public sector in the role of rectifying and remedying the shortcomings and failures connected with the market and private sector (Wollmann, 2018, p. 421). During the twentieth century, the trend toward privatization has turned to reverse privatization or re-municipalisation, which is seen as municipalities take the provision of local public services back into their own hands (Gradus & Budding, 2018, pp. 2–3; Gradus, Schoute & Budding, 2019, p. 1; McDonald, 2019, p. 61; Wollmann, 2018, pp. 426). These shifts over time show that not only privatization and contracting out are important phenomena, but also that re-municipalisation has become increasingly important (Gradus & Budding, 2018, p. 2).

Private and public management face many challenges and problems, like lack of resources, inadequate cooperation among municipalities, inefficient administrative structures, an absence of transparency, low rates of citizen participation etc. And, neither privatization nor a reversion to public management appear as solutions to these problems and challenges (González-Gómez, García-Rubio & González-Martínez, 2014, p. 2). The re-emergence of public ownership is also explained as a strategy to deal with pressing social, economic, and ecological problems. Public ownership boasts benefits for local communities, such as lower costs for consumers, better access for underserved populations, providing social services etc. Further, public ownership can support economic development, provide jobs, and enhance local control and participation in economic decision-making (Hanna, 2019, p. 45–46). Even balance sheets favour public provision when taking into account the transaction costs of outsourcing services. There are also financial gains to be had for local authorities when operating public services themselves instead of outsourcing them to private providers (Wollmann, 2018, p. 421). However, there is no guarantee they will prove more efficient and cost-effective than private provision. (Hanna, 2019, p. 46) Even public enterprises with full public ownership have seen extensive commercialization. Market principles, especially efficiency, have led to reductions in staff and investment in many public enterprises (Beveridge, Hüesker & Naumann 2014, p. 69).

1.4.2 Drivers of re-municipalisation

Re-municipalisation is described in different terms: de-privatization, reclaiming public services, taking services back into public hands, and in-sourcing (McDonald, 2019, p. 61). With re-municipalisation, municipalities strive to achieve greater municipal democracy and autonomy. Public ownership can have benefits for local communities, such as lower costs for consumers, more access for underserved populations, providing social services etc. Further, public ownership can support economic development, provide jobs, and enhance local control and participation in economic decision-making (Berlo, Wagner & Heenen, 2017, p. 1; Hanna, 2019, p. 45–46).

The literature review on re-municipalisation as trend provides insight into the various driving factors behind re-municipalisation. Usually, the process of re-municipalisation is intentional and is effected by ending the contract with a private provider prematurely or by not renewing the arrangement after it expires. Such re-municipalisation is often a consequence of dissatisfaction with a private provider, the outcomes of privatization, and with failures in private contracting. Many authors (Bel, 2020; Busshardt, 2014; Clifton, Warner, Gradus & Bel, 2019; McDonald, 2018; Lindholst, 2019; Ulmer & Gerlak, 2019; Valdovinos, 2012) point to disappointment with privatization as the main driving factor for re-municipalisation. Bel (2020), Valdovinos (2012), Nissan, Hall, Lobina & de la Motte (2004) show that corruption is one of the chief failures cited under private management, followed by overpricing, rising contractual and transaction costs, and financial failures (Bel, 2020; Clifton, Warner, Gradus & Bel, 2019; Busshardt, 2014; Ulmer & Gerlak, 2019; Valdovinos, 2012) which are other important reasons behind the failure of private provision, together with deteriorating quality of service, public mistrust of private providers, and operative failures (Clifton, Warner, Gradus & Bel, 2019; Lindholst, 2019; Valdovinos, 2012, Ulmer & Gerlak, 2019).

However, sometimes municipalities are forced to municipalise, even though policymakers would prefer to retain the private service arrangement. This is often the result of the high cost of monitoring, short-term contracts, diminished efficiency gains or, on the other hand, due to an insufficient number of private-sector bidders for a contract. Private firms may also be unwilling to bid on what they see as unprofitable contracts, or may end contracts early (McDonald, 2019, p. 62). However, sometimes the high cost of monitoring and regulating private contracts drives municipalities to re-municipalize, even though they may be satisfied with the quality of the private service. This usually happens with large, long-term concessions and with small, short-term contracts, where in both cases sophisticated and expensive regulatory management is required. Municipalities must also contend with costly teams of lawyers and bureaucrats required for contracting out, which reduces or reverses potential efficiency gains. Naturally, re-municipalisation is often opposed by private providers, who may employ various strategies to maintain their position and to delay the process of re-municipalisation (Berlo, Wagner & Heenen, 2017, p. 1; McDonald, 2019, p. 62).

Some authors also find re-municipalisation blurs political intervention (McDonald, 2019), expresses alternative political thinking, and transforms and socially empowers politics (Cumbers & Becker, 2018) in order to favour or strengthen local politics (Berlo, Wagner & Heenen, 2017). On the other hand, re-municipalisation is also seen as an opportunity to enhance municipal and citizen influence and re-politicize urban utilities, which contributes to post-neoliberal urban governance (Becker, Beveridge & Naumann, 2015); or as an opportunity to make policy in line with or beyond the norms of neo-liberal urban governance (Beveridge, Hüscher & Naumann, 2014). Further on, Albalade & Bel (2020) conclude that politicians do not favour private service delivery and the chance to reform services as do bureaucrats, and Gradus & Budding (2018) found that corporatization is usually not particularly political. Due to the corporatization component in the re-municipalisation scenario, Voorn, Van Genugten & Van Thiel (2020) conclude that re-municipalisation is not an ideologically-oriented trend, as cost savings are far more important factor than political ideology.

Sometimes, re-municipalisation appears as a strategy to overcome pressing economic, social, and ecological problems; however, it cannot guarantee a more sustainable economic and political system (Hanna, 2019), even though it does gain from the benefits of local government (Wollman, 2018). Further, empirical evidence from Warner & Hefetz (2020) show that non-unionised municipalities experience more re-municipalisation than unionized municipalities, which more often opt for new contracts with private providers. Friedländer, Röber & Schaefer (2021) indicate that exercising an appropriate level of influence over the provision of services is the biggest challenge when public government does not opt for in-house provision. Gradus, Schoute & Budding (2019) also found some support for certain economic conditions (unemployment) and ideological factors on the municipal level, namely social democratic forces in charge, resisting change in market forces, and privatisation.

Municipalities have proceeded towards re-municipalisation in two ways: by repurchasing shares that were previously sold to private companies, and by insourcing services that were previously outsourced. When the concession expires, municipalities decide for re-municipalisation as an opportunity to bring services back in-house without the transaction costs associated with the termination of a contract. When the concession has not yet expired, difficulties with the outgoing private provider may arise in connection possible compensation. Often, very high compensation may be required, which is a strong deterrent to early termination of the contract (Beveridge, Hüscher & Naumann, 2014, p. 68; Hall, Lobina & Terhorst, 2013, p. 206; Wollmann, 2018, p. 422). The negotiation process surrounding compensation is one of the key elements a municipality has to consider when opting for re-municipalisation. Beyond the negotiation process, user involvement is also a key element. User involvement is essential, as it is a key factor in the process, and municipalities guarantee democratic and efficient public services. It is also fundamental to evaluate the private provider's performance and the benefits and risks of returning to public provision – especially when considering the current situation in public service in terms of

investment needs and the cost of guaranteeing efficient performance. However, the re-municipalisation process can vary according to the local context, the condition of public service, the involvement of the local government, the duration of the contract, the degree of private participation etc. (Valdovinos, 2012, pp. 115–116).

Most of the studies on re-municipalisation in Europe come to us from Germany, France, and Spain (Voorn, Van Genugten & Van Thiel, 2020). However, the US is also an example of re-municipalisation as highly common practice (McDonald, 2018, 2019). Similarly, we also see evidence of re-municipalisation in the Netherlands (Gradus & Budding, 2018; Gradus, Schoute & Budding, 2019) and Denmark (Lindholst, 2019). The trend of re-municipalisation has accelerated greatly since 2010 (McDonald, 2018) and has largely developed in the water and energy sector, as well as in waste disposal (Busshardt, 2014; Voorn, Van Genugten & Van Thiel, 2020). Even though re-municipalisation is highly common in only a few countries, it is nonetheless a global phenomenon (McDonald, 2018). Yet, it is less common in Eastern Europe, especially in post-socialist countries, but we do nevertheless find examples there as well.

Even though re-municipalisation is observed in numerous countries, there is a need for extensive research in the area to better understand the phenomenon, including the factors behind this trend, together with its strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the aim of our research part of the doctoral dissertation is to identify the final outcome of the reorganization process of the local public utility providers in Slovenia, which was legalized with the adoption of the PPPA in 2006. In this context, we also look to identify the experience of re-municipalisation of local public utilities in the field of water and wastewater management in Slovenia.

1.5 Concluding remarks of theoretical background

The theoretical background, together with a literature review of the field addressed here in the doctoral dissertation, serves to better acquaint us with the governance issues related to corporate governance in the public sector, where the principal-agent relationship serves as the basis for the selection of the most appropriate local public services delivery mechanism. By examining several key dimensions of the question through existing empirical and non-empirical studies that affect the choice of delivery mechanism by local government, we come to recognize the key advantages and disadvantages that come with each delivery mechanism and acquaint us with the trend of re-municipalisation in the provision of local public services. Based on the findings of the literature review, we can provide short answers to the first four research questions, which are discussed in more detail in the conclusion of the doctoral dissertation.

RQ1: Which governance issues related to local public services delivery mechanisms are identified in theory and researched in practice?

Choosing the most appropriate local public services delivery mechanism is one of the challenges faced by municipalities today. It is important for municipalities to provide their inhabitants/constituents with quality and efficient local public services and to fulfil their needs. However, this can only be achieved through good corporate governance in the public sector. The basis for good corporate governance is a stable principal-agent relationship, where information asymmetry and moral hazard can be overcome through the application of efficient motivating mechanisms, which leads to a striving for common, public goals.

RQ2: Are different local public services delivery mechanisms (in-house production, privatization, inter-municipal cooperation) well-identified in theory and researched in practice?

Local public services delivery mechanisms, especially in-house production, privatization, and inter-municipal cooperation is a rather new subject of research, which is marked by a large increase in the number of published journal papers since 2007. On the one hand, the literature review identifies a marked lack of scientific journal papers dealing with the in-house provision of local public services; and on the other hand, it notes an increase in papers examining private provision and IMC in local service provision. Most of the papers are empirical country studies analysing a specific national or local context.

RQ3: What are the global trends in delivery mechanisms for local public services?

Trends in research on delivery mechanisms for local public services show a following of cost-efficient solutions for the provision of services. Since 2009, the focus of scientific papers on IMC as a possible solution for local public services provision or as an alternative to private provision has increased significantly. These trends are connected to the changing fiscal conditions of local governments and the changing needs of local citizens. Often, the focus is on cost reduction, achieving economies of scale in relation to the size of local government, efficiency gains, and the impact of political, institutional, social, and financial factors on the choice of delivery mechanism.

RQ4: In which cases do municipalities prefer a certain local public services delivery mechanism, and which factors influence such decisions?

The choice of a local public services delivery mechanism is mainly influenced by the size of the local government, the efficiency of service provision, the resources available, and the institutional framework. Small local governments tend to prefer IMC, as it can provide more advantages than large local governments, where private provision is still a more economical option.

2 THE WATER INDUSTRY AND RELATED SERVICE DELIVERY MECHANISMS IN SLOVENIA

2.1 Provision of local public services

In Slovenia, a form of local public service provision is prescribed by a municipality, by decree, to ensure its implementation within the framework of a functionally and spatially complete supply system. The municipal decree regulates the conditions for the provision and use of public goods; sources of funding and the manner of their formation; and the rights and obligations of users and the position of infrastructure in the public service (Grafenauer, 2009, p. 213). A municipality may provide local public services via the municipal administration body, by establishing public institutes and public enterprises, by awarding concessions, and in any other way as determined by law. In-house provision is a relatively rare form of local commercial public services provision. It may be used when it would be uneconomical or irrational to establish a public enterprise or to grant a concession in view of the small size or the characteristics of the service. A public commercial institute is also a very rare form of local commercial public services provision. It is used when a public service, due to its nature, cannot be provided as a for-profit activity or if profit is not one of the goals of such service. A public commercial institute may be either a legal entity of public law or an entity without legal personality (Pevcin & Rakar, 2015, pp. 705–706). Concession, performed by a legal person of private law, is the only possible form of commercial public services provision. It is, by its nature, a form of public-private partnership (Institut for Public-Private Partnership, 2017).

Public enterprise is the most widespread form of local commercial public services provision. The concept of the public enterprise was brought into the Slovenian legal order in the 1990s, introduced by the Companies Act of 1988. The Act re-introduced market activities, allowed the creation of companies as private, mixed, and social property, and allowed the creation of all forms of commercial companies. The Act introduced a public enterprise as a separate legal structure with its own legal personality, which is as an enterprise of social ownership or as an enterprise of mixed ownership (Brezovnik, 2009, p. 186). Public enterprise is used for the provision of one or more services of increased volume or when in economic terms a public service is a monopoly. In both cases, services are required to be performed profitably (Pevcin & Rakar, 2015, pp. 705–706).

A public enterprise may be established as a Limited Liability Company or as a Public Limited Company. A public limited company is the appropriate form of public enterprise when the enterprise has a larger number of founders and/or shareholders of private capital, because in such cases greater transparency and business formalities are necessary. If the public enterprise has no private shareholders, then there is no special need that it would be organized as a public limited company. Even if there are more founders, the most appropriate

form of organization is a limited liability company, which gives the shareholders much greater autonomy in managing their inter-relationships (Bratina, 2004, p. 7).

Public enterprise has always been the most important and most common form of providing public utilities from the European perspective, especially in the areas of water, waste, telecommunications, rail transport, air transport and similar. Despite the importance and frequency of its existence, the form and status of the public enterprise has changed significantly over the past 20 years (Greiling & Grüb, 2014, p. 209; Lane, 2002, pp. 56–57). The creation of a common EU internal market and the greater impact of globalization on the countries of continental Europe have prompted the need to transform existing public enterprises. Transformation has commonly involved internal transformation, usually into joint-stock companies, together with changes in market rules and regulations through the process of deregulation (Aulich, 2011, p. 250; Bognetti & Obermann, 2012).

In line with EU directives, a certain degree of competitiveness should exist in public utilities. Although EU directives do not explicitly dictate the privatization of public enterprises, they nevertheless seek to liberalize public services, which of course signifies a greater role for the private sector and a change in the ownership of public enterprises (Aulich, 2011, p. 250; Bognetti & Obermann, 2012; Greiling & Grüb, 2014, p. 209; Lane, 2002, p. 60). This trend influenced the transformation of existing traditional public enterprises across Western Europe, only at different time periods, and led to various forms of the institutional framework of transformed public enterprises. Most of the existing public enterprises were transformed into joint-stock companies, which today is the basic form of a public enterprise, with the share of public ownership ranging from minority shares to total ownership (Lane, 2002, pp. 60–61).

2.2 Reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia

Before 2006, the inclusion of the private sector in the traditional public sphere of public services was allowed by the Services of General Economic Interest Act (ZGJS, Official Gazette of RS, No. 32/93 and 30/98) for the provision of commercial public services used in the form of concessionary relationships and in the form of capital investment in the activities of private law; and by the Institutions Act, which has allowed awarding concessions for non-commercial public services provision (Institute for Public-Private Partnership, 2017).

Since the 1990s, three concepts of public enterprise have prevailed in the Slovenian legal system, based in particular on the system of property ownership. According to the Services of General Economic Interest Act, a public enterprise was a form of commercial public services provision. The public enterprise did not have its own status, because this regime relied directly on the regulation of commercial companies. A public enterprise could, as a commercial company, also have shared capital. The status of a public enterprise, therefore, did not differentiate from commercial companies; the significant difference lay only in management rights, where the state or local government as founder of such enterprise had

special founder's rights, independent of its capital structure. Under the Services of General Economic Interest Act, a public enterprise can be established only for the provision of commercial public services or for the performance of activities that are carried out in the manner of public utilities (Brezovnik, 2009, p. 181; Trpin, 2007, p. 6).

A study analysing the coherence of the position of public enterprises in Slovenia with EU legislation showed that providing commercial public utilities services through public enterprises actually represented an economic activity. The problematic fact was that most public enterprises used budgetary resources for their activities (Trpin, 2007, pp. 3–4). Another problem was the lack of clarity in the definition of the concept of a public enterprise and therefore, its legal status. This was solved by the Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between member states and public enterprises. This Directive has affected the legal definition of a public enterprise in individual EU member states. Based on this Directive, the Transparency of Financial Relations and the Separate Record of Various Activities Act was adopted in Slovenia in 2007 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 53/2007, 65/2008), which significantly changed the definition of the concept of public enterprise.

In accordance with this Act, the public enterprise was defined broadly, based not only on ownership but also on the basis of proprietary rights. A public enterprise is any enterprise over which the public authorities may exert a dominant influence. Therefore, a public enterprise is any organization with a legal form of public institutions, public commercial institutions, public enterprises established under the Services of General Economic Interest Act, and enterprises in which public authorities have a dominant position (Brezovnik, 2009, p. 182; Trpin, 2007, pp. 6–7).

The position of private capital in public enterprise in terms of its legal certainty was, according to Brezovnik (2009, p. 187), unsustainable. On the one hand a public enterprise was a commercial company, whose shareholder may have been a person of private law. On the other hand, it carried out activities in the public interest, which prices were regulated by the state or local governments. Brezovnik (2009, p. 189) also points out the question of the establishment of public enterprises. The formation of a public enterprise is controversial both in cases when a public enterprise is set up by the state or by the local community, and when it is set up by several founders (public-public partnership). The regulation is not clear which legal instrument forms a public enterprise.

There are also shortcomings in the relationship between the founder of a public enterprise and the public enterprise. In relation to public enterprise, the State or local community acts as a regulator of public services implemented by the public sector. On the other hand, they act as the enterprise's (co)founder or the owner of the majority of the capital share. Proceeding from that the state or the local community has a dual role (Brezovnik, 2009, p. 190). Important changes in the field of transformation of existing public enterprises in

Slovenia came with the adoption of the Public-Private Partnership Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 127/06) in 2006 (implemented in 2007).

2.3 Legislative basis for a reorganization of Slovenian public enterprises

In 2006 Slovenia adopted the Public-Private Partnership Act (PPPA), based on the EU Green Paper, and therefore the rules for awarding works and service concessions were set in accordance with the aforementioned EU Green Paper (Hrovatin, 2010, p. 95). Awarding concession is one of the ways, according to the Services of General Economic Interest Act, of providing public utilities. It is the only possible form of public utility provision by private legal entities. By its nature, it is a form of public-private partnership. The grantor (municipality) authorises the concessionaire (a person of private law) to provide the public utility in his own name and for his own account.

Usually, the municipality decides to award a concession when such form of public utility provision could ensure the provision of cheaper and better quality service(s) than could a public enterprise or in-house provision. The Services of General Economic Interest Act dictates that if the enterprise is organized in the formal form of a public enterprise, the provision of public utilities can be directly granted. Consequently, the municipality avoids the administrative procedures of awarding a concession. At the same time, the municipality as founder, acquires special founding rights, including direct pricing and conditions for the provision of public utilities. In the case of a direct concession, the municipality has a greater influence on the business of the public enterprise and more possibilities to better work in cooperation, which can also be reflected in better quality public utility provision.

The legislative solutions that came out of the European Court practice were integrated into the PPPA; for example, the Stadt Halle case and the Teckal case, which ruled that only fully publicly owned enterprises can gain a concession without a tender or can be treated as an in-house operation. The Stadt Halle case explains that even a minority private shareholding makes it impossible for an entity to be treated as an in-house operation. The Teckal case explains that a contracting body (local authority) can assign a task without a competitive tendering to a third party when it can exercise control over that third party as it does over its own departments (an in-house entity). However, in the Parking Brixen case the European Court ruled that an organization, even with full municipal ownership, cannot be treated as an in-house entity when this organization also carries out marketing activities (Šen Kreže, 2009).

We can conclude that the legal praxis of the EU Court determines a few conditions that need to be fulfilled in the case of a direct concession, which are: no private capital involved; economic dependence (the enterprise operates in its essential part only for the grantor); and control or supervision of the enterprise in the same way it supervises its own services, which has a decisive influence on the strategic goals and important decisions of the concessionaire (organizational dependence).

As presented in the following section 3.2, referring to the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia due to the implementation of PPPA, the mentioned Act determines a public enterprise only as a public enterprise with full public ownership (Hrovatin, 2010, p. 102). This definition of a Slovenian public enterprise is consistent with the EU legislation, and is consistent with the awarding of concessions. Awarding concessions to public enterprises that transformed into commercial companies is required through competitive tendering, and only fully publicly-owned enterprises have a guaranteed concession without a public tender (Hrovatin, 2010, p. 104).

The PPPA has followed the provisions of Directive 2004/18/EC relating to concessions, which is explicitly emphasized in the PPPA (Kranjc, 2009, p. 204). On the EU level, concession-based constructions were covered in the already mentioned Public-Private Partnership Directive 2004/18/EC, whereas service concession arrangements were not included. However, service concession arrangements had to follow EU court practice in terms of the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Burnik, 2017, p. 1). The Commission Interpretative Communication on Concessions under Community law (2000) explains which transaction has the status of a concession and not a public procurement, and what legal regime applies to awarding concessions. These explanations and requirements were taken into account also by the Slovenian PPPA (Kranjc, 2009, p. 204).

The PPPA therefore differentiates between concession-based constructions and service concession arrangements, and defines the concession as a form of a contractual public-private partnership (Grafenauer & Klarić, 2011, p. 79–80). A new Directive 2014/23/EU on the awarding of concession contracts defines both concession-based constructions and service concession arrangements, and provides clear, simple, and pragmatic rules for the awarding of concessions. Slovenia was required to incorporate the provisions of the new Directive regarding the awarding of concessions in its national legal order by April 2016. Some provisions of the new Directive are not in line with the PPPA: for example, the differentiation between concession-based constructions and service concession arrangements in a specific provision of the Act, whereas in the new Directive the specific provisions apply to all forms of concessions; the definition of basic terms connected to concessions are more precise in the new Directive, etc. Due to the inconsistent nature of the PPPA with the new Directive, concession providers must deal with which provisions apply in practice in certain cases (Burnik, 2017, pp. 3, 48).

The European Parliament excluded the water sector from Directive 2014/23/EU, as water is a public good and is often subject to special and complex arrangements. The exclusion covers concessions for the construction and operation of networks intended to provide a public service relating to the production, transport, or distribution of drinking water and the supply of drinking water to such networks, concessions for water engineering, irrigation, or drainage (when the amount of drinking water supply represents more than 20% of all water)

and concessions for wastewater disposal and treatment (Official Gazette of the European Union, 2014).

2.4 Institutional changes to the framework of public enterprises in Slovenia

As already mentioned, in 2007 an important impetus for the transformation of existing public enterprises in Slovenia arrived with the implementation of the PPPA (Brezovnik, 2009, p. 180; Trpin, 2007, pp. 5–6). The law demanded reorganization of the existing public enterprises (transformation into private law companies or remain public enterprises) and the awarding of concessions to public enterprises that had transformed into private law companies through competitive tendering.

In 2006, Slovenia adopted the PPPA, that entered into force in March 2007. The Act had a large implications for the legal status of public enterprises, especially on the further organization and operation of public enterprises providing public services. It determined the rules of transformation of existing public enterprises, which *mutatis mutandis* apply also to public institutions and public commercial institutions (Brezovnik, 2010, p. 24). From the perspective of public institution regulation, Tičar & Zajc (2010, p. 211) highlight the importance of the repeal of Article 80 in the 1999 Public Finance Act by the PPPA. Article 80 of the Public Finance Act specifically regulated the privatization of public institutions (also public commercial institutions and public enterprises). It prohibited all privatization initiatives, since it did not allow for the transfer of capital investments or establishment rights of the state or municipality in public institutions. Privatization was possible only when permitted by a specific law on the performance of public service, but no such laws were adopted between 2002 and 2007. This restriction was then removed with the implementation of the PPPA in 2007.

The PPPA defines the legal status of public enterprises. The new regulation aims to differentiate between »true« public enterprises that shall remain exclusively publicly owned to perform public service activities, and other public enterprises that shall be transformed into commercial companies. Two options were envisaged for the transformation of public enterprises with private equity stakes. One option was that a public enterprise could be transformed into a commercial company in accordance with the Companies Act. The other option offered that public enterprise status could be retained and the private equity stakes would in a way be nullified (Kocbek, 2011, p. 86).

Public enterprises where private investors had shares needed to be transformed into commercial companies, and public enterprises that wanted to remain public had to transfer the private ownership part to the State or the local community. The decision had to be taken by the founder of the enterprise within three years from the adoption of the Act, i.e., by March 2010. Under the new regulation, a public enterprise may only be an enterprise that is wholly owned by the state or local government (Brezovnik, 2010, p. 24; Trpin, 2007, p. 6).

The Act also regulates awarding concessions to public enterprises, which are transformed into commercial companies. First, the founder shall award concessions without public tender to those commercial companies that were created out of public enterprises by withdrawing (selling) all private ownership shares. This had to be done within one year, by March 2008. Second, public enterprises transformed into the legal status of private commercial companies must obtain a concession in compliance with the legislation. The concession should be awarded within one year by the founder of the enterprise through a bidding process on a public tender (Brezovnik, 2010, p. 24; Trpin, 2007, p. 6).

In determining the duration of the concession, the founder of a public enterprise has to take into account the nature of the public service and the extent of its implementation, current investment in the public service, and the degree of its depreciation, together with any necessary new investments and other circumstances. When deciding on the duration of the concession, the founder has to determine the minimum necessary duration of the concession in accordance with the Act. The founder had to organise the bidding process on the public tender by March 2008, also in the cases of those commercial companies providing commercial public services that had already been transformed on the basis of previous regulations (Hrovatin, 2010, p. 102; Brezovnik, 2010, p. 24; Trpin, 2007, pp. 6, 13). To conclude, the PPPA demanded the reorganization of public enterprises with mixed ownership and the awarding of concessions to public enterprises that had transformed into commercial companies on a competitive basis.

Table 15: Institutional changes of public enterprises after the PPPA

Public enterprise	Before PPPA	After PPPA
Legal status	No own status (Services of General Economic Interest Act); a part of legal regime of commercial public services	Commercial company (Companies Act) or Public enterprise
Capital	Possible shared capital (public and private)	Public enterprise: only public capital (state or local government)
Ownership	Majority public	Public enterprise: 100% public
Founder	The State, local government, public-private partnership	The State, local government

Source: own work

Table 15 presents the changes that the PPPA brought to the institutional framework of public enterprises in Slovenia. Before the reorganization process, public enterprise did not have its own legal status, but was part of a legal regime of commercial public services, and could be founded in one of the forms of commercial companies. After adoption of the PPPA, a public enterprise had a clear definition of its legal status: it could either be transformed into a commercial company or remain a public enterprise.

Despite that, Brezovnik (2008) argues that the legal status of public enterprises is still disputed due to missing evidence on the final outcome of reorganization. The majority of public enterprises operate like commercial companies, and on the one hand behave like private law companies, while on the other hand they have public law status. Significant changes were also made in the ownership structure of the public enterprise. Previously, a public enterprise should have had majority public ownership, and therefore also shared capital investments were possible. Under the new regime, only public ownership is required, meaning only public capital investments are possible, either from the State or local government. In view of this definition, the founder of a public enterprise under the new regime may only be the State or a local government.

Empirical evidence from communal utilities shows that the majority of public enterprises retained their status as public enterprises, with full local community ownership. Their decision not to change their public enterprise status was most commonly taken in order to avoid a public tendering procedure for the awarding of a concession. At the time, some enterprises with mixed ownership had not yet transformed into exclusively publicly owned public enterprises, despite their wish to do so. The reasons for such were as follows: some private investors did not want to give up their ownership rights, and on the other hand, some public utilities did not have enough resources to acquire their shares. Empirical evidence also points out the advantages of retaining the status of a public enterprise, which are: faster work processes (no need for public tender), better utilization of labour and capital, better organization of work, and better cooperation between the local community and the enterprise (Hrovatin, 2010, p. 105).

Solely publicly owned enterprises avoid competition from domestic and foreign private companies. Public ownership is not economically rational, as private investors in public enterprises hope to bring greater efficiency as the result of market competition. Private investors also tend to require rational decision-making and operations in order to reduce costs. Mandatory tendering does not always guarantee greater economic efficiency. Preparation of tenders, closing contracts, and monitoring their execution involves high transaction costs and further on, possible higher prices and lower quality, which in the end may not offset the potential benefits of lower costs for the private provision of local services (Hrovatin, 2010, pp. 105–106).

Despite the above-mentioned empirical evidence, the reorganization process of public enterprises in Slovenia has not been sufficiently researched. It is not quite clear (e.g. for water utilities), whether public enterprise is the preferable model over commercial (private) companies. Therefore, in the following research part of the doctoral dissertation, we try to identify the final outcomes of the reorganization of public enterprises, the motives behind reorganization, and the advantages and disadvantages of reorganization as the result of the PPPA.

3 ANALYSIS OF THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS OF SLOVENIAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

3.1 Research topic

Changes in ownership from private back to public, and the tendency toward re-municipalisation of local public services is also observed in Slovenia. In Slovenia, public enterprises represent the most common form of local public services provision. In order to enable and encourage mutual help and cooperation between entities from the public and the private sectors, Slovenia adopted the Public-Private Partnership Act in 2006. The implementation of the Act in 2007 brought about important changes in the transformation of existing public enterprises, which were required to make the appropriate changes in their organizational status within the specified period, or their founders had to consider adapting their status to the new legislative conditions (Brezovnik, 2009, p. 180; Trpin, 2007, pp. 5–6).

The research topic documents Slovenian experiences in the field of local public services delivery mechanisms after the reorganization of public enterprises, which came about in the period 2007–2009 as the result of the adoption of the Public-Private Partnership Act (PPPA, Official Gazette of RS, no. 127/06). Both the perspectives of municipalities as owners of public enterprises and that of public enterprises as public services providers are taken into consideration. The research presents a classical principal-agent relationship, where municipalities represent principals and public utility providers, i.e., public enterprises represent agents. Therefore, the research also looks at the expectations and characteristics of the principal-agent theory; and also looks at the characteristics of trends in re-municipalisation in the context of the reorganization of public enterprises into fully publicly owned enterprises.

The goal of our research is to assess the final outcome of the reorganization process, in particular to what extent the municipality buyout was implemented and what motives guided municipalities in buying up ownership, which was a necessary condition for the reorganization of existing public enterprises into public enterprises with full municipal ownership. Therefore, the focus of our research is on the impact of the new legislation on the mechanisms of the provision of local public services; more precisely, on mandatory local public utilities for drinking water supply, sewage, and wastewater discharges, and urban wastewater and sewage treatment; and if and how the provision of local public utilities has changed due to the reorganization of existing public enterprises. Attention is given to the motives behind reorganization efforts, to the municipal purchase of ownership shares in public enterprises from private individuals, to granting concessions in cases when private individuals still held shares in public enterprises, and the relationship between the owners of public commercial infrastructure and public utility providers. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of reorganization are analysed.

The analysis of the reorganization process of public enterprises in Slovenia in the field of water and wastewater management looks to answer the following research questions:

RQ5: Which experiences have the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia in the period 2007–2009 brought to the field of local public services delivery mechanisms? Which changes have been implemented, and which advantages and disadvantages has it brought?

RQ6: What is the current state of local public services delivery mechanisms in Slovenia?

RQ7: What are the experiences with the provision of local public services in municipalities that bought shares in public enterprises back from private individuals, and what are the experiences with awarding concessions in cases when private individuals still hold shares in public enterprises in Slovenia?

RQ8: To what extent does the current state of local public services delivery in Slovenia enable the adoption of inter-municipal cooperation as a delivery mechanism?

RQ9: Does inter-municipal cooperation present the most appropriate delivery mechanism for Slovenian local public services? Under which conditions is this delivery mechanism the most appropriate?

RQ10: Which good practices regarding local public services delivery can be identified in Slovenia?

3.2 Methodology of research

3.2.1 Research design

An empirical investigation was performed using primary data collection through two structured and detailed online questionnaires developed by the candidate of the doctoral dissertation and her supervisory team. The questionnaires were pre-tested by the Institut of Public Services in Slovenia in order to gain an expert opinion on the relevance of the survey content. The study intended to explore the compliance of the reorganization process with the new legislation and the experiences of the reorganization for local public utility providers.

One questionnaire was addressed to Slovenian municipalities, as the majority of public utilities in Slovenia in the field of water and wastewater are managed locally, on the municipal level. Owing to the new legislative provisions set in 2013, the regulation of local public utilities was transferred from the central to the municipal level. Therefore, municipal administrations are now responsible for local public utility regulation, including water supply and wastewater treatment (Cerkvenik, 2015, p. 69). The municipality prescribes the form of local public service provision with a decree, which regulates conditions for the provision and use of public goods; sources of funding and the manner of their formation; rights and obligations of users; and the status of public infrastructure for the public service provision (Grafenauer, 2009, p. 213). The other questionnaire was addressed to local public

utility providers in water and wastewater management; more precisely, to public enterprises in the field of water and wastewater management in Slovenia, as public enterprise status is the most common form of water and wastewater utility provision and the central-most topic of our research is the reorganization of public enterprises in the field of water and wastewater management as the result to new legislation.

The invitation, with a link to each of the two questionnaires, was sent to recipients by email. The questionnaire prepared for local public utilities was addressed to the managing directors of all Slovenian public enterprises in the field of water and wastewater management. In most cases their e-mail addresses were taken from their websites. When an email address was not available on their website (a small number of cases), we obtained it through the general »info« email of the specific public enterprise. The other questionnaire, prepared for municipalities, was addressed to all directors of municipal administrations. Again, their addresses were in most cases obtained through municipality websites.

The email invitation was sent several times due to the unresponsiveness of the addressees. In order to get a representative sample of utilities and municipalities, we tried to efficiently overcome the problems of unresponsiveness, e.g. by sending reminders, additional requests with additional explanations of the value-added of this research, a personal visit to selected public enterprises and municipalities with the request to complete the questionnaire. For these reasons the survey period lasted roughly two years, and the questionnaires were collected in the period 2018–2020. The collection time of two years did not affect the authenticity and comparability of the data among the respondents, as specific focus was placed on the collection of answers related to past events. Despite the fact that we faced certain obstacles in our research, especially in the form of incomplete responses, our research still provides authoritative insight into the research topic and related issues. Regarding the focus of the questionnaire, the respondents who completed the questionnaire in full or in large part were involved in the reorganization process and were, therefore, able to provide specific facts and information on the reorganization of existing public enterprises.

The questionnaires are segmented to allow respondents to answer only questions relevant to them specifically, meaning that public utility providers and municipalities answer only questions related to their legal organisational form and the utilities they manage, while all other irrelevant questions are skipped. In so doing, the questionnaire automatically guides the respondents through the relevant questions. Completing each of the questionnaires takes some 30–45 minutes.

Content-wise the online questionnaires are structured very similarly, as we wanted to gain some comparative insight into the researched topic from the point of view of both actors – the municipality as a manager of public utilities, and the public enterprise as a public utility provider. Therefore, both questionnaires cover 5 thematic parts: (1) the basic data of the respondent, (2) the provision/management of public utilities in the area of drinking water supply and wastewater treatment, (3) the ownership structure of the public utility before the

adoption of the new legislation, (4) the changes resulting from the reorganization of existing public enterprises and compliance with the new act, and (5) the pricing of the utilities. However, there are some differences in the thematic part of the questions (the number and the content) regarding the specifics of each actor. Both questionnaires use a combination of open-ended questions, multiple-choice answers, and a Likert scale of 1–5. We chose to use a Likert 5-point scale as it provides better quality data compared to a 7- or 11-point scale (Revilla, Saris & Krosnick, 2014). A more detailed outline of the structure of the questionnaires is further explained in what follows.

The online questionnaire for the public utility providers (public enterprises) comprises a total of 102 questions, while the questionnaire for municipalities consists of 105 questions. The first thematic part covers the basic data of the respondent (in total 6 questions for public enterprises and 1 question for municipalities), and the second the provision of public utilities in the area of drinking water supply and wastewater treatment (in total 5 questions for public enterprises and 3 questions for municipalities), using a combination of open-ended questions and multiple-choice answers. The first two parts aim to collect information on the legal status of the public enterprise and on the range of their mandatory local public utilities provision; and on the other hand, to gain information about the form of public utility provision (e.g. public enterprise, concession etc).

The third part covers the ownership structure of the public utilities before the adoption of the new legislation (14 questions in total for public enterprises, and 10 questions for municipalities), also using the combination of open-ended questions and multiple-choice answers. The fourth part covers the changes resulting from the reorganization of existing public enterprises and compliance with the new act (with 42 questions for public enterprises and 58 questions for municipalities). A combination of multiple-choice answers, open-ended questions, and a Likert scale of 1–5 is used (1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree).

The third and fourth parts aim to gain insight into the reorganization process and its outcomes, in particular to elaborate on the major potential motivations that may have moved municipalities to buy shares in the mixed ownership enterprises, which was a necessary condition for the transformation of utilities into (pure) public enterprises. We were also interested in the way concessions were gained, and in the possible advantages and disadvantages brought about by the reorganisation, including the impact on the business performance of the existing public enterprises. Also, changes in the relationship between the owners and managers of public infrastructure were recorded. Additionally, municipalities provided more information on the awarding of joint³ and horizontal⁴ concessions,

³ A joint concession is a concession awarded by two or more municipalities for the provision of joint public service and is more economical and efficient than awarding an individual concession by each involved municipality (Inštitut za javne službe, 2016, p. 4).

⁴ A horizontal concession is a direct concession that a municipality grants to a public enterprise in the ownership of the other municipality (Inštitut za javne službe, 2016, p. 18).

establishing joint enterprises etc. as forms of inter-municipal cooperation; and in reference to this, also information on the advantages and disadvantages of inter-municipal cooperation. The fifth and last part covers the setting of price by utilities, from the point of view the relationship between the municipality and the public utility provider (a total of 35 questions for public enterprises and 33 for municipalities). The aim of the fifth part is to determine why utility prices differ between municipalities, and particularly why they differ when two or more municipalities share a common utility provider.

3.2.2 Research population and sample

As already mentioned in the previous section, our research includes two groups of actors: Slovenian public enterprises, as public utility providers for drinking water supply, sewage and wastewater discharges, and urban wastewater and sewage treatment; and Slovenian municipalities as the owners of public enterprises. The small scale of Slovenia and the number of its utilities ensured that we sent questionnaire to all public enterprises in the water industry and to all Slovenian municipalities.

Therefore, on the one hand, the total population includes 72 public enterprises for water and wastewater treatment in Slovenia. The response rate was almost 42% (30 public enterprises responded). On the other hand, the total population included 212 Slovenian municipalities, where the response rate was slightly less than 20% (42 municipalities responded).

Table 16: Research population of public enterprises

Public enterprises	Number	Share of total population (%)
Research population total	72	100
Provision of water and wastewater treatment	55	76.39
Provision of water treatment	6	8.33
Provision of wastewater treatment	11	15.28
Total no of responses	30	41.67
No of (almost) completed surveys	21	29.17
No of incomplete surveys	9	12.5

Source: own work

As seen from Table 16, in total 30 public enterprises (41.67% of total population) responded to the on-line questionnaire, but only 21 public enterprises fully or almost fully completed the survey. The actual response rate to all questions in the survey is 29.17%, which could be considered sufficient to enable the generalisation of results for the whole country. The reason

for incomplete response rate might be attributed to the fact that questionnaire is rather long since it is aimed towards a detailed evaluation of the reorganisation process and its outcomes. The data analysis and results, which are presented in the following sections, consider all responses, from partly completed to fully completed questionnaires, therefore the total number of responses differs in the tables.

Regarding the responses to the parts of the surveys, the first part (basic information of utilities), was fully answered by all firms, which is expected as the questions were relatively easy to answer. The questions in the second, third and fourth part were answered by lower number of utilities, around 75% of all. This is not surprising because questions in those parts were more specific and demanded from respondents to search for the data or to verify the answers for example in their accounting office, which needed more of their time and effort.

Table 17: Legal status of public enterprises

Legal status	No of utilities	Share of utilities (%)
LLC	24	85.71
PLC	4	14.29
	N=28	

Source: own work

As seen from the Table 17, most of the respondent public enterprises (almost 86%) were established as a Limited Liability Company (LLC) and only 14% as a Public Limited Company (PLC).

Table 18: Provision of local public utilities in the field of environmental protection

Local public utility service	No of utilities	Share of utilities (%)
Drinking water supply	21	84
Sewage and wastewater discharges	22	88
Urban wastewater and sewage treatment	21	84
Collection of certain types of municipal waste	18	72
Treatment of certain types of municipal waste	3	12
Disposal of residues from waste recovery or disposal of municipal waste	2	8
Arranging and cleaning public areas	16	64
	N=25	

Source: own work

The majority of studied public enterprises provide most of the mandatory local public utilities for water supply and environmental protection, as seen from the Table 18. As much as 84% of enterprises provide Sewage and wastewater discharges and Urban wastewater and sewage treatment; 88% Drinking water supply; 72% Collection of certain types of municipal waste and 64% of enterprises provide Arranging and cleaning public areas. However, only 12% of enterprises provide Treatment of certain types of municipal waste and only 8% Disposal of residues from waste recovery or disposal of municipal waste.

On average, public utilities provide drinking water supply for three municipalities, and sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment on average for two municipalities.

As water and wastewater utilities are managed at the municipal level, the second research population includes all 212 Slovenian municipalities. A municipality is the primary self-governing local community. Of total 212 municipalities, 12 municipalities present the so-called urban municipalities. In accordance with the Constitution and within their competence, urban municipalities may also perform tasks under state competence stipulated by law, which refer to the development of the city. Municipalities, in accordance with the Constitution and laws, autonomously regulate and perform matters, duties and functions assigned to them by law (Pevcin, 2012, p. 706; Vlaj, 2010, p. 7). Municipal administration in Slovenia is organized by the municipal representative body or the mayor. The organization of municipal administration depends on the competencies of a municipality, its size and its ability to organize and provide sufficient funding for the administration. The problem arises with a very small size of some municipalities and their provision of obligatory public services (Haček & Bačlija, 2014, pp. 88–89).

Table 19: Research population of municipalities

Municipalities	Number	Share of total population (%)
Research population total	212	100
Total no of responses	42	19.8
No of (almost) completed surveys	28	13.2
No of incomplete surveys	14	6.6

Source: own work

Table 19 shows that in total, 42 municipalities (19.8% of total population) responded to the survey, but only 28 municipalities fully or almost fully completed the survey. The actual response rate (fully and almost fully completed surveys) is 13.2%. However, similar as with the research population of public enterprises, this input should be considered in a sufficient manner to extrapolate the field experiences. In the results analysis we utilize also the data

obtained from the surveys not fully completed, therefore the total number of responses differs between the presented results.

Table 20: Local public utilities delivery mechanism

Delivery mechanism	Drinking water supply		Sewage and wastewater discharges		Urban wastewater and sewage treatment	
	Municipalities		Municipalities		Municipalities	
	No	Share (%)	No	Share (%)	No	Share (%)
Public enterprise	35	85.37	25	60.98	25	60.98
Concession with a public tender	2	4.88	6	14.63	5	12.20
In-house provision	3	7.32	9	21.95	9	21.95
Public enterprise and concession with a public tender	1	2.44	0	0	0	0
In-house provision and public enterprise	0	0	0	0	0	0
In-house provision and concession with a public tender	0	0	1	2.44	1	2.44
In-house provision, public enterprise and concession with a public tender	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N=41		N=41		N=41	

Source: own work

As seen from the Table 20, the majority of the respondent municipalities provide drinking water supply (in 85% cases), sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment (in 61% cases) via public enterprise. Almost 22% of respondent municipalities provide sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment via in-house provision⁵, whereas in-house provision of drinking water supply is practised only in 7% of respondent municipalities. Around 14.6% municipalities provide sewage and wastewater discharges via concession with a public tender, similarly concession with a public tender is practiced in around 12% municipalities for provision of urban wastewater and sewage treatment, but only in around 5% cases this delivery mechanism is used for drinking water supply. There is only one example in respondent municipalities, where drinking water supply is provided by public enterprise and also by concession with a

⁵ In our research in-house provision is defined as service provision via public utility unit/overhead plant, which presents an organizational unit of municipal administration. It does not exclude the awarding of concessions (Services of General Economic Interest Act, Article 29).

public tender and there is only one example where sewage and wastewater discharges and treatment is provided by in-house provision and by concession with a public tender.

On average each respondent municipality has only one public utility provider for each of the local public utilities studied. However, public utility providers in the majority of cases (80.5% of 41 respondent municipalities) provide drinking water supply for more than just one municipality, and in 61% of cases also provide sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment for more than one municipality. This was already highlighted in the sample of public utilities providers.

4 RESEARCH RESULTS

4.1 The reorganization process and local public utility providers

4.1.1 Reorganization of local public utilities

As already mentioned in section 2.4, the PPPA demanded reorganization of existing public enterprises with private equity stakes. On one hand, the status of public enterprise can be retained with the transfer of the private ownership part to municipalities, and on the other hand the public enterprise can be transformed into a commercial company in accordance with the Companies Act.

Table 21: Ownership of public enterprises before and after PPPA

Ownership	Ownership before PPPA		Ownership after PPPA	
	No of utilities	Share of utilities (%)	No of utilities	Share of utilities (%)
Full public	17	77.27	21	91.3
Mixed	5	22.73	2	8.7
Private	0	0	0	0
	N=22		N=23	

Source: own work

As seen from Table 21, the majority of those public enterprises that responded (77%) already had full public (municipal) ownership already the adoption of PPPA and retained their legal status of public enterprise after the adoption of new legislation. After the adoption of PPPA, the share of full public ownership rose to 91%, which shows that in the process of reorganization some enterprises with mixed ownership transformed into fully publicly owned entities. Before the adoption of PPPA, mixed public enterprises represented almost

23% of all existing public enterprises; after adoption of the new legislation their share fell to 8.7%.

Table 22: Retention of or transformation into full public ownership after PPPA

Reorganization	No of utilities	Share of utilities (%)
Retention of full public ownership	18	85.71
Transformation into full public ownership	2	9.52
Other	1	4.76
	N=21	

Source: own work

As previously mentioned, the majority of respondent public enterprises already had full public ownership before the adoption of PPPA, which is also seen in Table 22. After the PPPA went into effect, the founder of a public enterprise (a municipality) has retained full public ownership in almost 86% of researched cases, while only 9.5% of cases saw transformation to full public ownership.

Respondents with full municipal ownership also provided information on whether retention or change in ownership structure was a consequence of the adoption of PPPA. Some 30% of respondent public enterprises confirmed that PPPA affected the decision on ownership. Roughly 60% of public enterprises did not have this information, and some (approx. 10%) stated that full municipal ownership was never in question, regardless of the new legislation.

The ownership structure of retained mixed public enterprises did not change much after the adoption of PPPA. The average public share decreased from 66% to 59%, and the average private share increased from 34% to 42%. We may assume that retention of mixed ownership after the new legislation and consequently transformation into a commercial company was due to the inability of a municipality to secure funds for the purchase of ownership shares as well as to the (dis)interest of owners and employees.

4.1.2 Changes in the ownership of public infrastructure

The changes in the legislation that came with the adoption of the PPPA and harmonization of the Slovenian Accounting Standard (SAS) with the International Financial Reporting Standards demanded the transfer of public infrastructure into municipal ownership. As a result, the relationship between the public infrastructure owner (the municipality) and the infrastructure manager (the public enterprise) had to be regulated, in the case of full municipal ownership of a public enterprise, by the end of 2009 (Ministry of Finance, 2009).

The following possibilities for control over infrastructure before the PPPA were as follows: 1) the transfer of public infrastructure to a controlling public utility provider, 2) the transfer of public infrastructure to a public utility provider in lease or maintenance, and 3) the transfer of public infrastructure to a public utility provider as a non-cash contribution into the public enterprise. Research by Kavčič et al. (2002, p. 41) shows that the most common form of regulation of public infrastructure ownership between the municipalities and the public utility providers before the PPPA and before the harmonization of SAS was the transfer of public infrastructure to public utility provider in control.

After the PPPA and after the harmonization of SAS the municipality, as the owner of public infrastructure, had three options for the transfer of infrastructure to a public enterprise (the infrastructure manager). One option was to transfer it into the ownership of a public utility provider (public enterprise), while the other two options involve the lease of it – either in the form of a financial or business lease. Following the recommendation of the Slovenian Ministry of Finance, most of the municipalities decided for a business lease. In this case, the PPPA allows for the direct conclusion of a contract with the public enterprise. On the other hand, the financial lease requires many conditions, which are usually not fulfilled (Čižman & Prislan, 2009, pp. 23–24).

To be more precise, the Ministry of Finance (2009) dictates that in the case of transferring public infrastructure into the ownership of a public utility provider, the public utility provider has to fulfil a basic condition, which is the ability to finance certain additional investments into the public infrastructure itself; and with leased funds, the ability to provide funds to cover all costs and service debts using/within the operating budget for the provision of the public utility service. Two risks appear in this case. The first risk is that the public utility provider performs poorly, and the municipality is unable to provide the public utility efficiently and economically. The second risk appears when the transfer of the public infrastructure ownership represents the transfer of a public monopoly into a private monopoly, which could lead to higher prices and lower quality service by the public utility.

Further on, in the case of financial lease, the Ministry of Finance states that financial lease is not a possible option, as they do not fulfil the conditions set by the SRS, and because a municipality cannot conclude financial lease transactions or credit transactions. Therefore, in view of the above-mentioned risks and limits, the Ministry of Finance recommends the business lease as the most appropriate option for the legal arrangement of the relationship between the public infrastructure owner and the infrastructure manager (Ministry of Finance, 2009).

The following Table 23 presents the changes in ownership of public infrastructure. Before the PPPA, more than half of the respondent public enterprises (59%) did not own public infrastructure, while some 41% had full ownership of public infrastructure. There were no cases of mixed ownership of public infrastructure. After the PPPA, the majority of the respondent public enterprises (around 73%), which did not already have full municipal

ownership of public infrastructure, transmitted the public infrastructure into municipal ownership in order to comply with the PPPA provisions. The remaining utilities (27%) stated that ownership of the public infrastructure was never in the hands of the enterprise, meaning that this public infrastructure was already in full municipal ownership before the PPPA.

Table 23: Changes in the ownership of public infrastructure

Ownership of public infrastructure	Before PPPA	After PPPA	Relationship between infrastructure owner and infrastructure manager after PPPA	
	Share of utilities (%)	Share of utilities (%)	Share of utilities (%)	
Yes, full ownership of public enterprise.	41.33			
No ownership.	58.67			
Transmission into full municipal ownership.		72.66	Ownership	5.77
			Financial lease	15.47
			Business lease	78.76
No transmission.		27.34	N=20	
	N=22	N=20		

Source: own work

Table 23 also shows that in most cases after the PPPA (78.76%) the relationship was managed through the transfer of public infrastructure into a business lease of a public utility provider (83% of respondents for drinking water supply and 76.5% of respondents for sewage and wastewater discharges, and urban wastewater and sewage treatment). In less than 6% of cases the relationship was managed through transfer into the ownership of a public utility provider, and in 15.5% of cases through the transfer into financial lease of a public utility provider.

4.1.3 Motives for the reorganization of local public utilities

The drivers of re-municipalisation (poor private management, overpricing, rising contractual and transaction costs, deteriorating quality of service etc.), as previously presented in section 1.4.2, are very closely connected to the motivating factors behind the reorganization of local public utilities identified in our research. The results below list standard reasons for re-municipalisation in the field under investigation.

Table 24: Motivating factors behind full municipal ownership of a public enterprise

Motivating factor	Weighted average
Management problems in enterprises with mixed ownership	4.3
Simpler regulation of the provider	4.0
Greater control over the provider	3.95
More possibilities to influence business operations	3.8
Greater rationality and efficiency of business	3.8
To use in-house orders	2.9
Easier to obtain EU funds	2.6
To avoid public tenders for concessions	2.45
To prevent employee dismissal	2.15
N = 20	

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

As seen from Table 24, the most important motive behind the transformation to full municipal ownership of a public utility appears to be *management problems in a mixed-ownership enterprise* rated, with an average value of 4.3, closely followed by *simpler regulation of the service provider*, *greater control over the service provider*, *more possibilities to influence business activities*, and *more rational and efficient business activities*. On the other hand, *preventing employee dismissal* (2.15) and *avoiding public tenders for concession* (2.45) are found to be the least important motives. We can assume that avoiding public tenders for concession was not seen as an important factor, given the small share of public utilities provision via the awarding of concessions in general; and more specifically, due to the even smaller share of provision via direct, horizontal concessions without a public tender.

Public enterprises transformed into full public ownership have either retained the concession for the provision of a local public utility or vice versa. Around 47% of respondents have retained the concession for the provision of drinking water supply and around 39% of respondents have retained it for sewage and wastewater discharges and for urban wastewater and sewage treatment. Around 47% of respondents did not have a concession for drinking water supply before the transformation process, and 50% of respondents did not have a concession for sewage and wastewater discharges and for urban wastewater and sewage treatment before the transformation.

However, concessions retained for the provision of public utilities do not as a rule represent horizontal concessions, which a public enterprise would retain to provide public services for

another municipality. The share of horizontal concessions is highest in the case of provision of drinking water supply, where 50% of respondent public enterprises have retained a concession as a horizontal concession. Only some 29% of respondent public enterprises have retained the concession as a horizontal concession for the provision of sewage and wastewater discharges, and only around 14% of respondent enterprises for urban wastewater and sewage treatment. Public enterprises that have not retained the concession as a horizontal concession explained that the enterprise provides the public utility only for their own municipality, and that the concession is granted to a public enterprise with the ordinance of the individual municipality.

4.1.4 Advantages and disadvantages of the reorganization process

The literature review on re-municipalisation in section 1.4.2 highlights the fact that the high cost of monitoring and regulating private contracts usually drives municipalities to re-municipalise. In this regard, the advantages and disadvantages of reorganization process were formulated and verified in our research in order to verify the literature findings.

Table 25: Advantages of the reorganization of public enterprises

Advantage	Weighted average
The municipality monitors the business of the enterprise under the decree	4.06
The municipality has full control over the performance of public utility	3.63
Institutional, corporate, and governmental rights are prescribed by municipal decree	3.5
Better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community	3.44
Developing expertise and increasing the quality of the services provided	3.13
Better use of labour and capital	2.75
Better job performance	2.63
Better organization of work	2.63
Lower costs of service provision / Lower transaction costs	2.5
Acquisition of additional municipal financial sources	2.5
Easier to obtain European funds	2.44
Lower labour costs	2.31
Total profit from a public enterprise is transferred to the budget and devoted to investment in infrastructure	2.31
N = 16	

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

Table 25 shows that public enterprises see the biggest advantage of reorganization in a *municipality's ability to monitor the business activities of the enterprise under the decree* (4.06), followed by the advantage that *the municipality has full control over the performance of public utilities providers* (3.63); that *institutional, corporate, and governmental rights are prescribed by a municipal decree* (3.5); and *better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community* (3.44).

Table 26: Disadvantages of the reorganization of public enterprises

Disadvantage	Weighted Average
The arrangement of a concession relationship requires the regulation of many legal acts	3.75
Regulatory pricing policy	3.5
Higher costs for the utility provider due to municipal control	3.0
The municipality does not have control over the concessionaire through founding and corporate rights	3.0
Lack of municipal experience in providing control over the concession in terms of maintaining the high quality of service for citizens, and maintaining and increasing the value of the property for the municipality at justifiable service prices	3.0
Higher transaction costs due to public tenders for concessions	2.75
Higher transaction costs for the municipality in terms of controlling the concessionaire	2.75
Higher public utility prices	2.5
Poorer quality of public utility	2.5
N = 13	

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

In contrast, some disadvantages of the reorganization process can be observed in Table 26, but they are on average less important and of smaller magnitudes than the advantages. Utilities find the biggest disadvantage in *the arrangement of a concession relationship, which requires the regulation of many legal acts* (3.75). They agree that *regulatory pricing policy* (3.5), *higher costs for the utility provider due to municipal control* (3), *visible lack of experience of municipal control over the concessions* (3) and *no possibility of control over the concessionaire through founding and corporate rights* (3) also present disadvantages.

Interestingly, the utilities do not see any essential changes in the effectiveness of their business as the result of the new legislation, even if they have recognised advantages of legal amendments. Around 70% of respondent public enterprises share the perception that their business performance has not deteriorated. Slightly less than 6% of utilities feel their

performance has declined somewhat, and 17.5% of utilities find the opposite, that their performance has improved some.

4.1.5 Provision of public utilities and its price-setting

Long-standing restrictive price-setting as the result of various forms of regulation was typical for communal utilities in the past, which resulted in price disparities. Since 1 January 2013, the pricing of obligatory local public utilities for environmental protection has been regulated by the MEDO Regulation (Decree on the methodology for determining prices of obligatory municipal public services for environmental protection, Official Gazzete of RS, No. 87/12, 109/12, 76/17 and 78/19). Authority over price setting was transferred to municipalities, which are also the regulatory body responsible for approving public utilities' prices. The prices of public utilities are set by the utility providers (e.g. public enterprise) and confirmed by the municipal or city council of the local community (Inštitut za javne službe, 2020, p. 49).

Each municipality independently decides on an individual public utility's prices in the area of the municipality. The provision of public utilities for water and wastewater management (in general for all public utilities for environmental protection) is financed by the utility's incomes. The price of the drinking water supply consists of network charges (cost of renting public infrastructure) and a water charge (cost of providing the utility service). The price of sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment also consists of network charges and the cost of performing the public utility service (Inštitut za javne službe, 2020, p. 21).

The network charges include the costs of public infrastructure used to provide the public utility. The biggest part of network charges are depreciation costs or the lease of public infrastructure. The rent for infrastructure charged by municipalities to public utility providers for the provision of a public utility service have to be set according to the amount of the calculated depreciation. Network charges are determined on an annual basis and are charged as a fixed cost to end users according to the capacity of the connections. Water charges or the cost of providing a public utility service represent the variable part of the price, which is charged to end users according to the quantity of drinking water supplied, expressed in m³ (Inštitut za javne službe, 2020, p. 22).

The price of an individual public utility must not differ between users based on the location of use when there is only one public utility provider in an individual municipality (MEDO Regulation, 2012, article 12). The MEDO Regulation determines the costs that a public utility provider can include in the price of a public utility. However, there are no specific criteria for assessing the eligibility of each cost, which leads to different prices for public utilities in comparable municipalities. Assessment of the eligibility of costs is left entirely to the public utility provider (Inštitut za javne službe, 2020, p. 55).

The complex costs of a supply system in an individual municipality affects the price of a utility service. Both technical and technological factors as well as economic factors influence costs. Costs, which influence price setting, depend largely on the density of water consumption, which is directly connected to population density. Normally, costs decrease as consumption increases and vice versa (Inštitut za javne službe, 2020, pp. 5, 34; Inštitut za javne službe, 2020, pp. 46).

However, other supply factors influence the technical and technological conditions and consequently the price of the utility service and the price of network charges. These factors are: 1) the number of water supply and sewerage systems, managed by a single utility provider; 2) the complexity of the water production process or the purchase of water from other suppliers; 3) the quality of the drinking water supply; 4) water losses (which from an economic perspective means higher costs); and 5) sustainability and cost efficiency (which from an economic perspective means ensuring full cost cover of service provision) (Inštitut za javne službe, 2020, p. 52; Pevcin, 2018, p. 88).

Table 27: Municipal price confirmation of public utility

Confirmation of price upon first proposal	No of utilities	Share of utilities (%)			
Yes	13	68.42			
No	6	31.58	Possibility of negotiating	No of utilities	Share of utilities (%)
	N=19		Yes	5	83.33
			No	1	16.67
				N=6	

Source: own work

The majority of respondent public enterprises (68.4%) have their prices confirmed by the municipality already upon submission of first proposal (Table 27). The remaining part of the utilities, which do not have their prices confirmed upon submission of first proposal usually have the possibility to negotiate the price with the municipality.

In the following Tables 28–30 we verify the equality and diversity of the prices of public utility services and prices of network charges in the case of providing a public utility service to more than one municipality. And, we also verify which reasons contribute to same or different price of utility service, which is provided to multiple municipalities by the same utility provider.

Table 28: Price-setting in cases of provision to more than one municipality

Price-setting	Share of utilities (%)		
	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
Same price for utility service and same price for network charges	22.22	37.5	25
Same price for utility service, but different price for network charges	11.11	12.5	12.5
Same price for network charges, but different price for utility service	0	0	0
No, both price for utility service and price for network charges differ	66.67	50	62.5
	N=9	N=8	N=8

Source: own work

A public utility provider can provide a single utility service to more than one municipality. The results in Table 28 show that in more than 50% of cases, the price of the utility service and the price of the network charges differ between municipalities where the utility service is provided by the same utility provider.

Table 29: Reasons for different prices in provision to more than one municipality

Reasons for different prices	Different price for public utility service	Different price for network charges
	Weighted average	
Number of inhabitants of the municipality	2.69	2.69
Population density in the agglomeration	2.81	2.81
Population density	2.81	2.81
Geographical conditions	2.75	2.75
Technical and technological conditions	3.5	3.5
Strategic and negotiating conditions	3.08	3.08
Inability to agree on a single price	3.47	3.47
	N=7	N=6

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

As seen from Table 29, the difference in prices of an individual utility provider between municipalities can largely be attributed to the *technical and technological conditions surrounding the provision of a utility service* (with an average grade 3.5), closely followed by *inability to agree on a single price* (3.47). Interestingly, *population density* (2.81) does not appear as an important reason for price differentiation, even though population density should have an impact on prices from an economic point of view. The respondent utilities assessed the difference in price for public utility service as well as for network charges equally.

Table 30: Reasons for same prices in provision to more than one municipality

Reasons for same prices	Same price for public utility service	Same price for network charges
	Weighted average	
Strategic negotiating conditions	2.36	2.36
Technical and technological conditions	3.92	3.92
User satisfaction	4.19	4.19
Social equality	4.19	4.19
Simplification of charging	3.64	3.64
Revenue transfer between businesses	1.44	1.44
	N=10	N=9

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

Regardless of price differences among municipalities in more than half the analysed cases, some 28% of respondent public enterprises maintain the same price of the public utility service as well as of network charges when providing public utility service to more than one municipality. Table 30 shows that *user satisfaction* and *social equality*, both graded at 4.19, represent the most important reasons for price equality. However, *technical and technological conditions* also represent an important reason for the same prices (grade 3.92), which was also the most important reason for choosing different prices. *Simplification of charging* (graded with 3.63) is also seen among the important factors behind price equality between municipalities, which from an economic point of view can be attributed to cost efficiency.

4.1.6 Summary of findings of the reorganization process by public utility providers

The questionnaire addressed to public utility providers focused on their evaluation of the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia in the field of water and wastewater management under the adopted PPPA, where public policy makers worked to design policies that aimed at improving the efficiency of local public utilities delivery. Namely, the implementation of the Public-Private Partnership Act affected the legal status of public enterprises, where sole public ownership of those entities was prescribed. The purpose of examining the findings is to reveal the final outcome of the reorganization process, what specific institutional changes and experiences the policy brought: e.g. whether the ownership structure of public enterprises changed after the PPPA; what motivated existing public enterprises to retain full public ownership or to transform to full public ownership; what advantages and disadvantages could be seen in the reorganization of public enterprises under the PPPA; and whether the PPPA affected business efficiency and how prices were set.

Referring to RQ5: *Which experiences have the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia in the period 2007–2009 brought to the field of local public services delivery mechanisms? Which changes have been implemented, and which advantages and disadvantages has it brought?* and RQ6: *What is the current state of local public services delivery mechanisms in Slovenia?* The results of the analysis indicate that the majority of respondent public enterprises have retained their legal status of public enterprise with full public ownership, and that some public enterprises with mixed ownership have transformed into 100% publicly-owned public enterprises. Mixed public enterprises retaining mixed ownership after the new legislation transformed into commercial companies did so due to the municipality's inability to provide funds for the purchase of own shares and the lack of interest among owners and employees.

The policy also contributed to a greater share of public enterprises with more than one municipality owner. The results also indicate that the most important reasons to have full municipal ownership of a public enterprise was management problems that arose in a mixed-ownership enterprise, closely followed by simpler regulation of the service provider, greater control over the service provider, more opportunities to influence business activities, and greater rationality and efficiency of business activities. The results also indicate that the reorganization process brought many advantages, e.g. a municipality can monitor the business activities of the enterprise under the decree; the municipality has full control over the performance of public utilities providers; institutional, corporate, and governmental rights are prescribed by municipal decree; and better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community. Interestingly, respondent public enterprises do not see any essential changes in the effectiveness of their business, even if they see the new legislation as largely advantageous. Many respondent public enterprises provide an individual public utility service to more than one municipality and charge different prices between municipalities. The main reasons for these price differences consist in technical and technological conditions.

4.2 The reorganization process and municipalities

4.2.1 The reorganization process and the motives behind it

In 2006, before the implementation of the PPPA, some 66% of respondent municipalities (of the 41 respondent municipalities) already owned the local public utilities, where drinking water supply and/or sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment represented their predominant activity. Most of them already fully owned these public enterprises; more precisely, 85% of respondent municipalities (N=20) fully owned those public enterprises providing drinking water supply, 79% of respondent municipalities (N=19) fully owned the provision of urban wastewater and sewage treatment, and 63% (N=19) in providing sewage and wastewater discharges.

Table 31: Retention of or transformation into full municipal ownership after PPPA

Reorganization	Drinking water supply		Sewage and wastewater discharges		Urban wastewater and sewage treatment	
	Municipalities		Municipalities		Municipalities	
	No	Share (%)	No	Share (%)	No	Share (%)
Retention of full ownership of the existing public enterprise	21	70	18	66.67	16	66.67
Purchase of private own shares and transformation into full municipal ownership	4	13.33	2	7.41	2	8.33
No purchase of private own shares; the enterprise retained mixed ownership	1	3.33	3	11.11	0	0
Other	4	13.33	4	14.81	6	25
	N=30		N=27		N=24	

Source: own work

Referring to the facts on municipal ownership presented above, the reorganization process of public enterprises, which began in 2007, simply meant in the majority of cases the retention of full ownership of the existing public enterprises. Table 31 shows that in the provision of drinking water supply, 70% of respondent municipalities have retained full ownership; similarly, 67% of respondent municipalities have retained full ownership in the provision of sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment.

Around 13% of municipalities have bought private own shares and transformed into full municipal ownership in the provision of drinking water supply; slightly less (roughly 7%)

of municipalities transformed into full municipal ownership in the provision of sewage and wastewater discharges, and around 8% of respondent municipalities transformed their ownership into public ownership in the provision of urban wastewater and sewage treatment. Only a small percentage of respondent municipalities have not bought up private own shares, thus those enterprises retained mixed ownership. Other factors prevented transformation into full municipal ownership, e.g. the enterprise retained private ownership, the provision of public utilities is organized in-house, or is under a concession.

Table 32: Motives to retain or transform into full municipal ownership

Motivating factor	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
	Weighted average		
To avoid public tenders for concessions	2.73	2.93	3.13
To use in-house orders	3.27	3.36	3.4
Easier to obtain EU funds	2.73	2.93	2.87
To prevent employee dismissal	2.33	2.57	2.67
Greater control over the provider	4.2	4.14	3.73
Simpler regulation of the provider	4	4.14	3.6
More possibilities to influence business operations	3.6	3.71	4
Greater rationality and efficiency of business	3.53	3.71	3.87
Bad experience with a private provider with a share in the ownership	2.73	2.5	2.67
Small scale of activities	2.14	2.57	2.6
N=15			

Note: A Likert scale 1 – 5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

Municipalities that have retained full ownership and have transformed public enterprises into full municipal ownership have provided the following motives for such, as shown in the Table 32. The greatest motivating factors are *greater control over the provider*, *simpler regulation of the provider*, *more influence over the business*, and *greater rationalisation and efficiency of business*.

Respondent municipalities provided additional information: in cases where they did not purchase own shares (when the enterprise retained mixed ownership), they took such decision due to a lack of interest on the part of the owners to sell their shares. They also indicated that there was no interest in or plan that these municipalities would redeem their private capital and transfer it into public ownership.

4.2.2 Relationship between owner and manager of public infrastructure

As previously mentioned, the PPPA also affected the ownership of public infrastructure. Below we present these changes from a municipal point of view and compare the state of ownership of public infrastructure before and after the PPPA.

Table 33: Changes in ownership of public infrastructure

Ownership of public infrastructure	Share of municipalities (%)					
	Drinking water supply		Sewage and wastewater discharges		Urban wastewater and sewage treatment	
	Before PPPA	After PPPA	Before PPPA	After PPPA	Before PPPA	After PPPA
Full public enterprise ownership	31.43	11.11	28.13	14.81	25.81	22.22
Mixed ownership	14.29	0	9.38	0	3.26	0
Full municipal ownership	45.71	88.89	53.13	85.19	58.06	77.78
	N=35	N=27	N=32	N=27	N=31	N=27

Source: own work

Table 33 shows that before the PPPA, full municipal ownership of public infrastructure was found in almost 46% of cases for drinking water supply, in around 53% cases for sewage and wastewater discharges, and in 58% cases for urban wastewater and sewage treatment. The majority of the remainder opted for full public enterprise ownership, while a very small share opted for mixed ownership. After the PPPA, full municipal ownership of public infrastructure almost doubled, to 89% for drinking water supply, 85% for sewage and wastewater discharges, and 78% for urban wastewater and sewage treatment. After the PPPA went into force no mixed ownership of public infrastructure remained, and full public enterprise ownership decreased.

Only a small share of public utility providers fully owned the public infrastructure; this is consistent with the findings about the relationship between the public infrastructure owner and the infrastructure manager after the PPPA, presented in the following Table 34.

Table 34: Relationship between owner and manager of infrastructure after PPPA

Relationship between owner and manager of public infrastructure	Share of municipalities (%)		
	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
Transfer of public infrastructure to ownership of public utility provider	3.70	3.85	7.69
Transfer of public infrastructure to financial lease of public utility provider	7.41	7.69	7.69
Transfer of public infrastructure to business lease of public utility provider	81.48	76.92	69.23
Other	7.4	11.54	15.38
	N=27	N=26	N=26

Source: own work

As seen in Table 34, less than a mere 4% of respondent municipalities have transferred public infrastructure into the ownership of the public utility provider for drinking water supply and for sewage and wastewater discharges; and less than 8% have done so for urban wastewater and sewage treatment. Most of the respondent municipalities have transferred the public infrastructure into a business lease at the public utility provider (81.5% for drinking water supply, 77% for sewage and wastewater discharges, and 69% for urban wastewater and sewage treatment). Among the answers for »other« were in-house provision and management of public infrastructure, concession-based management, and management contract based on the constitutive act.

The respondent municipalities also indicated that the majority (89% for drinking water supply, 78% for sewage and wastewater discharges, and 70% for urban wastewater and sewage treatment) charge a rent for the use of public infrastructure. In the opposite scenario, municipalities use in-house provision or provide public utilities under concession. In most cases (70–75% of municipalities) the amount of the rent is set on the basis of the total amount of the depreciation.

4.2.3 Positive and negative aspects of the reorganization process

The respondent municipalities also expressed the advantages and disadvantages of the reorganization process under the PPPA. Of the 20 respondent municipalities, only 12 municipalities actually expressed an opinion and agreement on the advantages and disadvantages. Among the remaining 8 municipalities, 6 answered that they did not go through the reorganization process, and 2 answered that they were not able to provide an assessment.

Table 35: Advantages of the reorganization process for municipalities

Advantage	Weighted average
Better organization of work	3.75
Developing expertise and increasing the quality of the utility	3.75
Municipality monitors the business of the enterprise under the decree	3.58
Easier to obtain European funds	3.58
Better use of labour and capital	3.5
Lower labour costs	3.5
Better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community	3.5
Institutional, corporate, and governmental rights are prescribed by municipal decree	3.42
Better job performance	3.36
Lower costs for utility provision / Lower transaction costs	3.33
Lower costs for utility provision due to joint provision of utility (bundled services)	3.25
Total profit from a public enterprise is transferred to the budget and devoted to investment in infrastructure	3.17
Municipality has full control over the performance of utility provider	3.08
Acquisition of additional municipal financial sources	2.92
N=12	

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

As seen from Table 35, municipalities see the biggest advantage of the reorganization process in *better organization of work* and in *developing expertise and improving the quality of utility provision*, followed by the *municipality monitors the business of the enterprise according to the decree* and *easier to obtain European funds*. Also, *better use of labour and capital*, *lower labour costs*, and *better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community* were listed as advantages.

On the other hand, disadvantages are also seen but are not particularly significant, as the weighted average only moves around the 2-mark, as seen from the following Table 36. This may indicate that municipalities, as owners of public enterprises, see more advantages in the reorganization process. We can point to the *arrangement of a concession relationship requires regulations from many legal acts* as the biggest issue, followed by *higher price of public utility* and *regulatory pricing policy*.

Table 36: Disadvantages of the reorganization process for municipalities

Disadvantage	Weighted average
The arrangement of a concession relationship requires the regulation of many legal acts	2.5
Higher public utility prices	2.44
Regulatory pricing policy	2.44
Lack of municipal experience in providing control over the concession (for maintaining the high quality of service, and maintaining/increasing the value of the property for municipality at justifiable service prices)	2.4
The municipality does not have control over the concessionaire through founding and corporate rights	2.3
Higher transaction costs due to public tenders for concessions	2
Higher transaction costs for municipality - controlling the concessionaire	2
Poorer quality of public utility	1.9
N=12	

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

Even though, *higher transaction costs due to public tenders for concessions* and *higher transaction costs due to controlling the concessionaire* present minor disadvantages for municipalities, the following section (4.2.4) presents that municipalities award concessions only in smaller extent.

4.2.4 Awarding concessions to public utility providers

As already stated in section 2.3, the concessionaire may be chosen on the basis of a public tender; however, if the organizational and economic dependence for an in-house relationship between the public enterprise and the founder (municipality) conditions are met, the concession may also be granted directly, without a public tender.

According to our research (the following Table 37), the majority of respondent municipalities (around 80%) do not award concessions for any of the public utility services analysed. Around 11% of respondent municipalities award concessions with a public tender for drinking water supply and for urban wastewater and sewage treatment, and around 15% municipalities award concessions with a public tender for sewage and wastewater discharges. Only some 8% of respondent municipalities award concessions without a public tender.

Table 37: Awarding a concession for public utility provision

Awarding concessions	Share of municipalities (%)		
	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
Yes, concessions with public tender	11.11	15.38	11.54
Yes, concessions without public tender (a public enterprise has no shares in private legal entities)	7.41	7.69	7.69
Both, concessions with public tender, as well as concessions without public tender	0	0	0
No awarded concession	81.48	76.92	80.77
	N=27	N=26	N=26

Source: own work

Much like the above results summarising the awarding of concessions in general, the majority of respondent municipalities (almost 90%) have not yet awarded a horizontal concession, as seen in the following Table 38. In a few cases, municipalities have awarded a horizontal concession, and there the conditions of the municipality(-ies) (as founders of the involved public enterprises) are taken into account.

Table 38: Involvement in awarding a horizontal concession

Awarding horizontal concessions	Share of municipalities (%)		
	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
Yes	14.81	11.11	11.11
No	85.19	88.89	88.89
N=27			

Source: own work

Most of the respondent municipalities have not yet been involved in awarding a joint concession with one or more municipalities in the field of water and wastewater management, too. Table 39 shows that only 15% of respondent municipalities have been involved in awarding a joint concession for drinking water supply, only 7.5% of municipalities for urban wastewater and sewage treatment, and only 3.7% of municipalities for sewage and wastewater discharges. At this point, more incentives should be created to promote and take advantage of the benefits of joint concession, rather than each municipality awarding its own concession. Naturally, a thorough analysis should first be performed

between municipalities to determine those factors that would improve the cost efficiency and effectiveness of such joint concession in order to justify such cooperation.

Table 39: Involvement in awarding a joint concession

Awarding joint concessions	Share of municipalities (%)		
	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
No	85.19	96.30	92.59
Yes	14.81	3.70	7.41
N=27			

Source: own work

Those respondent municipalities that have already been involved in awarding a joint concession have in most cases (as seen in Table 39: 3 respondent municipalities in the field of drinking water supply, 1 respondent in the field of sewage and wastewater discharges, and 2 respondents in the field of urban wastewater and sewage treatment) established a joint public enterprise⁶, and in one case (in the field of drinking water supply) have established a joint municipal administration body⁷. The respondent municipalities also indicated that most decide to award joint concessions on the basis of a geographically well-rounded distribution area, and not, surprisingly, owing to the lower costs involved. Apparently, cost-efficiency based on a geographically rounded distribution area outweighs other factors related to lower costs (e.g. lower cost of providing commercial public utilities due to economies of scale, lower cost of awarding and monitoring concessions (cost sharing) etc.). Interestingly, the respondent municipalities do not see many opportunities for awarding joint concessions in the future. Only 1 of 26 respondent municipalities see the possibility of an inter-municipal network that would be built/renovated with the help of cohesion grants.

4.2.5 Advantages and disadvantages of inter-municipal cooperation

IMC can bring many advantages to cooperating municipalities and their inhabitants. The purpose of cooperation is to increase efficiency through joint projects and tasks that an individual municipality could not perform on its own. As seen in the previous section (4.2.4), two or more municipalities can establish a joint public enterprise or award a joint concession with an aim to achieve more cost-effective and efficient provision of utility services.

⁶ A joint public enterprise is an enterprise established by two or more municipalities. The right to regulate a public utility by a general act still remains with the individual municipality and therefore, public utilities can be provided under a different regime in an individual municipality (Pirnat, 2013, p. 14).

⁷ Collaborative municipalities can, by a decree, establish one or more bodies of joint municipal administration, which must act as a body of the municipality to which territorial jurisdiction the matter falls (Inštitut za javne službe, 2016, p. 5–7).

Table 40: Advantages of IMC

Advantage	Weighted average
Transfer and exchange of knowledge, experience, good/bad practices	4
Advantages due to the size of municipality (smaller municipalities)	3.87
Achieving greater professionalism in the provision of utilities	3.78
Exploiting economies of scale	3.74
Lower price of utilities for end users	3.74
Joint management of infrastructure	3.74
Higher quality utility services	3.7
Easier access to external sources of funding	3.61
Less pressure on budget funds	3.39
Lower transaction costs	3.36
N=23	

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

Among the advantages listed in Table 40, respondent municipalities find the greatest advantages of IMC in *the transfer and exchange of knowledge, experience, good and bad practices, achieving advantages due to the size of the municipality (smaller municipalities)* and *achieving greater professionalism in the provision of utilities*. We also find references in literature to the positive effect of knowledge transfer in cooperation; e.g. Gil (2016, p. 7) states that knowledge sharing represents a positive mechanism for policymakers to take quick decisions in today's changing socio-political environment. However, the advantages pointed to revolve around more efficient and effective provision of public utility services, and on the other hand to consequent lower prices and higher quality utility services for end users.

However, IMC also has its disadvantages. The most common disadvantages are listed in the following Table 41. The respondent municipalities see the biggest disadvantages in *difficulties in reaching consensus among participants, complexity of joint governance, and lack of trust among participating municipalities*. Other empirical studies provide similar evidence of difficulties arising out a lack of inter-personal relationships, disputes, and lack of trust, but these more as a consequence of lack of legal knowledge, skills, and inexperience (Klimovský, Mejere, Mikolaityte, Pinterič & Saparniene, 2014, p. 654; Leca, 2014, p. 219; Wiberg & Limani, 2015, pp. 67–68). However, in our research lack of legal knowledge and inexperience are not seen as the biggest disadvantages of IMC.

Table 41: Disadvantages of IMC

Disadvantage	Weighted Average
Difficulties in reaching consensus among participants	3.67
Complexity of joint governance	3.33
Lack of trust among participating municipalities	3.33
Regional questions	3.14
Difficulties in defining responsibilities	3.1
Disputes between municipal officials	2.9
Lack of experience in cooperation	2.9
Lack of transparency	2.81
Lack of legal knowledge	2.76
Lack of professionalism in joint service management	2.48
N=21	

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

To conclude, our research results point to the fact that IMC in certain circumstances (e.g. smaller municipalities) brings more advantages over disadvantages and such efficient provision of public utility services can affect also on lower prices for their end users.

4.2.6 Public utility provision and its price-setting

As already stated in section 4.1.5, authority for price-setting was transferred to the municipal level in 2013 (MEDO Regulation). Therefore, we asked municipalities about their ability to negotiate and confirm prices as proposed by the public utility providers.

Table 42: Municipal confirmation of public utility price

Confirmation of price upon first proposal	Share of municipalities (%)		
Yes	65		
No	35	Possibility of negotiating	Share of municipalities (%)
	N=20	Yes	85.71
		No	14.29
			N=7

Source: own work

As seen from Table 42, 65% of respondent municipalities confirm the acceptance and non-negotiability of prices set by the provider. The remaining 35% of municipalities allow for the possibility of negotiating with the public utility provider.

Table 43: Price-setting in cases of more than one public utility provider

Price-setting	Share of municipalities (%)		
	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
Yes, same price for utility service and same price for network charges	64.29	78.57	76.92
Same price for utility service, but a different price for network charges	7.14	0	0
Same price for network charges, but different price for utility service	0	0	0
No, the price for utility and the price for network charges differ	28.57	21.43	23.08
	N=14	N=14	N=13

Source: own work

A municipality can have more than just a single utility provider. And the price of public utilities in the majority of respondent municipalities do not differ among the providers. As seen from Table 43, around 64% of municipalities have the same price for drinking water supply and the same price for network charges. The share of respondent municipalities using the same pricing policy is even higher for sewage and wastewater discharges and for urban wastewater and sewage treatment, where the share is almost 80%. On the other hand, the price for drinking water supply and the price for network charges differ in almost 29% of respondent municipalities and in around 22% of cases in the other two public utilities services analysed. These results show that not only do prices differ between municipalities, but they also differ in a single municipality, when there is more than just a single public utility provider.

The study has detected some potential reasons for setting the same price for public utility service and/or the same price for network charges in cases when a municipality has more than one public utility provider. The following Table 44 shows that 8 respondent municipalities (a total of 12 municipalities responded to these questions, but 4 have only one public utility provider and therefore are not applicable) recognize *social equality* as the most important reason for setting the same price for public utility service. Similarly, social equality is one of the most important reasons for setting the same price for network charges – that in addition to assuring user satisfaction and promoting simplification of charging schemes.

Table 44: Reasons for same prices in cases of more than one public utility provider

Reasons for same prices	Same price for public utility service	Same price for network charges
	Weighted average	
Social equality	4.25	3.67
User satisfaction	3.5	3.67
Simplification of charging	2.88	3.67
Internal subsidies (revenue transfer between businesses)	2.5	3
N=8		

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

However, as already stated, municipalities can set different prices for public utility service and network charges in cases where there are more than one public utility provider. Our research checks whether price differentiation depends on costs of provision, granted subsidy, capacities and technology or negotiating power.

Table 45: Reasons for different prices in cases of more than one public utility provider

Reasons for different prices	Different price for public utility service	Different price for network charges
	Weighted average	
Differences in the cost of providing commercial public utilities	4	3
Granted subsidy	3.5	4
Unused capacities	3	3
Inappropriate technology	3.5	3
Negotiating power of commercial public utilities	3.33	2
N=5		

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

As seen in Table 45, the most common reason for setting different prices for public utility service lies in *differences in the cost of providing public utilities*; and the reason for setting different prices for network charges is *granted subsidy*. This is consistent with the cost

complexity affecting the price of public utility service already outlined in section 4.1.5. Technical and technological factors, and economic factors influence costs, and the differences in these factors among municipalities give rise to differences in prices.

Table 46: Subsidizing of prices for public utility service

Subsidizing options	Share of municipalities (%)		
	Drinking water supply	Sewage and wastewater discharges	Urban wastewater and sewage treatment
We subsidize both the cost of utility service and the cost of network charges	14.29	20.00	14.29
We subsidize the cost of utility service, but not of network charges	0	0	0
We subsidize the cost of network charges, but not of utility service	23.81	35	42.86
We do not subsidize either the cost of utility service nor of network charges	61.9	40	38.1
	N=21	N=20	N=21

Source: own work

A municipality can subsidize the cost of public utility service and/or the cost of network charges (MEDO Regulation, 2012, article 15). The results of our analysis (Table 46) show that around 40% of respondent municipalities either subsidize the cost of network charges but not the cost of utility service, or they do not subsidize either the cost of utility service nor the cost of network charges for sewage and wastewater discharges nor for urban wastewater and sewage treatment. In the case of drinking water supply, around 24% of respondent municipality subsidize the cost of network charges, but not the cost of utility service, and around 62% of respondent municipalities do not subsidize either the cost of utility service nor the cost of network charges.

4.2.7 Summary of findings of the reorganization process from a municipal point of view

The questionnaire addressed to municipalities was focused on the evaluation of the final outcomes of the reorganization of existing public enterprises in Slovenia in the field of water and wastewater management under the PPPA. This was done in order to compare the similarities and possible differences identified in the reorganization process from each side – from the municipalities as owners (principals) and the public utilities providers as managers (agents). In particular, what motivated municipalities to buy private own shares in order to transform the existing public enterprises into full public ownership, or to retain full public ownership; what advantages and disadvantages of the reorganization process did the municipal side identify; did the PPPA affect the public tendering process for concessions and, related to that (especially joint concessions), what are the advantages and disadvantages

of IMC; and last but not least, how is the price setting of public utilities arranged in the eyes of the municipalities.

Referring to RQ6: *What is the current state of local public services delivery mechanisms in Slovenia?* The results of the municipal analysis indicate that the majority of the respondent municipalities retained full municipal ownership in existing public enterprises. Referring to the first part of RQ7: *What are the experiences with the provision of local public services in municipalities that bought shares in public enterprises back from private individuals*, and what are the experiences with awarding concessions in cases when private individuals still hold shares in public enterprises in Slovenia? The results include examples where municipalities bought up privately held shares and transformed the enterprise into a sole public enterprise. However, there were some exceptions where municipalities did not buy up private shares, largely as the result of owners unwilling to sell their shares.

Referring to the second part of RQ5: Which experiences have the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia in the period 2007–2009 brought to the field of local public services delivery mechanisms? *Which changes have been implemented and which advantages and disadvantages has it brought?* Municipalities see the biggest advantage of the reorganization process in better organization of work, in developing expertise and improving the quality of utility provision. On the other hand, the disadvantages were not particularly pronounced, pointing to the fact that the arrangement of a concession relationship requires the regulation of many legal acts as the biggest disadvantage.

Referring to the second part of RQ7: What are the experiences with the provision of local public services in municipalities that bought shares in public enterprises back from private individuals, and *what are the experiences with awarding concessions in cases when private individuals still hold shares in public enterprises in Slovenia?* and to RQ8: *To what extent does the current state of local public services delivery in Slovenia enable the adoption of inter-municipal cooperation as a delivery mechanism?* Obviously, the aforementioned disadvantage could be the reason for low participation rates in awarding concessions. Most of the respondent municipalities have not yet awarded a single concession. Nevertheless, referring to RQ10: *Which good practices regarding local public services delivery can be identified in Slovenia?* There are a number of examples of joint concessions, where in most cases the cooperation is designed in the form of a joint public enterprise. The initiative to award a joint concession was largely due to the geographically rounded distribution area of the municipality. The respondent municipalities do not see many opportunities for awarding a joint concession in the future, but they do, however, see many advantages in inter-municipal cooperation.

Referring to RQ9: *Does inter-municipal cooperation present the most appropriate delivery mechanism for Slovenian local public services? Under which conditions is this delivery mechanism the most appropriate?* The biggest advantages of IMC are seen in the transfer and exchange of knowledge, experience, and good and bad practices; achieving advantages

due to the size of municipalities (smaller municipalities) and achieving greater professionalism in the provision of utilities. Naturally, certain disadvantages are also identified. The respondent municipalities see the biggest disadvantages in difficulties in reaching consensus among participants; the complex nature of joint management; and lack of trust among participating municipalities. Here, a seemingly simple solution is available in the form of a written agreement, which can prevent misunderstandings among cooperating municipalities that could otherwise complicate or threaten their cooperation.

Consensus among stakeholders is also required when it comes to setting prices for public utility services. More than half the municipalities confirm the first price proposal from the public utility provider. The rest of the municipalities allow for the possibility of negotiating with the public utility provider. As many of the respondent municipalities have more than one provider for an individual public utility service, prices between these providers differ; consequently, prices for a single public utility service inside an individual municipality can also differ. Different prices are usually the result of differences in the cost of providing public utility services; and subsidies often account for variations in prices charged for network charges.

4.3 Comparative analysis of public utility providers and municipalities

4.3.1 Comparison of outcomes of the reorganization process

The results of both surveys provided us with insight into the reorganization process and its outcomes, both from the public utility provider's (public enterprise) perspective and from the municipal perspective, where the municipality is the principal, and the public enterprise is the agent. In order to confirm the key results from both perspectives a comparative analysis is performed to produce some final conclusions. As we presented in the methodological part, in section 3.2.1, the structure of the questionnaires is very similar, which makes comparison of the most important results possible. The comparative analysis, on the one hand, encompass the basic results related to the retention or transformation of existing public enterprises into full public ownership, and coincident with that also those results related to ownership of the public infrastructure, as well as the relationship between the infrastructure owner and infrastructure manager after the reorganization process. On the other hand, the analysis presents a comparison of motivating factors for full municipal ownership of public enterprises and the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the reorganization process.

A comparison of the ownership structure of public enterprises in 2006 (before the implementation of the PPPA) yields very similar results, both on the side of public enterprises as well as on the side of municipalities.

Table 47: Comparison of ownership of public enterprises before PPPA

Ownership	Share of utilities (%)	Share of municipalities (%)
Full municipal ownership	78.26	75.67
Mixed ownership	21.74	24.33
	N=23	N=20

Source: own work

As seen from Table 47, more than 75% of existing public enterprises, where a selected public utility service (drinking water supply and/or sewage and wastewater discharges and urban wastewater and sewage treatment) represented a predominant provision activity, were already fully municipally owned, even before the implementation of the PPPA.

Table 48: Comparison of reorganization outcomes

Reorganization	Share of utilities (%)	Share of municipalities (%)
Retention of full municipal ownership	85.71	67.78
Transformation into full municipal ownership	9.52	9.69
	N=21	N=30

Source: own work

Table 48 shows highly similar results on transformation into full public ownership, where both public enterprises and municipalities indicated that less than 10% of existing public enterprises have transformed into full public ownership. Most of existing public enterprises have retained full public ownership. However, at this point we find a difference between the responses. The share of total responses is smaller on the municipalities side, which can be explained by the individual indications of municipalities under the answer section »other«. These indications show that the difference arises out of the few examples of in-house provision and concession-based provision. In cases when the municipality did not buy the private shares, the enterprise retained mixed ownership. The respondent public enterprises explained that the municipalities chose not to buy up the shares when they were unable to raise the funds necessary for the purchase. The respondent municipalities also highlighted the fact that there was no interest on the owner side to sell their shares.

Table 49: Comparison of ownership of public infrastructure

Ownership	Share of utilities (%)		Share of municipalities (%)	
	Before PPPA	After PPPA	Before PPPA	After PPPA
Full public enterprise ownership	45.45	0	28.46	16.05
Mixed ownership	0	0	8.98	0
Full municipal ownership	54.55	100	52.3	83.95
	N=22	N=20	N=35	N=27

Source: own work

In line with the directions of the PPPA, public infrastructure too came under municipal ownership. As seen from Table 49, before the PPPA (in 2006) more than 50% of public infrastructure was already fully held by municipalities. After the PPPA, the majority of the respondent municipalities (84%) and all the respondent public enterprises confirmed full municipal ownership of public infrastructure.

Table 50: Comparison of relationship between owner and manager of infrastructure

Relationship between infrastructure owner and infrastructure manager after PPPA	Share of utilities (%)	Share of municipalities (%)
Transfer of public infrastructure into ownership of public utility provider	5.77	5.08
Transfer of public infrastructure into financial lease of public utility provider	15.47	7.60
Transfer of public infrastructure into business lease of public utility provider	78.76	75.88
	N=20	N=27

Source: own work

Table 50 shows that in most cases (more than 75%), the relationship between the infrastructure owner (municipality) and the infrastructure manager (public utility provider) was settled with the transfer of public infrastructure into a business lease at a public utility provider. A deviation in the responses between public enterprises and municipalities is seen in the transfer of public infrastructure into financial lease, where the share of respondent municipalities is less than half that of the utilities. Again, we can explain this deviation with the responses of the respondent municipalities that use in-house provision and concession-based provision of public utility services.

4.3.2 Comparison of motives, advantages, and disadvantages of the reorganization process

Municipalities and public enterprises opted to retain or transform existing public enterprises into public enterprises with full municipal ownership as the result of various factors, regardless of any directions in the PPPA. Nine motivating factors were checked with public enterprises as well as with municipalities.

Table 51: Comparison of motives behind full municipal ownership

Motivating factor	Utilities	Municipalities
	Weighted average	
Management problems in enterprise with mixed ownership / Bad experience with a private provider with a share in ownership	4.3	2.63
Simpler regulation of the provider	4.0	3.91
Greater control over the provider	3.95	4.02
More possibilities to influence business operations	3.8	3.77
Greater rationality and efficiency of business	3.8	3.7
To use in-house orders	2.9	3.34
Easier to obtain EU funds	2.6	2.84
Avoid public tenders for concessions	2.45	2.93
To prevent employee dismissal	2.15	2.52
	N=20	N=15

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

Table 51 shows that both public enterprises and municipalities rank (around 4) *simpler regulation of the provider* and *greater control over the provider* highly. There is a slight disparity in the results for *using in-house orders* and *avoiding public tenders for concessions*, where these factors are ranked higher by municipalities than by public enterprises. Municipalities also give more importance to factors like *easier to obtain EU funds* and *ability to prevent employee dismissal*. However, one factor is formulated differently for public enterprises and for municipalities, but whose meaning is similar. On one hand, this factor presents *management problems in an enterprise with mixed ownership* for public enterprises, which is ranked as the most important motivating factor (4.3). On the other hand, municipalities do not find *bad experience with a private provider with a share in ownership* an important factor (2.63).

Table 52: Involvement in a horizontal concession

Horizontal concession	Share of utilities (%)	Share of municipalities (%)
Yes	20	12.34
No	80	87.66
	N=20	N=27

Source: own work

As per motivating factor *avoiding public tenders for concessions*, both municipalities and public enterprises were also asked about involvement in horizontal concessions. Table 52 shows that the majority of respondent utilities (80%) and municipalities (88%) have not yet been involved or have not yet awarded a horizontal concession for those services analysed, indicating that this might be the reason for not recognizing the *avoiding of public tenders for concessions* as one of the important motivating factors of the reorganization process.

Table 53: Comparison of advantages of the reorganization process

Advantage	Utilities	Municipalities
	Weighted average	
Municipality monitors the business of the enterprise under the decree	4.06	3.58
The municipality has full control over the performance of utility provider	3.63	3.08
Institutional, corporate, and government rights are prescribed by a municipal decree	3.5	3.42
Better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community	3.44	3.5
Developing expertise and increasing quality of the utility	3.13	3.75
Better use of labour and capital	2.75	3.5
Better job performance	2.63	3.36
Better organization of work	2.63	3.75
Lower costs of service provision / Lower transaction costs	2.5	3.33
Access to additional municipal financial sources	2.5	2.92
Easier to obtain European funds	2.44	3.58
Lower labour costs	2.31	3.5
Total profit from a public enterprise is transferred to the budget and devoted to investment in infrastructure	2.31	3.17
	N=16	N=12

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

We find some differences between public enterprises and municipalities on the advantages of the reorganization process, as seen in the Table 53. Public enterprises find the greatest advantages in *monitoring the business of the enterprise by municipality under the decree* (4.06) and in *fully controlling the performance of public utility by municipality* (3.63). This is also among the most important motivating factors, as seen in Table 51. The municipalities, however, give more importance to *developing expertise* and *improving the quality of the utility's services* (3.75) and to *better organization of work* (3.75). Surprisingly, public enterprises do not find such great advantages in *lower costs of utility's provision* (2.5) or in *lower labour costs* (2.31), regardless of their choosing *greater rationality and efficiency of business* (3.8) as a rather important motivating factor, as seen in Table 51. Municipalities also find important advantages in *easier to obtain EU funds*, *better use of labour and capital*, and *better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community*, whereas public enterprises ranked these lower, indicating that these advantages are not as important to public utilities providers as they are to municipalities as principals.

Table 54: Comparison of disadvantages of the reorganization process

Disadvantage	Utilities	Municipalities
	Weighted average	
The arrangement of a concession relationship requires the regulation of many legal acts	3.75	2.5
Regulatory pricing policy	3.5	2.44
The municipality does not have control over the concessionaire through founding and corporate rights	3.0	2.3
Lack of municipal experience in providing control over the concession (for maintaining the high quality of service, and maintaining/increasing the value of the property for the municipality at justifiable service prices)	3.0	2.4
Higher transaction costs due to public tenders for concessions	2.75	2
Higher transaction costs for the municipality - controlling the concessionaire	2.75	2
Higher public utility prices	2.5	2.44
Poorer quality of public utility	2.5	1.9
	N=13	N=12

Note: A Likert scale 1–5 was used: 1 – I totally disagree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I neither agree nor disagree, 4 – I agree, 5 – I totally agree.

Source: own work

The disadvantages listed in Table 54 did not turn out not to be particularly important factors in the reorganization process, as municipalities ranked all the of the disadvantages listed below the middle grade of 3, and public enterprises also ranked half of the listed disadvantages below 3. Therefore, public enterprises see more disadvantages in the

reorganisation process, with the biggest disadvantages *the arrangement of a concession relationship requires the regulation of many legal acts* (3.75) and *regulatory pricing policy* (3.5). An important fact is that both public enterprises and municipalities believe that the quality of public utilities did not deteriorate and the prices of public utilities did not rise due to the reorganization process. Municipalities also do not see as particular disadvantages *higher transaction costs due to public tenders for concessions* (2.0) and *due to controlling the concessionaire* (2.0). This also confirms the results for motivating factors (Table 51), where avoiding public tenders for concessions was not ranked as an important motivating factor.

4.3.3 Comparison of price-setting for public utilities

Regulatory pricing policy is listed among the disadvantages of the reorganization process, as seen in the previous section (4.3.2) in Table 54, and which is seen as a greater disadvantage for public enterprises than for municipalities. Therefore, below we compare price setting scenarios in order to determine whether prices for an individual utility service differ within a single municipality, as well as between municipalities.

Table 55: Comparison of municipal confirmation of price of public utility

Confirmation of price upon first proposal	Share of utilities (%)	Share of municipalities (%)			
Yes	68.42	65.00			
No	31.58	35.00	Possibility of negotiating	Share of utilities (%)	Share of municipalities (%)
	N=19	N=19	Yes	83.33	85.71
			No	16.67	14.29
				N=6	N=7

Source: own work

As seen from Table 55, more than half (around 65%) of respondent public enterprises and municipalities affirmed that the price of a public utility service is already confirmed by the municipality upon the first proposal by a public enterprise. However, in most cases when the price is not confirmed upon first proposal, the municipalities offer to negotiate. This was affirmed by around 85% of respondent public enterprises and municipalities.

Table 56: Differences in prices between municipalities and inside a municipality

Price-setting	Share of utilities providing individual utility service for more than one municipality (%)	Share of municipalities having more than one public utility provider for an individual utility service (%)
Same price for utility service and same price for network charges	22.22	64.29
Same price for utility service, but different price for network charges	11.11	7.14
Same price for network charges, but different price for utility service	0	0
Both price for utility service and price for network charges differ	66.67	28.57
	N=9	N=14

Source: own work

Table 56 shows that almost two-thirds of respondent public enterprises charge different prices (for the utility service as well as for network charges) when providing an individual public utility service for different municipalities. On the other hand, 64% of respondent municipalities that have more than one public utility provider for an individual utility service charge the same prices inside the municipality. It can be assumed that equal prices are set (regardless of different utility providers) in order to ensure user satisfaction and social equality, which are among the highest ranked reasons for setting the same prices. This is presented in sections 4.1.5 (Table 30) and 4.2.6 (Table 44).

4.3.4 Summary of findings of the comparative analysis

As already seen from the analysis of the public utility providers and municipalities, the majority of existing public enterprises have retained full public ownership, while only a small share of existing public enterprises with mixed ownership have transformed into full public ownership. Both public enterprises and municipalities confirmed full municipal ownership of public infrastructure as well. In most cases, the relationship between the infrastructure owner (municipality) and the infrastructure manager (public utility provider) is arranged through a business lease to the public utility provider.

Among the motivating factors for full municipal ownership were simpler regulation of the provider and greater control over the provider, for public enterprises as well as for municipalities. However, differences are seen among the advantages of the reorganization process. Monitoring the business of the enterprise by a municipality under the decree, and full control of the public utility's performance by a municipality are seen as the most important advantages for public enterprises; on the other hand, municipalities find the most important advantages in developing expertise, in improving the quality of the service

provided, and in better organization of work. Arranging concession relationships requires the regulation of many legal acts, and regulatory pricing policies are seen as the biggest disadvantages connected with the reorganization process, for both public enterprises and municipalities.

The price of a public utility is usually confirmed by a municipality already upon first proposal by the public enterprise. Public enterprises usually charge different prices when providing a public utility for different municipalities. Municipalities, however, deal with different prices when they have more than one public utility provider for an individual utility service.

4.4 Discussion on the reorganization process of public enterprises

The reorganization process of public enterprises in Slovenia influenced on increase of full public ownership in local public utility services provision in the field of water and wastewater management examined herein. Said full municipal ownership has increased by about 10%, as the majority of public enterprises were already fully municipally owned even before the implementation of the PPPA, i.e. before the reorganization process. The relationship between municipalities and the public enterprises that were created as a result of the reorganization process is a classic example of the principal-agent relationship in the context of corporate governance in the public sector.

Corporate governance is on the one hand defined first from the point of view of the private sector (Blidisel, 2013; Branston, Cowling & Sugden, 2006; Hirigoyen & Laouer, 2013; OECD, 2015; Rezart, 2013; Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča, 2019), which is presented as a relationship between all involved stakeholders, and as a mechanism by which the owner of the organization governs and regulates the manager's activities. From the public sector point of view (Choudhury & Petrin, 2018; Ferry & Ahrens, 2017; Papachristou & Papachristou, 2014; Papenfuß, van Genugten, de Kruijf & van Thiel, 2018), corporate governance is seen as a framework for controlling, monitoring, and managing publicly owned entities, with the aim of satisfying stakeholders and improving the functioning of the public organization, as well as pursuing the public interest. From this we can see that the concept of corporate governance is very similar in both sectors, with the only distinction revolving around the fact that in the public sector, the corporate governance mechanisms have to observe or be consistent with certain public goals. Our research addresses and is based on certain elements of corporate governance in the public sector, as the stakeholders here are municipalities and public utility providers (e.g. public enterprises) in the field of water and wastewater management. The goals of water and wastewater management are publicly oriented, and are aimed at serving the needs of the local population, while at the same time it aims to operate efficiently, i.e. achieve allocative efficiency as well as technical and production efficiency (Blidisel, 2013; Lin, Ma & Su, 2009; Locke & Duppati, 2014; Munteanu, Grigorescu, Condrea & Pelinescu, 2020; Romano, Salvati & Guerrini, 2018).

On the other hand, if we take into consideration the principal-agent relationship as the basis of corporate governance theory, again we find explicit connections to our research. The principal-agent relationship, defined as a contracting relationship in which one side (principal) engages another side (agent) to perform certain tasks on its behalf (Gumanti, Nastiti & Lestari, 2016; Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014; Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča, 2019). In our research it is defined as a relationship between municipalities, as the principals (the founders and sole owners of public enterprises) and public enterprises, as the agents (public utility providers and managers). With the implementation of the PPPA, the relationship between municipalities and public utility providers has become clear (Brezovnik, 2009; Kocbek, 2011; Trpin, 2007).

Municipalities are sole owners of public enterprises and therefore the only principal in the relationship. However, as seen from the results of our research, the ownership of an individual public enterprise can be divided among more than just one municipality. In such cases the public enterprise has more than one principal. Similarly, when a municipality has more than one public utility provider for the same utility, it has multiple agents. Plurality of stakeholders is therefore typical for the public sector and leads to difficulties in coordination and control, and to corporate inefficiency (Gumanti, Nastiti & Lestari, 2016; Horan & Mulreany, 2020; Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014). Multiple principals in particular create potentially conflicting goals and conflicting interests among stakeholders (Horan & Mulreany, 2020). The presence of multiple principals – e.g. before the implementation of the PPPA, when a public enterprise with mixed ownership was permitted, meaning that a municipality and a private legal person could both be owners (principals) – easily led to conflicts regarding goals and interests.

Therefore, it is clear why respondent public utility providers see *management problems in an enterprise with mixed ownership* as the most important factor behind transformation into full municipal ownership. And it is also clear why municipalities see simpler *regulation of the provider* and *greater control over the provider* as their most important motivating factors for full municipal ownership. Also, among the advantages of the reorganization process, research results indicate that public enterprises prefer *the municipalities to monitor the business of the enterprise under the decree*, and *the municipalities to have full control over the performance of public utility providers*. This reinforces the view that if the provision of an individual public utility should be efficient and serve the needs of the local population (public, social goals), then a good corporate governance system for public enterprises is needed (Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014), and that the principal-agent relationship should be clear.

At this point, we also encounter the question how owners (principals) could motivate the managers (agents) to pursue public goals and minimize the opportunism of the agents (Pevcin, 2018). Therefore, it seems that price-setting by public utilities is one such motivation mechanism, as prices of public utilities in Slovenia are set by the utility providers and confirmed by the municipality. The results of our research indicate that almost two-

thirds of the respondent municipalities confirm the price upon first proposal; also, the rest of the respondents agreed that municipalities offer the opportunity to negotiate on price.

However, said plurality of stakeholders in the public sector principal-agent relationship leads to different prices for the same public utility, both among municipalities as well as inside a single municipality. On one hand, price variation are conditioned on multiple principals – when a public enterprise has multiple owner municipalities and each of these municipalities has the power to approve or negotiate different prices for a public utility. Our results show that the reason for different prices between municipalities is usually related to *the technical and technological conditions* surrounding the provision of a public utility service. On the other hand, when a municipality has multiple agents (multiple public utility providers), each of these providers can submit a different price for the same public utility service. This is usually due to *differences in the costs of providing a public utility service*, as shown in our research results. The costs of public utility service provision differ between municipalities due to various technical, technological, and economic factors, which all influence costs. As the price of the public utility service is set according to the costs involved, the setting of different prices is justified. However, respondent public enterprises in our research pointed to *regulatory pricing policy* as one of the biggest disadvantages of the reorganization process.

The literature review on re-municipalisation pointed to various motives for taking services back into public hands (Gradus & Budding, 2018; Gradus, Schoute & Budding, 2019; McDonald, 2019; Wollmann, 2018). As re-municipalisation is usually intentional, and is effected by terminating a contract with a private provider, the most frequently cited motive is dissatisfaction with the private provision or provider (Bel, 2020; Busshardt, 2014; Clifton, Warner, Gradus & Bel, 2019; McDonald, 2018; Lindholst, 2019; Ulmer & Gerlak, 2019; Valdovinos, 2012), owing to poor private management, overpricing, increased contractual and transaction costs, financial failures, deteriorating quality of service, public mistrust, operative failures etc. Similar motives behind the decision to re-municipalise – or in other words to retain or transform public enterprises into full municipal ownership – were also identified in our research (*management problems, regulation of the service provider, control over the service provider, influence over business activities, and rationality and efficiency of business activities*). As these are classical reasons for re-municipalisation, we can argue that legal amendments (in the form of the PPPA) have served to promote the trend towards re-municipalisation in Slovenia.

On the other side, the literature review highlights the fact that municipalities may also be forced to re-municipalise, especially in the face of the high cost of monitoring, short-term contracts, deteriorating efficiency, insufficient private-sector bidders for a contract etc. (Berlo, Wagner & Heenen, 2017; McDonald, 2019). As our research identified certain advantages connected with the reorganization process (*municipality can monitor the business activities of the enterprise under the decree; municipality has full control over the performance of public utility providers; institutional, corporate, and governmental rights*

are prescribed by a municipal decree; better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community), we see that the high cost of monitoring and regulating private contracts often drives municipalities to re-municipalise (Bel, 2020; Busshardt, 2014; Clifton, 2019; Gradus & Budding, 2018; Gradus, Schoute & Budding, 2019; Hanna, 2019; Ulmer & Gerlak, 2019; Valdovinos, 2012; Wollmann, 2018). However, we also find those opposed to re-municipalisation and who support privatization. They see private provision as the most efficient scenario, usually in view of the positive effects of a competitive market environment. Empirical studies (e.g. González-Gómez, García-Rubio & González-Martínez, 2014; Pessoa, 2009; Soukopová, Klimovský & Ochrana, 2017) point to evidence of cost savings, better quality of services, better investment opportunities, as well as access to better knowledge and skills under a private provision of local public services regime.

The literature review also points out that it is necessary to evaluate the private provider's performance and the benefits and risks of returning to public provision (Beveridge, Hüesker & Naumann, 2014; Friedländer, Röber & Schaefer, 2021; Hall, Lobina & Terhorst 2013; Valdovinos, 2012; Wollmann, 2018). Such evaluation is important when considering the cost of guaranteeing efficient performance. A municipality should guarantee the delivery of efficient public service. By the same token, neither public nor private providers can truly guarantee efficient service (Beveridge, Hüesker & Naumann, 2014; Hanna, 2019; Wollmann, 2018). According to the respondent public enterprises in our research, the reorganization process did not bring any essential changes to the effectiveness of the business. In view of their position on this question, we can assume that re-municipalisation does not have a significant effect on performance.

As already stated at the beginning of the Discussion section, the reorganization process of existing public enterprises in Slovenia raised public (100% municipal) ownership in the provision of local public utilities, which certainly contributed to the trend toward re-municipalisation in Slovenia. Re-municipalisation, however, brings benefits to both local communities and to the local population. The literature review points to lower costs for consumers in particular, more access for underserved populations, more jobs for the local population and better overall economic development, more local control over the provision of public utilities, financial gains for local authorities, and more empowered municipalities and local inhabitants (Becker, Beveridge & Naumann, 2015; Hanna, 2019; Wollmann, 2018). These benefits of re-municipalisation are also seen in the results of our research, among the motivating factors and advantages of the reorganization process. For example, *greater control over the provider* and *more rational and efficient business* are both indicated as among the most important motivating factors for public enterprises as well as for municipalities. Similarly, *better cooperation between the enterprise and the local community, developing expertise and improving quality of services, better organization of work, better job performance, lower cost for service provision / lower transaction costs, and securing of additional municipal resources* are identified as important advantages of the reorganization process, especially for municipalities.

Municipalities can work in cooperation with each other through different forms of inter-municipal cooperation in order to achieve greater economies of scale, realize greater cost savings, maximise available resources, and provide better quality and more efficient public utility services, and at the same time enable a better quality of life for the local population, create economic growth, more efficient operations, better environmental quality and more (Bel & Warner, 2014; Blaeschke, 2014; Blaeschke & Haug, 2014; Bolgherini, 2011; Citroni, Lippi & Profeti, 2013; Hefetz & Warner, 2011; Klimovský, Mejere, Mikolaityte, Pinterič & Saparniene, 2014; Masik et al., 2021; Mohr, Halstead & Deller, 2010; Rubado, 2014; Spicer, 2015; Wolfe & Nelles, 2009). The respondent municipalities in our research also find many advantages of IMC. Among the most important are *the transfer and exchange of knowledge, experience, good and bad practices; gaining advantages due to the size of municipalities (smaller municipalities) and developing greater professionalism in the provision of utilities*; all of which lead to other important IMC-related advantages, as seen in the results, like *exploiting economies of scale, lower utility services prices for end users, and higher quality utility services*.

Regardless of all the benefits of IMC, which are well known among the respondent municipalities, we do not find many examples of IMC in Slovenian municipalities in the field of water and wastewater management. The results indicate only a few examples of joint concessions, through joint public enterprise schemes. As is generally recognised, IMC brings more advantages to smaller municipalities (Bel & Costas, 2006; Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2012; Blaeschke, 2014; Klimovský, Mejere, Mikolaityte, Pinterič & Saparniene, 2014; De Mello & Lago-Peñas, 2012; Mor, Halstead & Deller, 2010; Pérez-López, Zafra-Gómez & Prior, 2015; Warner, 2011). As a rule, they are to a large extent financially independent of the central government, are less competitive, and suffer a lack of human resources etc., which ultimately leads to problems providing local public utility services and meeting the needs of the local population. There should, from the perspective of small municipalities in particular – which are common for local governments in Slovenia – exist more incentives to motivate enter or create IMCs. Even the results of the research show that the respondent municipalities do not see many opportunities for IMC in the future – not in the form of awarding joint concessions, which indicates a lack of the right incentives or a lack of accurate information about the benefits of IMC. Therefore, additional information and awareness-raising is needed at the national level, including the exchange of good practices, in order to adequately represent all the benefits of IMC, especially to smaller municipalities.

To conclude the discussion, we can say that according to the PPPA, public enterprise gained legal status, which is predominantly 100% public ownership (state or local). The PPPA dictated the reorganization of public enterprises such that they retained or transformed into full public enterprises or transformed into commercial companies (Brezovnik, 2009; Brezovnik, 2010; Kocbek, 2011; Trpin, 2007). As we have seen in our analysis of the research results, the majority of surveyed public enterprises retained their status as public enterprises (with full municipal ownership), which shows that municipal ownership has

increased due to the PPPA, and as already stated, has served to promote re-municipalisation in Slovenia. The trend towards re-municipalisation presents an opportunity to better fulfill the needs of local communities and also an opportunity for municipalities to cooperate with each other. Here, as we saw from the research results, we have only a few examples of joint concessions. Awarding concessions, however, is also a constituent part of the PPPA, which requires that the founder (municipality) shall award concessions without a public tender to public enterprises with full public ownership (Hrovatin, 2010; Brezovnik, 2010; Trpin, 2007). At this point it is interesting to note that *avoiding public tenders for concessions* is not in our research recognized as an important motivating factor. This is also reflected in the research results that show only a few public utilities provision schemes award concessions, and an even smaller share award direct, horizontal concessions without a public tender.

As we have outlined herein, a public enterprise is the most common form of local public utility provision in Slovenia (Pevcin, 2018). However, awarding a concession is also one of the forms of provision used, usually when it ensures cheaper and better-quality provision of services than other forms. It is also used when a municipality lacks an adequate infrastructure for said provision (Inštitut za javne službe, 2016). A concession-based provision represents a principal-agent relationship, where the municipality (the grantor) as the owner of the public utility authorises the concessionaire (a person of private law) to provide a public utility service. However, cheaper and better-quality provision of public utility services also point to more efficient provision, which is an indicator of good corporate governance in the public sector (Dzomira, 2020), regardless whether the municipality has chosen a public enterprise, in-house provision, concession-based provision, or even an IMC. And here lies the responsibility as well as the challenge of each municipality to choose the most appropriate local public services delivery mechanism, with the ultimate aim of serving and fulfilling the needs of the local population (Blidisel, 2013; Gumanti, Nastiti & Lestari, 2016; Pevcin, 2018; Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014).

CONCLUSION

The subject of this doctoral dissertation covers corporate governance issues in the public sector, with a focus on the principal-agent relationship as related to local public services delivery mechanisms. The principal-agent relationship takes the role of multiple stakeholders in the public sector into consideration, and special attention is given to corporate governance in Slovenian local government, where municipalities as the owners of public utilities act as principals, and the public utilities (e.g. public enterprises) act as agents. The efficiency of local public utilities provision depends on corporate governance practices in local government, which is also closely connected to the local public services delivery mechanism chosen by an individual municipality. In general, three delivery mechanisms are analysed in the doctoral dissertation: in-house provision, private provision of local public services, and provision within IMC.

Re-municipalisation, as a more recent trend in local public services provision, is also taken into consideration, with a focus on the analysis of the driving factors behind re-municipalisation, in order to determine whether there are any parallels between the drivers of re-municipalisation enumerated in the literature review and those drivers identified in Slovenian local government. Namely, after the implementation of the PPPA in 2007, public ownership of public utilities increased, which naturally influenced the trend toward re-municipalisation in Slovenia as well. In order to identify the parallels between the literature and the current state of local public utilities the provision in Slovenia, a detailed literature review on corporate governance in the public sector, on local public services delivery mechanisms, and on re-municipalisation trends is presented. The literature review explores existing reviews related to these research areas by examining several factors or dimensions that affect the choice of delivery mechanism by local governments. A holistic approach is used here, including empirical and non-empirical studies that address the issues explored in the dissertation.

The implementation of the PPPA brought about important changes in the field, in the transformation of existing public enterprises, and which changed their legal status, such that public enterprises are 100% publicly owned exclusively. The focus of the empirical part of the doctoral dissertation is, on the one hand, on public enterprises as agents, and on the other hand, on municipalities as principals. The final outcome of the reorganization process of existing public enterprises is not entirely evident, especially to what extent the municipality buyout was implemented, and what motives guided municipalities in buying up own shares in the utility, which was a necessary condition under the reorganization of existing public enterprises into public enterprises with full municipal ownership. Thus our research focuses on the impact of the new legislation on the mechanisms of providing local public services – more precisely, on mandatory local public utility services for drinking water supply, sewage and wastewater discharges, and urban wastewater and sewage treatment; and how the provision of said local public utility services has changed as the result of the reorganization of existing public enterprises. At this point, attention is paid to the motives behind reorganization – to the municipal purchase of shares in public enterprises from private individuals, to granting concessions when private individuals still held shares in public enterprises, and the relationship between the owners of public commercial infrastructure and public utility providers. Also, the advantages and disadvantages of reorganization are taken into consideration, and price setting arrangements in the field are examined.

In order to realise the goals of the empirical part, we developed two structured and detailed on-line questionnaires: one addressed to Slovenian municipalities, and the other to local public utility providers (public enterprises) in water and wastewater management in Slovenia. Using primary data collection, we explored compliance of the reorganization process with the new legislation and the experiences of local public utility providers of said reorganization. The results of the empirical research, as well as the results of the literature review, as answers to the 10 research questions posed in our dissertation, are summarized

below. Within the theoretical part of the dissertation, we provide answers to the first four research questions. The main findings of the empirical part are summarized in the answers to the remaining six research questions.

RQ1: Which governance issues related to local public services delivery mechanisms are identified in theory and researched in practice?

Local governments face many challenges in selecting the most appropriate local public services delivery mechanism, which should on the one hand, give rise to efficient service delivery, and on the other hand should prove most suitable in fulfilling the needs of the local population. Efficient service delivery is also an indicator of good corporate governance in the public sector, which is key to offsetting agency costs arising from the principal-agent relationship. As the principal-agent relationship in the public sector consists of multiple stakeholders (e.g. multiple principals), we find more potential conflicting goals and conflicting interests between stakeholders. A plurality of stakeholders can also introduce difficulties with leadership, coordination, and control, and may consequentially lead to greater information asymmetry and moral hazard.

Empirical studies (presented in the literature review of corporate governance in the public sector) point on the one hand to the fact that government owners and efficient corporate governance have a significant impact on the enterprise's value, performance, and revenue. Corporate governance factors, like shared vision, strategic coordination, and clarity of goals have a significantly positive impact on the success of municipally owned enterprises. On the other hand, we also find that fully publicly owned enterprises are less efficient than public enterprises with mixed ownership. Agency costs tend to be lower in public enterprises with mixed ownership than in fully publicly owned enterprises. The proper implementation of principles and rules has a positive effect on the corporate governance mechanism. However, many EU initiatives apply only to the private sector and not to the public sector; specifically, they do not apply to state- or municipally owned enterprises.

RQ2: Are different local public services delivery mechanisms (in-house production, privatization, inter-municipal cooperation) well identified in theory and researched in practice?

The subject examined herein represents a rather new field of research, one which has become very popular since 2007, and which has seen a large increase in the number of published journal papers. Most of the papers examine private local service provision or IMC in local service provision or a combination of both. There is a lack of scientific papers dealing with in-house provision of local public services, which makes it difficult to compare all three delivery mechanisms studied. Most of said papers are empirical studies done on the country level; therefore, the results and findings are also bound to specific national contexts and specific local government frameworks and may therefore vary from country to country. The majority of sample studies use regression analysis, but there are also studies that use explanatory, descriptive, and/or comparative analysis, case study analysis, literature review and other statistical methods. Although various empirical and non-empirical studies in the

area under examination exist, our literature review contributes to a thorough synthesis of previous existing research. Our review also serves to update the overview of investigations in the field and represents a holistic approach in its use of both manifest and latent content analytical approaches.

RQ3: What are the global trends in delivery mechanisms for local public services?

Our findings show that the research trend towards more cost-efficient solutions for local public services delivery is seen in the period after 2009 and has been further highlighted in recent papers published in 2019 and 2020. These papers focus mainly on IMC; several still deal with private service provision, but with more references and links to public-private partnerships, reverse contracting, re-municipalisation, and third sector cooperation. It is clear that the focus of these studies is changing due to the changing fiscal circumstances of local governments and the changing needs of the local citizenry. The recent financial and economic crisis and likely the COVID-19 crisis have also had a significant impact on the scientific literature, which in turn reflects the ongoing search for the most effective local public services delivery mechanisms. The studies focus mainly on cost reduction and achieving economies of scale in relation to the size of local government, on efficiency gains, and on the impact of political, institutional, social, and financial factors on the choice of delivery mechanism.

RQ4: In which cases do municipalities prefer a certain local public services delivery mechanism, and which factors influence such decisions?

Our findings tell us that decisions on local public services delivery mechanisms are mainly influenced by the size of the local government, efficiency of service, the resources available, and the institutional framework. Politics and competition in the market are also important decision-making factors. Most authors find that large local governments tend to prefer private service provision, while small local governments prefer IMC. This finding is directly related to potential cost savings resulting from economies of scale and efficiency.

RQ5: Which experiences have the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia in the period 2007–2009 brought to the field of local public services delivery mechanisms? Which changes have been implemented and which advantages and disadvantages has it brought?

The research results show that implementation of the PPPA contributed to an increase in public ownership in local public utilities provision, and that most existing public enterprises retained or transformed into full municipal ownership. Mixed public enterprises that retained mixed ownership after the new legislation (transformation into a commercial company) took such decision due to the municipality's inability to provide funds to purchase shares and because neither owners nor employees were sufficiently interested in such. The new legislation also gave rise to more public enterprises with more than one owner municipality. The most important reasons for the increased share of public ownership schemes were management problems in a mixed-ownership enterprise, closely followed by simpler regulation of the service provider, greater control over the service provider, more opportunities to influence business activities, and more rational and efficient business

operations. Avoiding public tenders for concessions did not appear as an important driver. Therefore, we can point to the fact that most existing public enterprises retained full public ownership and as a result do not need to arrange public tenders for concessions.

The research results show that the reorganization process brought largely advantages. The biggest advantage registered was the municipality being able to monitor the business activities of the enterprise under the decree, followed by the fact that the municipality has full control over the public utility providers. On the other hand, the biggest disadvantage is seen in the arrangement of concession relationships, which requires the regulation of many legal acts. Also, lack of experience on the part of municipalities in providing control over the concessions and regulatory pricing policies can present disadvantages. Interestingly, respondent public enterprises do not see any fundamental changes in the effectiveness of their business, even if they do recognise the predominant advantages of the new legislation.

RQ6: What is the current state of local public services delivery mechanisms in Slovenia?

The most common form of local public utilities provision in Slovenia is the public enterprise. This is also confirmed by the results of the reorganization process, where the majority of existing public enterprises have retained or transformed into full municipal ownership, and only a small share of mixed enterprises have transformed into commercial companies. The reorganization process of public enterprises in Slovenia led municipalities to re-municipalise, meaning that public (full municipal) ownership and control has increased. Also, the majority of the respondent municipalities and all the respondent public enterprises have confirmed full municipal ownership of public infrastructure. In the majority of cases the relationship between the infrastructure owner (municipality) and the infrastructure manager (public utility provider) has been settled with the transfer of public infrastructure into a business lease by the public utility provider.

RQ7: What are the experiences with the provision of local public services in municipalities that bought shares in public enterprises back from private individuals, and what are the experiences with awarding concessions in cases when private individuals still hold shares in public enterprises in Slovenia?

Municipalities that bought up private shares became sole owners of these public enterprises. The share of such transformed public enterprises is rather small (around 10%), as the majority of existing public enterprises already had full municipal ownership before the reorganization process. The responses here also provide insight into the most important motivating factors behind the increase in public ownership (and for buying up privately held shares), which are management problems in a mixed-ownership enterprise, simpler regulation of the service provider, greater control over the service provider, more opportunities to influence the business activities, and more rational and efficient business activities. Reasons that municipalities did not buy up the privately held shares consisted in a lack of interest on the part of the owners to sell their shares, and the inability of municipalities to provide funds for such purchase. According to the PPPA, when private shares are present, a municipality shall award a concession by holding a public tender. But

only around 10% of respondent municipalities award concessions with a public tender. Awarding concessions generally represents a minority form of public utility delivery in the field of water and wastewater management, and less than 10% of respondent municipalities award concessions without a public tender.

RQ8: To what extent does the current state of local public services delivery in Slovenia enable the adoption of inter-municipal cooperation as a delivery mechanism?

Within IMC in the field of water and wastewater management only one in ten respondent municipalities award joint concessions to provide public utility services. The respondent municipalities largely decide to award joint concessions in view of geographically rounded supply areas, and surprisingly not in order to achieve economies of scale or cost sharing schemes. Those respondent municipalities that have been already involved in awarding joint concessions have in most cases established a joint public enterprise. Respondent municipalities, however, do not see any other opportunities of awarding a joint concession in the near future. As already stated, this is indicative of a lack of good incentives and accurate information about the benefits of IMC. Therefore, awareness-raising that comes with the exchange of good practices is much needed, especially for smaller municipalities. Despite the less than encouraging situation, the respondent municipalities see advantages in IMC, especially in the transfer and exchange of knowledge and experiences, in the advantages that come with smaller sized municipalities, and in developing greater professionalism in the provision of public utility services.

RQ9: Does inter-municipal cooperation present the most appropriate delivery mechanism for Slovenian local public services? Under which conditions is this delivery mechanism the most appropriate?

In Slovenian local government – and more specifically in the field of water and wastewater management – the research results confirm the existence of IMC, but to a smaller extent. As is recognized from the literature review, IMC brings the most advantages to smaller municipalities. Achieving advantages due to the size of municipalities (smaller municipalities) is the second most frequently chosen advantage of IMC by the respondent municipalities. Slovenia has many small municipalities, which lack adequate local financial resources, human resources, and adequate public infrastructure needed to efficiently deliver local public utility services. Our literature review and research results suggest that Slovenia embodies those conditions that favour IMC as an appropriate delivery mechanism. These conditions refer in particular to smaller sized municipalities, which are typical for Slovenian local self-government. Therefore, IMC should become a more common delivery practice in Slovenia.

RQ10: Which good practices regarding local public services delivery can be identified in Slovenia?

IMC as a local public services delivery mechanism is definitely one of the good practices identified in Slovenia in the studied field of water and wastewater management, even when the most common forms of IMC are joint concessions and joint public enterprises. IMC

enables municipalities to provide better quality public utilities more efficiently and at the same time also enables a better quality of life for the local inhabitants. The other good practice is the trend toward re-municipalisation. The reorganization process of existing public enterprises under the PPPA has impacted the shift of private ownership back to public (municipal) ownership. According to the research results, greater municipal ownership of public enterprises (as the most common form of local public utilities provision), holds out advantages like simpler regulation of the service provider, greater control over the service provider, more opportunities to influence business activities, and more rational and efficient business activities. By the same token, we have formed these conclusions on the basis of the opinions of respondent municipalities and public enterprises, so a certain degree of subjectivity must be taken into consideration.

The answers to the first group of research questions (RQ1-RQ4) provide us with brief insights into the theoretical background of the field studied herein. Firstly, they serve to better acquaint us with the issues related to corporate governance in the public sector – more specifically with the principal-agent relationship, which assumes a significant role in the local public services delivery mechanisms. Secondly, they better acquaint us with local public services delivery mechanisms in general, pointing up the advantages and disadvantages of each delivery mechanism; and thirdly, we become better familiar with the trend toward re-municipalisation in connection with the provision of local public services. Further on, the answers to the research questions make us better acquainted with the delivery mechanisms of local public services in Slovenia. Attention is given to the public enterprise as the most common form of local public services provision, and to the legal amendments that affected the legal status of public enterprises after the implementation of the PPPA and the reorganization of existing public enterprises.

The answers to the second group of research questions, which refer to the empirical part (RQ5-RQ10), provide us with insight into the final outcomes of the reorganization process of existing public enterprises in the field of water and wastewater management, and which were the result of the implementation of the PPPA and its legal amendments. To be more precise, we see confirmation that the reorganization process actually increased the share of full municipal ownership of public enterprises, which in turn points to the trend toward the re-municipalisation of public utilities in Slovenia. The results also confirm the shift of public infrastructure to full municipal ownership, where the relationship between the infrastructure owner (municipality) and the infrastructure manager (public enterprise) is arranged through a business lease to the public utility provider.

The motivating factors behind sole municipal ownership are seen in simpler regulation of the provider and greater control over the provider, which also led municipalities to buy up private shares in existing mixed public enterprises. Similarly, advantages of the reorganization process point to full control of the public utility, to better quality utility service provision, and better organization of work. The results also acquaint us with the awarding of concessions, which is a relatively rare practice in the field of water and

wastewater management in Slovenia, both those concessions that employ public tendering as well as concessions without public tendering (horizontal concessions). Nevertheless, we do find a few examples of awarding joint concessions, which indicates that IMC is seen as a desirable, perhaps alternative arrangement for small Slovenian municipalities. The need for IMC is also indicated in those perceived advantages of IMC that were expressed among the respondent municipalities, but more and better incentives are required to encourage more such provision arrangements.

Our empirical results are consistent with and confirm the characteristics and expectations of the principal-agent theory. The conducted research presents a classical principal-agent relationship, where municipalities, as the owners of public enterprises, represent principals, and public utility providers, e.g. public enterprises, represent agents. The principal-agent relationship became clear after the implementation of the PPPA and the reorganization of public enterprises. Also, we find elements in our research results typical of corporate governance in the public sector as a whole. Among the most important advantages of the reorganization process, both public enterprises and municipalities point to monitoring performance, and control of the public utility provider by the municipality as principal. However, the results are not entirely consistent with certain basic theoretical assumptions of corporate governance in the public sector as regards the importance of efficiency in public service provision. Even though both public enterprises and municipalities point to more rational and efficient business as an important advantage of the reorganization process, the respondent public enterprises do not find any particularly essential changes in the effectiveness of their business after the reorganization. This may be connected to the fact that a relatively small share of public enterprises were transformed into full municipal ownership, as most public enterprises were already in full public ownership before the reorganization process. As a result, neither the effectiveness nor efficiency of business changed significantly with reorganization.

Further on, the retention of and transformation of public enterprises into full municipal ownership confirms the presence of and trend towards re-municipalisation in local government in Slovenia, and the shift back from private to public provision. Classical theoretical reasons for re-municipalisation are seen in our research results, and appear in the context of motivating factors behind full municipal ownership. The reasons identified herein consist in management problems, regulation of the service provider, control over the service provider, influencing the business activities, and more rational and efficient business activities.

Also, IMC as a local public services delivery mechanism is recognized in the research, but is not as well established in Slovenian local self-government as it might be. The theoretical presuppositions favour IMC in the case of smaller municipalities. Slovenia has a large number of small municipalities where an IMC arrangement for the provision of local public services could yield good results. This is quite evident from the research results on the perceived and expected advantages of IMC. However, it is interesting that despite the

recognized advantages, the respondent municipalities do not see many opportunities for such cooperation in the future. Therefore, it would be interesting to further monitor the trend towards IMC in Slovenian local self-government, in order to determine whether the detected advantages of IMC will at some point be more – and more widely – tangible.

In general, the findings of the theoretical part represent a valuable supplement to the body of scientific and professional literature in Slovenia and beyond. Our literature review contributes to a thorough synthesis of previous research in the area under investigation. Using manifest and latent content analysis we update and upgrade the overview of investigations of the field. As the trend in literature over the past decade has expressed a particular growing interest in re-municipalisation and IMC, the empirical results of our research play a role in contributing to further development of the theoretical component, and provide insight into a unique empirical example of re-municipalisation on the national level.

The empirical results show how the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia was arranged and whether it was conducted in accordance with the new legislation; similarly, it provides insight into the final outcomes of the reorganization process, together with its influence on the delivery mechanism of local public utilities. The overall results can serve as the basis for a formulation of recommendations for different types of local public services delivery mechanisms as regards particular characteristics of municipalities. The results also provide useful information for municipalities, local public utility providers, and public policy makers with a view to designing policies aimed at organising the most efficient way of delivering local public services. Last but not least, our empirical research also serves as a good basis for further investigation of the field studied, into the field of water and wastewater management as well as other public utility services.

To conclude, despite the fact that we have confronted some obstacles and limiting factors in our empirical research, especially as regards the incomplete responses to the questionnaires, our research succeeds in providing insight into the central subject and related issues. The questionnaires were entirely self-prepared and therefore cover all of the factors and inputs required to conduct a highly detailed research of the subject under consideration herein. The questionnaires are quite extensive and also ask for particularly detailed information, which requires extra time and effort both to complete and to obtain them, and this resulted the relatively large volume of incomplete responses. But this kind of research on the reorganization process of public enterprises in Slovenia has not yet been done, therefore we performed the analysis despite certain shortcomings. As regards the focus of both questionnaires, the respondents who completed the questionnaires in full or in large part were in fact directly involved in the reorganization process and were therefore able to provide valuable and relevant information on and assessments of the reorganization of public enterprises in Slovenia as directed by the PPPA. These answers – and the related analysis – thus represent a unique contribution to both the research area and the related theory.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Summary in Slovenian language / Daljši povzetek disertacije v slovenskem jeziku

Tematika doktorske disertacije pokriva problematiko upravljanja in zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev. Podrobneje so proučevani lastno izvajanje lokalnih javnih storitev, privatizacija lokalnih javnih storitev in medobčinsko sodelovanje pri zagotavljanju lokalnih javnih storitev. Upoštevana je vloga deležnikov, ki se, glede na obravnavo mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, osredotoča na ponudbeno stran, in sicer na občine in javna podjetja.

V doktorski disertaciji proučimo svetovne trende mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev ter ob tem ugotovimo, kateri dejavniki vplivajo na izbor določenega mehanizma. Posebna pozornost je namenjena slovenskim izkušnjam na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, in sicer po procesu preoblikovanja javnih podjetij, ki ga je narekovala uvedba Zakona o javno-zasebnem partnerstvu (ZJZP, Ur.l. RS, št. 127/06). V okviru tega smo osredotočeni na spremembe institucionalnega okvira, ki jih je omenjeni zakon povzročil javnim podjetjem.

Cilj doktorske disertacije je raziskati področje mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev in na podlagi tega posodobiti in nadgraditi obstoječo literaturo proučevanega področja. Dalje je cilj ugotoviti, kakšne izkušnje je na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev prinesel proces preoblikovanja javnih podjetij, predvsem na področju upravljanja voda. Nazadnje je cilj prepoznati končne izide procesa preoblikovanja javnih podjetij in motive zanj.

V doktorski disertaciji naslovimo 10 raziskovalnih vprašanj. Prva 4 vprašanja se nanašajo na teoretični del in preostalih 6 vprašanj se nanaša na empirični del disertacije. Raziskovalna vprašanja so sledeča:

RV1: Katere težave na področju upravljanja mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev so prepoznane v teoriji in raziskane v praksi?

RV2: Ali so mehanizmi zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev (lastno izvajanje, privatizacija in medobčinsko sodelovanje) dovolj dobro prepoznani v teoriji in raziskani v praksi?

RV3: Kakšni so svetovni trendi uporabe mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev?

RV4: V katerih primerih dajejo občine prednost določenemu načinu zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev in kateri dejavniki vplivajo na njihovo odločitev?

RV5: Kakšne izkušnje je na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev prineslo preoblikovanje javnih podjetij v Sloveniji v obdobju 2007–2009? Kakšne spremembe so bile vpeljane ter katere prednosti in slabosti je prineslo preoblikovanje?

RV6: Kakšno je obstoječe stanje na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji?

RV7: Kakšne so izkušnje z zagotavljanjem lokalnih javnih storitev v občinah, ki so odkupile lastniške deleže od zasebnikov ter kakšne so izkušnje s podeljevanjem koncesij v primeru, če imajo zasebniki še svoje deleže v javnih podjetjih v Sloveniji?

RV8: V kakšnem obsegu obstoječe stanje na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji omogoča posluževanje medobčinskega sodelovanja pri zagotavljanju javnih storitev?

RV9: Ali medobčinsko sodelovanje predstavlja najbolj primeren način zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji? V kakšnih pogojih je ta način najprimernejši?

RV10: Katere dobre prakse na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev lahko prepoznamo v Sloveniji?

Metodološko je doktorska disertacija razdeljena na dva dela. V prvem, teoretičnem delu so na osnovi pregleda literature uporabljene deskriptivne metode, kritični pregled literature in primerjalna analiza različnih praks. Pregled literature nam poda odgovore na prva štiri raziskovalna vprašanja. V drugem, empiričnem delu je na osnovi zbiranja primarnih podatkov narejena raziskava o preoblikovanju slovenskih javnih podjetij v obdobju 2007–2009 na področju upravljanja voda. Podatki so zbrani preko dveh lastno pripravljenih, strukturiranih spletnih anketnih vprašalnikov. Zbiranje odgovorov je potekalo v obdobju 2018–2020. Rezultati in ugotovitve empiričnega dela nam podajo odgovore na raziskovalna vprašanja št. 5–10. Podrobnejše informacije o metodologiji empiričnega dela sledijo v nadaljevanju.

Doktorska disertacija je sestavljena iz štirih vsebinskih poglavij. V prvem poglavju prikaz pregleda literature, ki vključuje korporativno upravljanje v javnem sektorju, mehanizme zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev in remunicipalizacijo pri zagotavljanju lokalnih javnih storitev. V drugem poglavju je najprej predstavljeno zagotavljanje lokalnih javnih služb na področju upravljanja voda v Sloveniji. Sledi predstavitev teoretičnega ozadja procesa preoblikovanja javnih podjetij v Sloveniji, kot posledica sprejetja ZJZP. Tretje poglavje predstavi empirični del doktorske disertacije, t.j. analiza procesa preoblikovanja slovenskih javnih podjetij. Poglavje vključuje predstavitev raziskovalnega problema in metodologijo. V četrtem poglavju so predstavljeni rezultati empirične raziskave, in sicer z vidika javnih podjetij, z vidika občin in primerjalno. V nadaljevanju so predstavljena vsa štiri vsebinska poglavja.

TEORETIČNO OZADJE

Teoretično ozadje nas preko sistematičnega pregleda literature proučevanega področja najprej seznani s problematiko korporativnega upravljanja v javnem sektorju. Korporativno upravljanje je v prvi vrsti značilno za zasebni sektor in predstavlja razmerje med vsemi vključenimi deležniki posamezne organizacije in hkrati mehanizem s katerim lastnik organizacije upravlja in nadzoruje aktivnosti managerjev (Blidisel, 2013; Branston, Cowling

& Sugden, 2006; Hirigoyen & Laouer, 2013; OECD, 2015; Rezart, 2013; Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča, 2019). Korporativnega upravljanja se vse bolj poslužuje tudi javni sektor. V javnem sektorju korporativno upravljanje prav tako predstavlja mehanizem za upravljanje in nadzor organizacij v javni lasti, s ciljem zadovoljiti vključene deležnike, izboljšati delovanje javne organizacije in zasledovati javni interes (Choudhury & Petrin, 2018; Ferry & Ahrens, 2017; Papachristou & Papachristou, 2014; Papenfuß et al, 2018). Torej, korporativno upravljanje v javnem sektorju se od zasebnega sektorja razlikuje predvsem po zasledovanju javnih ciljev. Osnova teorije korporativnega upravljanja je odnos med principalom in agentom. Opredeljeno je kot pogodbeno razmerje, v katerem ena stran (lastnik, principal) najame drugo stran (manager, agent) za izvedbo določenih aktivnosti (Gumanti, Nastiti & Lestari, 2016; Scrimgeour & Duppati, 2014; Tajnikar, Aleksić & Došenović Bonča, 2019).

V nadaljevanju nas pregled literature na področju mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev seznani z različnimi dejavniki, ki vplivajo na izbor načina zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev. Najpogostejše so te dejavniki vezani na zniževanje stroškov, fiskalne omejitve, velikost lokalnih oblasti ter politične in ideološke interese (Bel & Fageda, 2008, pp. 60-61; Bel, Hebdon & Warner, 2007, p. 513; González-Gómez, Picazo-Tadeo & Guardiola, 2011, p. 475). Občine se običajno odločajo med lastnim izvajanjem lokalnih javnih storitev, privatizacijo in medobčinskim sodelovanjem (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013, p. 437; Rodrigues, Tavares & Araújo, 2012, p. 618). Kadar lastno izvajanje storitev ne omogoča izkoriščanja ekonomij obsega in ustvarja previsoke stroške, se občina lahko odloči za alternativni način zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev. Običajno je to zasebno izvajanje javnih storitev, se pa vse bolj pogosto uveljavlja tudi medobčinsko sodelovanje oz skupno izvajanje storitev (Bel, Fageda & Mur, 2013, p. 436). Vzporedno z medobčinskim sodelovanjem se kot trend vse bolj uveljavlja tudi remunicipalizacija v zagotavljanju lokalnih javnih storitev (Albalade & Bel, 2020; Warner & Aldag, 2019; Voorn et al., 2020).

Torej v zadnjem delu teoretičnega poglavja, ob pregledu literature na področju remunicipalizacije spoznamo različne motive za prenos izvajanja lokalnih javnih storitev nazaj v lastno občinsko izvajanje (Gradus & Budding, 2018; Gradus et al., 2019; McDonald, 2019; Wollmann, 2018). Remunicipalizacija je običajno namerna in se zgodi s prekinitvijo pogodbe z zasebnim izvajalcem. Najpogostejši razlog za to je nezadovoljstvo z zasebnim izvajalcem, zaradi naraščajočih pogodbenih in transakcijskih stroškov, finančnih nepravilnosti, poslabšanja kvalitete storitev, nezaupanja javnosti itd. (Bel, 2020; Busshardt, 2014; Clifton et al., 2019; McDonald, 2018; Lindholst, 2019; Ulmer & Gerlak, 2019; Valdovinos, 2012). Lahko pa se zgodi, da je občina prisiljena v remunicipalizacijo, predvsem zaradi previsokih stroškov nadzora, kratkoročnih pogodb, zmanjšanja učinkovitosti, nezadostnega števila zasebnih ponudnikov za sklenitev pogodbe itd. (Bel, 2020; Berlo et al., 2017; Busshardt, 2014; Clifton, 2019; McDonald, 2019; Gradus & Budding, 2018; Gradus et al., 2019; Hanna, 2019; Ulmer & Gerlak, 2019; Valdovinos, 2012; Wollmann, 2018). Remunicipalizacija tako občinam kot tudi lokalnemu prebivalstvu prinaša

določene prednosti. Te so predvsem nižji stroški za končne uporabnike storitev, večji dostop storitev za premalo oskrbovana območja, povečanje ponudbe delovnih mest za lokalno prebivalstvo, posledično boljši gospodarski lokalni razvoj, več nadzora nad izvajanjem storitev s strani občine, finančni prihranki za občine itd. (Becker et al., 2015; Hanna, 2019; Wollmann, 2018).

Na podlagi ugotovitev pregleda literature v teoretičnem delu doktorske disertacije lahko odgovorimo na prva štiri raziskovalna vprašanja. Odgovori sledijo.

RV1: Katere težave na področju upravljanja mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev so prepoznane v teoriji in raziskane v praksi?

Izbor najprimernejšega mehanizma zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev občinam vsekakor predstavlja izziv. Občine želijo svojemu prebivalstvu zagotavljati učinkovite in kvalitetne lokalne javne storitve in ob tem zadovoljiti njihove potrebe. To pa lahko dosežemo le z dobrim korporativnim upravljanjem v javnem sektorju oz s stabilnim odnosom med principalom in agentom, kjer sta asimetrija informacij in moralni hazard premagana z učinkovitimi motivacijskimi mehanizmi, ki vodijo k doseganju skupnih družbenih ciljev.

RV2: Ali so mehanizmi zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev (lastno izvajanje, privatizacija in medobčinsko sodelovanje) dovolj dobro prepoznani v teoriji in raziskani v praksi?

Mehanizmi zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev sodijo med novejša področja raziskovanja, kar potrjuje dejstvo, da se je število objavljenih prispevkov močno povečalo od leta 2007 dalje. Ob pregledu literature je zaznati manjko znanstvene literature na področju lastnega izvajanja lokalnih javnih storitev, po drugi strani pa se povečuje obseg znanstvene literature na področju zasebnega izvajanja lokalnih javnih storitev in na področju medobčinskega sodelovanja. Prevladujejo empirične nacionalne in lokalne študije.

RV3: Kakšni so svetovni trendi uporabe mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev?

Raziskave sledijo načinom zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, ki so dovolj stroškovno učinkoviti. Od leta 2009 dalje se je močno povečala osredotočenost znanstvene literature na medobčinsko sodelovanje pri izvajanju lokalnih javnih storitev kot alternativa zasebnemu izvajanju. Sicer je zasebno izvajanje storitev še dovolj zastopano v literaturi, vendar se pojavlja vse več povezav zasebnega izvajanja z javno-zasebnim partnerstvom, remunicipalizacijo itd. Iz pregleda literature je mogoče zaznati, da se osredotočenost študij spreminja glede na spreminjajoče se fiskalne pogoje lokalnih oblasti in glede na spreminjajoče se potrebe lokalnega prebivalstva.

RV4: V katerih primerih dajejo občine prednost določnemu načinu zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev in kateri dejavniki vplivajo na njihovo odločitev?

Na odločitev glede načina zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev se občine običajno odločajo na podlagi njihove velikosti, učinkovitosti izvajanja storitev, razpoložljivosti virov in institucionalnega okvirja. Velikokrat pa so prisotni tudi politični vplivi in konkurenca na

trgu. Pregled literature kaže, da večje občine dajejo prednost zasebnemu izvajanju javnih storitev, medtem ko se manjše občine raje poslužujejo medobčinskega sodelovanja.

VODNA INDUSTRIJA IN ZAGOTAVLJANJE NJENIH STORITEV V SLOVENIJI

Obliko zagotavljanja lokalnih gospodarskih javnih služb predpiše občina z odlokom (Grafenauer, 2009, p. 213). Občina zagotavlja gospodarske javne službe preko režijskega obrata, javnih gospodarskih zavodov in javnih podjetij ter s podeljevanjem koncesij. Režijski obrat in javni gospodarski zavod sta redki obliki zagotavljanja lokalnih gospodarskih javnih služb. Koncesija je edina možna oblika izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb s strani pravnih oseb zasebnega prava. Javno podjetje pa je najpogostejša oblika izvajanja lokalnih gospodarskih javnih služb (Pevcin & Rakar, 2015, pp. 705-706).

V Sloveniji je bil leta 2006 sprejet Zakon o javno-zasebnem partnerstvu, ki je prinesel spremembe institucionalnega okvira obstoječih javnih podjetij v procesu njihovega preoblikovanja. Zakon je vplival predvsem na pravni status javnih podjetij, ki izvajajo javne službe (Brezovnik, 2009; Trpin, 2007). V obdobju 2007-2009, ko je potekal proces preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij, so le ta skladno z zakonom lahko ohranila status javnega podjetja ali pa se preoblikovala v gospodarsko družbo. V primeru, da so ohranila status javnega podjetja, so morala odkupiti vložke zasebnega kapitala in jih prenesti v lastniške deleže v lasti Republike Slovenije ali lokalnih skupnosti (Brezovnik, 2009; Kocbek, 2011). Javno podjetje je tako lahko le tisto podjetje, ki je v popolni lasti države ali lokalne skupnosti. Zakon je torej z vidika lastništva prinesel velike spremembe, in sicer povečal javno lastništvo in nadzor lokalnih javnih služb. Odločitev glede organizacijske strukture javnih podjetij je prepustil njihovim ustanoviteljem. Poleg spremembe statusa javnega podjetja, omenjeni zakon obravnava tudi podeljevanje koncesij javnim podjetjem, ki so se preoblikovala v gospodarske družbe. V tem primeru so morala podjetja pridobiti koncesijo z javnim razpisom (Hrovatin, 2010, p. 102; Brezovnik, 2010, p. 24; Trpin, 2007, pp. 6, 13).

ANALIZA PROCESA PREOBLIKOVANJA SLOVENSКИH JAVNIH PODJETIJ

Cilj naše raziskave je oceniti končni izid procesa preoblikovanja javnih podjetij, in sicer v kolikšnem obsegu so občine odkupile zasebne lastniške deleže, potrebne za preoblikovanje v javna podjetja v popolni javni lasti, in kateri motivi so jih pri tem vodili. Osredotočenost raziskave je na učinkih ZJZP na mehanizme zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, natančneje na zagotavljanje gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode. Zanima nas ali se je zagotavljanje teh storitev kaj spremenilo zaradi preoblikovanja javnih podjetij. Podrobneje proučimo motive pri preoblikovanju, odkup zasebnih lastniških deležev s strani občin, podeljevanje koncesij v primeru, da imajo zasebniki še prisotne svoje lastniške deleže, ureditev razmerja med lastniki

in upravljalci gospodarske javne infrastrukture ter prednosti in slabosti procesa preoblikovanja.

Empirična raziskava je narejena na podlagi zbiranja primarnih podatkov z dvema, lastno izdelanima, strukturiranima spletnima vprašalnikoma. Vprašalnika sta preizkušena s pomočjo Inštituta za javne službe, s ciljem dobiti mnenje strokovnjaka o ustreznosti vsebine vprašalnikov. Eden od vprašalnikov je namenjen slovenskim občinam, saj je večina javnih služb na področju upravljanja voda v Sloveniji urejena na lokalni ravni. Drugi vprašalnik je namenjen slovenskim komunalnim podjetjem na področju upravljanja voda, kjer je potekal proces preoblikovanja javnih podjetij. Vabilo s povezavo na vprašalnik je bilo poslano preko elektronskih naslov, in sicer izvršnim direktorjem v komunalnih podjetjih in direktorjem občinskih uprav. Podatke smo zbirali v obdobju od 2018 do 2020. Daljše obdobje zbiranja podatkov ne vpliva na njihovo relevantnost in primerljivost med naslovniki, saj so vprašanja vezana na pretekle dogodke. Vprašalnika sta strukturirana, kar omogoča posameznemu naslovniku odgovarjati le na zanj relevantna vprašanja. To pomeni, da odgovarjajo na vprašanja vezana na njihovo organizacijsko obliko in javne službe, ki jih zagotavljajo. Vprašanja so različnih tipov, od odprtih vprašanj, vprašanj več izbir odgovorov, do vprašanj s 5-stopenjsko Likertovo lestvico.

V želji po primerjavi rezultatov raziskave med komunalnimi podjetji in občinami, sta vprašalnika vsebinsko podobno strukturirana. Oba vprašalnika vključujeta pet vsebinskih sklopov: 1) osnovni podatki o anketirancu, 2) zagotavljanje oz. izvajanje javnih služb na področju upravljanja voda, 3) lastništvo javnih podjetij pred uvedbo ZJZP, 4) spremembe po procesu preoblikovanja javnih podjetij in njihova skladnost z zakonom in 5) oblikovanje cen javnih služb na področju upravljanja voda.

Raziskava vključuje celotno populacijo komunalnih podjetij (72 podjetij) na področju upravljanja voda v Sloveniji ter celotno populacijo slovenskih občin (212 občin). Zaradi velikega obsega vprašanj in njihove kompleksnosti je odziv s strani vprašanih nekoliko slabši, vendar še vedno dovolj reprezentativen za pripravo ustreznih zaključkov raziskave. Odziv na strani komunalnih podjetij je skoraj 42 % (N=30), vendar le 21 podjetij na vprašalnik odgovori v celoti oz. skoraj v celoti. Tako je dejanski odziv na strani podjetij malo manj kot 30 %. Odziv na strani občin je okoli 20 % (N=42), pri čemer je le 28 občin na vprašalnik odgovorilo v celoti oz. skoraj v celoti. Dejanski odziv pri občinah je tako le 13,2 %. V analizi rezultatov se upoštevajo vsi odgovori pri posameznem vprašanju, zato se stopnja odziva med posameznimi vprašanji razlikuje.

REZULTATI RAZISKAVE

Analiza rezultatov raziskave je narejena ločeno za javna podjetja in za občine. Na koncu je narejena še primerjalna analiza med rezultati obeh vprašalnikov. Rezultati podajo vpogled v proces preoblikovanja javnih podjetij in njegovih izidov, tako z vidika javnih podjetij (izvajalci javnih služb) kot z vidika občin (lastnice javnih podjetij).

Rezultati so zelo podobni na strani občin in na strani javnih podjetij. To pokaže tudi primerjalna analiza rezultatov. Več kot tri četrtine javnih podjetij, ki izvajajo gospodarske javne službe oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, je že imelo polno občinsko lastništvo pred sprejetjem ZJZP, torej že pred letom 2006. Odgovor je podalo 23 podjetij in 20 občin. Posledično se je v procesu preoblikovanja javnih podjetij, le okoli desetina podjetij preoblikovalo v javno podjetje v popolni javni lasti, preostala pa so zgolj ohranila status javnega podjetja. Za preoblikovanje v javno podjetje v izključni javni lasti so morale občine odkupiti zasebne lastniške deleže v podjetju. V nekaterih primerih tega niso storile in ta podjetja so se preoblikovala v gospodarske družbe. Po mnenju vprašanih, odkup zasebnih deležev ni bil opravljen zaradi nezmožnosti občine pridobiti ustrezna proračunska sredstva za nakup deležev ter tudi zaradi nezainteresiranosti zasebnih deležnikov za prodajo. Odgovor glede preoblikovanja je podalo 21 podjetij in 30 občin.

Na podlagi ZJZP se je tudi gospodarska javna infrastruktura dokončno prenesla v lastništvo občin. Pred ZJZP je imelo gospodarsko javno infrastrukturo v lasti več kot polovica vprašanih občin. Po uvedbi ZJZP pa polno občinsko lastništvo nad javno infrastrukturo potrjuje 84 % občin in vsa vprašana javna podjetja. Odgovor je podalo 20 podjetij in 27 občin. Pri več kot 2/3 vprašanih je razmerje med lastnikom javne infrastrukture (občina) in upravljalcem javne infrastrukture (javno podjetje) urejeno s poslovnim najemom upravljalcu infrastrukture. Odgovorilo je 20 podjetij in 27 občin.

Občine in javna podjetja so se za preoblikovanje oz ohranitev polnega javnega lastništva odločila na podlagi različnih motivacijskih dejavnikov. Kot najpomembnejši motivacijski dejavnik lahko izpostavimo *težave pri upravljanju podjetja z mešanim lastništvom* (z vidika podjetij) oz *negativne izkušnje z zasebnim izvajalcem* (z vidika občin), poleg tega pa sta bila tako pri podjetjih kot tudi pri občinah izpostavljena tudi dejavnika *lažje upravljanje izvajalca* in *večji nadzor nad izvajalcem*. Odgovorilo je 20 podjetij in 15 občin.

Tako občine kot tudi javna podjetja podajo informacije glede sodelovanja pri neposrednih oz horizontalnih koncesijah. Večina anketiranih javnih podjetij (80 %) še ni bilo vključenih v horizontalno koncesijo, prav tako tudi velika večina občin (skoraj 90 %) še ni podelila horizontalne koncesije na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode. Pri odgovorih je sodelovalo 20 podjetij in 27 občin. Podobno večina v raziskavi sodelujočih občin še ni bila vključena v podeljevanje skupne koncesije z eno ali več drugih občin na področju upravljanja voda. Največ skupnih koncesij je podeljenih pri oskrbi s pitno vodo (15 % anketiranih občin), medtem ko je ta delež pri odvajanju komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode znatno manjši. Odgovori kažejo, da se občine za skupno koncesijo običajno odločijo zaradi geografsko zaokroženega oskrbovanega področja in zanimivo ne zaradi nižjih stroškov zagotavljanja storitev. Odgovor je podalo 27 občin.

Podeljevanje skupnih koncesij predstavlja sodelovanje med občinami. Zato se vprašanja dotikajo tudi medobčinskega sodelovanja, predvsem prednosti in slabosti le tega. Med

največje prednosti medobčinskega sodelovanja v raziskavi sodelujoče občine izpostavljajo *prenos in izmenjavo znanj, izkušenj ter dobrih in slabih praks, doseganje prednosti ekonomij obsega (pri manjših občinah) in doseganje večje strokovnosti pri zagotavljanju javnih služb*. Pri odgovorih je sodelovalo 23 občin. Na drugi strani so zaznane tudi nekatere pomanjkljivosti medobčinskega sodelovanja. Med največjimi pomanjkljivostmi občine vidijo *težave pri doseganju konsenza med vključenimi občinami, kompleksnost skupnega upravljanja in pomanjkanje zaupanja med vključenimi občinami*. Sodelovalo je 21 občin.

Tudi celotni proces preoblikovanja javnih podjetij ima svoje prednosti in slabosti. Na tem področju so zaznane določene razlike med odgovori javnih podjetij in občin. Javna podjetja vidijo največje prednosti procesa preoblikovanja pri *izvajanju nadzora nad poslovanjem podjetja po občinskem odloku s strani občine in popolnem nadzoru nad poslovanjem komunalnih storitev s strani občine*. Poleg tega izpostavljajo tudi prednost v *korporativnih pravicah, ki se predpišejo z občinskim odlokom ter v boljšem sodelovanju med podjetjem in lokalno skupnostjo*. Občine pa kot najpomembnejši prednosti izpostavljajo *razvoj strokovnega znanja in s tem povečane kakovosti opravljanja storitev in boljšo organizacijo dela*. Poleg tega vidijo pomembne prednosti tudi pri *nadzoru podjetja nad njegovim poslovanjem po odloku, enostavnejšem pridobivanju evropskih sredstev, nižjih stroških dela in boljši izrabi delovne sile in kapitala*. Pri odgovorih je sodelovalo 16 podjetij in 12 občin.

Med pomanjkljivostmi procesa preoblikovanja javnih podjetij ni zaznati bistvenih pomanjkljivosti, saj so tako podjetja kot tudi občine le te ocenile kot razmeroma nepomembne. Omenimo lahko na primer *ureditev koncesijskega razmerja terja urejanje veliko pravnih aktov in regulativno cenovno politiko* kot najbolj izpostavljeni pomanjkljivosti tako z vidika javnih podjetij kot tudi z vidika sodelujočih občin. Sodelovalo je 13 podjetij in 12 občin.

Cenovna politika oz oblikovanje cen komunalnih storitev na področju upravljanja voda je tudi sestavni element vprašalnikov. Približno dve tretjini vprašanih javnih podjetij in občin pritrjuje, da je predračunska lastna cena komunalne storitve s strani občine vedno potrjena ob njeni prvi predložitvi. Preostale občine in podjetja pa so v večini potrdile, da občina dopušča možnost pogajanja z izvajalcem storitve, v kolikor cena ni potrjena ob njeni prvi predložitvi. Pri odgovorih je sodelovalo 19 podjetij in 19 občin.

Izvajalci javnih storitev lahko isto storitev izvajajo v več kot eni občini, pri čemer se cena te storitve med občinami lahko razlikuje. Sodelujoča podjetja pravijo, da se razlike v ceni storitve med posameznimi občinami običajno pojavljajo zaradi *tehničnih in tehnoloških pogojev izvajanja storitve in zaradi nezmožnosti strinjanja glede enotne cene*. Presenetljivo gostota prebivalstva ni ocenjena kot pomemben dejavnik. Nekateri izvajalci pa kljub vsemu ohranijo enake cene zagotavljanja iste storitve v različnih občinah. Tu so razlogi predvsem v *zasledovanju zadovoljstva končnih uporabnikov in enakosti prebivalstva*. Prav tako pa so tudi pri enakih cenah izpostavljeni *tehnični in tehnološki pogoji*, ki omogočajo enakost cen. Sodelovalo je 8 podjetij.

Rezultati in ugotovitve zgoraj predstavljene empirične raziskave nam podajo odgovore na zadnjih šest raziskovalnih vprašanj, ki so prikazani v nadaljevanju.

RV5: Kakšne izkušnje je na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev prineslo preoblikovanje javnih podjetij v Sloveniji v obdobju 2007–2009? Kakšne spremembe so bile vpeljane ter katere prednosti in slabosti je prineslo preoblikovanje?

Rezultati raziskave kažejo, da je uvedba ZJZP prispevala k povečanju popolnega javnega lastništva javnih podjetij, sicer približno le za desetino, saj je bila večina javnih podjetij že pred procesom preoblikovanja v popolni javni lasti. Mešana javna podjetja, ki so se preoblikovala v gospodarske družbe, so to storila zaradi finančne nezmožnosti občin za odkup zasebnih lastniških deležev ali zaradi interesov lastnikov in zaposlenih. Najpomembnejši motivi za preoblikovanje javnih podjetij oz tudi za ohranitev popolnega lastništva nad javnim podjetjem so problemi pri upravljanju podjetja z mešanim lastništvom, enostavnejši in boljši nadzor nad izvajalcev javnih storitev, več možnosti vplivanja na poslovanje podjetja ter večja racionalnost in učinkovitost poslovanja. Rezultati tudi pokažejo, da je proces preoblikovanja prinesel prednosti nad pomanjkljivostmi, ki se kažejo, kot že omenjeno, predvsem pri večjem nadzoru izvajalcev javnih storitev s strani občin.

RV6: Kakšno je obstoječe stanje na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji?

Najpogostejša oblika izvajanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji je javno podjetje. To potrjujejo tudi rezultati raziskave, saj je v procesu preoblikovanja javnih podjetij večina le teh ohranila popolno lastništvo nad javnim podjetjem, preostala pa so se večinoma preoblikovala v podjetja s 100 % javnim lastništvom. To je povečalo občinsko lastništvo nad javnimi podjetji ter hkrati tudi nadzor na temi podjetji, kar pomeni, da je proces preoblikovanja javnih podjetij vplival na potek remunicipalizacije v Sloveniji.

RV7: Kakšne so izkušnje z zagotavljanjem lokalnih javnih storitev v občinah, ki so odkupile lastniške deleže od zasebnikov ter kakšne so izkušnje s podeljevanjem koncesij v primeru, če imajo zasebniki še svoje deleže v javnih podjetjih v Sloveniji?

Občine, ki so odkupile zasebne lastniške deleže v podjetjih, so postale 100 % lastnice teh javnih podjetij. Kot že večkrat omenjeno je sicer delež tovrstnih primerov majhen, le okoli desetina. V primeru, ko občina ni odkupila lastniških deležev zasebnikov, le to pripisujejo finančni nezmožnosti odkupa ter nezainteresiranosti zasebnih lastnikov za prodajo. Kjer so v proučevanih podjetjih ostali tudi zasebni lastniški deleži, torej kjer se je javno podjetje preoblikovalo v gospodarsko družbo, mora občina v primeru podeljevanja koncesije le to opraviti preko javnega razpisa.

RV8: V kakšnem obsegu obstoječe stanje na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji omogoča posluževanje medobčinskega sodelovanja pri zagotavljanju javnih storitev?

V okviru medobčinskega sodelovanja se občine poslužujejo skupnih koncesij, vendar v zelo majhnem obsegu. Običajno se za to odločijo zaradi geografsko zaokroženega oskrbovalnega

območja in ne zaradi doseganja ekonomij obsega ali delitve stroškov. Tiste občine, ki so vključene v skupno koncesijo, so ustanovile skupno javno podjetje ali pa skupno občinsko upravo. Občine tudi v prihodnje ne vidijo veliko možnosti za podeljevanje skupnih koncesij.

RV9: Ali medobčinsko sodelovanje predstavlja najbolj primeren način zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji? V kakšnih pogojih je ta način najprimernejši?

Medobčinsko sodelovanje v slovenskih občinah obstaja, vendar kot smo videli, v majšem obsegu. Literatura predlaga posluževanje medobčinskega sodelovanja v manjših občinah, zaradi večjih možnosti doseganja ekonomij obsega, kar so med prednostmi sodelovanja izpostavile tudi v raziskavi sodelujoče občine. Slovenija ima veliko majhnih občin, ki se soočajo s pomanjkanjem ustreznih finančnih, človeških in drugih virov, potrebnih za učinkovito zagotavljanje lokalnih javnih storitev. Na podlagi pregleda literature in rezultatov raziskave lahko rečemo, da je medobčinsko sodelovanje pri zagotavljanju lokalnih javnih storitev ustrezna izbira, predvsem zaradi majhnosti slovenskih občin.

RV10: Katere dobre prakse na področju zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev lahko prepoznamo v Sloveniji?

Med dobrimi praksami mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji lahko izpostavimo medobčinsko sodelovanje na področju upravljanja voda, kljub manjšemu številu tovrstnih primerov. Običajno gre za obliko sodelovanja pri podeljevanju skupne koncesije ali pa za ustanovitev skupnega javnega podjetja. Tovrstno sodelovanje vključenim občinam omogoča večjo učinkovitost pri zagotavljanju storitev in tudi večjo kakovost storitev, kar seveda vpliva tudi na boljše življenje lokalnega prebivalstva. Nadalje pa se v Slovenija povečuje trend remunicipalizacije, ki je nastal tudi kot posledica procesa preoblikovanja javnih podjetij in s tem prenosa lastništva nad javnimi podjetji nazaj v javno oz občinsko lastništvo.

Rezultati empirične raziskave najprej potrjujejo značilnosti in teoretična pričakovanja teorije principal-agenta. Izvedena raziskava ponazarja klasičen odnos med principalom in agentom, kjer občine nastopajo kot principal in javna podjetja kot agenti. Dalje ohranitev popolnega javnega lastništva javnih podjetij oz preoblikovanje le teh v popolno javno lastništvo potrjuje prisotnost trenda remunicipalizacije ter prenos izvajanja lokalnih javnih storitev od zasebnikov k lastnemu javnemu izvajanju. V raziskavi so zaznani klasični razlogi za remunicipalizacijo, predvsem v kontekstu motivacijskih dejavnikov procesa preoblikovanja. Tudi medobčinsko sodelovanje kot način skupnega zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev je prepoznan na proučevanem področju. Zaradi majhnosti slovenskih občin bi veljalo bolj promovirati tovrsten način sodelovanja.

Raziskovalna tema še ni bila predmet širše raziskave v Sloveniji. Ugotovitve na osnovi obstoječih teoretičnih in empiričnih lokalnih, nacionalnih in mednarodnih študij predstavljajo dober dodatek k obstoječi domači in tuji akademski in strokovni literaturi na področjih korporativnega upravljanja, natančneje na področju odnosa med principalom in agentom v povezavi z zagotavljanjem lokalnih javnih storitev, na področju mehanizmov

zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev ter tudi na področju remunicipalizacije, kot nov trend zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev. Poleg tega doktorska disertacija predstavlja tudi veliko dodano vrednost z vidika rezultatov in ugotovitev empirične raziskave. Na eni strani, rezultati prikažejo proces preoblikovanja javnih podjetij v Sloveniji na podlagi ZJZP. Poleg tega rezultati pokažejo, ali je bilo preoblikovanje izvedeno skladno z omenjenim zakonom in kako je zakon vplival na način zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev. Na drugi strani, rezultati pokažejo izkušnje s preoblikovanjem javnih podjetij, tako z vidika občin (principali) kot lastnic javnih podjetij, kot tudi z vidika javnih podjetij kot izvajalcev storitev (agenti). Rezultati pokažejo tudi morebitne dobre prakse uporabe mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev v Sloveniji na področju upravljanja voda.

Rezultati predstavljajo osnovo za oblikovanje priporočil za uporabo različnih oblik mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev glede na značilnosti občin. Poleg tega prinašajo koristne informacije občinam, izvajalcem lokalnih javnih storitev in nosilcem javnih politik pri oblikovanju politik za organizacijo zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev na najbolj učinkovit način. Raziskava daje tudi dobre možnosti nadaljnjega proučevanja, ne le na področju upravljanja voda, ampak se lahko razširi tudi na preostala področja zagotavljanja obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb.

Appendix 2: The questionnaire »Reorganization process of public enterprises according to Public-Private Partnership Act (for public utility providers)«⁸

⁸ The added questionnaire is original print from online survey platform SurveyMonkey.

Spoštovani.

Moje ime je Veronika Petkovšek. Sem doktorska študentka na Ekonomski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani in v okviru moje doktorske disertacije z naslovom "Analiza izvajalcev in mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev na primeru Slovenije", pod mentorstvom izr. prof. dr. Primoža Pevcina (Fakulteta za upravo, UL) in somentorstvom red. prof. dr. Nevenke Hrovatin (Ekonomska fakulteta, UL), opravljam raziskavo, pri čemer Vas prosim za sodelovanje.

Izpolnjevanje anketnega vprašalnika Vam bo vzelo 30-45 min časa. Vprašalnik je segmentiran, zato ne pridejo v poštev vsa vprašanja (nanj ne odgovarjate v celoti). Sestavljen je na način, da pokriva različne možnosti izvajanja izbranih obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb, zato odgovarjate le na tista vprašanja, ki so relevantna za vašo organizacijo in so vezana na gospodarske javne službe, ki jih izvajate. Pri tem vas bodo izbrani odgovori samodejno usmerjali na nadaljnja vprašanja.

Pridobljeni podatki bodo uporabljeni izključno za namene raziskave v moji doktorski disertaciji, pri čemer bo zagotovljena anonimnost in sintetičnost pridobljenih podatkov. Rezultate in ugotovitve raziskave Vam bom ob zaključku analize z veseljem posredovala v vpogled.

Anketni vprašalnik je sestavljen iz 5 vsebinskih sklopov: 1. Podatki o izvajalcu obvezne gospodarske javne službe, 2. Izvajanje obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, 3. Lastniška struktura obstoječih javnih podjetij v obdobju 1993-2006 (v skladu z ZGJS), 4. ZJZP in preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij (obdobje 2007-), 5. Oblikovanje cen obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Cilj raziskave je prepoznati izkušnje v Sloveniji na področju mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev pred in po reorganizaciji obstoječih javnih podjetij, ki se je zgodila v obdobju 2007-2009 zaradi sprejetja Zakona o javno-zasebnem partnerstvu (Uradni list RS, št. 127/06). Zakon, poleg javno-zasebnega partnerstva, obravnava tudi reorganizacijo obstoječih javnih podjetij (preoblikovanje v gospodarsko družbo ali ohranitev statusa javnega podjetja) in podelitev koncesij javnim podjetjem, ki so se preoblikovala v gospodarske družbe.

Poudarek anketnega vprašalnika je na vplivu omenjenih sprememb institucionalnega okvira na mehanizme zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, natančneje obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, in sicer če in kako se je zagotavljanje lokalnih javnih storitev spremenilo zaradi reorganizacije javnih podjetij. Na tem mestu bo pozornost namenjena tudi proučevanju odkupovanja deležev občin v javnih podjetjih od zasebnikov, proučevanju podeljevanja koncesij v primeru, če imajo zasebniki še svoje deleže v javnih podjetjih ter proučevanju razmerja med lastniki gospodarske infrastrukture in izvajalci gospodarske javne službe. Poleg institucionalnih sprememb anketni vprašalnik preverja tudi oblikovanje cen obveznih občinskih gospodarskih javnih služb na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo ter

odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Z izpolnjevanjem ankete pričnete s klikom na naslednjo stran.

V kolikor imate kakšno vprašanje, se lahko obrnete neposredno name preko e-naslova: veronika.petkovsek@fu.uni-lj.si.

Za sodelovanje se Vam že vnaprej najlepše zahvaljujem.

Veronika Petkovšek

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

1. PODATKI O IZVAJALCU GOSPODARSKIH JAVNIH SLUŽB

Prvi sklop vprašanj zajema nekaj osnovnih podatkov o izvajalcu gospodarskih javnih služb.

1. Polni naziv in sedež organizacije.

2. Statusno-pravna oblika organizacije.

☐ Družba z omejeno odgovornostjo (d.o.o.)

☐ Delniška družba (d.d.)

☐ Drugo (navedite):

3. Leto ustanovitve organizacije.

4. Leto pričetka izvajanja oskrbe s pitno vodo.

5. Leto pričetka izvajanja odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

6. Leto pričetka izvajanja čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

2. IZVAJANJE OBVEZNIH GOSPODARSKIH JAVNIH SLUŽB

Drugi sklop vprašanj pokriva obvezne gospodarske javne službe in z njimi povezan delež prihodka organizacije ter opravljanje tržnih dejavnosti.

7. Katere obvezne občinske gospodarske javne službe (v nadaljevanju GJS) izvaja vaša organizacija na področju varstva okolja? Možnih je več odgovorov.

- ☐ oskrba s pitno vodo
- ☐ odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
- ☐ čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
- ☐ zbiranje določenih vrst komunalnih odpadkov
- ☐ obdelava določenih vrst komunalnih odpadkov
- ☐ odlaganje ostankov predelave ali odstranjevanja komunalnih odpadkov
- ☐ urejanje in čiščenje javnih površin

8. Katere ostale obvezne občinske gospodarske javne službe izvaja vaša organizacija? Možnih je več odgovorov.

- | | |
|--|--|
| ☐ vzdrževanje občinskih javnih cest | ☐ vzdrževanje javne razsvetljave |
| ☐ gospodarjenje s stavbnimi zemljišči | ☐ pomoč, oskrba in namestitev zapuščenih živali v zavetišču |
| ☐ javna snaga in čiščenje javnih površin | ☐ gasilska služba |
| ☐ urejanje javnih poti, površin za pešce in zelenih površin | ☐ linijski prevoz v mestnem prometu |
| ☐ pregledovanje, nadzorovanje in čiščenje kurilnih naprav, dimnih vodov in zračnikov zaradi varstva zraka | ☐ urejanje mestnega prometa |
| ☐ pokopališka dejavnost | ☐ urejanje prometa in upravljanje javnih parkirišč |
| ☐ Drugo (navedite): | |

9. Kolikšen okvirni delež prihodkov v celotnih prihodkih organizacije ustvarjate pri izvajanju spodaj navedenih dejavnosti? Navedite okvirni delež v %, za leto 2017.

obvezne občinske
gospodarske javne službe
varstva okolja:

ostale obvezne občinske
gospodarske javne službe:

tržna dejavnost:

10. Kolikšen okvirni delež prihodkov v celotnih prihodkih organizacije ustvarjate pri izvajanju spodaj navedenih obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb varstva okolja? Navedite v %, za leto 2017.

oskrba s pitno vodo:

odvajanje komunalne in
padavinske odpadne
vode:

čiščenje komunalne in
padavinske odpadne
vode:

11. Za koliko občin izvajate GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode? Navedite število.

Oskrba s pitno vodo:

Odvajanje komunalne in
padavinske odpadne
vode:

Čiščenje komunalne in
padavinske odpadne
vode:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

Tretji sklop vprašanj pokriva lastniško strukturo obstoječih javnih podjetij in lastništvo gospodarske javne infrastrukture pri obveznih gospodarskih javnih službah oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode na dan 31. 12. 2006.

12. Ali je vaše podjetje v letu 2006 opravljalo GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode kot pretežno dejavnost (delež prihodka, ki ga je podjetje pridobilo z opravljanjem GJS v celotnem prihodku podjetja, je večji od 50%)?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Da	☐	☐	☐
Ne	☐	☐	☐

13. Kakšno je bilo lastništvo podjetja na dan 31. 12. 2006?

- ☐ 100% občinsko lastništvo
- ☐ Mešano lastništvo
- ☐ Zasebno lastništvo

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

14. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura podjetja na dan 31. 12. 2006, v primeru 100% občinskega lastništva?

- ☐ Podjetje je bilo v lasti ene občine.
- ☐ Podjetje je bilo v lasti več občin (navedite št. občin):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

15. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura podjetja na dan 31. 12. 2006, v primeru mešanega lastništva? Navedite deleže v osnovnem kapitalu (v %).

Delež države:	
Delež občin:	
Delež drugih:	

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

16. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura podjetja na dan 31. 12. 2006, v primeru zasebnega lastništva?
Navedite deleže (v %).

Delež zasebnega kapitala
pravnih oseb:

Delež zasebnega kapitala
fizičnih oseb:

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

17. Ali je na dan 31. 12. 2006 vaše podjetje imelo v lasti gospodarsko javno infrastrukturo (v nadaljevanju GJI) za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo?

- ☐ Da, 100% delež GJI v lasti podjetja.
- ☐ Da, mešano lastništvo GJI.
- ☐ Ne.

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

18. Navedite lastniške deleže (v %; na dan 31. 12. 2006) v primeru mešanega lastništva GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo.

Delež GJI v lasti podjetja:

Delež GJI v lasti občine:

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

19. Če vaše podjetje na dan 31. 12. 2006 NI imelo v lasti GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanje in čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, potem je imelo GJI v* (* najem, vzdrževanje in upravljanje po SRS 35)

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
najemu	☐	☐	☐
vzdrževanju	☐	☐	☐
upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu in vzdrževanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
vzdrževanju in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu, vzdrževanju in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐

drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

20. Ali je na dan 31. 12. 2006 vaše podjetje imelo v lasti gospodarsko javno infrastrukturo (v nadaljevanju GJI) za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

- ☐ Da, 100% delež GJI v lasti podjetja.
- ☐ Da, mešano lastništvo GJI.
- ☐ Ne.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

21. Navedite lastniške deleže (v %; na dan 31. 12. 2006) v primeru mešanega lastništva GJI za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Delež GJI v lasti podjetja:

Delež GJI v lasti občine:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

22. Če vaše podjetje na dan 31. 12. 2006 NI imelo v lasti GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanje in čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, potem je imelo GJI v*
(* najem, vzdrževanje in upravljanje po SRS 35)

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
najemu	☐	☐	☐
vzdrževanju	☐	☐	☐
upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu in vzdrževanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
vzdrževanju in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu, vzdrževanju in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐

drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

23. Ali je na dan 31. 12. 2006 vaše podjetje imelo v lasti gospodarsko javno infrastrukturo (v nadaljevanju GJI) za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐ Da, 100% delež GJI v lasti podjetja.

☐ Da, mešano lastništvo GJI.

☐ Ne.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

24. Navedite lastniške deleže (v %; na dan 31. 12. 2006) v primeru mešanega lastništva GJI za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Delež GJI v lasti podjetja:

Delež GJI v lasti občine:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

25. Če vaše podjetje na dan 31. 12. 2006 NI imelo v lasti GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanje in čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, potem je imelo GJI v*
(* najem, vzdrževanje in upravljanje po SRS 35)

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
najemu	☐	☐	☐
vzdrževanju	☐	☐	☐
upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu in vzdrževanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
vzdrževanju in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐
najemu, vzdrževanju in upravljanju	☐	☐	☐

drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4. PREOBLIKOVANJE OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

Četrty sklop vprašanj je razdeljen na tri podsklope. Prva dva podsklopa pokrivata proces preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode v skladu z uveljavitvijo ZJZP in z njim povezanimi spremembami v lastniški strukturi obstoječih javnih podjetij ter spremembami v razmerju med lastnikom gospodarske javne infrastrukture in izvajalcem gospodarske javne službe. Tretji podsklop zajema prednosti in pomanjkljivosti preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij po uveljavitvi ZJZP.

26. Kakšno je bilo lastništvo podjetja na dan 31. 12. 2017?

- ☐ 100% občinsko lastništvo
- ☐ Mešano lastništvo
- ☐ Zasebno lastništvo

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

27. Ustanovitelj javnega podjetja (občina) je po uveljavitvi ZJZP

- ☐ ohranil 100% lastništvo obstoječega javnega podjetja
- ☐ odkupil zasebne lastniške deleže in preoblikoval obstoječe javno podjetje v 100% lastništvo občine
- ☐ drugo (navedite):

28. Ali je bila ohranitev oz. sprememba lastniške strukture podjetja, posledica uvedbe ZJZP?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne vem
- ☐ Ne, bila je posledica (navedite):

29. Katerega leta se je o ohranitvi oz. preoblikovanju v 100% lastništvo občine odločil ustanovitelj vašega podjetja?

30. Kakšna je lastniška struktura podjetja danes, v primeru 100% občinskega lastništva?

- ☐ Podjetje je v lasti ene občine.
- ☐ Podjetje je v lasti več občin (navedite št. občin):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

31. Zakaj se je vaš ustanovitelj (občina) odločil za ohranitev oz. preoblikovanje v 100% lastništvo občine?
Ocenite strinjanje z navedenimi razlogi.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Izogib javnim razpisom za koncesije	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izraba notranjih (in- house) naročil	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje sredstev EU	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izogib odpuščanju zaposlenih	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večji nadzor nad izvajalcem	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enostavnejša regulacija izvajalca	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja možnost vplivanja na poslovanje	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja racionalnost in učinkovitost poslovanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Težave z upravljanjem v podjetju z mešanim lastništvom.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

32. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura podjetja na dan 31. 12. 2017, v primeru mešanega lastništva?
Navedite deleže v osnovnem kapitalu (v %).

Delež države:

Delež občin:

Delež drugih:

33. Ali je bila ohranitev mešanega lastništva podjetja in posledično preoblikovanje v gospodarsko družbo posledica uvedbe ZJZP?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne vem
- ☐ Ne, bila je posledica (navedite):

34. Katerega leta se je o preoblikovanju v gospodarsko družbo odločil ustanovitelj vašega podjetja?

35. Katerega leta je bilo v primeru preoblikovanja podjetja v gospodarsko družbo le to zaključeno?

36. Zakaj ni bil prodan lastniški delež podjetja občini oz. zakaj občina ni odkupila lastniškega deleža, glede na to, da je podjetje ohranilo mešano lastništvo? Izberite oz navedite najpomembnejši dejavnik.

- ☐ Občina ni imela zadostnih sredstev za odkup lastniških deležev.
- ☐ Lastnik(-i) podjetja niso imeli interesa prodati svojih deležev podjetja.
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

37. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura podjetja na dan 31. 12. 2017, v primeru zasebnega lastništva? Navedite deleže (v %).

Delež zasebnega kapitala
pravnih oseb:

Delež zasebnega kapitala
fizičnih oseb:

38. Ali je bila v primeru spremembe lastniške strukture podjetja, le ta posledica uvedbe ZJZP?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne vem
- ☐ Ne, bila je posledica (navedite):

39. V primeru, da se je vaše podjetje preoblikovalo v gospodarsko družbo; katerega leta se je o tem preoblikovanju odločil ustanovitelj vašega podjetja?

40. V primeru, da se je vaše podjetje preoblikovalo v gospodarsko družbo; katerega leta je bilo to preoblikovanje zaključeno?

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

41. Ali je vaše podjetje, ker ima zasebni kapital, pridobilo koncesijo z javnim razpisom za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne

42. Ali je vaše podjetje, ker ima zasebni kapital, pridobilo koncesijo z javnim razpisom za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne

43. Ali je vaše podjetje, ker ima zasebni kapital, pridobilo koncesijo z javnim razpisom za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

44. Ali je vaše podjetje v primeru, da se je preoblikovalo v 100% lastništvo občine, kljub temu ohranilo koncesijo za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo, če jo je pred preoblikovanjem imelo?

- ☐ Da.
- ☐ Ne.
- ☐ Podjetje pred preoblikovanjem ni imelo koncesije za to dejavnost.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

45. Ali gre v tem primeru za t.i. horizontalno koncesijo*, ki jo je podjetje ohranilo z namenom, da lahko GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo izvaja za drugo občino?

(*Neposredna koncesija, ki jo občina podeli javnemu podjetju v lasti druge občine.)

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne. Prosim navedite, s kakšnim namenom je podjetje ohranilo koncesijo.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

46. Ali je vaše podjetje v primeru, da se je preoblikovalo v 100% lastništvo občine, kljub temu ohranilo koncesijo za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, če jo je pred preoblikovanjem imelo?

- ☐ Da.
- ☐ Ne.
- ☐ Podjetje pred preoblikovanjem ni imelo koncesije za to dejavnost.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

47. Ali gre v tem primeru za t.i. horizontalno koncesijo*, ki jo je podjetje ohranilo z namenom, da lahko GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode izvaja za drugo občino?
(*Neposredna koncesija, ki jo občina podeli javnemu podjetju v lasti druge občine.)

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne. Prosim navedite, s kakšnim namenom je podjetje ohranilo koncesijo.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

48. Ali je vaše podjetje v primeru, da se je preoblikovalo v 100% lastništvo občine, kljub temu ohranilo koncesijo za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, če jo je pred preoblikovanjem imelo?

- ☐ Da.
- ☐ Ne.
- ☐ Podjetje pred preoblikovanjem ni imelo koncesije za to dejavnost.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

49. Ali gre v tem primeru za t.i. horizontalno koncesijo*, ki jo je podjetje ohranilo z namenom, da lahko GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode izvaja za drugo občino?

(*Neposredna koncesija, ki jo občina podeli javnemu podjetju v lasti druge občine.)

☐ Da

☐ Ne. Prosim navedite, s kakšnim namenom je podjetje ohranilo koncesijo.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

50. Ali je vaše podjetje že kdaj pridobilo t.i. horizontalno koncesijo* brez javnega razpisa za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo?

(*Neposredna koncesija, ki jo občina podeli javnemu podjetju v lasti druge občine.)

☐ Da

☐ Ne

51. Ali je vaše podjetje že kdaj pridobilo t.i. horizontalno koncesijo brez javnega razpisa za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐ Da

☐ Ne

52. Ali je vaše podjetje že kdaj pridobilo t.i. horizontalno koncesijo brez javnega razpisa za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐ Da

☐ Ne

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

53. Ali je bila GJI za zagotavljanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode (v lasti vašega podjetja) po uveljavitvi ZJZP prenesena v lastništvo občine?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Da.	☐	☐	☐
Ne.	☐	☐	☐

V primeru odgovora NE, prosim navedite vzrok.

54. Na kakšen način je urejeno razmerje med lastnikom (občino) GJI in vašim podjetjem kot izvajalcem GJS (kot upravljalcem infrastrukture) oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Prenos GJI v last izvajalca GJS	☐	☐	☐
Prenos GJI v finančni najem izvajalca GJS	☐	☐	☐
Prenos GJI v poslovni najem izvajalca GJS	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (prosim, navedite):

55. Ali občina vašemu podjetju zaračunava najemnino za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne. Zakaj?

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

56. Višina najemnine za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo se določa na podlagi:

- ☐ višine amortizacije
- ☐ obresti za posojila, v primeru financiranja GJI z najemom posojil
- ☐ drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

57. Ali občina vašemu podjetju zaračunava najemnino za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne. Zakaj?

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

58. Višina najemnine za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode se določa na podlagi:

- ☐ višine amortizacije
- ☐ obresti za posojila, v primeru financiranja GJI z najemom posojil
- ☐ drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

59. Ali občina vašemu podjetju zaračunava najemnino za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne. Zakaj?

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

60. Višina najemnine za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode se določa na podlagi:

- ☐ višine amortizacije
- ☐ obresti za posojila, v primeru financiranja GJI z najemom posojil
- ☐ drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

4.3. PREDNOSTI IN POMANJKLJIVOSTI ZJZP V PROCESU PREOBLIKOVANJA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ

61. Ocenite strinjanje glede prednosti, ki ste jih pri izvajanju vaše GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Hitrejše opravljanje dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Boljša izraba delovne sile in kapitala	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša organizacija dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev / nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljše sodelovanje med podjetjem in lokalno skupnostjo oz. občinsko upravo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina ima popoln nadzor nad poslovanjem izvajalcev komunalnih storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina izvaja nadzor nad poslovanjem podjetja po odloku	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dobiček v javnem podjetju se v celoti nakaže v proračun in nameni vlaganju v infrastrukturo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ustanovitelske, korporacijske in oblastne pravice se predpišejo z občinskim odlokom	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pridobitev dodatnih drugih virov financiranja za občino	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razvoj strokovnega znanja in s tem povečanje kvalitete opravljanja storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje evropskih sredstev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

62. Ocenite* strinjanje glede prednosti, ki ste jih pri izvajanju vaše GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.

(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI

POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Hitrejše opravljanje dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša izraba delovne sile in kapitala	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša organizacija dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev / nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljše sodelovanje med podjetjem in lokalno skupnostjo oz. občinsko upravo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina ima popoln nadzor nad poslovanjem izvajalcev komunalnih storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina izvaja nadzor nad poslovanjem podjetja po odloku	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dobiček v javnem podjetju se v celoti nakaže v proračun in nameni vlaganju v infrastrukturo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ustanoviteljske, korporacijske in oblastne prave se predpišejo z občinskim odlokom	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pridobitev dodatnih drugih virov financiranja za občino	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razvoj strokovnega znanja in s tem povečanje kvalitete opravljanja storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje evropskih sredstev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

63. Ocenite* strinjanje glede prednosti, ki ste jih pri izvajanju vaše GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske

odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.

(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO ALI PRI ODVAJANJU ODPADNE VODE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Hitrejše opravljanje dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša izraba delovne sile in kapitala	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša organizacija dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev / nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljše sodelovanje med podjetjem in lokalno skupnostjo oz. občinsko upravo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina ima popoln nadzor nad poslovanjem izvajalcev komunalnih storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina izvaja nadzor nad poslovanjem podjetja po odloku	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dobiček v javnem podjetju se v celoti nakaže v proračun in nameni vlaganju v infrastrukturo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ustanoviteljske, korporacijske in oblastne pravice se predpišejo z občinskim odlokom	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pridobitev dodatnih drugih virov financiranja za občino	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razvoj strokovnega znanja in s tem povečanje kvalitete opravljanja storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje evropskih sredstev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

64. Ocenite strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki ste jih pri izvajanju vaše GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Višji stroški zaradi javnih razpisov za podeljevanje koncesij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji stroški za občino z vidika nadzora koncesionarja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji stroški za izvajalca GJS zaradi nadzora občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja cena storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja kvaliteta storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regulativna cenovna politika	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina nad koncesionarjem nima možnosti nadzora preko ustanovitelskih in korporacijskih pravic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ureditev koncesijskega razmerja terja ureditev veliko pravnih aktov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Premajhne izkušnje občine, da bo izvajala nadzor nad koncesijo, v smislu ohranitve kvalitetne storitve za občane, ohranjanja in povečanja vrednosti premoženja za občino, ob upravičenih cenah storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

65. Ocenite* strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki ste jih pri izvajanju vaše GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.
(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Višji stroški zaradi javnih razpisov za podeljevanje koncesij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji stroški za občino z vidika nadzora koncesionarja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji stroški za izvajalca GJS zaradi nadzora občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja cena storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja kvaliteta storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regulativna cenovna politika	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina nad koncesionarjem nima možnosti nadzora preko ustanovitelskih in korporacijskih pravic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ureditev koncesijskega razmerja terja ureditev veliko pravnih aktov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Premajhne izkušnje občine, da bo izvajala nadzor nad koncesijo, v smislu ohranitve kvalitetne storitve za občane, ohranjanja in povečanja vrednosti premoženja za občino, ob upravičenih cenah storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

66. Ocenite* strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki ste jih pri izvajanju vaše GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.
(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO ALI ODVAJANJU ODPADNE VODE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Višji stroški zaradi javnih razpisov za podeljevanje koncesij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji stroški za občino z vidika nadzora koncesionarja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji stroški za izvajalca GJS zaradi nadzora občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja cena storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja kvaliteta storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regulativna cenovna politika	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina nad koncesionarjem nima možnosti nadzora preko ustanovitelskih in korporacijskih pravic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ureditev koncesijskega razmerja terja ureditev veliko pravnih aktov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Premajhne izkušnje občine, da bo izvajala nadzor nad koncesijo, v smislu ohranitve kvalitetne storitve za občane, ohranjanja in povečanja vrednosti premoženja za občino, ob upravičenih cenah storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

67. Kako se je spremenila uspešnost poslovanja vašega podjetja po uveljavitvi ZJZP oz po procesu preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij? Ocenite spremembo.

	1 - Se je močno zmanjšala	2 - Se je delno zmanjšala	3 - Se ni spremenila	4 - Se je delno povečala	5 - Se je močno povečala
Sprememba uspešnosti poslovanja podjetja zaradi uveljavitve ZJZP oz preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Komentar/pojasnilo:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

Peti, zadnji sklop, pokriva oblikovanje cen gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode z vidika razmerja med občino in izvajalcem gospodarske javne službe.

68. Katerega leta ste za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode prvič oblikovali cene skladno z Uredbo o metodologiji za oblikovanje cen storitev obveznih občinskih gospodarskih javnih služb varstva okolja (Ur. l. RS, št. 87/12, 109/12)?

Oskrba s pitno vodo:

Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode:

Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode:

69. Predračunska lastna cena za prihodnje obračunsko obdobje je s strani občine vedno potrjena ob prvi predložitvi le te:

- ☐ da
- ☐ ne
- ☐ drugo (navedite):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

70. Ali imate v primeru, da predračunska cena za prihodnje obračunsko obdobje s strani občine ni potrjena ob njeni prvi predložitvi, kot izvajalec storitev možnost usklajevanja z občino?

☐ Da

☐ Ne

71. Ali imate v primeru, da GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo izvajate za več občin hkrati, za vse občine oblikovano enako ceno?

☐ Da, enako ceno storitve in enako ceno omrežnine.

☐ Enako ceno storitve, vendar različno ceno omrežnine.

☐ Enako ceno omrežnine, vendar različno ceno storitve.

☐ Ne, razlikujejo se tako cena storitve kot cena omrežnine.

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

72. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

73. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

74. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

75. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

76. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

77. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

78. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

79. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za več občin hkrati? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

80. Ali imate v primeru, da GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode izvajate za več občin hkrati, za vse občine oblikovano enako ceno?

- ☐ Da, enako ceno storitve in enako ceno omrežnine.
- ☐ Enako ceno storitve, vendar različno ceno omrežnine.
- ☐ Enako ceno omrežnine, vendar različno ceno storitve.
- ☐ Ne, razlikujejo se tako cena storitve kot cena omrežnine.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

81. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

82. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

83. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

84. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

85. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

86. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

87. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

88. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

89. Ali imate v primeru, da GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode izvajate za več občin hkrati, za vse občine oblikovano enako ceno?

- ☐ Da, enako ceno storitve in enako ceno omrežnine.
- ☐ Enako ceno storitve, vendar različno ceno omrežnine.
- ☐ Enako ceno omrežnine, vendar različno ceno storitve.
- ☐ Ne, razlikujejo se tako cena storitve kot cena omrežnine.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN

90. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

91. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

92. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

93. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

94. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

95. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

96. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

97. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za več občin hkrati? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Število prebivalcev občine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev v aglomeraciji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gostota prebivalcev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Geografski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tehnično-tehnološki pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Strateško-pogajalski pogoji	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nezmožnost dogovora o enotni ceni	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

98. Ali v vašem podjetju nastaja morebitni presežek poslovanja podjetja? Če nastaja, navedite okvirni delež presežka poslovanja, ki pripada podjetju ter okvirni delež, ki pripada občini.

Delež presežka
poslovanja, ki pripada
podjetju:

Delež presežka
poslovanja, ki pripada
občini:

99. V primeru, da podjetje ustvarja izgubo, le to pokriva

- ☐ podjetje v celoti
- ☐ podjetje in občina
- ☐ drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

100. Če nastalo izgubo pokrivata podjetje in občina, potem so deleži pokrivanja izgube običajno sledeči:

delež izgube, ki ga pokriva
podjetje:

delež izgube, ki ga pokriva
občina:

101. Ali občina/občine, kjer izvajate GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode subvencionira ceno omrežnine in ceno storitve?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Da, subvencionirana je tako cena omrežnine kot tudi cena storitve.	☐	☐	☐
Subvencionirana je cena omrežnine, ne pa tudi cena storitve.	☐	☐	☐
Subvencionirana je cena storitve, ne pa tudi cena omrežnine.	☐	☐	☐
Ne, subvencionirana ni niti cena omrežnine niti cena storitve.	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

102. Kako je uvedba nove uredbe o oblikovanju cen storitev obveznih občinskih GJS vplivala na njihovo ceno? Ocenite spremembo.

	1 - Se je močno znižala	2- Se je delno znižala	3 - Se ni spremenila	4 - Se je delno zvižala	5 - Se je močno zvižala
Cena oskrbe s pitno vodo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cena odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cena čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Komentar/pojasnilo:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (izvajalci obveznih GJS)

ZAHVALA ZA SODELOVANJE

Zahvaljujem se Vam za sodelovanje pri izpolnjevanju vprašalnika.

Po zaključeni analizi rezultatov Vam rezultate z ugotovitvami z veseljem posredujem. Če želite prejeti povratno informacijo glede rezultatov, Vas prosim, da spodaj navedete kontaktne podatke.

103. Kontaktni podatki organizacije za posredovanje rezultatov analize.

Ime in priimek:

E-naslov:

Drugo (komentar, opomba):

104. Vaše mnenje glede ustreznosti vprašalnika in uporabnosti pridobljenih rezultatov analize:

NAJLEPŠA HVALA ZA SODELOVANJE!

Appendix 3: The questionnaire »Reorganization process of public enterprises according to Public-Private Partnership Act (for municipalities)«⁹

⁹ The added questionnaire is original print from online survey platform SurveyMonkey.

Spoštovani.

Moje ime je Veronika Petkovšek. Sem doktorska študentka na Ekonomski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani in v okviru moje doktorske disertacije z naslovom "Analiza izvajalcev in mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev na primeru Slovenije", pod mentorstvomizr. prof. dr. Primoža Pevcina (Fakulteta za upravo, UL) in somentorstvom red. prof. dr. Nevenke Hrovatin (Ekonomska fakulteta, UL), opravljam raziskavo, pri čemer Vas prosim za sodelovanje.

Izpolnjevanje anketnega vprašalnika Vam bo vzelo 30-45 min časa. Vprašalnik je segmentiran, zato ne pridejo v poštev vsa vprašanja (nanj ne odgovarjate v celoti). Sestavljen je na način, da pokriva različne možnosti zagotavljanja izbranih obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb, zato odgovarjate le na tista vprašanja, ki so relevantna za vašo občino in so vezana na gospodarske javne službe, ki jih zagotavljate. Pri tem vas bodo izbrani odgovori samodejno usmerjali na nadaljnja vprašanja.

Pridobljeni podatki bodo uporabljeni izključno za namene raziskave v moji doktorski disertaciji, pri čemer bo zagotovljena anonimnost in sintetičnost pridobljenih podatkov. Rezultate in ugotovitve raziskave Vam bom ob zaključku analize z veseljem posredovala v vpogled.

Vprašalnik je sestavljen iz 5 vsebinskih sklopov: 1. Podatki o občini, 2. Zagotavljanje obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, 3. Lastniška struktura obstoječih javnih podjetij v obdobju 1993-2006 (v skladu z ZGJS), 4. ZJZP in preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij (obdobje 2007-), 5. Oblikovanje cen obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Cilj raziskave je prepoznati izkušnje v Sloveniji na področju mehanizmov zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev pred in po preoblikovanju obstoječih javnih podjetij, do katerega je prišlo v obdobju 2007-2009 zaradi sprejetja Zakona o javno-zasebnem partnerstvu (Uradni list RS, št. 127/06). Zakon, poleg javno-zasebnega partnerstva, obravnava tudi preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij (preoblikovanje v gospodarsko družbo ali ohranitev statusa javnega podjetja) in podelitev koncesij javnim podjetjem, ki so se preoblikovala v gospodarske družbe.

Poudarek anketnega vprašalnika je na vplivu omenjenih sprememb institucionalnega okvira na mehanizme zagotavljanja lokalnih javnih storitev, natančneje obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, in sicer če in kako se je zagotavljanje lokalnih javnih storitev spremenilo zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij. Na tem mestu bo pozornost namenjena tudi proučevanju odkupovanja deležev občin v javnih podjetjih od zasebnikov, proučevanju podeljevanja koncesij v primeru, če imajo zasebniki še svoje deleže v javnih podjetjih, ter proučevanju razmerja med lastniki gospodarske infrastrukture in izvajalci gospodarske javne službe. Poleg institucionalnih sprememb anketni vprašalnik preverja tudi izkušnje občin z medsebojnim (medobčinskim) sodelovanjem ter

oblikovanje cen obveznih občinskih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Z izpolnjevanjem ankete pričnete s klikom na naslednjo stran.

V kolikor imate kakšno vprašanje, se lahko obrnete neposredno name preko e-naslova: veronika.petkovsek@fu.uni-lj.si.

Za sodelovanje se Vam že vnaprej najlepše zahvaljujem.

Veronika Petkovšek

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

1. PODATKI O OBČINI

Prvi sklop vprašalnika zajema vprašanje o imenu občine.

1. Ime občine.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

2. ZAGOTAVLJANJE OBVEZNIH GOSPODARSKIH JAVNIH SLUŽB

Drugi sklop vprašanj pokriva načine zagotavljanja obveznih gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

2. Na kakšen način vaša občina zagotavlja obvezne gospodarske javne službe (v nadaljevanju GJS) oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Javno podjetje	☐	☐	☐
Koncesija na podlagi javnega razpisa	☐	☐	☐
Režijski obrat	☐	☐	☐
Javno podjetje in koncesija na podlagi javnega razpisa	☐	☐	☐
Režijski obrat in javno podjetje	☐	☐	☐
Režijski obrat in koncesija na podlagi javnega razpisa	☐	☐	☐
Režijski obrat, javno podjetje in koncesija na podlagi javnega razpisa	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

3. Navedite število izvajalcev obveznih GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode v vaši občini.

Oskrba s pitno vodo:

Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode:

Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode:

4. Ali izvajalec obveznih GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode izvaja storitve tudi za druge občine?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Da	☐	☐	☐
Ne	☐	☐	☐

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

Tretji sklop vprašanj pokriva lastniško strukturo obstoječih javnih podjetij in lastništvo gospodarske javne infrastrukture pri obveznih GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode na dan 31. 12. 2006.

5. Ali je vaša občina na dan 31. 12. 2006 imela lastništvo nad katerim obstoječim podjetjem, ki je GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo in/ali odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode opravljalo kot pretežno dejavnost (delež prihodka, ki ga je podjetje pridobilo z opravljanjem GJS v celotnem prihodku podjetja, je večji od 50%)?

☐

Da

☐

Ne

V primeru odgovora DA, navedite naziv podjetja/podjetij:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

6. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura javnih podjetij (podjetja, ki so zaradi izvajanja pretežne dejavnosti postala lastnina vaše občine) s pretežno dejavnostjo GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo, na dan 31. 12. 2006? Navedite deleže v osnovnem kapitalu (v %).

Delež države:

Delež občin:

Delež drugih:

7. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura javnih podjetij (podjetja, ki so zaradi izvajanja pretežne dejavnosti postala lastnina vaše občine) s pretežno dejavnostjo GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, na dan 31. 12. 2006? Navedite deleže v osnovnem kapitalu (v %).

Delež države:

Delež občin:

Delež drugih:

8. Kakšna je bila lastniška struktura javnih podjetij (podjetja, ki so zaradi izvajanja pretežne dejavnosti postala lastnina vaše občine) s pretežno dejavnostjo GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, na dan 31. 12. 2006? Navedite deleže v osnovnem kapitalu (v %).

Delež države:

Delež občin:

Delež drugih:

9. Čigavo je bilo lastništvo gospodarske javne infrastrukture (v nadaljevanju GJI) za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo, na dan 31. 12. 2006?

☐

100% delež GJI v lasti podjetja.

☐

Mešano lastništvo GJI.

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

10. Navedite lastniške deleže (v %; na dan 31. 12. 2006) v primeru mešanega lastništva GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo.

Delež GJI v lasti podjetja:

Delež GJI v lasti občine:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

11. Čigavo je bilo lastništvo gospodarske javne infrastrukture za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, na dan 31. 12. 2006?

☐

100% delež GJI v lasti podjetja.

☐

Mešano lastništvo GJI.

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

12. Navedite lastniške deleže (v %; na dan 31. 12. 2006) v primeru mešanega lastništva GJI za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Delež GJI v lasti podjetja:

Delež GJI v lasti občine:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

13. Čigavo je bilo lastništvo gospodarske javne infrastrukture za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, na dan 31. 12. 2006?

☐

100% delež GJI v lasti podjetja.

☐

Mešano lastništvo GJI.

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

3. LASTNIŠKA STRUKTURA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PRED UVELJAVITVIJO ZJZP

14. Navedite lastniške deleže (v %; na dan 31. 12. 2006) v primeru mešanega lastništva GJI za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode.

Delež GJI v lasti podjetja:

Delež GJI v lasti občine:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4. PREOBLIKOVANJE OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

Četrti sklop vprašanj je razdeljen na pet podsklopov, ki pokrivajo proces preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP in z njim povezane spremembe v lastniški strukturi obstoječih javnih podjetij ter v razmerju med lastnikom gospodarske javne infrastrukture in izvajalcem

gospodarske javne službe. Poleg tega pokriva tudi podeljevanje koncesij, prednosti in pomanjkljivosti sodelovanja med občinami ter prednosti in pomanjkljivosti preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij.

15. Kako je v procesu preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij, v skladu z ZJZP, pri zagotavljanju GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ravnala vaša občina?

- ☐ Ohranila je 100% lastništvo obstoječega javnega podjetja. ☐ Ni odkupila zasebnih lastniških deležev; podjetje je ohranilo mešano lastništvo.
- ☐ Odkupila je zasebne lastniške deleže in podjetje preoblikovala v 100% lastništvo občine.
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

16. Če se je na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo obstoječe javno podjetje preoblikovalo v 100% lastništvo občine, je občina lastniške deleže odkupila od: (navedite kot delež (v %) v osnovnem kapitalu).

pravnih oseb:

fizičnih oseb:

drugo (navedite):

17. V primeru, da je občina na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo ohranila oz. preoblikovala javno podjetje v 100% lastništvo občine, zakaj se je odločila za to? Ocenite strinjanje z navedenimi razlogi.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Izogib javnim razpisom za koncesije	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izraba notranjih (in- house) naročil	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje sredstev EU	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izogib odpuščanju zaposlenih	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večji nadzor nad izvajalcem	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enostavnejša regulacija izvajalca	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja možnost vplivanja na poslovanje	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja racionalnost in učinkovitost poslovanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Slabe izkušnje z zasebnim izvajalcem z deležem lastnine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Majhen obseg dejavnosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

18. Katera podjetja na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo so bila na dan 31. 12. 2017 v izključni (100%) lasti občine? Navedite.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

19. Če je na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo podjetje ohranilo mešano lastništvo, potem so lastniški deleži sledeči: (navedite kot delež (v %) v osnovnem kapitalu)

delež občin:

delež drugih:

20. Če je podjetje na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo ohranilo mešano lastništvo, občina ni odkupila lastniških deležev, ker: (izberite oz. navedite najpomembnejši dejavnik)

☐

Občina ni imela zadostnih sredstev za odkup lastniških deležev.

☐

Lastnik(-i) niso imeli interesa prodati svojih deležev podjetja.

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

21. Kako je v procesu preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij, v skladu z ZJZP, pri zagotavljanju GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ravnala vaša občina?

☐

Ohranila je 100% lastništvo obstoječega javnega podjetja.

☐

Ni odkupila zasebnih lastniških deležev; podjetje je ohranilo mešano lastništvo.

☐

Odkupila je zasebne lastniške deleže in podjetje preoblikovala v 100% lastništvo občine.

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

22. Če se je na področju odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode javno podjetje preoblikovalo v 100% lastništvo občine, je občina lastniške deleže odkupila od: (navedite kot delež (v %) v osnovnem kapitalu)

pravnih oseb:

fizičnih oseb:

drugo (navedite):

23. V primeru, da je občina na področju odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ohranila oz. preoblikovala javno podjetje v 100% lastništvo občine, zakaj se je odločila za to? Ocenite strinjanje z navedenimi razlogi.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Izogib javnim razpisom za koncesije	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izraba notranjih (in- house) naročil	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje sredstev EU	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izogib odpuščanju zaposlenih	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večji nadzor nad izvajalcem	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enostavnejša regulacija izvajalca	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja možnost vplivanja na poslovanje	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja racionalnost in učinkovitost poslovanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Slabe izkušnje z zasebnim izvajalcem z deležem lastnine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Majhen obseg dejavnosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

24. Katera podjetja na področju odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode imate v izključni (100%) lasti občine? Navedite.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

25. Če je na področju odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode podjetje ohranilo mešano lastništvo, potem so lastniški deleži sledeči: (navedite kot delež (v %) v osnovnem kapitalu)

delež občin:

delež drugih:

26. Če je podjetje na področju odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ohranilo mešano lastništvo, občina ni odkupila lastniških deležev, ker: (izberite oz. navedite najpomembnejši dejavnik)

☐

Občina ni imela zadostnih sredstev za odkup lastniških deležev.

☐

Lastnik(-i) niso imeli interesa prodati svojih deležev podjetja.

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

27. Kako je v procesu preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij, v skladu z ZJZP, pri zagotavljanju GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ravnala vaša občina?

- ☐ Ohranila je 100% lastništvo obstoječega javnega podjetja. ☐ Ni odkupila zasebnih lastniških deležev; podjetje je ohranilo mešano lastništvo.
- ☐ Odkupila je zasebne lastniške deleže in podjetje preoblikovala v 100% lastništvo občine.
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

28. Če se je na področju čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode javno podjetje preoblikovalo v 100% lastništvo občine, je občina lastniške deleže odkupila od: (navedite kot delež (v %) v osnovnem kapitalu)

pravnih oseb:

fizičnih oseb:

drugo (navedite):

29. V primeru, da je občina na področju čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ohranila oz. preoblikovala javno podjetje v 100% lastništvo občine, zakaj se je odločila za to? Ocenite strinjanje z navedenimi razlogi.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Izogib javnim razpisom za koncesije	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izraba notranjih (in-house) naročil	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje sredstev EU	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Izogib odpuščanju zaposlenih	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večji nadzor nad izvajalcem	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Enostavnejša regulacija izvajalca	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja možnost vplivanja na poslovanje	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Večja racionalnost in učinkovitost poslovanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Slabe izkušnje z zasebnim izvajalcem z deležem lastnine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Majhen obseg dejavnosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

30. Katera podjetja na področju čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode imate v izključni (100%) lasti občine? Navedite.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

31. Če je na področju čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode podjetje ohranilo mešano lastništvo, potem so lastniški deleži sledeči: (navedite kot delež (v %) v osnovnem kapitalu)

delež občin:

delež drugih:

32. Če je podjetje na področju čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ohranilo mešano lastništvo, občina ni odkupila lastniških deležev, ker: (izberite oz. navedite najpomembnejši dejavnik)

☐

Občina ni imela zadostnih sredstev za odkup lastniških deležev.

☐

Lastnik(-i) niso imeli interesa prodati svojih deležev podjetja.

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.1. SPREMEMBE V LASTNIŠKI STRUKTURI OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

33. Ali v prihodnosti načrtujete odkup zasebnega kapitala in prenos v javno lastništvo ali prodajo javnega kapitala in prenos v zasebno lastništvo?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Da, odkup zasebnega kapitala in prenos v javno lastništvo.	☐	☐	☐
Da, prodajo javnega kapitala in prenos v zasebno lastništvo.	☐	☐	☐
Da, tako odkup zasebnega kapitala in prenos v javno lastništvo, kot tudi prodajo javnega kapitala in prenos v zasebno lastništvo.	☐	☐	☐
Ne.	☐	☐	☐

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

34. Ali je bila na dan 31. 12. 2017 gospodarska javna infrastruktura (GJI) za zagotavljanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode v 100% lasti občine?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Da.	☐	☐	☐
Ne.	☐	☐	☐

Deloma (navedite delež (v %) v lasti občine za posamezno GJS):

35. Na kakšen način je urejeno razmerje med lastnikom (občino) GJI in izvajalcem GJS (kot upravljalcem infrastrukture) oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Prenos GJI v last izvajalca GJS	☐	☐	☐
Prenos GJI v finančni najem izvajalca GJS	☐	☐	☐
Prenos GJI v poslovni najem izvajalca GJS	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite):

36. Ali izvajalcu GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo zaračunavate najemnino za uporabo GJI?

- ☐ Da.
- ☐ Ne. Zakaj?

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

37. Občina določa višino najemnine za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo na podlagi:

- ☐ višina amortizacije (v celoti) ☐ obresti za posojila, v primeru financiranja GJI z najemom posojil
- ☐ višina amortizacije (delno)
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):

38. Ali izvajalcu GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske vode zaračunavate najemnino za uporabo GJI?

- ☐ Da.
- ☐ Ne. Zakaj?

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

39. Občina določa višino najemnine za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode na podlagi:

- ☐ višina amortizacije (v celoti) ☐ obresti za posojila, v primeru financiranja GJI z najemom posojil
- ☐ višina amortizacije (delno)
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

40. Ali izvajalcu GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske vode zaračunavate najemnino za uporabo GJI?

☐

Da.

☐

Ne. Zakaj?

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.2. RAZMERJE MED LASTNIKOM GJI IN IZVAJALCEM GJS PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

41. Občina določa višino najemnine za uporabo GJI za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode na podlagi:

☐

višina amortizacije (v celoti)

☐

obresti za posojila, v primeru financiranja GJI z najemom posojil

☐

višina amortizacije (delno)

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

42. Ali vaša občina podeljuje koncesije za opravljanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

	Oskrba s pitno vodo	Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode	Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode
Da, koncesije na podlagi javnega razpisa	☐	☐	☐
Da, koncesije brez javnega razpisa (v javnem podjetju ni vložkov oseb zasebnega prava)	☐	☐	☐
Da, tako koncesije na podlagi javnega razpisa, kot tudi koncesije brez javnega razpisa	☐	☐	☐
Ne	☐	☐	☐

43. Ali vaša občina podeljuje tudi t.i. horizontalne koncesije* brez javnega razpisa za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo?

* Neposredna koncesija javnim podjetjem v lasti drugih občin.

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

44. Ali so bili v primeru podelitve horizontalne koncesije za koncesijsko razmerje upoštevani pogoji občine/občin ustanoviteljic vključenega javnega podjetja na področju oskrbe s pitno vodo?

- ☐ Da ☐ Ne
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):

45. Ali vaša občina podeljuje tudi t.i. horizontalne koncesije* brez javnega razpisa za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

* Neposredna koncesija javnim podjetjem v lasti drugih občin.

- ☐ Da
- ☐ Ne

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

46. Ali so bili v primeru podelitve horizontalne koncesije za koncesijsko razmerje upoštevani pogoji občine/občin ustanoviteljic vključenega javnega podjetja na področju odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐

Da

☐

Ne

☐

Drugo (navedite):

47. Ali vaša občina podeljuje tudi t.i. horizontalne koncesije* brez javnega razpisa za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

* Neposredna koncesija javnim podjetjem v lasti drugih občin.

☐

Da

☐

Ne

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

48. Ali so bili v primeru podelitve horizontalne koncesije za koncesijsko razmerje upoštevani pogoji občine/občin ustanoviteljic vključenega javnega podjetja na področju čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐

Da

☐

Ne

☐

Drugo (navedite):

49. Ali je vaša občina že bila kdaj vključena v podelitev skupne koncesije v sodelovanju z eno ali več občinami za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo?

☐ Ne

☐ Da, v sodelovanju z občinami (navedite občine):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

50. Za podelitev skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ste sodelujoče občine ustanovile/vzpostavile (možnih je več odgovorov):

☐ Organ ali organe skupne občinske uprave

☐ Medobčinski sporazum

☐ Svet koncedentov

☐ Skupno javno podjetje

☐ Interesno zvezo občin

☐ Nič od navedenega

☐ Drugo (navedite):

51. V primeru podelitve skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo, ste se sodelujoče občine za to odločile zaradi (izberite najpomembnejši dejavnik):

☐ Geografsko zaokroženega oskrbovalnega območja

☐ Predvidenih nižjih stroškov podeljevanja in nadzora koncesij (delitev stroškov)

☐ Predvidenih nižjih stroškov izvajanja dejavnosti GJS zaradi ekonomij obsega

☐ Drugo (navedite):

52. Ali je vaša občina že bila kdaj vključena v podelitev skupne koncesije v sodelovanju z eno ali več občinami za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐ Ne

☐ Da, v sodelovanju z občinami (navedite občine):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

53. Za podelitev skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ste sodelujoče občine ustanovile/vzpostavile (možnih je več odgovorov):

☐ Organ ali organe skupne občinske uprave

☐ Medobčinski sporazum

☐ Svet koncendentov

☐ Skupno javno podjetje

☐ Interesno zvezo občin

☐ Nič od navedenega

☐ Drugo (navedite):

54. V primeru podelitve skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, ste se sodelujoče občine za to odločile zaradi (izberite najpomembnejši dejavnik):

☐ Geografsko zaokroženega oskrbovalnega območja

☐ Predvidenih nižjih stroškov podeljevanja in nadzora koncesij (delitev stroškov)

☐ Predvidenih nižjih stroškov izvajanja dejavnosti GJS zaradi ekonomij obsega

☐ Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

55. Ali je vaša občina že bila kdaj vključena v podelitev skupne koncesije v sodelovanju z eno ali več občinami za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐ Ne

☐ Da, v sodelovanju z občinami (navedite občine):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

56. Za podelitev skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode ste sodelujoče občine ustanovile/vzpostavile (možnih je več odgovorov):

☐ Organ ali organe skupne občinske uprave

☐ Medobčinski sporazum

☐ Svet koncedentov

☐ Skupno javno podjetje

☐ Interesno zvezo občin

☐ Nič od navedenega

☐ Drugo (navedite):

57. V primeru podelitve skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, ste se sodelujoče občine za to odločile zaradi (izberite najpomembnejši dejavnik):

☐ Geografsko zaokroženega oskrbovalnega območja

☐ Predvidenih nižjih stroškov podeljevanja in nadzora koncesij (delitev stroškov)

☐ Predvidenih nižjih stroškov izvajanja dejavnosti GJS zaradi ekonomij obsega

☐ Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.3. PODELJEVANJE KONCESIJ PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

58. Ali v prihodnosti vidite kakšno priložnost za podelitev skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo?

☐ Ne

☐ Da, navedite:

59. Ali v prihodnosti vidite kakšno priložnost za podelitev skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐ Ne

☐ Da, navedite:

60. Ali v prihodnosti vidite kakšno priložnost za podelitev skupne koncesije za izvajanje GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode?

☐ Ne

☐ Da, navedite:

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.4. PREDNOSTI IN POMANJKLJIVOSTI SODELOVANJA MED OBČINAMI PO UVELJAVITVI ZJZP

61. Ocenite strinjanje glede prednosti, ki jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo že prinaša oz. bi prineslo sodelovanje med občinami (podeljevanje skupnih koncesij, horizontalnih koncesij, ustanovitev skupnega javnega podjetja itd.).

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Izkoriščanje ekonomij obsega	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja cena storitev za končne uporabnike	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja kakovost storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prenos in izmenjava znanja, izkušenj, dobrih in slabih praks	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Manjši pritiski na proračunska sredstva	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažji dostop do zunanjih virov financiranja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Doseganje večje strokovnosti pri zagotavljanju storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Doseganje prednosti iz naslova velikosti občin (manjše občine)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Skupno upravljanje infrastrukture	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

62. Ocenite* strinjanje glede prednosti, ki jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode že prinaša oz. bi prineslo sodelovanje med občinami (podeljevanje skupnih koncesij, horizontalnih koncesij, ustanovitev skupnega javnega podjetja itd.).

(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Izkoriščanje ekonomij obsega	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja cena storitev za končne uporabnike	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja kakovost storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prenos in izmenjava znanja, izkušenj, dobrih in slabih praks	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Manjši pritiski na proračunska sredstva	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažji dostop do zunanjih virov financiranja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Doseganje večje strokovnosti pri zagotavljanju storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Doseganje prednosti iz naslova velikosti občin (manjše občine)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Skupno upravljanje infrastrukture	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

63. Ocenite* strinjanje glede prednosti, ki jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode že prinaša oz. bi prineslo sodelovanje med občinami (podeljevanje skupnih koncesij, horizontalnih koncesij, ustanovitev skupnega javnega podjetja itd.).

(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO ALI PRI ODVAJANJU ODPADNE VODE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Izkoriščanje ekonomij obsega	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja cena storitev za končne uporabnike	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja kakovost storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prenos in izmenjava znanja, izkušenj, dobrih in slabih praks	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Manjši pritiski na proračunska sredstva	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažji dostop do zunanjih virov financiranja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Doseganje večje strokovnosti pri zagotavljanju storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Doseganje prednosti iz naslova velikosti občin (manjše občine)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Skupno upravljanje infrastrukture	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

64. Ocenite strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo že prinaša oz. bi prineslo sodelovanje med občinami.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Pomanjkanje strokovnosti pri skupnem upravljanju storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zapletenost skupnega upravljanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Težje dosegati soglasje med sodelujočimi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regionalna vprašanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje transparentnosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Težave pri opredeljevanju odgovornosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje zaupanja med sodelujočimi občinami	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Spori med občinskimi uradniki	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkušenost na področju sodelovanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje pravnega znanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

65. Ocenite* strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode že prinaša oz. bi prineslo sodelovanje med občinami.

(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Pomanjkanje strokovnosti pri skupnem upravljanju storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zapletenost skupnega upravljanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Težje dosegati soglasje med sodelujočimi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regionalna vprašanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje transparentnosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Težave pri opredeljevanju odgovornosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje zaupanja med sodelujočimi občinami	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Spori med občinskimi uradniki	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkušenost na področju sodelovanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje pravnega znanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

66. Ocenite* strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode že prinaša oz. bi prineslo sodelovanje med občinami.
(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO ALI PRI ODVAJANJU ODPADNE VODE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Pomanjkanje strokovnosti pri skupnem upravljanju storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zapletenost skupnega upravljanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Težje dosegati soglasje med sodelujočimi	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regionalna vprašanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje transparentnosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Težave pri opredeljevanju odgovornosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje zaupanja med sodelujočimi občinami	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Spori med občinskimi uradniki	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkušenost na področju sodelovanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pomanjkanje pravnega znanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

4.5. PREDNOSTI IN POMANJKLJIVOSTI ZJZP V PROCESU PREOBLIKOVANJA OBSTOJEČIH JAVNIH PODJETIJ

67. Ocenite strinjanje glede prednosti, ki ste jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Hitrejše opravljanje dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša izraba delovne sile in kapitala	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša organizacija dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev / nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev zaradi skupnega izvajanja storitev (povezane storitve)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljše sodelovanje med podjetjem in lokalno skupnostjo oz. občinsko upravo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina ima popoln nadzor nad poslovanjem komunalnih storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina izvaja nadzor nad poslovanjem podjetja po odloku	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dobiček v javnem podjetju se v celoti nakaže v proračun in nameni vlaganju v infrastrukturo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ustanovitelske, korporacijske in oblastne pravice se predpišejo z občinskim odlokom	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pridobitev dodatnih občinskih proračunskih virov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razvoj strokovnega znanja in s tem povečanje kvalitete opravljanja storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje evropskih sredstev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

68. Ocenite* strinjanje glede prednosti, ki ste jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP. (*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Hitrejše opravljanje dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša izraba delovne sile in kapitala	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša organizacija dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev / nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev zaradi skupnega izvajanja storitev (povezane storitve)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljše sodelovanje med podjetjem in lokalno skupnostjo oz. občinsko upravo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina ima popoln nadzor nad poslovanjem komunalnih storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina izvaja nadzor nad poslovanjem podjetja po odloku	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dobiček v javnem podjetju se v celoti nakaže v proračun in nameni vlaganju v infrastrukturo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ustanovitelske, korporacijske in oblastne pravice se predpišejo z občinskim odlokom	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pridobitev dodatnih občinskih proračunskih virov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Razvoj strokovnega znanja in s tem povečanje kvalitete opravljanja storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje evropskih sredstev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

69. Ocenite* strinjanje glede prednosti, ki ste jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.
(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO ALI PRI ODVAJANJU ODPADNE VODE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Hitrejše opravljanje dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša izraba delovne sile in kapitala	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljša organizacija dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški dela	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev / nižji transakcijski stroški	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižji stroški zagotavljanja storitev zaradi skupnega izvajanja storitev (povezane storitve)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Boljše sodelovanje med podjetjem in lokalno skupnostjo oz. občinsko upravo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina ima popoln nadzor nad poslovanjem komunalnih storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina izvaja nadzor nad poslovanjem podjetja po odloku	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Dobiček v javnem podjetju se v celoti nakaže v proračun in nameni vlaganju v infrastrukturo	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ustanovitelske, korporacijske in oblastne pravice se predpišejo z občinskim odlokom	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pridobitev dodatnih občinskih proračunskih virov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razvoj strokovnega znanja in s tem povečanje kvalitete opravljanja storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lažje pridobivanje evropskih sredstev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

70. Ocenite strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki ste jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Višji transakcijski stroški na račun javnih razpisov za podeljevanje koncesij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji transakcijski stroški z vidika nadzora koncesionarja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja cena storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja kvaliteta storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regulativna cenovna politika	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina nad koncesionarjem nima možnosti nadzora preko ustanovitelskih in korporacijskih pravic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ureditev koncesijskega razmerja terja ureditev veliko pravnih aktov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Premajhne izkušnje občine, da bo izvajala nadzor nad koncesijo, v smislu ohranitve kvalitetne storitve za občane, ohranjanja in povečanja vrednosti premoženja za občino, ob upravičenih cenah storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

71. Ocenite* strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki ste jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.
 (*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Višji transakcijski stroški na račun javnih razpisov za podeljevanje koncesij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji transakcijski stroški z vidika nadzora koncesionarja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja cena storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja kvaliteta storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regulativna cenovna politika	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina nad koncesionarjem nima možnosti nadzora preko ustanovitelskih in korporacijskih pravic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ureditev koncesijskega razmerja terja ureditev veliko pravnih aktov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Premajhne izkušnje občine, da bo izvajala nadzor nad koncesijo, v smislu ohranitve kvalitetne storitve za občane, ohranjanja in povečanja vrednosti premoženja za občino, ob upravičenih cenah storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

72. Ocenite* strinjanje glede pomanjkljivosti, ki ste jih pri zagotavljanju vaše GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode zaznali zaradi preoblikovanja obstoječih javnih podjetij na osnovi ZJZP.
(*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI OSKRBI S PITNO VODO ALI PRI ODVAJANJU ODPADNE VODE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE)

	1 - Nikakor se ne strinjam	2 – Ne strinjam se	3 – Niti se ne strinjam niti se strinjam	4 – Se strinjam	5 – Popolnoma se strinjam
Višji transakcijski stroški na račun javnih razpisov za podeljevanje koncesij	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višji transakcijski stroški z vidika nadzora koncesionarja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Višja cena storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nižja kvaliteta storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regulativna cenovna politika	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Občina nad koncesionarjem nima možnosti nadzora preko ustanoviteljskih in korporacijskih pravic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ureditev koncesijskega razmerja terja ureditev veliko pravnih aktov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Premajhne izkušnje občine, da bo izvajala nadzor nad koncesijo, v smislu ohranitve kvalitetne storitve za občane, ohranjanja in povečanja vrednosti premoženja za občino, ob upravičenih cenah storitev	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

Peti, zadnji sklop pokriva oblikovanje cen gospodarskih javnih služb oskrbe s pitno vodo ter

odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode, z vidika razmerja med občino in izvajalcem gospodarske javne službe.

73. Katerega leta je občina prvič potrdila cene GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode skladno z Uredbo o metodologiji za oblikovanje cen storitev obveznih občinskih gospodarskih javnih služb varstva okolja (Ur. l. RS, št. 87/12, 109/12)? V primeru, da želite dodati komentar k odgovoru, le to navedite pod "drugo".

Oskrba s pitno vodo:

Odvajanje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode:

Čiščenje komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode:

Drugo (navedite):

74. Ali je predračunska lastna cena izvajalca/izvajalcev GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo ter odvajanja in čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za prihodnje obračunsko obdobje s strani občine vedno potrjena ob prvi predložitvi le te?

☐

Da

☐

Ne

☐

Drugo (navedite):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

75. Ali v primeru, da predračunska lastna cena izvajalca za prihodnje obračunsko obdobje s strani občine ni potrjena ob njeni prvi predložitvi, dopuščate možnost pogajanja z izvajalcem storitev?

☐

Da

☐

Ne

76. Ali imate v primeru, da GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo za vašo občino hkrati izvaja več izvajalcev, pri vseh izvajalcih oblikovano enako ceno?

☐

Da, enako ceno storitve in enako ceno omrežnine.

☐

Enako ceno omrežnine, vendar različno ceno storitve.

☐

Enako ceno storitve, vendar različno ceno omrežnine.

☐

Ne, razlikujeta se tako cena storitve kot cena omrežnine.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

77. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

78. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

79. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

80. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

81. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

82. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

83. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

84. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

85. Ali imate v primeru, da GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za vašo občino hkrati izvaja več izvajalcev, pri vseh izvajalcih oblikovano enako ceno?

- ☐ Da, enako ceno storitve in enako ceno omrežnine.
 ☐ Enako ceno omrežnine, vendar različno ceno storitve.
 ☐ Enako ceno storitve, vendar različno ceno omrežnine.
 ☐ Ne, razlikujeta se tako cena storitve kot cena omrežnine.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

86. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

87. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

88. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

89. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

90. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

91. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

92. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

93. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVRNO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

94. Ali imate v primeru, da GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode za vašo občino hkrati izvaja več izvajalcev, pri vseh izvajalcih oblikovano enako ceno?

- ☐ Da, enako ceno storitve in enako ceno omrežnine.
 ☐ Enako ceno omrežnine, vendar različno ceno storitve.
 ☐ Enako ceno storitve, vendar različno ceno omrežnine.
 ☐ Ne, razlikujeta se tako cena storitve kot cena omrežnine.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

95. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

96. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

97. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

98. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

99. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje enakih cen omrežnine.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Enakopravnost občanov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Zadovoljstvo uporabnikov	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poenostavitev obračunavanja	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Notranje subvencioniranje (prelivanje prihodkov med dejavnostmi)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

100. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

101. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen storitve v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen storitve.

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

102. Kaj so ključni razlogi za oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine v primeru izvajanja GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode s strani več izvajalcev? Ocenite* vpliv posameznih dejavnikov na oblikovanje različnih cen omrežnine.

*ČE SO OCENE ENAKE KOT PRI CENI STORITVE, TO NAVEDITE POD DRUGO; NI POTREBNO PONOVO IZPOLNJEVANJE

	1 – Nima nobenega vpliva	2 – Ima minimalni vpliv	3 – Ima delen vpliv	4 – Ima velik vpliv	5 – Ima popolnoma ves vpliv
Podeljena subvencija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neizkoriščene zmogljivosti	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neprimerna tehnologija	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pogajalska moč izvajalcev gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Razlike v stroških izvajanja gospodarskih javnih služb	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Drugo (navedite in podajte oceno 1 - 5):

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

5. OBLIKOVANJE CEN GJS NA PODROČJU OSKRBE S PITNO VODO TER ODVAJANJA IN ČIŠČENJA ODPADNE VODE

103. Ali izvajalcu GJS oskrbe s pitno vodo subvencionirate ceno storitve in ceno omrežnine? V primeru, da želite dodati komentar k vprašanju ali izbranemu odgovoru, le to navedite pod "drugo".

- ☐ Da, subvencioniramo tako ceno storitve kot tudi ceno omrežnine.
- ☐ Subvencioniramo ceno omrežnine, ne pa tudi cene storitve.
- ☐ Subvencioniramo ceno storitve, ne pa tudi cene omrežnine.
- ☐ Ne subvencioniramo niti cene storitve niti cene omrežnine.
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):

104. Ali izvajalcu GJS odvajanja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode subvencionirate ceno storitve in ceno omrežnine? V primeru, da želite dodati komentar k vprašanju ali izbranemu odgovoru, le to navedite pod "drugo".

- ☐ Da, subvencioniramo tako ceno storitve kot tudi ceno omrežnine.
- ☐ Subvencioniramo ceno storitve, ne pa tudi cene omrežnine.
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):
- ☐ Subvencioniramo ceno omrežnine, ne pa tudi cene storitve.
- ☐ Ne subvencioniramo niti cene storitve niti cene omrežnine.

105. Ali izvajalcu GJS čiščenja komunalne in padavinske odpadne vode subvencionirate ceno storitve in ceno omrežnine? V primeru, da želite dodati komentar k vprašanju ali izbranemu odgovoru, le to navedite pod "drugo".

- ☐ Da, subvencioniramo tako ceno storitve kot tudi ceno omrežnine.
- ☐ Subvencioniramo ceno storitve, ne pa tudi cene omrežnine.
- ☐ Drugo (navedite):
- ☐ Subvencioniramo ceno omrežnine, ne pa tudi cene storitve.
- ☐ Ne subvencioniramo niti cene storitve niti cene omrežnine.

Preoblikovanje obstoječih javnih podjetij v skladu z ZJZP (občine)

ZAHVALA ZA SODELOVANJE

Zahvaljujem se Vam za sodelovanje pri izpolnjevanju vprašalnika.

Po zaključeni analizi rezultatov Vam rezultate z ugotovitvami z veseljem posredujem. Če želite prejeti povratno informacijo glede rezultatov, Vas prosim, da spodaj navedete kontaktne podatke.

106. Kontaktni podatki občine za posredovanje rezultatov analize.

Ime in priimek:

E-naslov:

Drugo (komentar, opomba):

107. Vaše mnenje glede ustreznosti vprašalnika in uporabnosti pridobljenih rezultatov analize:

NAJLEPŠA HVALA ZA SODELOVANJE!